switchroom 0.20.9 → 0.20.11

package/dist/host-control/main.js

@@ -10994,7 +10994,7 @@ var init_observation_scopes = __esm(() => {
 });
 
 // src/config/schema.ts
-var CodeRepoEntrySchema, AgentBindMountSchema, HttpDiffPollSchema, PollSpecSchema, TelegramMessageActionSchema, WebhookActionSchema, ActionSpecSchema, ScheduleEntrySchema, AgentSoulSchema, AgentToolsSchema, ObservationScopesSchema, ObservationScopeStrategySchema, AntiConfabulationDirectiveSchema, AgentMemorySchema, HookEntrySchema, AgentHooksSchema, SubagentSchema, SessionSchema, SessionContinuitySchema, webhookDispatchRule, TelegramChannelSchema, BuzzChannelSchema, ChannelsSchema, TIMEZONE_REGEX, ApproverIdSchema, GoogleWorkspaceTierSchema, GoogleServiceTokenSchema, GoogleWorkspaceConfigSchema, LiteLLMConfigSchema, HindsightPerOpLlmSchema, HindsightConfigSchema, MicrosoftWorkspaceConfigSchema, NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema, AgentGoogleWorkspaceConfigSchema, MicrosoftAccountEmailSchema, MicrosoftToolTokenSchema, MicrosoftAccountBindingSchema, AgentMicrosoftWorkspaceConfigSchema, AgentNotionWorkspaceConfigSchema, ReactionsSchema, ReactionDispatchSchema, releaseBlockFields, ReleaseBlock, RootReleaseBlock, NetworkIsolationSchema, servesField, knowsField, profileFields, ProfileSchema, _omitExtends, defaultsFields, AgentDefaultsSchema, AgentSchema, TelegramConfigSchema, MemoryBackendConfigSchema, VaultConfigSchema, QuotaConfigSchema, AutoReleaseCheckSchema, HostControlConfigSchema, WebServiceConfigSchema, FleetHealthConfigSchema, HostdConfigSchema, CronEgressSchema, CronConfigSchema, UserSchema, SwitchroomConfigSchema;
+var CodeRepoEntrySchema, AgentBindMountSchema, HttpDiffPollSchema, PollSpecSchema, TelegramMessageActionSchema, WebhookActionSchema, ActionSpecSchema, ScheduleEntrySchema, AgentSoulSchema, AgentToolsSchema, ObservationScopesSchema, ObservationScopeStrategySchema, AntiConfabulationDirectiveSchema, AgentMemorySchema, HookEntrySchema, AgentHooksSchema, SubagentSchema, SessionSchema, SessionContinuitySchema, webhookDispatchRule, TelegramChannelSchema, BuzzChannelSchema, ChannelsSchema, TIMEZONE_REGEX, ApproverIdSchema, GoogleWorkspaceTierSchema, GoogleServiceTokenSchema, GoogleWorkspaceConfigSchema, LiteLLMConfigSchema, HindsightPerOpLlmSchema, HindsightConfigSchema, MicrosoftWorkspaceConfigSchema, NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema, AgentGoogleWorkspaceConfigSchema, MicrosoftAccountEmailSchema, MicrosoftToolTokenSchema, MicrosoftAccountBindingSchema, AgentMicrosoftWorkspaceConfigSchema, AgentNotionWorkspaceConfigSchema, ReactionsSchema, ReactionDispatchSchema, releaseBlockFields, ReleaseBlock, RootReleaseBlock, NetworkIsolationSchema, servesField, knowsField, profileFields, ProfileSchema, _omitExtends, defaultsFields, AgentDefaultsSchema, AgentSchema, TelegramConfigSchema, MemoryBackendConfigSchema, VaultConfigSchema, QuotaConfigSchema, AutoReleaseCheckSchema, HostControlConfigSchema, WebServiceConfigSchema, FleetHealthConfigSchema, HostdConfigSchema, CronEgressSchema, CronConfigSchema, UserSchema, ConfigRepoConfigSchema, SwitchroomConfigSchema;
 var init_schema = __esm(() => {
   init_zod();
   init_observation_scopes();
@@ -11691,8 +11691,10 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     bot_username: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Per-agent Telegram bot username (without leading @) when it doesn't " + "contain the agent slug. Replaces the default 'username includes slug' " + "preflight check with an exact (case-insensitive) match. Use when an " + "agent and its bot have intentionally divergent names (e.g. agent " + "'lawgpt' paired with bot '@meken_law_bot')."),
     timezone: exports_external.string().regex(TIMEZONE_REGEX, "timezone must be an IANA zone name like 'Australia/Melbourne' or 'UTC' " + "(three-letter aliases like EST/PST and bare offsets like UTC+10 are not accepted)").optional().describe("Per-agent IANA timezone override. Wins over any profile/defaults " + "value and over the top-level switchroom.timezone global. Controls " + "the UserPromptSubmit timezone hook's emitted local time and the " + "agent container's `environment.TZ` in compose."),
     auth: exports_external.object({
-      override: exports_external.string().min(1).optional().describe("Per-agent override of the fleet-wide `auth.active`. Edge-case use only — " + "this agent talks to the named account regardless of fleet active. See RFC H §4.5.")
-    }).optional().describe("Account routing for switchroom-auth-broker. RFC H schema uses " + "fleet-wide `auth.active` plus per-agent `override:` for edge cases. " + "Pre-RFC-H `auth.accounts: [..]` and `auth_label:` are migrated in-place " + "on first apply (see src/auth/migrate-schema.ts)."),
+      override: exports_external.string().min(1).optional().describe("Per-agent override of the fleet-wide `auth.active`. Edge-case use only — " + "this agent talks to the named account regardless of fleet active. See RFC H §4.5."),
+      strict: exports_external.boolean().optional().describe("Requires `override`. When true, the pin is a hard binding, not a " + "routing preference: the broker NEVER serves this agent from any " + "other account — no failover to `auth.fallback_order` while the " + "pinned account is quota-walled or exhausted. The agent rides out " + "the wall on its own account (surfacing the normal 429/quota " + "cards) instead of silently borrowing fleet quota. Use for " + "accounts that must never cross a billing/compliance boundary " + "(e.g. an employer-provided subscription)."),
+      exclusive: exports_external.boolean().optional().describe("Requires `override`. When true, the pinned account belongs to " + "THIS agent alone: the broker refuses to serve it to any other " + "agent or consumer, refuses `auth use <label>` (set-active) onto " + "it, and refuses pinning another agent to it. Config that routes " + "others to the account (`auth.active`, `auth.fallback_order`, " + "another agent's `override`, a consumer pin) is rejected at load. " + "Usually paired with `strict: true` for full two-way isolation.")
+    }).optional().describe("Account routing for switchroom-auth-broker. RFC H schema uses " + "fleet-wide `auth.active` plus per-agent `override:` for edge cases, " + "with optional `strict:` (never borrow another account) and " + "`exclusive:` (no one else may use the pinned account) hardening. " + "Pre-RFC-H `auth.accounts: [..]` and `auth_label:` are migrated in-place " + "on first apply (see src/auth/migrate-schema.ts)."),
     dm_only: exports_external.boolean().optional().describe("Mark this agent as a DM-only bot — has its own bot_token and lives " + "exclusively in a private chat with the operator. Suppresses " + "scaffolding's default behavior of inheriting the global " + "telegram.forum_chat_id into the agent's access.json `groups` entry " + "(the forum chat the bot isn't a member of, which would otherwise " + "trigger a 'boot-probe-failed: 400 chat not found' warning every " + "restart). topic_name is still schema-required but unused — set it " + "to a display label like 'DM' for /switchroom status output."),
     topic_name: exports_external.string().describe("Telegram forum topic display name"),
     topic_emoji: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Emoji for the topic (e.g., '\uD83C\uDFCB️')"),
@@ -11767,6 +11769,17 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
       tmp_size: exports_external.string().regex(/^\d+(\.\d+)?[kmgKMG]?$/, "tmp_size must be a Docker size string like '1g', '4g', '512m'").refine((v) => parseFloat(v) > 0, "tmp_size must be greater than zero").optional()
     }).optional()
   }).superRefine((agent, ctx) => {
+    if (agent.auth && !agent.auth.override) {
+      for (const flag of ["strict", "exclusive"]) {
+        if (agent.auth[flag]) {
+          ctx.addIssue({
+            code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+            message: `\`auth.${flag}: true\` requires \`auth.override: <account>\` — there is no pinned account for it to apply to.`,
+            path: ["auth", flag]
+          });
+        }
+      }
+    }
     if (agent.dm_only !== true)
       return;
     const tg = agent.channels?.telegram;
@@ -11879,6 +11892,13 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     profile_bank: exports_external.string().describe("Hindsight bank holding this user's memory profile (author via " + "`switchroom memory profile add <bank> ...`)."),
     person_id: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Free-text display name projected into the inbound `<channel>` " + 'tag\'s `user` attribute (e.g. "Lisa") so an agent can greet by ' + "name instead of only seeing the raw Telegram id/username. NOT a " + "stable identity system — just a label. Resolution is boot-time-only " + "(no hot-reload; a config change needs an agent restart) and " + "chat-scoped (a resolved name is only shown in a chat/group the " + "person is actually a member of, per that chat's access.json " + "membership — never broadcast into every chat the agent operates " + "in). Keep this broadly safe to show, the same discipline as " + "picking a `profile_bank` name: there is no automated enforcement " + "that a `person_id` stays safe if a group's membership changes " + "later — see docs/configuration.md.")
   });
+  ConfigRepoConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
+    enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Master switch for config-repo change control. Default false (opt-in). " + "When false the `config-repo sync` verb still runs on demand but the " + "doctor check and (later) the scheduled tick treat the feature as off."),
+    path: exports_external.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9~._\-/]+$/, "config_repo.path must not contain shell-special characters ($, `, \", ', \\, etc.)").default("~/.switchroom-config").describe("Filesystem path to the operator's private config repo. Must be a git " + "repo (else `switchroom doctor` FAILs). Tilde-expanded at read time."),
+    push: exports_external.boolean().default(true).describe("When true, `config-repo sync` pushes after committing (subject to the " + "`require_private` gate). When false, it commits locally only — useful " + "for offline hosts or a review-before-push workflow."),
+    remote: exports_external.string().min(1).default("origin").describe("Git remote name to push to. Default `origin`."),
+    require_private: exports_external.boolean().default(true).describe("Refuse to PUSH unless the GitHub API confirms the remote repo is " + "private. On a public remote — or when the API is unreachable — the " + "push is skipped (commits still land locally) and a WARN is emitted. " + "Fail-safe against exfiltrating memory files / workspace state to a " + "repo that has been flipped public. Default true.")
+  });
   SwitchroomConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
     switchroom: exports_external.object({
       version: exports_external.literal(1).describe("Config schema version"),
@@ -11891,6 +11911,7 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     memory: MemoryBackendConfigSchema.optional(),
     hindsight: HindsightConfigSchema.optional().describe("Fleet-singleton Hindsight (memory backend) configuration. Currently " + "just the LLM knob (provider + model) used for retain/reflect/" + "consolidation. Both fields optional; when unset the container falls " + "back to provider=claude-code + the hard-coded HINDSIGHT_DEFAULT_MODEL " + "so nothing changes for operators who don't set it. Read at container " + "launch by startHindsight() (src/setup/hindsight.ts) — takes effect on " + "the next `switchroom apply` / `memory setup --recreate`."),
     vault: VaultConfigSchema.optional(),
+    config_repo: ConfigRepoConfigSchema.optional().describe("Change control for the operator's private ~/.switchroom-config git repo " + "(backup + audit trail of live host config, agent workspace state, and " + "mirrored personal skills). Consumed by `switchroom config-repo sync` and " + "the `config repo` doctor check. Optional and OFF by default."),
     auth: exports_external.object({
       active: exports_external.string().min(1).optional().describe("Fleet-wide active Anthropic account label. Every agent without " + "an explicit `agent.auth.override` uses this account. See " + "docs/auth.md for the full model. Set by `switchroom auth use <label>`."),
       fallback_order: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().min(1)).optional().describe("Ordered list of account labels for `switchroom auth rotate` to cycle " + "through when the active account hits a quota event. First entry is " + "normally the same as `auth.active`. When unset, `rotate` is a no-op."),
@@ -11958,6 +11979,48 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     for (const [name, a] of Object.entries(cfg.agents ?? {})) {
       checkServes(a.serves, ["agents", name, "serves"]);
     }
+    for (const [name, a] of Object.entries(cfg.agents ?? {})) {
+      const agentAuth = a.auth;
+      if (!agentAuth?.exclusive || !agentAuth.override)
+        continue;
+      const acct = agentAuth.override;
+      if (cfg.auth?.active === acct) {
+        ctx.addIssue({
+          code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+          message: `account '${acct}' is exclusive to agent '${name}' ` + `(agents.${name}.auth.exclusive) — it cannot be the fleet \`auth.active\``,
+          path: ["auth", "active"]
+        });
+      }
+      const fbIdx = (cfg.auth?.fallback_order ?? []).indexOf(acct);
+      if (fbIdx !== -1) {
+        ctx.addIssue({
+          code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+          message: `account '${acct}' is exclusive to agent '${name}' ` + `(agents.${name}.auth.exclusive) — it cannot appear in \`auth.fallback_order\``,
+          path: ["auth", "fallback_order", fbIdx]
+        });
+      }
+      for (const [other, oa] of Object.entries(cfg.agents ?? {})) {
+        if (other === name)
+          continue;
+        const otherOverride = oa.auth?.override;
+        if (otherOverride === acct) {
+          ctx.addIssue({
+            code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+            message: `account '${acct}' is exclusive to agent '${name}' ` + `(agents.${name}.auth.exclusive) — agent '${other}' cannot pin it`,
+            path: ["agents", other, "auth", "override"]
+          });
+        }
+      }
+      (cfg.auth?.consumers ?? []).forEach((c, i) => {
+        if (c.account === acct) {
+          ctx.addIssue({
+            code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+            message: `account '${acct}' is exclusive to agent '${name}' ` + `(agents.${name}.auth.exclusive) — consumer '${c.name}' cannot pin it`,
+            path: ["auth", "consumers", i, "account"]
+          });
+        }
+      });
+    }
     const microsoftAccounts = cfg.microsoft_accounts;
     for (const [name, a] of Object.entries(cfg.agents ?? {})) {
       const mw = a.microsoft_workspace;
@@ -21493,7 +21556,7 @@ function allocateAgentUid(name) {
 }
 
 // src/build-info.ts
-var VERSION = "0.20.9";
+var VERSION = "0.20.11";
 
 // src/setup/hindsight-recall-tunables.ts
 var RECALL_DEADLINE_HEADROOM_SECONDS = 2;

package/dist/vault/approvals/kernel-server.js

@@ -4434,7 +4434,7 @@ var init_observation_scopes = __esm(() => {
 });
 
 // src/config/schema.ts
-var CodeRepoEntrySchema, AgentBindMountSchema, HttpDiffPollSchema, PollSpecSchema, TelegramMessageActionSchema, WebhookActionSchema, ActionSpecSchema, ScheduleEntrySchema, AgentSoulSchema, AgentToolsSchema, ObservationScopesSchema, ObservationScopeStrategySchema, AntiConfabulationDirectiveSchema, AgentMemorySchema, HookEntrySchema, AgentHooksSchema, SubagentSchema, SessionSchema, SessionContinuitySchema, webhookDispatchRule, TelegramChannelSchema, BuzzChannelSchema, ChannelsSchema, TIMEZONE_REGEX, ApproverIdSchema, GoogleWorkspaceTierSchema, GoogleServiceTokenSchema, GoogleWorkspaceConfigSchema, LiteLLMConfigSchema, HindsightPerOpLlmSchema, HindsightConfigSchema, MicrosoftWorkspaceConfigSchema, NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema, AgentGoogleWorkspaceConfigSchema, MicrosoftAccountEmailSchema, MicrosoftToolTokenSchema, MicrosoftAccountBindingSchema, AgentMicrosoftWorkspaceConfigSchema, AgentNotionWorkspaceConfigSchema, ReactionsSchema, ReactionDispatchSchema, releaseBlockFields, ReleaseBlock, RootReleaseBlock, NetworkIsolationSchema, servesField, knowsField, profileFields, ProfileSchema, _omitExtends, defaultsFields, AgentDefaultsSchema, AgentSchema, TelegramConfigSchema, MemoryBackendConfigSchema, VaultConfigSchema, QuotaConfigSchema, AutoReleaseCheckSchema, HostControlConfigSchema, WebServiceConfigSchema, FleetHealthConfigSchema, HostdConfigSchema, CronEgressSchema, CronConfigSchema, UserSchema, SwitchroomConfigSchema;
+var CodeRepoEntrySchema, AgentBindMountSchema, HttpDiffPollSchema, PollSpecSchema, TelegramMessageActionSchema, WebhookActionSchema, ActionSpecSchema, ScheduleEntrySchema, AgentSoulSchema, AgentToolsSchema, ObservationScopesSchema, ObservationScopeStrategySchema, AntiConfabulationDirectiveSchema, AgentMemorySchema, HookEntrySchema, AgentHooksSchema, SubagentSchema, SessionSchema, SessionContinuitySchema, webhookDispatchRule, TelegramChannelSchema, BuzzChannelSchema, ChannelsSchema, TIMEZONE_REGEX, ApproverIdSchema, GoogleWorkspaceTierSchema, GoogleServiceTokenSchema, GoogleWorkspaceConfigSchema, LiteLLMConfigSchema, HindsightPerOpLlmSchema, HindsightConfigSchema, MicrosoftWorkspaceConfigSchema, NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema, AgentGoogleWorkspaceConfigSchema, MicrosoftAccountEmailSchema, MicrosoftToolTokenSchema, MicrosoftAccountBindingSchema, AgentMicrosoftWorkspaceConfigSchema, AgentNotionWorkspaceConfigSchema, ReactionsSchema, ReactionDispatchSchema, releaseBlockFields, ReleaseBlock, RootReleaseBlock, NetworkIsolationSchema, servesField, knowsField, profileFields, ProfileSchema, _omitExtends, defaultsFields, AgentDefaultsSchema, AgentSchema, TelegramConfigSchema, MemoryBackendConfigSchema, VaultConfigSchema, QuotaConfigSchema, AutoReleaseCheckSchema, HostControlConfigSchema, WebServiceConfigSchema, FleetHealthConfigSchema, HostdConfigSchema, CronEgressSchema, CronConfigSchema, UserSchema, ConfigRepoConfigSchema, SwitchroomConfigSchema;
 var init_schema = __esm(() => {
   init_zod();
   init_observation_scopes();
@@ -5131,8 +5131,10 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     bot_username: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Per-agent Telegram bot username (without leading @) when it doesn't " + "contain the agent slug. Replaces the default 'username includes slug' " + "preflight check with an exact (case-insensitive) match. Use when an " + "agent and its bot have intentionally divergent names (e.g. agent " + "'lawgpt' paired with bot '@meken_law_bot')."),
     timezone: exports_external.string().regex(TIMEZONE_REGEX, "timezone must be an IANA zone name like 'Australia/Melbourne' or 'UTC' " + "(three-letter aliases like EST/PST and bare offsets like UTC+10 are not accepted)").optional().describe("Per-agent IANA timezone override. Wins over any profile/defaults " + "value and over the top-level switchroom.timezone global. Controls " + "the UserPromptSubmit timezone hook's emitted local time and the " + "agent container's `environment.TZ` in compose."),
     auth: exports_external.object({
-      override: exports_external.string().min(1).optional().describe("Per-agent override of the fleet-wide `auth.active`. Edge-case use only — " + "this agent talks to the named account regardless of fleet active. See RFC H §4.5.")
-    }).optional().describe("Account routing for switchroom-auth-broker. RFC H schema uses " + "fleet-wide `auth.active` plus per-agent `override:` for edge cases. " + "Pre-RFC-H `auth.accounts: [..]` and `auth_label:` are migrated in-place " + "on first apply (see src/auth/migrate-schema.ts)."),
+      override: exports_external.string().min(1).optional().describe("Per-agent override of the fleet-wide `auth.active`. Edge-case use only — " + "this agent talks to the named account regardless of fleet active. See RFC H §4.5."),
+      strict: exports_external.boolean().optional().describe("Requires `override`. When true, the pin is a hard binding, not a " + "routing preference: the broker NEVER serves this agent from any " + "other account — no failover to `auth.fallback_order` while the " + "pinned account is quota-walled or exhausted. The agent rides out " + "the wall on its own account (surfacing the normal 429/quota " + "cards) instead of silently borrowing fleet quota. Use for " + "accounts that must never cross a billing/compliance boundary " + "(e.g. an employer-provided subscription)."),
+      exclusive: exports_external.boolean().optional().describe("Requires `override`. When true, the pinned account belongs to " + "THIS agent alone: the broker refuses to serve it to any other " + "agent or consumer, refuses `auth use <label>` (set-active) onto " + "it, and refuses pinning another agent to it. Config that routes " + "others to the account (`auth.active`, `auth.fallback_order`, " + "another agent's `override`, a consumer pin) is rejected at load. " + "Usually paired with `strict: true` for full two-way isolation.")
+    }).optional().describe("Account routing for switchroom-auth-broker. RFC H schema uses " + "fleet-wide `auth.active` plus per-agent `override:` for edge cases, " + "with optional `strict:` (never borrow another account) and " + "`exclusive:` (no one else may use the pinned account) hardening. " + "Pre-RFC-H `auth.accounts: [..]` and `auth_label:` are migrated in-place " + "on first apply (see src/auth/migrate-schema.ts)."),
     dm_only: exports_external.boolean().optional().describe("Mark this agent as a DM-only bot — has its own bot_token and lives " + "exclusively in a private chat with the operator. Suppresses " + "scaffolding's default behavior of inheriting the global " + "telegram.forum_chat_id into the agent's access.json `groups` entry " + "(the forum chat the bot isn't a member of, which would otherwise " + "trigger a 'boot-probe-failed: 400 chat not found' warning every " + "restart). topic_name is still schema-required but unused — set it " + "to a display label like 'DM' for /switchroom status output."),
     topic_name: exports_external.string().describe("Telegram forum topic display name"),
     topic_emoji: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Emoji for the topic (e.g., '\uD83C\uDFCB️')"),
@@ -5207,6 +5209,17 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
       tmp_size: exports_external.string().regex(/^\d+(\.\d+)?[kmgKMG]?$/, "tmp_size must be a Docker size string like '1g', '4g', '512m'").refine((v) => parseFloat(v) > 0, "tmp_size must be greater than zero").optional()
     }).optional()
   }).superRefine((agent, ctx) => {
+    if (agent.auth && !agent.auth.override) {
+      for (const flag of ["strict", "exclusive"]) {
+        if (agent.auth[flag]) {
+          ctx.addIssue({
+            code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+            message: `\`auth.${flag}: true\` requires \`auth.override: <account>\` — there is no pinned account for it to apply to.`,
+            path: ["auth", flag]
+          });
+        }
+      }
+    }
     if (agent.dm_only !== true)
       return;
     const tg = agent.channels?.telegram;
@@ -5319,6 +5332,13 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     profile_bank: exports_external.string().describe("Hindsight bank holding this user's memory profile (author via " + "`switchroom memory profile add <bank> ...`)."),
     person_id: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Free-text display name projected into the inbound `<channel>` " + 'tag\'s `user` attribute (e.g. "Lisa") so an agent can greet by ' + "name instead of only seeing the raw Telegram id/username. NOT a " + "stable identity system — just a label. Resolution is boot-time-only " + "(no hot-reload; a config change needs an agent restart) and " + "chat-scoped (a resolved name is only shown in a chat/group the " + "person is actually a member of, per that chat's access.json " + "membership — never broadcast into every chat the agent operates " + "in). Keep this broadly safe to show, the same discipline as " + "picking a `profile_bank` name: there is no automated enforcement " + "that a `person_id` stays safe if a group's membership changes " + "later — see docs/configuration.md.")
   });
+  ConfigRepoConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
+    enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Master switch for config-repo change control. Default false (opt-in). " + "When false the `config-repo sync` verb still runs on demand but the " + "doctor check and (later) the scheduled tick treat the feature as off."),
+    path: exports_external.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9~._\-/]+$/, "config_repo.path must not contain shell-special characters ($, `, \", ', \\, etc.)").default("~/.switchroom-config").describe("Filesystem path to the operator's private config repo. Must be a git " + "repo (else `switchroom doctor` FAILs). Tilde-expanded at read time."),
+    push: exports_external.boolean().default(true).describe("When true, `config-repo sync` pushes after committing (subject to the " + "`require_private` gate). When false, it commits locally only — useful " + "for offline hosts or a review-before-push workflow."),
+    remote: exports_external.string().min(1).default("origin").describe("Git remote name to push to. Default `origin`."),
+    require_private: exports_external.boolean().default(true).describe("Refuse to PUSH unless the GitHub API confirms the remote repo is " + "private. On a public remote — or when the API is unreachable — the " + "push is skipped (commits still land locally) and a WARN is emitted. " + "Fail-safe against exfiltrating memory files / workspace state to a " + "repo that has been flipped public. Default true.")
+  });
   SwitchroomConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
     switchroom: exports_external.object({
       version: exports_external.literal(1).describe("Config schema version"),
@@ -5331,6 +5351,7 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     memory: MemoryBackendConfigSchema.optional(),
     hindsight: HindsightConfigSchema.optional().describe("Fleet-singleton Hindsight (memory backend) configuration. Currently " + "just the LLM knob (provider + model) used for retain/reflect/" + "consolidation. Both fields optional; when unset the container falls " + "back to provider=claude-code + the hard-coded HINDSIGHT_DEFAULT_MODEL " + "so nothing changes for operators who don't set it. Read at container " + "launch by startHindsight() (src/setup/hindsight.ts) — takes effect on " + "the next `switchroom apply` / `memory setup --recreate`."),
     vault: VaultConfigSchema.optional(),
+    config_repo: ConfigRepoConfigSchema.optional().describe("Change control for the operator's private ~/.switchroom-config git repo " + "(backup + audit trail of live host config, agent workspace state, and " + "mirrored personal skills). Consumed by `switchroom config-repo sync` and " + "the `config repo` doctor check. Optional and OFF by default."),
     auth: exports_external.object({
       active: exports_external.string().min(1).optional().describe("Fleet-wide active Anthropic account label. Every agent without " + "an explicit `agent.auth.override` uses this account. See " + "docs/auth.md for the full model. Set by `switchroom auth use <label>`."),
       fallback_order: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().min(1)).optional().describe("Ordered list of account labels for `switchroom auth rotate` to cycle " + "through when the active account hits a quota event. First entry is " + "normally the same as `auth.active`. When unset, `rotate` is a no-op."),
@@ -5398,6 +5419,48 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     for (const [name, a] of Object.entries(cfg.agents ?? {})) {
       checkServes(a.serves, ["agents", name, "serves"]);
     }
+    for (const [name, a] of Object.entries(cfg.agents ?? {})) {
+      const agentAuth = a.auth;
+      if (!agentAuth?.exclusive || !agentAuth.override)
+        continue;
+      const acct = agentAuth.override;
+      if (cfg.auth?.active === acct) {
+        ctx.addIssue({
+          code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+          message: `account '${acct}' is exclusive to agent '${name}' ` + `(agents.${name}.auth.exclusive) — it cannot be the fleet \`auth.active\``,
+          path: ["auth", "active"]
+        });
+      }
+      const fbIdx = (cfg.auth?.fallback_order ?? []).indexOf(acct);
+      if (fbIdx !== -1) {
+        ctx.addIssue({
+          code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+          message: `account '${acct}' is exclusive to agent '${name}' ` + `(agents.${name}.auth.exclusive) — it cannot appear in \`auth.fallback_order\``,
+          path: ["auth", "fallback_order", fbIdx]
+        });
+      }
+      for (const [other, oa] of Object.entries(cfg.agents ?? {})) {
+        if (other === name)
+          continue;
+        const otherOverride = oa.auth?.override;
+        if (otherOverride === acct) {
+          ctx.addIssue({
+            code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+            message: `account '${acct}' is exclusive to agent '${name}' ` + `(agents.${name}.auth.exclusive) — agent '${other}' cannot pin it`,
+            path: ["agents", other, "auth", "override"]
+          });
+        }
+      }
+      (cfg.auth?.consumers ?? []).forEach((c, i) => {
+        if (c.account === acct) {
+          ctx.addIssue({
+            code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+            message: `account '${acct}' is exclusive to agent '${name}' ` + `(agents.${name}.auth.exclusive) — consumer '${c.name}' cannot pin it`,
+            path: ["auth", "consumers", i, "account"]
+          });
+        }
+      });
+    }
     const microsoftAccounts = cfg.microsoft_accounts;
     for (const [name, a] of Object.entries(cfg.agents ?? {})) {
       const mw = a.microsoft_workspace;

package/dist/vault/broker/server.js

@@ -4030,7 +4030,7 @@ var init_observation_scopes = __esm(() => {
 });
 
 // src/config/schema.ts
-var CodeRepoEntrySchema, AgentBindMountSchema, HttpDiffPollSchema, PollSpecSchema, TelegramMessageActionSchema, WebhookActionSchema, ActionSpecSchema, ScheduleEntrySchema, AgentSoulSchema, AgentToolsSchema, ObservationScopesSchema, ObservationScopeStrategySchema, AntiConfabulationDirectiveSchema, AgentMemorySchema, HookEntrySchema, AgentHooksSchema, SubagentSchema, SessionSchema, SessionContinuitySchema, webhookDispatchRule, TelegramChannelSchema, BuzzChannelSchema, ChannelsSchema, TIMEZONE_REGEX, ApproverIdSchema, GoogleWorkspaceTierSchema, GoogleServiceTokenSchema, GoogleWorkspaceConfigSchema, LiteLLMConfigSchema, HindsightPerOpLlmSchema, HindsightConfigSchema, MicrosoftWorkspaceConfigSchema, NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema, AgentGoogleWorkspaceConfigSchema, MicrosoftAccountEmailSchema, MicrosoftToolTokenSchema, MicrosoftAccountBindingSchema, AgentMicrosoftWorkspaceConfigSchema, AgentNotionWorkspaceConfigSchema, ReactionsSchema, ReactionDispatchSchema, releaseBlockFields, ReleaseBlock, RootReleaseBlock, NetworkIsolationSchema, servesField, knowsField, profileFields, ProfileSchema, _omitExtends, defaultsFields, AgentDefaultsSchema, AgentSchema, TelegramConfigSchema, MemoryBackendConfigSchema, VaultConfigSchema, QuotaConfigSchema, AutoReleaseCheckSchema, HostControlConfigSchema, WebServiceConfigSchema, FleetHealthConfigSchema, HostdConfigSchema, CronEgressSchema, CronConfigSchema, UserSchema, SwitchroomConfigSchema;
+var CodeRepoEntrySchema, AgentBindMountSchema, HttpDiffPollSchema, PollSpecSchema, TelegramMessageActionSchema, WebhookActionSchema, ActionSpecSchema, ScheduleEntrySchema, AgentSoulSchema, AgentToolsSchema, ObservationScopesSchema, ObservationScopeStrategySchema, AntiConfabulationDirectiveSchema, AgentMemorySchema, HookEntrySchema, AgentHooksSchema, SubagentSchema, SessionSchema, SessionContinuitySchema, webhookDispatchRule, TelegramChannelSchema, BuzzChannelSchema, ChannelsSchema, TIMEZONE_REGEX, ApproverIdSchema, GoogleWorkspaceTierSchema, GoogleServiceTokenSchema, GoogleWorkspaceConfigSchema, LiteLLMConfigSchema, HindsightPerOpLlmSchema, HindsightConfigSchema, MicrosoftWorkspaceConfigSchema, NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema, AgentGoogleWorkspaceConfigSchema, MicrosoftAccountEmailSchema, MicrosoftToolTokenSchema, MicrosoftAccountBindingSchema, AgentMicrosoftWorkspaceConfigSchema, AgentNotionWorkspaceConfigSchema, ReactionsSchema, ReactionDispatchSchema, releaseBlockFields, ReleaseBlock, RootReleaseBlock, NetworkIsolationSchema, servesField, knowsField, profileFields, ProfileSchema, _omitExtends, defaultsFields, AgentDefaultsSchema, AgentSchema, TelegramConfigSchema, MemoryBackendConfigSchema, VaultConfigSchema, QuotaConfigSchema, AutoReleaseCheckSchema, HostControlConfigSchema, WebServiceConfigSchema, FleetHealthConfigSchema, HostdConfigSchema, CronEgressSchema, CronConfigSchema, UserSchema, ConfigRepoConfigSchema, SwitchroomConfigSchema;
 var init_schema = __esm(() => {
   init_zod();
   init_observation_scopes();
@@ -4727,8 +4727,10 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     bot_username: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Per-agent Telegram bot username (without leading @) when it doesn't " + "contain the agent slug. Replaces the default 'username includes slug' " + "preflight check with an exact (case-insensitive) match. Use when an " + "agent and its bot have intentionally divergent names (e.g. agent " + "'lawgpt' paired with bot '@meken_law_bot')."),
     timezone: exports_external.string().regex(TIMEZONE_REGEX, "timezone must be an IANA zone name like 'Australia/Melbourne' or 'UTC' " + "(three-letter aliases like EST/PST and bare offsets like UTC+10 are not accepted)").optional().describe("Per-agent IANA timezone override. Wins over any profile/defaults " + "value and over the top-level switchroom.timezone global. Controls " + "the UserPromptSubmit timezone hook's emitted local time and the " + "agent container's `environment.TZ` in compose."),
     auth: exports_external.object({
-      override: exports_external.string().min(1).optional().describe("Per-agent override of the fleet-wide `auth.active`. Edge-case use only — " + "this agent talks to the named account regardless of fleet active. See RFC H §4.5.")
-    }).optional().describe("Account routing for switchroom-auth-broker. RFC H schema uses " + "fleet-wide `auth.active` plus per-agent `override:` for edge cases. " + "Pre-RFC-H `auth.accounts: [..]` and `auth_label:` are migrated in-place " + "on first apply (see src/auth/migrate-schema.ts)."),
+      override: exports_external.string().min(1).optional().describe("Per-agent override of the fleet-wide `auth.active`. Edge-case use only — " + "this agent talks to the named account regardless of fleet active. See RFC H §4.5."),
+      strict: exports_external.boolean().optional().describe("Requires `override`. When true, the pin is a hard binding, not a " + "routing preference: the broker NEVER serves this agent from any " + "other account — no failover to `auth.fallback_order` while the " + "pinned account is quota-walled or exhausted. The agent rides out " + "the wall on its own account (surfacing the normal 429/quota " + "cards) instead of silently borrowing fleet quota. Use for " + "accounts that must never cross a billing/compliance boundary " + "(e.g. an employer-provided subscription)."),
+      exclusive: exports_external.boolean().optional().describe("Requires `override`. When true, the pinned account belongs to " + "THIS agent alone: the broker refuses to serve it to any other " + "agent or consumer, refuses `auth use <label>` (set-active) onto " + "it, and refuses pinning another agent to it. Config that routes " + "others to the account (`auth.active`, `auth.fallback_order`, " + "another agent's `override`, a consumer pin) is rejected at load. " + "Usually paired with `strict: true` for full two-way isolation.")
+    }).optional().describe("Account routing for switchroom-auth-broker. RFC H schema uses " + "fleet-wide `auth.active` plus per-agent `override:` for edge cases, " + "with optional `strict:` (never borrow another account) and " + "`exclusive:` (no one else may use the pinned account) hardening. " + "Pre-RFC-H `auth.accounts: [..]` and `auth_label:` are migrated in-place " + "on first apply (see src/auth/migrate-schema.ts)."),
     dm_only: exports_external.boolean().optional().describe("Mark this agent as a DM-only bot — has its own bot_token and lives " + "exclusively in a private chat with the operator. Suppresses " + "scaffolding's default behavior of inheriting the global " + "telegram.forum_chat_id into the agent's access.json `groups` entry " + "(the forum chat the bot isn't a member of, which would otherwise " + "trigger a 'boot-probe-failed: 400 chat not found' warning every " + "restart). topic_name is still schema-required but unused — set it " + "to a display label like 'DM' for /switchroom status output."),
     topic_name: exports_external.string().describe("Telegram forum topic display name"),
     topic_emoji: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Emoji for the topic (e.g., '\uD83C\uDFCB️')"),
@@ -4803,6 +4805,17 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
       tmp_size: exports_external.string().regex(/^\d+(\.\d+)?[kmgKMG]?$/, "tmp_size must be a Docker size string like '1g', '4g', '512m'").refine((v) => parseFloat(v) > 0, "tmp_size must be greater than zero").optional()
     }).optional()
   }).superRefine((agent, ctx) => {
+    if (agent.auth && !agent.auth.override) {
+      for (const flag of ["strict", "exclusive"]) {
+        if (agent.auth[flag]) {
+          ctx.addIssue({
+            code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+            message: `\`auth.${flag}: true\` requires \`auth.override: <account>\` — there is no pinned account for it to apply to.`,
+            path: ["auth", flag]
+          });
+        }
+      }
+    }
     if (agent.dm_only !== true)
       return;
     const tg = agent.channels?.telegram;
@@ -4915,6 +4928,13 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     profile_bank: exports_external.string().describe("Hindsight bank holding this user's memory profile (author via " + "`switchroom memory profile add <bank> ...`)."),
     person_id: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Free-text display name projected into the inbound `<channel>` " + 'tag\'s `user` attribute (e.g. "Lisa") so an agent can greet by ' + "name instead of only seeing the raw Telegram id/username. NOT a " + "stable identity system — just a label. Resolution is boot-time-only " + "(no hot-reload; a config change needs an agent restart) and " + "chat-scoped (a resolved name is only shown in a chat/group the " + "person is actually a member of, per that chat's access.json " + "membership — never broadcast into every chat the agent operates " + "in). Keep this broadly safe to show, the same discipline as " + "picking a `profile_bank` name: there is no automated enforcement " + "that a `person_id` stays safe if a group's membership changes " + "later — see docs/configuration.md.")
   });
+  ConfigRepoConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
+    enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Master switch for config-repo change control. Default false (opt-in). " + "When false the `config-repo sync` verb still runs on demand but the " + "doctor check and (later) the scheduled tick treat the feature as off."),
+    path: exports_external.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9~._\-/]+$/, "config_repo.path must not contain shell-special characters ($, `, \", ', \\, etc.)").default("~/.switchroom-config").describe("Filesystem path to the operator's private config repo. Must be a git " + "repo (else `switchroom doctor` FAILs). Tilde-expanded at read time."),
+    push: exports_external.boolean().default(true).describe("When true, `config-repo sync` pushes after committing (subject to the " + "`require_private` gate). When false, it commits locally only — useful " + "for offline hosts or a review-before-push workflow."),
+    remote: exports_external.string().min(1).default("origin").describe("Git remote name to push to. Default `origin`."),
+    require_private: exports_external.boolean().default(true).describe("Refuse to PUSH unless the GitHub API confirms the remote repo is " + "private. On a public remote — or when the API is unreachable — the " + "push is skipped (commits still land locally) and a WARN is emitted. " + "Fail-safe against exfiltrating memory files / workspace state to a " + "repo that has been flipped public. Default true.")
+  });
   SwitchroomConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
     switchroom: exports_external.object({
       version: exports_external.literal(1).describe("Config schema version"),
@@ -4927,6 +4947,7 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     memory: MemoryBackendConfigSchema.optional(),
     hindsight: HindsightConfigSchema.optional().describe("Fleet-singleton Hindsight (memory backend) configuration. Currently " + "just the LLM knob (provider + model) used for retain/reflect/" + "consolidation. Both fields optional; when unset the container falls " + "back to provider=claude-code + the hard-coded HINDSIGHT_DEFAULT_MODEL " + "so nothing changes for operators who don't set it. Read at container " + "launch by startHindsight() (src/setup/hindsight.ts) — takes effect on " + "the next `switchroom apply` / `memory setup --recreate`."),
     vault: VaultConfigSchema.optional(),
+    config_repo: ConfigRepoConfigSchema.optional().describe("Change control for the operator's private ~/.switchroom-config git repo " + "(backup + audit trail of live host config, agent workspace state, and " + "mirrored personal skills). Consumed by `switchroom config-repo sync` and " + "the `config repo` doctor check. Optional and OFF by default."),
     auth: exports_external.object({
       active: exports_external.string().min(1).optional().describe("Fleet-wide active Anthropic account label. Every agent without " + "an explicit `agent.auth.override` uses this account. See " + "docs/auth.md for the full model. Set by `switchroom auth use <label>`."),
       fallback_order: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().min(1)).optional().describe("Ordered list of account labels for `switchroom auth rotate` to cycle " + "through when the active account hits a quota event. First entry is " + "normally the same as `auth.active`. When unset, `rotate` is a no-op."),
@@ -4994,6 +5015,48 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     for (const [name, a] of Object.entries(cfg.agents ?? {})) {
       checkServes(a.serves, ["agents", name, "serves"]);
     }
+    for (const [name, a] of Object.entries(cfg.agents ?? {})) {
+      const agentAuth = a.auth;
+      if (!agentAuth?.exclusive || !agentAuth.override)
+        continue;
+      const acct = agentAuth.override;
+      if (cfg.auth?.active === acct) {
+        ctx.addIssue({
+          code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+          message: `account '${acct}' is exclusive to agent '${name}' ` + `(agents.${name}.auth.exclusive) — it cannot be the fleet \`auth.active\``,
+          path: ["auth", "active"]
+        });
+      }
+      const fbIdx = (cfg.auth?.fallback_order ?? []).indexOf(acct);
+      if (fbIdx !== -1) {
+        ctx.addIssue({
+          code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+          message: `account '${acct}' is exclusive to agent '${name}' ` + `(agents.${name}.auth.exclusive) — it cannot appear in \`auth.fallback_order\``,
+          path: ["auth", "fallback_order", fbIdx]
+        });
+      }
+      for (const [other, oa] of Object.entries(cfg.agents ?? {})) {
+        if (other === name)
+          continue;
+        const otherOverride = oa.auth?.override;
+        if (otherOverride === acct) {
+          ctx.addIssue({
+            code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+            message: `account '${acct}' is exclusive to agent '${name}' ` + `(agents.${name}.auth.exclusive) — agent '${other}' cannot pin it`,
+            path: ["agents", other, "auth", "override"]
+          });
+        }
+      }
+      (cfg.auth?.consumers ?? []).forEach((c, i) => {
+        if (c.account === acct) {
+          ctx.addIssue({
+            code: exports_external.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+            message: `account '${acct}' is exclusive to agent '${name}' ` + `(agents.${name}.auth.exclusive) — consumer '${c.name}' cannot pin it`,
+            path: ["auth", "consumers", i, "account"]
+          });
+        }
+      });
+    }
     const microsoftAccounts = cfg.microsoft_accounts;
     for (const [name, a] of Object.entries(cfg.agents ?? {})) {
       const mw = a.microsoft_workspace;

package/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "switchroom",
   "//version": "NOT the release version — source of truth is the git tag, resolved by scripts/build.mjs:resolveVersion() (see CLAUDE.md > Standard release process). This field is stale by design and only the Layer-4 dev/non-tag fallback for build.mjs + src/cli/resolve-version.ts; do NOT bump it expecting a release to pick it up. npm-pack tarball naming needs a real version — do that as an UNCOMMITTED pack-time bump (see release step 6), never a committed one.",
-  "version": "0.20.9",
+  "version": "0.20.11",
   "description": "Run Claude Code 24/7 on your Claude Pro/Max subscription over Telegram. Open-source alternative to OpenClaw and NanoClaw — no API keys.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {

package/profiles/_base/start.sh.hbs

@@ -1692,6 +1692,55 @@ if ! ls -d "$sr_cb_dir"/chromium-*/ >/dev/null 2>&1; then
 fi
 unset sr_cb_dir
 
+# Playwright browsers cache seeding. The agent image bakes the fleet-default
+# Playwright version's chromium at /opt/playwright/browsers (immutable:
+# root-owned inside a `read_only: true` root fs), but PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH
+# points at the persistent per-agent HOME cache (Dockerfile.agent ENV) so a
+# project pinning a DIFFERENT Playwright version can `playwright install` its
+# matching browser revision — revision-keyed dirs coexist side by side, and
+# the install survives container recreate via the HOME bind mount. Symlink
+# each baked revision into the cache so the fleet default (@playwright/mcp,
+# webapp-testing skill) still resolves with ZERO download; a real
+# agent-installed dir with the same name always wins over the link. Dangling
+# links into the bake (stale after an image bump changed the default
+# revision) are swept first. Dot-entries (.links) are untouched by the glob —
+# they must stay real + writable so project installs can register there.
+#
+# Zero-download depends on TWO things, not just this seeding. (1) Playwright
+# decides "already installed / skip download" purely by the INSTALLATION_COMPLETE
+# marker inside each revision dir (playwright-core browserFetcher.ts) — which
+# resolves fine through these symlinks, so the seed alone is enough at launch.
+# (2) BUT `playwright install` first GC-sweeps the browsers dir, deleting any
+# revision not referenced by a `.links/<sha1>` entry. The baked packages
+# registered their reference in /opt/.../.links at build time, not here, so a
+# skewed-version project install would otherwise GC these seed links and force a
+# re-download. Dockerfile.agent sets PLAYWRIGHT_SKIP_BROWSER_GC=1 in the runtime
+# env to disable that sweep — keep the two in lockstep. (`.links` is still
+# written by every install; we just never run the removal pass.)
+if [ -d /opt/playwright/browsers ]; then
+  sr_pw_cache="${PLAYWRIGHT_BROWSERS_PATH:-$HOME/.cache/ms-playwright}"
+  mkdir -p "$sr_pw_cache" 2>/dev/null || true
+  if [ -d "$sr_pw_cache" ] && [ -w "$sr_pw_cache" ]; then
+    for sr_pw_link in "$sr_pw_cache"/*; do
+      if [ -L "$sr_pw_link" ] && [ ! -e "$sr_pw_link" ]; then
+        case "$(readlink "$sr_pw_link")" in
+          /opt/playwright/browsers/*) rm -f "$sr_pw_link" ;;
+        esac
+      fi
+    done
+    for sr_pw_rev in /opt/playwright/browsers/*/; do
+      [ -d "$sr_pw_rev" ] || continue
+      sr_pw_name="$(basename "$sr_pw_rev")"
+      if [ ! -e "$sr_pw_cache/$sr_pw_name" ]; then
+        ln -s "${sr_pw_rev%/}" "$sr_pw_cache/$sr_pw_name" 2>/dev/null || true
+      fi
+    done
+  else
+    echo "WARNING (playwright cache): $sr_pw_cache missing or not writable — baked browsers not linked; playwright-based skills may attempt a fresh ~150MB download" >&2
+  fi
+  unset sr_pw_cache sr_pw_rev sr_pw_name sr_pw_link
+fi
+
 # LiteLLM routing (opt-in, #litellm). When SWITCHROOM_LITELLM is set (compose
 # env, gated on litellm.enabled && keyConfirmed), route the unmodified `claude`
 # CLI through the operator's LiteLLM proxy at ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: fetch the

package/profiles/_shared/agent-self-service.md.hbs

@@ -48,16 +48,12 @@ hot-reloads, no restart needed.
   crons. `context: "agent"` pins a fire here when it genuinely needs your
   accumulated context (this always wins).
 - **Model-free tiers — you must REQUEST these from the operator** (they need a
-  config commit for the egress / identity gates; you can only self-author plain
-  prompt crons plus the `model`/`context` hints):
-  - **`kind: action`** for posting a FIXED thing — zero tokens, no session at
-    all. Its `text` renders as full GFM markdown, so a literal `*` or `_`
-    becomes formatting unless you set `parse_mode: text` (the verbatim escape
-    hatch).
-  - **`kind: poll`** for "only act when X changes" — a model-free check where
-    only a *change* wakes you. Don't burn a frequent prompt cron on polling.
-  - **`reaction_dispatch`** for reaction-triggered work — an emoji reaction
-    wakes you instantly, zero polling.
+  config commit; you can only self-author plain prompt crons plus the
+  `model`/`context` hints): **`kind: action`** posts a FIXED text at zero
+  tokens (renders full GFM — set `parse_mode: text` for verbatim);
+  **`kind: poll`** is a model-free check where only a *change* wakes you —
+  don't burn a frequent prompt cron on polling; **`reaction_dispatch`** wakes
+  you instantly on an emoji reaction, zero polling.
 
 Cron-fired sessions render rich markdown, so scheduled/digest output should use
 **bold** headers and `code` for identifiers, just like a live reply.
@@ -87,11 +83,10 @@ fork is durable and auto-mirrors to `~/.switchroom-config/` when present.
 
 ### Confirm honestly
 
-After a successful `schedule_add`, tell the user the human-readable schedule
-("every Sunday at 5pm"), the cron expression you actually wrote, the `name`
-slug (so they can remove it later), and when it first fires if that isn't
-obvious. After a failed write, surface the error verbatim, name which rail
-tripped, and offer the closest legal alternative.
+After a successful `schedule_add`, tell the user the human-readable schedule,
+the cron expression you actually wrote, and the `name` slug (so they can
+remove it later). After a failed write, surface the error verbatim, name
+which rail tripped, and offer the closest legal alternative.
 {{#if linearAgentEnabled}}
 
 ## Capture to Linear (👨‍💻 / 📌 reaction → new issue)
@@ -157,10 +152,8 @@ config or paste them into a normal message; pass them straight to the tool.
 
 ### Don't lie about scheduling
 
-If the user asks for a one-shot ("at 5pm tomorrow, remind me to call
-mom"), the cron syntax doesn't natively encode one-shot — every cron
-entry recurs. Two honest options: (a) schedule it as a recurring entry
-and offer to remove it after it fires the first time, or (b) tell the
-user one-shot isn't supported and ask whether weekly / daily / every-X
-works. Don't claim "I've set a one-time reminder" and then leave a
-recurring entry running silently.
+Cron can't encode a one-shot — every entry recurs. For "at 5pm tomorrow,
+remind me": either (a) schedule it recurring and offer to remove it after
+the first fire, or (b) say one-shot isn't supported and ask what cadence
+works. Never claim "one-time reminder" while leaving a recurring entry
+running silently.

package/profiles/_shared/delegation-golden-rule.md.hbs

@@ -4,6 +4,6 @@ Execution belongs in sub-agents. **When in doubt, delegate.** A task is executio
 
 Acting in-turn and delegating are the same move: for an execution-class task the in-turn act IS dispatching the worker, so dispatch and acknowledge — that IS the fast response, not a slower one. The anti-pattern is opening the work inline "because it's almost done" and racking up tool calls in the foreground; hand off at the first tool call, not the fifth.
 
-If the user amends in-flight delegated work mid-turn, steer the running worker now (`SendMessage` by worker name, or by the agent id from its spawn result) rather than holding it for handback — and say in your reply which you did ("folded your update into the running worker" / "queued as a separate task"); never classify silently, never inferred. Unsure which it is? Queue it and say so — queue is the default. If the worker is effectively done and the steer lands too late, say so and apply the update yourself in the parent.
+If the user amends in-flight delegated work mid-turn, steer the running worker now (`SendMessage` by worker name or agent id) rather than holding it for handback — and say in your reply which you did ("folded your update into the running worker" / "queued as a separate task"); never classify silently, never inferred. Unsure? Queue it and say so — queue is the default. If the worker is effectively done and the steer lands too late, say so and apply the update yourself in the parent.
 
 If no sub-agents are configured, do the work yourself.

package/profiles/_shared/dev-protocol.md.hbs

@@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ This governs HOW delegated work is done, and is **not a license to do it inline*
 - **Design report before implementation, when the change is large.** Architecturally significant, cross-cutting, or ambiguous-approach work earns an evidence-grounded design report and a red-team pass before code, and ships as focused single-concern PRs.
 - **Run `git fetch origin` first, then branch off `origin/main`.** Never branch off the working copy as-is: you do not start in the repo you are coding in, and the checkout on disk may be many commits stale. Scoped tests + lint locally; CI is the full-suite authority.
 - **Adversarial review of the diff.** Read every change as an adversary would: what breaks, what's untested, what's inconsistent.
-- **Blockers and majors block the merge; lows don't** — file a low as a follow-up issue rather than fixing it now. Filing is mandatory. Fix what blocks, then merge on CI green. Do not count review rounds and do not run a mandatory re-review pass: verifying your own fix is part of making it, not a separate step.
+- **Blockers and majors block the merge; prefer fixing lows before merge too** — ship reliable code with a slight delay over filing tech debt that never gets addressed. Fix a low now unless it's genuinely out of scope or disproportionate to the change; only then file it as a tracked follow-up (filing is mandatory, and a filed low is a commitment to fix it, not a way to forget it). Fix what blocks, then merge on CI green. Do not count review rounds and do not run a mandatory re-review pass: verifying your own fix is part of making it, not a separate step. When that fix-vs-defer call is a genuine judgment call, don't decide it silently — surface it to the user as choice / user-impact / recommendation: name the options (fix now vs defer), their user-outcome impact, and which you recommend.
 - **Durable fixes over hack patches. Deterministic mechanisms over model-dependent behaviour** — if code can enforce a guarantee, don't leave it to prompt discipline. **Tests assert outcomes, not just code paths:** one that wouldn't fail on the bug it guards is not a test.
 - **Communicate as you go.** Consolidated messages — one substantive update beats five fragments; never go dark; no foreground watch over 30 seconds (background it); max 15 parallel sub-agents.

package/profiles/_shared/execution-discipline.md.hbs

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ## Grounding — check before you assert
 
-Your memory and prior context are leads, not facts. Anything you state as true — about code, a file, a system's state, a config value, a number, a status, or what you can and can't do — must come from something you actually checked this turn. When you have a way to look, look.
+Your memory and prior context are leads, not facts. Anything you state as true — code, config, a system's state, a number, a status, or what you can and can't do — must come from something you actually checked this turn.
 
-- **Read the ground truth live.** File and code contents, git status, config, versions, running services, processes, schedules, permissions — read them with a tool, don't recall them.
-- **Prefer finding over guessing.** If the fact is reachable — the codebase, a system, a doc, a tool's output, the web — go get it before answering.
-- **Don't assert a limit you haven't tested.** Before saying "no access" / "operator-only" / "not editable" / "no handle", verify it live. A fabricated boundary is as wrong as a fabricated fact, and it stops work that was actually possible.
+- **Read the ground truth live.** Files, git status, config, versions, running services, schedules, permissions — read them with a tool, don't recall them.
+- **Training memory is a lead, not a source — prefer finding over guessing.** A library's API, a version, a CLI flag, whether a repo exists — but equally a real-world fact: who a person is, what a company does, a product, a current event: validate against the real thing (the web, docs, the repo) before you assert it. Never answer "I don't recognize X" from model recall when X is one search away.
+- **Don't assert a limit you haven't tested.** Before saying "no access" / "operator-only" / "not editable", verify it live. A fabricated boundary is as wrong as a fabricated fact.
 - **A weak or empty result isn't a conclusion.** Vary the query, path, command, or source before deciding something doesn't exist.
 - **Final answers carry evidence** — tool output, a file you read, a check you ran, or a named blocker; not "it should work."
 

package/profiles/_shared/vault-protocol.md.hbs

@@ -1,12 +1,4 @@
-<!--
-  Switchroom-managed: vault protocol.
-  Rendered automatically by `switchroom apply` / `agent reconcile` from
-  profiles/_shared/vault-protocol.md.hbs. Edit there — hand-edits to
-  this section will be overwritten on next reconcile. To add agent-
-  specific guidance, edit CLAUDE.md below the "Yours (preserved across
-  apply)" marker line — that section is preserved verbatim across every
-  apply.
--->
+<!-- Switchroom-managed: rendered from profiles/_shared/vault-protocol.md.hbs — edit there; hand-edits here are overwritten on reconcile. -->
 
 ## Vault & secrets
 
@@ -65,15 +57,7 @@ there's an operator in the loop:
 
 ### When a sub-agent or tool reports a service/API/credential as "inaccessible"
 
-Treat this as the same signal as `VAULT-BROKER-DENIED` from your own tools. A sub-agent saying "Coolify API not accessible" or "cannot reach the database" almost always means no vault grant exists for that key — the sub-agent hit the broker wall and surfaced it as prose.
-
-Don't escalate to the operator to paste credentials or open a dashboard. Instead:
-
-1. Infer the likely key name (`<service>/<key>` convention — e.g. `coolify/api-token`, `github/token`, `<repo>/DATABASE_URL`).
-2. Call `vault_request_access` with that key, `scope='read'`, and a one-line reason (same flow as a direct `VAULT-BROKER-DENIED`).
-3. End your turn cleanly and resume when the grant is approved.
-
-Only escalate to the operator if the grant is explicitly denied, or if you cannot infer a plausible key name.
+That's the broker wall surfacing as prose — treat it as `VAULT-BROKER-DENIED`. Don't ask the operator to paste credentials or open a dashboard: infer the likely key name (`<service>/<key>` convention — e.g. `coolify/api-token`, `github/token`, `<repo>/DATABASE_URL`), call `vault_request_access` with it, `scope='read'`, and a one-line reason, then end your turn cleanly and resume on the grant. Escalate only if the grant is explicitly denied or you can't infer a plausible key name.
 
 ### Hint: the deny stderr tells you the exact recovery