switchroom 0.18.3 → 0.18.7

package/telegram-plugin/gateway/gateway.ts

@@ -126,6 +126,14 @@ import {
 } from './permission-timeout.js'
 import { renderVaultRequestAccessCard } from './vault-request-access-card.js'
 import { createPermissionCardStore, type PersistedPermCard } from './permission-card-store.js'
+import { createPendingCardStore, type PersistedApprovalCard } from './pending-card-store.js'
+import {
+  buildVaultAccessTimeoutInbound,
+  buildVaultSaveTimeoutInbound,
+  buildSecretRequestTimeoutInbound,
+  buildMentalModelProposeTimeoutInbound,
+} from './approval-timeout-inbound-builders.js'
+import { expirePendingCard, sweepExpiredEntries } from './pending-card-expiry.js'
 import {
   isPermissionRearmEnabled,
   permissionRearmGraceMs,
@@ -134,6 +142,11 @@ import {
   distinctRequestIds,
 } from './permission-rearm.js'
 import { createMissedApprovalsStore, type MissedApproval } from './missed-approvals-store.js'
+import {
+  createAlwaysAllowPersistQueue,
+  drainAlwaysAllowPersistQueue,
+  type AlwaysAllowDrainDeps,
+} from './always-allow-persist-queue.js'
 import {
   renderMissedApprovalsDigest,
   missedApprovalsKeyboard,
@@ -143,6 +156,8 @@ import {
 import { pickRecoveredPermissionOrigin } from './permission-card-origin.js'
 import { isTelegramReplyTool, isTelegramSurfaceTool } from '../tool-names.js'
 import { appendActivityLabel, clipNarrative, renderActivityFeedWithNested, formatStepSuffix, type SessionActivityHeader } from '../tool-activity-summary.js'
+import { formatModelLabel } from '../model-label.js'
+import { createSessionModelSource } from './session-model-source.js'
 import { runSilentTurnHeartbeatTick } from '../feed-heartbeat-climb.js'
 import { REPLY_TOOLS, isDraftOfReply } from '../narrative-dedup.js'
 import { toolLabel } from '../tool-labels.js'
@@ -185,6 +200,12 @@ import {
 import { clearStaleTelegramPollingState } from '../startup-reset.js'
 import { gatewayStartupRetry } from './startup-network-retry.js'
 import { writeQuarantineMarker } from './quarantine.js'
+import {
+  runPersonDirectoryBootCheck,
+  safeResolvePersonName,
+  type PersonDirectory,
+  type RawPersonEntry,
+} from './resolve-person.js'
 // RFC H §7.3: auth-dashboard + auth-slot-parser deleted. Three chat
 // verbs (/auth show | use | rotate) talk to switchroom-auth-broker
 // via the thin client in src/auth/broker/client.ts.
@@ -390,7 +411,7 @@ import {
   _resetHostdEnabledCache,
 } from './hostd-dispatch.js'
 import { formatUpdateStatusLine } from './update-status-line.js'
-import type { HostdRequest } from '../../src/host-control/protocol.js'
+import type { HostdRequest, HostdResponse } from '../../src/host-control/protocol.js'
 import type { AgentAudit } from '../welcome-text.js'
 import { shouldSweepChatAtBoot } from './boot-sweep-filter.js'
 import { startWebhookIngestServer } from './webhook-ingest-server.js'
@@ -524,6 +545,7 @@ import type {
   InjectInboundMessage,
   SendOutboundMessage,
   QuotaWallDetectedMessage,
+  QueryPendingPermissionMessage,
   PostSkillProposalMessage,
   PermissionEvent,
   RolloutStatusPostMessage,
@@ -555,6 +577,7 @@ import {
   clearCleanShutdownMarker,
   shouldSuppressRecoveryBanner,
   shouldSuppressBootResume,
+  parseBootResumeMode,
   resolveShutdownMarker,
   DEFAULT_MAX_AGE_MS as CLEAN_SHUTDOWN_MAX_AGE_MS,
 } from './clean-shutdown-marker.js'
@@ -671,9 +694,11 @@ import {
 import {
   buildResumeInterruptedInbound,
   buildResumeWatchdogReportInbound,
-  selectResumeBuilder,
+  buildResumeDeferredReportInbound,
+  decideBootResumeKind,
 } from './resume-inbound-builder.js'
-import { applySubagentsSchema, getSubagentByJsonlId, resolveSubagentOriginTurnKey } from '../registry/subagents-schema.js'
+import { applySubagentsSchema, getSubagentByJsonlId, resolveSubagentOriginTurnKey, listNonTerminalSubagentsForTurn } from '../registry/subagents-schema.js'
+import type { InterruptedSubagent } from './resume-inbound-builder.js'
 import { resolveWorkerFeedDispatch, type WorkerFeedDispatch } from './worker-feed-dispatch.js'
 import {
   resolveSubagentStatusSurface,
@@ -711,16 +736,137 @@ process.on('beforeExit', () => {
 // ─── Env + state dir ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 const STATE_DIR = process.env.TELEGRAM_STATE_DIR ?? join(homedir(), '.claude', 'channels', 'telegram')
 const permCardStore = createPermissionCardStore(STATE_DIR)
+// Durable store for the four AGENT-INITIATED approval-card families
+// (vault_request_access / vault_request_save / request_secret /
+// mental_model_propose). Persists card METADATA only — never any secret value
+// (see pending-card-store.ts secrets-hygiene note). Restored at boot so a
+// post-restart tap on a still-valid card works like a pre-restart tap, and
+// swept in the pendingStateReaper so an unanswered card wakes the parked agent
+// on TTL instead of leaving it parked forever.
+const pendingCardStore = createPendingCardStore(STATE_DIR)
 // #2862 — missed-approvals re-offer. Persisted list of approvals that
 // TTL-expired while the operator was away; a digest card is posted on the
 // operator's next activity. Kill switch: SWITCHROOM_MISSED_APPROVAL_REOFFER=0.
 const missedApprovalsStore = createMissedApprovalsStore(STATE_DIR)
 const MISSED_APPROVAL_REOFFER_ENABLED =
   process.env.SWITCHROOM_MISSED_APPROVAL_REOFFER !== '0'
+// #2973 pt.2 — durable retry queue for "🔁 Always allow" persists that
+// fail for a retryable reason (stale config view, rate limit, transient
+// hostd error). Drained at boot (below) and on a periodic timer so a
+// gateway restart mid-persist never loses the retry.
+const alwaysAllowPersistQueue = createAlwaysAllowPersistQueue(STATE_DIR)
+
+/** Read a hostd `error_envelope`'s structured `retry_after` fix (if
+ * present) as a millisecond delay from now. Returns undefined for any
+ * other fix kind / missing envelope / unparsable timestamp — callers
+ * fall back to plain exponential backoff in that case. */
+function extractRetryAfterMs(resp: HostdResponse): number | undefined {
+  const fix = resp.error_envelope?.fix
+  if (fix == null || fix.kind !== 'retry_after') return undefined
+  const at = Date.parse(fix.retry_at)
+  if (Number.isNaN(at)) return undefined
+  return Math.max(0, at - Date.now())
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build a FRESH dependency set for `drainAlwaysAllowPersistQueue` — a new
+ * factory call per drain pass, not a cached singleton, so every attempt
+ * re-reads config from disk (the #2973 stale-container-side-view failure
+ * class is fixed by never reusing a snapshot across retries).
+ */
+function alwaysAllowDrainDeps(): AlwaysAllowDrainDeps {
+  return {
+    readConfigText: () => {
+      const cfgPath = process.env.SWITCHROOM_CONFIG ?? SWITCHROOM_CONFIG ?? findSwitchroomConfigFile()
+      return readFileSync(cfgPath, 'utf8')
+    },
+    resolveAllowList: (_configText, agentName) => {
+      const cfg = loadSwitchroomConfig()
+      const rawAgent = cfg.agents?.[agentName]
+      if (!rawAgent) return []
+      const resolved = resolveAgentConfig(cfg.defaults, cfg.profiles, rawAgent)
+      return (resolved as { tools?: { allow?: string[] } }).tools?.allow ?? []
+    },
+    isRulePersisted,
+    synthesizeDiff: (agentName, rule, configText) =>
+      synthesizeAllowRuleDiff({ agentName, rule, configText }),
+    dispatchConfigEdit: async (entry, unifiedDiff) => {
+      const req: HostdRequest = {
+        v: 1,
+        op: 'config_propose_edit',
+        request_id: hostdRequestId('gw-always-allow-retry'),
+        args: {
+          unified_diff: unifiedDiff,
+          reason: `Operator 'always allow' retry: ${entry.agentName} can ${entry.grantPhrase}`,
+          target_path: '/state/config/switchroom.yaml',
+        },
+      }
+      const resp = await tryHostdDispatch(entry.agentName, req, 720_000)
+      if (resp === 'not-configured') {
+        return { ok: false as const, error: 'hostd not-configured (retry queue requires host_control.enabled)' }
+      }
+      if (resp.result === 'completed') return { ok: true as const }
+      return {
+        ok: false as const,
+        error: resp.error ?? `hostd ${resp.result}`,
+        retryAfterMs: extractRetryAfterMs(resp),
+      }
+    },
+    // #2973 pt.3 — loud terminal failure. A card edit doesn't ping the
+    // operator (the original permission card was already edited to the
+    // "saving durably in background…" interim state); this posts a NEW
+    // message instead, via the same operator-event broadcast every other
+    // fleet alert uses.
+    notifyTerminalFailure: (entry, reason) => {
+      emitGatewayOperatorEvent({
+        kind: 'always-allow-persist-failed',
+        agent: entry.agentName,
+        detail: `"${entry.grantPhrase}" (rule \`${entry.rule}\`) — ${reason}`,
+        suggestedActions: [],
+        firstSeenAt: new Date(),
+      })
+    },
+    log: (line) => process.stderr.write(line),
+  }
+}
+
+/** ~10 min between periodic drain passes — frequent enough that a
+ * retryable failure (rate limit, transient hostd hiccup) resolves within
+ * a reasonable window, infrequent enough to never look like polling. */
+const ALWAYS_ALLOW_DRAIN_INTERVAL_MS = 10 * 60_000
+
+/**
+ * Boot drain (picks up anything a prior gateway process queued right
+ * before a restart — success criterion: "restarting the gateway mid-
+ * persist does not lose the queued entry") + a periodic timer thereafter.
+ * Called once at gateway startup. Every pass is independently
+ * fault-tolerant — `drainAlwaysAllowPersistQueue` never throws.
+ */
+function scheduleAlwaysAllowPersistDrain(): void {
+  void drainAlwaysAllowPersistQueue(alwaysAllowPersistQueue, alwaysAllowDrainDeps()).catch((err) => {
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `telegram gateway: always-allow-persist-queue boot drain failed: ${(err as Error).message}\n`,
+    )
+  })
+  const timer = setInterval(() => {
+    void drainAlwaysAllowPersistQueue(alwaysAllowPersistQueue, alwaysAllowDrainDeps()).catch((err) => {
+      process.stderr.write(
+        `telegram gateway: always-allow-persist-queue periodic drain failed: ${(err as Error).message}\n`,
+      )
+    })
+  }, ALWAYS_ALLOW_DRAIN_INTERVAL_MS)
+  timer.unref?.()
+}
 const ACCESS_FILE = join(STATE_DIR, 'access.json')
 const APPROVED_DIR = join(STATE_DIR, 'approved')
 const ENV_FILE = join(STATE_DIR, '.env')
 const INBOX_DIR = join(STATE_DIR, 'inbox')
+// person_id name resolution (docs/configuration.md). Sibling to
+// access.json but a COMPLETELY SEPARATE, purely config-derived file —
+// scaffold regenerates it on every reconcile via writeFileSyncIfChanged,
+// the gateway never mutates it, and (unlike access.json) it is read
+// exactly ONCE at boot into PERSON_DIRECTORY below — no hot-reload.
+const PEOPLE_FILE = join(STATE_DIR, 'people.json')
 
 /**
  * Trigger a restart of the agent + gateway pair.
@@ -1224,6 +1370,33 @@ function loadAccess(): Access {
   return BOOT_ACCESS ?? readAccessFile()
 }
 
+/**
+ * Read `people.json` (the scaffold's plain projection of `users:` entries
+ * that carry a `person_id`). Fail-open: ENOENT or corrupt/malformed JSON
+ * returns an empty array rather than throwing — this feature must never
+ * block startup. Unlike `access.json` this file is never gateway-mutated,
+ * so there's no "move corrupt file aside" concern; the scaffold owns and
+ * regenerates it on every reconcile.
+ */
+function readPeopleFile(): RawPersonEntry[] {
+  try {
+    const raw = readFileSync(PEOPLE_FILE, 'utf8')
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as { entries?: unknown }
+    if (!Array.isArray(parsed.entries)) return []
+    return parsed.entries as RawPersonEntry[]
+  } catch {
+    return []
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Boot-time-only person-name directory (see resolve-person.ts module doc).
+ * Populated exactly once by the boot-validation block in the startup IIFE
+ * below, then never reassigned or re-read from disk again for the life of
+ * this process — a config change requires an agent restart.
+ */
+let PERSON_DIRECTORY: PersonDirectory = { byTelegramKey: {} }
+
 function assertAllowedChat(chat_id: string | number): void {
   const id = String(chat_id)
   const access = loadAccess()
@@ -1344,71 +1517,124 @@ try {
   const pending = findLatestTurnIfInterrupted(turnsDb)
   const selfAgent = process.env.SWITCHROOM_AGENT_NAME ?? ''
   if (pending != null && selfAgent) {
-    // Clean-shutdown gate: suppress auto-resume when the prior shutdown was
-    // operator/roll/CLI-initiated (clean). A clean-shutdown marker present and
-    // fresh means the agent was asked to stop; the "interrupted" turn was
-    // abandoned by that decision. Replaying it on every planned restart wastes
-    // subscription quota for no user benefit. Only unclean exits (crash/OOM/
-    // unexpected kill) should auto-resume.
+    // Boot-resume policy (2026-07, superseding #2585). The block only runs
+    // when `pending` exists — i.e. there IS genuinely in-flight work. The
+    // product decision is that a DELIBERATE restart must not silently drop
+    // that work: `session_continuity.boot_resume` (SWITCHROOM_BOOT_RESUME,
+    // default 'in-flight') resumes it even after a clean shutdown. #2585's
+    // quota-saving posture survives only as the opt-in 'never' mode — and
+    // even then we deliver a passive REPORT, never silence, because the user
+    // must always be told when in-flight work stopped.
     //
     // NOTE: GATEWAY_CLEAN_SHUTDOWN_MARKER_PATH is defined lower in this file
     // (module-init order); we compute the path inline here using the same
     // formula so we can read it at boot-resume time.
-    // SWITCHROOM_BOOT_RESUME_ALWAYS=1 is an escape hatch that restores
-    // unconditional resume if needed.
+    // SWITCHROOM_BOOT_RESUME_ALWAYS=1 remains a back-compat escape hatch that
+    // forces unconditional resume regardless of mode.
     const bootResumeMarkerPath =
       process.env.SWITCHROOM_GATEWAY_CLEAN_SHUTDOWN_MARKER ?? join(STATE_DIR, 'clean-shutdown.json')
     const bootResumeCleanMarker = readCleanShutdownMarker(bootResumeMarkerPath)
     const bootResumeForceAlways = process.env.SWITCHROOM_BOOT_RESUME_ALWAYS === '1'
+    const bootResumeMode = parseBootResumeMode(process.env.SWITCHROOM_BOOT_RESUME)
     const bootResumeSuppressed = shouldSuppressBootResume(bootResumeCleanMarker, Date.now(), {
       forceAlways: bootResumeForceAlways,
+      mode: bootResumeMode,
+    })
+
+    // 3h staleness failsafe (operator spec, 2026-06-03): never AUTO-resume
+    // interrupted work older than RESUME_MAX_AGE_MS — selectResumeBuilder
+    // downgrades a stale 'resume' to the passive 'report'. Env override
+    // SWITCHROOM_RESUME_MAX_AGE_MS (ms); set very high to disable.
+    const RESUME_MAX_AGE_MS = (() => {
+      const v = Number(process.env.SWITCHROOM_RESUME_MAX_AGE_MS)
+      return Number.isFinite(v) && v > 0 ? v : 10_800_000 // 3h
+    })()
+
+    // Decide the inbound kind (pure — see decideBootResumeKind). Precedence:
+    //   1. loop-guard  → 'defer-loop'       (never a second resume of a resume)
+    //   2. suppressed  → 'defer-suppressed' (boot_resume: never; notice, not silence)
+    //   3. otherwise   → selectResumeBuilder (resume | report | none)
+    const bootResumeKind = decideBootResumeKind({
+      pending,
+      suppressed: bootResumeSuppressed,
+      ageMs: Math.max(0, Date.now() - pending.started_at),
+      maxAgeMs: RESUME_MAX_AGE_MS,
     })
-    if (bootResumeSuppressed) {
+
+    // Sub-agents that were still in flight (running / stalled — non-terminal)
+    // when the turn was killed. Read HERE, at module top, BEFORE the
+    // subagent-watcher's boot scan + reaper run: the watcher never deletes
+    // these rows (it only flips running→stalled and marks files historical
+    // in-memory), and this accessor already includes 'stalled', so the data
+    // survives either ordering — but reading pre-watcher keeps it simplest.
+    // Threaded into ALL the builders below (resume, watchdog report, and the
+    // deferred report) so the session gets an explicit killed-workers block —
+    // it must not declare the task done on ghost workers, and even a
+    // suppressed/loop-guarded resume must still NAME the deaths.
+    let interruptedSubagents: InterruptedSubagent[] = []
+    try {
+      interruptedSubagents = listNonTerminalSubagentsForTurn(turnsDb, pending.turn_key).map(
+        (s) => ({ agentType: s.agent_type, description: s.description, status: s.status }),
+      )
+    } catch (err) {
       process.stderr.write(
-        `telegram gateway: boot-resume suppressed (clean shutdown` +
-        `${bootResumeCleanMarker?.reason ? ` reason=${JSON.stringify(bootResumeCleanMarker.reason)}` : ''}` +
-        `) — unclean exits still resume turnKey=${pending.turn_key}\n`,
+        `telegram gateway: boot-resume subagent lookup failed (${(err as Error).message}) — continuing without worker list\n`,
       )
-    } else {
-      // 3h staleness failsafe (operator spec, 2026-06-03): never AUTO-resume
-      // interrupted work older than RESUME_MAX_AGE_MS — selectResumeBuilder
-      // downgrades a stale 'resume' to the passive 'report' so the user is told
-      // ("I was working on X ~Nh ago") but nothing replays unprompted. Env
-      // override SWITCHROOM_RESUME_MAX_AGE_MS (ms); set very high to disable.
-      const RESUME_MAX_AGE_MS = (() => {
-        const v = Number(process.env.SWITCHROOM_RESUME_MAX_AGE_MS)
-        return Number.isFinite(v) && v > 0 ? v : 10_800_000 // 3h
-      })()
-      const kind = selectResumeBuilder(pending.ended_via, {
-        ageMs: Math.max(0, Date.now() - pending.started_at),
-        maxAgeMs: RESUME_MAX_AGE_MS,
-      })
-      if (kind === 'resume') {
-        bootResumeInbound = { agent: selfAgent, msg: buildResumeInterruptedInbound({ turn: pending }) }
-      } else if (kind === 'report') {
-        // idleMs: this boot's measured marker age if it just classified this
-        // turn; otherwise recover it from the persisted interrupt_reason (a
-        // later boot, marker already swept); else fall back to total runtime.
-        let idleMs = pending.turn_key === timeoutTurnKey && markerAgeMs != null ? markerAgeMs : null
-        if (idleMs == null && pending.interrupt_reason) {
-          try {
-            const parsed = JSON.parse(pending.interrupt_reason) as { idleMs?: unknown }
-            if (typeof parsed.idleMs === 'number' && Number.isFinite(parsed.idleMs)) idleMs = parsed.idleMs
-          } catch { /* malformed snapshot — fall through */ }
-        }
-        if (idleMs == null) idleMs = Math.max(0, Date.now() - pending.started_at)
-        bootResumeInbound = {
-          agent: selfAgent,
-          msg: buildResumeWatchdogReportInbound({ turn: pending, idleMs }),
-        }
+    }
+
+    if (bootResumeKind === 'resume') {
+      bootResumeInbound = {
+        agent: selfAgent,
+        msg: buildResumeInterruptedInbound({ turn: pending, subagents: interruptedSubagents }),
       }
-      if (bootResumeInbound != null) {
-        process.stderr.write(
-          `telegram gateway: boot-resume queued kind=${kind} turnKey=${pending.turn_key} ` +
-          `endedVia=${pending.ended_via ?? 'open'} chat=${pending.chat_id}\n`,
-        )
+    } else if (bootResumeKind === 'report') {
+      // idleMs: this boot's measured marker age if it just classified this
+      // turn; otherwise recover it from the persisted interrupt_reason (a
+      // later boot, marker already swept); else fall back to total runtime.
+      let idleMs = pending.turn_key === timeoutTurnKey && markerAgeMs != null ? markerAgeMs : null
+      if (idleMs == null && pending.interrupt_reason) {
+        try {
+          const parsed = JSON.parse(pending.interrupt_reason) as { idleMs?: unknown }
+          if (typeof parsed.idleMs === 'number' && Number.isFinite(parsed.idleMs)) idleMs = parsed.idleMs
+        } catch { /* malformed snapshot — fall through */ }
+      }
+      if (idleMs == null) idleMs = Math.max(0, Date.now() - pending.started_at)
+      bootResumeInbound = {
+        agent: selfAgent,
+        msg: buildResumeWatchdogReportInbound({ turn: pending, idleMs, subagents: interruptedSubagents }),
+      }
+    } else if (bootResumeKind === 'defer-loop' || bootResumeKind === 'defer-suppressed') {
+      // Passive deferred-report: work was in flight but we decline to
+      // auto-resume (loop-guard, or boot_resume:never). Silence is never
+      // acceptable here — tell the user what was in flight and ask.
+      bootResumeInbound = {
+        agent: selfAgent,
+        msg: buildResumeDeferredReportInbound({
+          turn: pending,
+          reason: bootResumeKind === 'defer-loop' ? 'loop-guard' : 'clean-restart-suppressed',
+          subagents: interruptedSubagents,
+        }),
       }
     }
+
+    if (bootResumeKind === 'defer-suppressed') {
+      process.stderr.write(
+        `telegram gateway: boot-resume suppressed (clean shutdown` +
+        `${bootResumeCleanMarker?.reason ? ` reason=${JSON.stringify(bootResumeCleanMarker.reason)}` : ''}` +
+        `, mode=${bootResumeMode}) — passive report delivered for turnKey=${pending.turn_key}\n`,
+      )
+    } else if (bootResumeKind === 'defer-loop') {
+      process.stderr.write(
+        `telegram gateway: boot-resume loop-guard tripped (interrupted turn was itself a resume) ` +
+        `— passive report delivered instead of re-resuming turnKey=${pending.turn_key}\n`,
+      )
+    }
+    if (bootResumeInbound != null) {
+      process.stderr.write(
+        `telegram gateway: boot-resume queued kind=${bootResumeKind} mode=${bootResumeMode} ` +
+        `turnKey=${pending.turn_key} endedVia=${pending.ended_via ?? 'open'} chat=${pending.chat_id}\n`,
+      )
+    }
   }
 
   // Diagnostic env file (one-shot, sourced by start.sh) — kept for the
@@ -1488,6 +1714,64 @@ function resolveSubagentOriginChat(
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Tracks worker-feed agents whose owner-DM fallback has already been
+ * logged, so `resolveWorkerFeedChat` emits the routing-decision line once
+ * per agent instead of every watcher tick (~1/s). Capped FIFO at 256 — a
+ * late duplicate log is harmless (one extra stderr line), and the cap keeps
+ * the set bounded across a long gateway lifetime even if origin resolution
+ * is persistently broken fleet-wide (history disabled → every nested worker
+ * hits the fallback). A gateway restart clears it.
+ */
+const WORKER_FEED_FALLBACK_LOG_CAP = 256
+const workerFeedOwnerDmFallbackLogged = new Set<string>()
+
+/**
+ * Resolve a worker-feed destination chat with a guaranteed last resort.
+ *
+ * The universal-liveness contract is "any active work has a card, at any
+ * nesting depth, with or without a parent turn open." Origin resolution
+ * (`resolveSubagentOriginChat`) only succeeds when the ancestor turn row is
+ * in `turnsDb` and history is enabled; a depth-2+ worker whose chain can't
+ * be walked (history disabled, row reaped, ancestor never stamped) would
+ * otherwise fall through `fleetChatId || allowFrom[0]` and, if those are
+ * empty too, hit the `chatId.length === 0` skip in `workerActivityFeed.update`
+ * — painting NOTHING, silently. That is the one path most likely to violate
+ * "any and all active work has a card."
+ *
+ * This never returns `''`: the precedence is origin chat → fleet chat →
+ * first allowed chat (the owner DM). The owner DM is the durable floor —
+ * "wrong chat" beats "no card." A one-line routing-decision log flags the
+ * fallback so an operator can see the misroute without it reading as an
+ * error (it isn't one — the card surfaced).
+ */
+function resolveWorkerFeedChat(
+  agentId: string,
+  fleetChatId: string,
+): { chatId: string; threadId?: number } {
+  const origin = resolveSubagentOriginChat(agentId)
+  if (origin != null && origin.chatId.length > 0) return origin
+  if (fleetChatId.length > 0) return { chatId: fleetChatId }
+  const ownerDm = loadAccess().allowFrom[0] ?? ''
+  if (origin == null && fleetChatId.length === 0 && ownerDm.length > 0) {
+    // Routing decision, not a warning: origin resolution failed and no
+    // fleet chat is configured, so the nested worker's card lands in the
+    // owner DM. Logged ONCE per agent so the misroute is auditable
+    // without spamming every tick (the watcher drives onProgress ~1/s).
+    if (!workerFeedOwnerDmFallbackLogged.has(agentId)) {
+      workerFeedOwnerDmFallbackLogged.add(agentId)
+      if (workerFeedOwnerDmFallbackLogged.size > WORKER_FEED_FALLBACK_LOG_CAP) {
+        const oldest = workerFeedOwnerDmFallbackLogged.values().next().value
+        if (oldest != null) workerFeedOwnerDmFallbackLogged.delete(oldest)
+      }
+      process.stderr.write(
+        `telegram gateway: worker-feed origin unresolved agent=${agentId} — routing card to owner DM\n`,
+      )
+    }
+  }
+  return { chatId: ownerDm, threadId: origin?.threadId }
+}
+
 // ─── Periodic history reaper (#1073) ──────────────────────────────────────
 // The init-time prune in history.ts only touched the `messages` table.
 // `subagents` and `turns` in registry.db grew unbounded — every Agent()
@@ -2176,6 +2460,110 @@ function deliverResumeSyntheticOrBuffer(agent: string, inbound: InboundMessage):
   return delivered
 }
 
+/** Outcome of routing an agent-authored button tap through the turn-safe
+ *  delivery machinery. `buffered-mid-turn` and `delivered` both mean "the tap
+ *  will be actioned" (the mid-turn case flushes on turn-complete); only
+ *  `buffered-bridge-offline` needs the user-facing "agent is restarting" notice. */
+type ButtonTapDeliveryOutcome = 'delivered' | 'buffered-mid-turn' | 'buffered-bridge-offline'
+
+/**
+ * Deliver an agent-authored inline-keyboard button tap (`agent:` callback_data)
+ * through the SAME turn-safe machinery as a normal Telegram inbound, instead of
+ * the old raw `sendToAgent` + buffer-only-on-bridge-miss.
+ *
+ * THE BUG (#271 button path, verified 2026-07): the `agent:` callback handler
+ * delivered the synthesized tap inbound with a bare `ipcServer.sendToAgent`,
+ * marked busy, and buffered ONLY when the bridge was offline. It never ran the
+ * #1556 turn gate — so a tap landing WHILE a turn is in flight fired the MCP
+ * channel notification mid-turn, typed into the CLI composer, and stranded there
+ * (the lawgpt/marko wedge). It also skipped the pre-send composer clear and the
+ * deliver-until-acked tracking, so a stranded tap was never sweep-redelivered.
+ *
+ * Fix: reuse the resume-synthetic turn gate (mid-turn → `buffer-until-idle`, the
+ * turn-complete hook + idle-drain flush it the instant claude goes idle), the
+ * pre-send composer clear, and the delivery-confirm tracking — exactly like the
+ * `handleInbound` fresh-turn path. A button tap carries no `meta.source` and a
+ * non-empty body, so `shouldTrackDelivery` enrols it; we additionally require a
+ * real `meta.message_id` so the `enqueue` ack has something to match (else the
+ * never-drop sweep would storm). The tap UX is unchanged — the ack toast, the
+ * single-use keyboard strip, and the bridge-offline spool + restart notice all
+ * stay at the call site; only delivery timing/safety changes.
+ */
+async function deliverButtonTapInbound(
+  agent: string,
+  inbound: InboundMessage,
+): Promise<ButtonTapDeliveryOutcome> {
+  // #1556 turn gate — same authoritative "is a turn in flight?" read the
+  // resume-synthetic path uses. Mid-turn → hold in the pending-inbound buffer;
+  // the turn-complete hook + idle-drain timer flush it when claude goes idle,
+  // where it lands cleanly as a fresh turn instead of stranding in the composer.
+  const { decision, reserve } = reserveInboundDelivery({
+    turnInFlight: turnInFlightForGate(),
+    isSteering: false,
+    isInterrupt: false,
+  })
+  if (decision === 'buffer-until-idle') {
+    pendingInboundBuffer.push(agent, inbound)
+    return 'buffered-mid-turn'
+  }
+  // #2917 per-chat FIFO: reserve the chat's busy key SYNCHRONOUSLY — before the
+  // composer-clear await below — so a concurrent same-chat inbound reaching the
+  // live gate observes this in-flight delivery and buffers behind it. Released
+  // in lockstep below if the send misses (bridge offline).
+  let reservedBusyKey: string | null = null
+  if (reserve && SERIALIZE_INBOUND_DELIVERY_ENABLED) {
+    reservedBusyKey = markClaudeBusyForInbound(inbound)
+  }
+  // Pre-send composer clear (the marko wedge) — wipe stale typed-ahead / ghost
+  // text so the channel notification lands at a clean line and auto-submits.
+  // Soft-fail by contract: a clear failure must NEVER block delivery.
+  if (agent) {
+    try {
+      const { clearAgentComposer } = await import('../../src/agents/tmux.js')
+      const cleared = clearAgentComposer({ agentName: agent })
+      if ('error' in cleared) {
+        process.stderr.write(
+          `telegram gateway: button-tap pre-send composer-clear soft-failed agent=${agent}: ${cleared.error} — delivering anyway\n`,
+        )
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      process.stderr.write(
+        `telegram gateway: button-tap pre-send composer-clear threw agent=${agent}: ${(err as Error).message} — delivering anyway\n`,
+      )
+    }
+  }
+  const delivered = ipcServer.sendToAgent(agent, inbound)
+  if (delivered) {
+    const busyKey = reservedBusyKey ?? markClaudeBusyForInbound(inbound)
+    // Track until claude acks via `enqueue` so the deliver-until-acked sweep
+    // re-delivers a tap stranded in the composer. Only when we have a real
+    // message_id to match the ack against — otherwise the never-drop loop storms.
+    if (
+      DELIVERY_CONFIRM_ENABLED &&
+      inbound.meta?.message_id != null &&
+      inbound.meta.message_id !== '' &&
+      shouldTrackDelivery({
+        isSteering: false,
+        isInterrupt: false,
+        hasSource: inbound.meta?.source != null,
+        effectiveText: inbound.text,
+      })
+    ) {
+      trackDelivery(deliveryQueue, busyKey, inbound, Date.now(), String(inbound.messageId))
+    }
+    return 'delivered'
+  }
+  // Bridge offline: release the synchronous reservation in lockstep (else the
+  // orphaned busy key gates every later inbound into the buffer), then spool the
+  // tap so it replays on reconnect — same behaviour as before this fix.
+  if (reservedBusyKey != null) {
+    claudeBusyKeys.delete(reservedBusyKey)
+    claudeBusyKeySince.delete(reservedBusyKey)
+  }
+  pendingInboundBuffer.push(agent, inbound)
+  return 'buffered-bridge-offline'
+}
+
 const pendingRestarts = new Map<string, number>()  // agentName -> timestamp when restart was requested
 
 // ─── Proactive context compaction (session.max_context_tokens) ──────────
@@ -2405,6 +2793,13 @@ type CurrentTurn = {
   // resume protocol uses this to decide "did the previous turn actually
   // finish a reply, or was it interrupted before commit?".
   lastAssistantDone: boolean
+  // Live model in use for THIS turn, sourced from the main transcript's
+  // `message.model` (the exact resolved model per API call) via the session-tail
+  // `model` event — never from config or launch-time state. Updated on change;
+  // undefined until the turn's first assistant line lands. Rendered onto the
+  // activity/liveness card header's metrics line (e.g. "2m · 14 tools · opus 4.8")
+  // and preferred by /status's buildAgentMetadata over the in-memory override.
+  currentModel?: string
   // Phase 1 of #332: count of tool_use events in the current turn, for
   // the tool_call_count column in the turns registry.
   toolCallCount: number
@@ -2530,6 +2925,16 @@ type CurrentTurn = {
 // is never written and this is exactly the old singleton.
 let currentTurn: CurrentTurn | null = null
 const currentTurnMap = new CurrentTurnMap<CurrentTurn>()
+// Freshness-aware /status session-model source. Two writers: the session-tail
+// `model` event (each assistant line's `message.model` — ground truth for the
+// last API call, survives between turns) and the #2982 /model override (set
+// the instant a switch is confirmed — the ONLY truthful source in the
+// idle-after-switch window, before the next assistant line lands). Every write
+// is seq-stamped and `resolve()` prefers the NEWER observation, so neither
+// source can go stale behind the other (session-model-source.ts, pinned by
+// tests/session-model-source.test.ts). buildAgentMetadata reads resolve();
+// the /model command paths write via setOverride.
+const sessionModelSource = createSessionModelSource()
 // Captures the most-recently-started turn's sessionChatId. Unlike currentTurn,
 // this is NOT cleared by the silence poke (firePoke/clearTurnStarted). It lets
 // the Bug B fallback in executeReply route to the correct chat even when the
@@ -4070,9 +4475,26 @@ async function resolveCompactCard(
       { chat_id: card.chatId, verb: `proactiveCompact.${kind}` },
     );
   } catch (err) {
+    // Best-effort status-card edit — a transport hiccup (429 / "not
+    // modified" / message gone) is not a liveness-logic error and must
+    // not log a "card edit failed" warning (the warning-as-excuse-for-a-
+    // stale-card anti-pattern). Only a genuine unexpected error warrants
+    // a line; transport classes are silent.
+    const desc = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+    const low = desc.toLowerCase();
+    if (
+      low.includes('not modified') ||
+      low.includes('not found') ||
+      low.includes("can't be edited") ||
+      low.includes('cannot be edited') ||
+      low.includes('not enough rights') ||
+      low.includes('429') ||
+      low.includes('retry after')
+    ) {
+      return;
+    }
     process.stderr.write(
-      `telegram gateway: proactive-compact ${kind} card edit failed: ` +
-        `${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}\n`,
+      `telegram gateway: proactive-compact ${kind} card edit failed: ${desc}\n`,
     );
   }
 }
@@ -5122,17 +5544,26 @@ interface PendingVaultRequestSave {
   why?: string
   /** Unix-ms timestamp; entries are reaped after VAULT_REQUEST_SAVE_TTL_MS. */
   staged_at: number
+  /** Set on entries RESTORED from disk after a gateway restart. The staged
+   *  secret `value` is held in memory only (never persisted — secrets
+   *  hygiene), so a restored entry has an empty value and cannot complete the
+   *  write. A Save tap on such a card degrades gracefully: it tells the agent
+   *  the value was lost to a restart instead of writing an empty secret. */
+  restoredWithoutValue?: boolean
 }
 const pendingVaultRequestSaves = new Map<string, PendingVaultRequestSave>()
 // Gateway-side reap window for a staged vault-save card. Tracks the operator
 // approval-card lifetime (config-driven, 60-min default) so the reap never
 // races ahead of the card the operator is still looking at.
 const VAULT_REQUEST_SAVE_TTL_MS = approvalTtlMs()
-function sweepPendingVaultRequestSaves(): void {
-  const cutoff = Date.now() - VAULT_REQUEST_SAVE_TTL_MS
-  for (const [k, v] of pendingVaultRequestSaves) {
-    if (v.staged_at < cutoff) pendingVaultRequestSaves.delete(k)
-  }
+function sweepPendingVaultRequestSaves(now = Date.now()): void {
+  sweepExpiredEntries(
+    pendingVaultRequestSaves,
+    (v, n) => v.staged_at < n - VAULT_REQUEST_SAVE_TTL_MS,
+    expireVaultSaveCard,
+    now,
+    cardExpiryLog,
+  )
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5175,11 +5606,14 @@ const pendingVaultRequestAccesses = new Map<string, PendingVaultRequestAccess>()
 // Gateway-side reap window for a staged vault-access card. Tracks the operator
 // approval-card lifetime (config-driven, 60-min default) — see approvalTtlMs.
 const VAULT_REQUEST_ACCESS_TTL_MS = approvalTtlMs()
-function sweepPendingVaultRequestAccesses(): void {
-  const cutoff = Date.now() - VAULT_REQUEST_ACCESS_TTL_MS
-  for (const [k, v] of pendingVaultRequestAccesses) {
-    if (v.staged_at < cutoff) pendingVaultRequestAccesses.delete(k)
-  }
+function sweepPendingVaultRequestAccesses(now = Date.now()): void {
+  sweepExpiredEntries(
+    pendingVaultRequestAccesses,
+    (v, n) => v.staged_at < n - VAULT_REQUEST_ACCESS_TTL_MS,
+    expireVaultAccessCard,
+    now,
+    cardExpiryLog,
+  )
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5211,23 +5645,14 @@ const MENTAL_MODEL_PROPOSE_TTL_MS = approvalTtlMs()
 // posted card's keyboard away, so a stale card left in the chat can't be tapped
 // into a "Card expired" answer — the operator sees the ⌛ expiry inline instead.
 // Best-effort: card edits are fire-and-forget (the entry is removed regardless).
-function sweepPendingMentalModelProposes(): void {
-  const cutoff = Date.now() - MENTAL_MODEL_PROPOSE_TTL_MS
-  for (const [k, v] of pendingMentalModelProposes) {
-    if (v.staged_at < cutoff) {
-      pendingMentalModelProposes.delete(k)
-      if (v.card_message_id != null) {
-        void lockedBot.api
-          .editMessageText(
-            v.chat_id,
-            v.card_message_id,
-            richMessage('⌛ _This mental-model proposal card expired. Ask the agent to re-propose if it still stands._'),
-            { reply_markup: { inline_keyboard: [] } },
-          )
-          .catch(() => {})
-      }
-    }
-  }
+function sweepPendingMentalModelProposes(now = Date.now()): void {
+  sweepExpiredEntries(
+    pendingMentalModelProposes,
+    (v, n) => v.staged_at < n - MENTAL_MODEL_PROPOSE_TTL_MS,
+    expireMentalModelProposeCard,
+    now,
+    cardExpiryLog,
+  )
 }
 
 // Sliding-window rate limit for mental-model proposals: at most
@@ -5464,6 +5889,296 @@ function isAutoFallbackCooldownActive(_agentName: string, now: number): boolean
   }
 }
 
+// ── Agent-initiated approval-card TTL expiry → wake the parked agent ────────
+//
+// The four agent-initiated approval-card families (vault_request_access /
+// vault_request_save / request_secret / mental_model_propose) each park the
+// requesting agent (it ends its turn to wait for the operator's tap). Before
+// this, an unanswered card that TTL-expired left the agent parked FOREVER: the
+// lazy sweep just deleted the in-memory entry and nothing woke the agent. Each
+// expire* helper mirrors the permission-card timeout path (#2411 / #2862) by
+// routing through the pure `expirePendingCard` core (pending-card-expiry.ts),
+// whose ordering + fault-isolation contract is behaviorally pinned by
+// pending-card-expiry.test.ts:
+//   1. drop the in-memory entry AND its durable store record FIRST (single-
+//      shot — a second tick can never double-fire the wake),
+//   2. edit the card to a ⌛ expired state + strip its keyboard (best-effort),
+//   3. record it in missedApprovalsStore BEFORE delivering, so a throwing
+//      deliver can't lose the re-offer for the operator's return,
+//   4. inject a TIMEOUT-outcome synthetic inbound (turn-gated via
+//      deliverResumeSyntheticOrBuffer, guarded — a half-dead IPC socket that
+//      throws on write is contained, never escaping the reaper's setInterval
+//      callback into an uncaughtException gateway shutdown).
+// Called from BOTH the lazy sweeps (on next stage) and the pendingStateReaper
+// (every 60s — the authoritative timer so an idle gateway still wakes agents).
+
+async function editCardExpired(chatId: string, messageId: number | undefined, body: string): Promise<void> {
+  if (messageId == null) return
+  await lockedBot.api
+    // allow-raw-bot-api: message-id-targeted edit (no thread to lose); best-effort card-expiry strip from the reaper (no grammy ctx). Dropping reply_markup strips the stale keyboard atomically with the text edit.
+    .editMessageText(chatId, messageId, richMessage(body), { reply_markup: { inline_keyboard: [] } })
+    .catch(() => {})
+}
+
+function recordMissedApproval(opts: {
+  stageId: string
+  toolName: string
+  action: string
+  chatId: string
+  threadId?: number
+  now: number
+}): void {
+  if (!MISSED_APPROVAL_REOFFER_ENABLED) return
+  missedApprovalsStore.add({
+    requestId: opts.stageId,
+    toolName: opts.toolName,
+    action: opts.action,
+    chatId: opts.chatId,
+    threadId: opts.threadId ?? null,
+    timedOutAt: opts.now,
+  })
+}
+
+const cardExpiryLog = (msg: string): void => {
+  process.stderr.write(`telegram gateway: ${msg}\n`)
+}
+
+function expireVaultAccessCard(stageId: string, v: PendingVaultRequestAccess, now: number): void {
+  const timeoutMinutes = Math.round(VAULT_REQUEST_ACCESS_TTL_MS / 60000)
+  const { delivered } = expirePendingCard({
+    remove: () => {
+      pendingVaultRequestAccesses.delete(stageId)
+      pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
+    },
+    editCard: () => void editCardExpired(
+      v.chat_id,
+      v.card_message_id,
+      `⌛ _This vault access request for \`${escapeHtmlForTg(v.key)}\` timed out before you tapped. Ask **${escapeHtmlForTg(v.agent)}** to re-request if it still stands._`,
+    ),
+    buildInbound: () => buildVaultAccessTimeoutInbound({
+      agent: v.agent,
+      chatId: v.chat_id,
+      ...(v.threadId != null ? { threadId: v.threadId } : {}),
+      stageId,
+      timeoutMinutes,
+      key: v.key,
+      scope: v.scope,
+    }),
+    deliver: (inbound) => deliverResumeSyntheticOrBuffer(v.agent, inbound),
+    recordMiss: () => recordMissedApproval({
+      stageId,
+      toolName: 'vault_request_access',
+      action: `grant ${v.agent} ${v.scope} access to \`${v.key}\``,
+      chatId: v.chat_id,
+      ...(v.threadId != null ? { threadId: v.threadId } : {}),
+      now,
+    }),
+    log: cardExpiryLog,
+  })
+  process.stderr.write(
+    `telegram gateway: vault_request_access TTL expired — wake agent=${v.agent} ` +
+    `key=${v.key} stage=${stageId} delivered=${delivered}\n`,
+  )
+}
+
+function expireVaultSaveCard(stageId: string, v: PendingVaultRequestSave, now: number): void {
+  const timeoutMinutes = Math.round(VAULT_REQUEST_SAVE_TTL_MS / 60000)
+  const { delivered } = expirePendingCard({
+    remove: () => {
+      pendingVaultRequestSaves.delete(stageId)
+      pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
+    },
+    editCard: () => void editCardExpired(
+      v.chat_id,
+      v.card_message_id,
+      `⌛ _This vault-save card for \`${escapeHtmlForTg(v.key)}\` timed out before you tapped. The secret was NOT stored. Ask **${escapeHtmlForTg(v.agent)}** to re-issue if you still want to save._`,
+    ),
+    buildInbound: () => buildVaultSaveTimeoutInbound({
+      agent: v.agent,
+      chatId: v.chat_id,
+      ...(v.threadId != null ? { threadId: v.threadId } : {}),
+      stageId,
+      timeoutMinutes,
+      key: v.key,
+    }),
+    deliver: (inbound) => deliverResumeSyntheticOrBuffer(v.agent, inbound),
+    recordMiss: () => recordMissedApproval({
+      stageId,
+      toolName: 'vault_request_save',
+      action: `save the secret \`${v.key}\` for ${v.agent}`,
+      chatId: v.chat_id,
+      ...(v.threadId != null ? { threadId: v.threadId } : {}),
+      now,
+    }),
+    log: cardExpiryLog,
+  })
+  process.stderr.write(
+    `telegram gateway: vault_request_save TTL expired — wake agent=${v.agent} ` +
+    `key=${v.key} stage=${stageId} delivered=${delivered}\n`,
+  )
+}
+
+function expireSecretRequestCard(stageId: string, v: PendingSecretRequest, now: number): void {
+  const timeoutMinutes = Math.round(PENDING_SECRET_REQUEST_TTL_MS / 60000)
+  const { delivered } = expirePendingCard({
+    remove: () => {
+      pendingSecretRequests.delete(stageId)
+      pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
+    },
+    editCard: () => void editCardExpired(
+      v.chat_id,
+      v.card_message_id,
+      `⌛ _This secret-request card for \`${escapeHtmlForTg(v.key)}\` timed out before you provided it. Ask **${escapeHtmlForTg(v.agent)}** to re-request if it still needs the value._`,
+    ),
+    buildInbound: () => buildSecretRequestTimeoutInbound({
+      agent: v.agent,
+      chatId: v.chat_id,
+      ...(v.threadId != null ? { threadId: v.threadId } : {}),
+      stageId,
+      timeoutMinutes,
+      key: v.key,
+    }),
+    deliver: (inbound) => deliverResumeSyntheticOrBuffer(v.agent, inbound),
+    recordMiss: () => recordMissedApproval({
+      stageId,
+      toolName: 'request_secret',
+      action: `provide the secret \`${v.key}\` for ${v.agent}`,
+      chatId: v.chat_id,
+      ...(v.threadId != null ? { threadId: v.threadId } : {}),
+      now,
+    }),
+    log: cardExpiryLog,
+  })
+  process.stderr.write(
+    `telegram gateway: request_secret TTL expired — wake agent=${v.agent} ` +
+    `key=${v.key} stage=${stageId} delivered=${delivered}\n`,
+  )
+}
+
+function expireMentalModelProposeCard(stageId: string, v: PendingMentalModelPropose, now: number): void {
+  const timeoutMinutes = Math.round(MENTAL_MODEL_PROPOSE_TTL_MS / 60000)
+  const { delivered } = expirePendingCard({
+    remove: () => {
+      pendingMentalModelProposes.delete(stageId)
+      pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
+    },
+    editCard: () => void editCardExpired(
+      v.chat_id,
+      v.card_message_id,
+      `⌛ _This mental-model proposal card for \`${escapeHtmlForTg(v.spec.name)}\` timed out before you tapped. Ask **${escapeHtmlForTg(v.agent)}** to re-propose if it still stands._`,
+    ),
+    buildInbound: () => buildMentalModelProposeTimeoutInbound({
+      agent: v.agent,
+      chatId: v.chat_id,
+      ...(v.threadId != null ? { threadId: v.threadId } : {}),
+      stageId,
+      timeoutMinutes,
+      name: v.spec.name,
+    }),
+    deliver: (inbound) => deliverResumeSyntheticOrBuffer(v.agent, inbound),
+    recordMiss: () => recordMissedApproval({
+      stageId,
+      toolName: 'mental_model_propose',
+      action: `declare the mental model \`${v.spec.name}\` for ${v.agent}`,
+      chatId: v.chat_id,
+      ...(v.threadId != null ? { threadId: v.threadId } : {}),
+      now,
+    }),
+    log: cardExpiryLog,
+  })
+  process.stderr.write(
+    `telegram gateway: mental_model_propose TTL expired — wake agent=${v.agent} ` +
+    `name=${v.spec.name} stage=${stageId} delivered=${delivered}\n`,
+  )
+}
+
+// Run all four agent-initiated approval-card expiry sweeps. Called from the
+// pendingStateReaper (the authoritative 60s timer). Each family sweep is
+// per-entry guarded via sweepExpiredEntries, so one throwing expiry (dead IPC
+// socket, store IO error) can't skip the remaining entries or families.
+function sweepExpiredApprovalCards(now: number): void {
+  sweepPendingVaultRequestAccesses(now)
+  sweepPendingVaultRequestSaves(now)
+  sweepPendingMentalModelProposes(now)
+  sweepSecretRequests(now)
+}
+
+// Boot restore: repopulate the four in-memory approval-card maps from the
+// durable store so a post-restart tap on a still-valid card resolves normally
+// (approve → grant + synthetic; deny → denial synthetic) instead of hitting
+// the "Card expired" tombstone. Entries already past their TTL are left for
+// the reaper's next tick, which wakes the parked agent via the timeout path.
+// vault_request_save entries restore WITHOUT their staged value (never
+// persisted) and are flagged `restoredWithoutValue` so a Save tap degrades
+// gracefully rather than writing an empty secret.
+function restorePendingApprovalCards(): number {
+  let restored = 0
+  for (const e of pendingCardStore.loadAll()) {
+    try {
+      if (e.family === 'vault_request_access') {
+        pendingVaultRequestAccesses.set(e.stageId, {
+          agent: e.agent,
+          chat_id: e.chatId,
+          ...(e.cardMessageId != null ? { card_message_id: e.cardMessageId } : {}),
+          ...(e.threadId != null ? { threadId: e.threadId } : {}),
+          key: e.key,
+          scope: e.scope,
+          ...(e.reason != null ? { reason: e.reason } : {}),
+          ttl_seconds: e.ttlSeconds,
+          staged_at: e.stagedAt,
+        })
+        restored++
+      } else if (e.family === 'vault_request_save') {
+        pendingVaultRequestSaves.set(e.stageId, {
+          agent: e.agent,
+          chat_id: e.chatId,
+          ...(e.cardMessageId != null ? { card_message_id: e.cardMessageId } : {}),
+          ...(e.threadId != null ? { threadId: e.threadId } : {}),
+          key: e.key,
+          kind: e.kind,
+          value: '', // never persisted — secrets hygiene
+          ...(e.why != null ? { why: e.why } : {}),
+          staged_at: e.stagedAt,
+          restoredWithoutValue: true,
+        })
+        restored++
+      } else if (e.family === 'request_secret') {
+        pendingSecretRequests.set(e.stageId, {
+          agent: e.agent,
+          chat_id: e.chatId,
+          ...(e.cardMessageId != null ? { card_message_id: e.cardMessageId } : {}),
+          ...(e.threadId != null ? { threadId: e.threadId } : {}),
+          key: e.key,
+          ...(e.reason != null ? { reason: e.reason } : {}),
+          staged_at: e.stagedAt,
+        })
+        restored++
+      } else if (e.family === 'mental_model_propose') {
+        pendingMentalModelProposes.set(e.stageId, {
+          agent: e.agent,
+          chat_id: e.chatId,
+          ...(e.cardMessageId != null ? { card_message_id: e.cardMessageId } : {}),
+          ...(e.threadId != null ? { threadId: e.threadId } : {}),
+          spec: e.spec,
+          ...(e.reason != null ? { reason: e.reason } : {}),
+          staged_at: e.stagedAt,
+        })
+        restored++
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      process.stderr.write(
+        `telegram gateway: pending-card restore skipped a malformed entry: ${(err as Error).message}\n`,
+      )
+    }
+  }
+  if (restored > 0) {
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `telegram gateway: restored ${restored} pending approval card(s) from prior gateway session\n`,
+    )
+  }
+  return restored
+}
+
 // 60-second sweep drops anything past its documented TTL.
 const pendingStateReaper = setInterval(() => {
   const now = Date.now()
@@ -5597,6 +6312,23 @@ const pendingStateReaper = setInterval(() => {
   for (const [k, v] of deferredSecrets) {
     if (now - v.staged_at > DEFERRED_SECRET_TTL_MS) deferredSecrets.delete(k)
   }
+  // Agent-initiated approval cards (vault_request_access / vault_request_save /
+  // request_secret / mental_model_propose): expire past-TTL entries and WAKE
+  // the parked agent (timeout synthetic + missed-approvals re-offer). This is
+  // the authoritative timer — before this the only expiry path was a lazy
+  // sweep on the NEXT stage, so an agent that ended its turn to wait on one of
+  // these cards could sit parked forever if no further request ever staged.
+  // try/catch matches the sibling sweepStaleTurnActiveMarker guard: an escaped
+  // throw inside this setInterval callback would reach uncaughtException and
+  // take the WHOLE gateway down (per-entry faults are already contained inside
+  // sweepExpiredEntries/expirePendingCard; this is the outer belt).
+  try {
+    sweepExpiredApprovalCards(now)
+  } catch (err) {
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `telegram gateway: approval-card expiry sweep failed: ${(err as Error).message}\n`,
+    )
+  }
   // #550: sweep a stale turn-active marker. Defence-in-depth for the
   // case where neither the turn_end arm nor onTurnComplete fired (SDK
   // killed before the JSONL turn_duration record, compaction window,
@@ -7282,6 +8014,19 @@ function trackRedeliveredInbound(merged: InboundMessage): void {
   ) {
     return
   }
+  // Button-tap anti-storm guard — mirrors the immediate-delivery path in
+  // deliverButtonTapInbound. A tap synthesized without a source message
+  // (`cbMessageId == null` → `messageId: 0`, no meta.message_id) has no id
+  // the `enqueue` ack can ever match, so enrolling it would make the
+  // never-drop sweep re-deliver it until TTL. The immediate path skips
+  // tracking for such taps; a tap that buffered mid-turn and flushed through
+  // here must be skipped identically (asymmetry = a storm on one path only).
+  if (
+    merged.meta?.button_callback === 'true' &&
+    (merged.meta.message_id == null || merged.meta.message_id === '')
+  ) {
+    return
+  }
   const key = chatKey(merged.chatId, merged.threadId != null ? Number(merged.threadId) : null)
   trackDelivery(
     deliveryQueue,
@@ -9147,6 +9892,42 @@ const ipcServer: IpcServer = createIpcServer({
     void fireFleetAutoFallback(msg.agentName, untilMs)
   },
 
+  // Issue #2971 — read-only wedge-watchdog probe: is there a live pending
+  // permission request (Telegram approval card) for this agent right now?
+  // Sourced directly from `pendingPermissions` — no mutation, no card
+  // posting, just a snapshot read. The watchdog uses this to decide whether
+  // to Esc a shape-persistent permission-prompt TUI or defer to the card /
+  // the #2724 TTL reaper. Always answered synchronously and on the SAME
+  // connection so the watchdog's short (~2s) budget can resolve promptly.
+  onQueryPendingPermission(client: IpcClient, msg: QueryPendingPermissionMessage) {
+    const self = process.env.SWITCHROOM_AGENT_NAME
+    if (self && msg.agentName !== self) {
+      process.stderr.write(
+        `telegram gateway: query_pending_permission rejected — agent mismatch (${msg.agentName} != ${self})\n`,
+      )
+      try {
+        client.send({ type: 'pending_permission_status', correlationId: msg.correlationId, pending: false })
+      } catch { /* best effort */ }
+      return
+    }
+    // Any LIVE entry answers the question — this gateway serves exactly one
+    // agent, so `pendingPermissions` is already scoped to `msg.agentName`.
+    const [requestId] = pendingPermissions.keys()
+    const pending = pendingPermissions.size > 0
+    try {
+      client.send({
+        type: 'pending_permission_status',
+        correlationId: msg.correlationId,
+        pending,
+        ...(pending && requestId ? { requestId } : {}),
+      })
+    } catch (err) {
+      process.stderr.write(
+        `telegram gateway: query_pending_permission reply failed: ${(err as Error).message}\n`,
+      )
+    }
+  },
+
   // #2670 one-tap self-improvement — persist a skill-improvement proposal and
   // post its Approve/Dismiss card. The store transition + apply-injection on
   // Approve are owned by handleSkillProposalCallback (so a gateway restart
@@ -11634,6 +12415,21 @@ async function executeVaultRequestSave(args: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<{
     { threadId, chat_id, verb: 'vault_request_save.card' },
   )
   pending.card_message_id = sent.message_id
+  // Persist card METADATA (never the staged `value` — secrets hygiene) so a
+  // gateway restart doesn't strand the parked agent. A restored Save tap can't
+  // complete (value is gone) and degrades to a "value lost to restart" wake-up.
+  pendingCardStore.add({
+    family: 'vault_request_save',
+    stageId,
+    agent: pending.agent,
+    chatId: pending.chat_id,
+    ...(pending.card_message_id != null ? { cardMessageId: pending.card_message_id } : {}),
+    ...(pending.threadId != null ? { threadId: pending.threadId } : {}),
+    key: pending.key,
+    kind: pending.kind,
+    ...(pending.why != null ? { why: pending.why } : {}),
+    stagedAt: pending.staged_at,
+  })
 
   return {
     content: [
@@ -11677,11 +12473,17 @@ const armedSecretCaptures = new Map<string, ArmedSecretCapture>()
 const PENDING_SECRET_REQUEST_TTL_MS = 30 * 60_000 // card lifetime
 const ARMED_SECRET_CAPTURE_TTL_MS = 10 * 60_000   // window to send the value after tapping
 
-function sweepSecretRequests(): void {
-  const now = Date.now()
-  for (const [k, v] of pendingSecretRequests) {
-    if (now - v.staged_at > PENDING_SECRET_REQUEST_TTL_MS) pendingSecretRequests.delete(k)
-  }
+function sweepSecretRequests(now = Date.now()): void {
+  sweepExpiredEntries(
+    pendingSecretRequests,
+    (v, n) => n - v.staged_at > PENDING_SECRET_REQUEST_TTL_MS,
+    expireSecretRequestCard,
+    now,
+    cardExpiryLog,
+  )
+  // armedSecretCaptures is a TRANSIENT post-tap window (never persisted): it's
+  // only set after the operator taps [Provide securely], and the request is
+  // no longer parked-on-a-card. Just drop stale ones — no wake needed.
   for (const [k, v] of armedSecretCaptures) {
     if (now - v.armed_at > ARMED_SECRET_CAPTURE_TTL_MS) armedSecretCaptures.delete(k)
   }
@@ -11731,7 +12533,10 @@ async function executeRequestSecret(args: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<{ co
   // Dedupe: one open request per (chat, key). Drop any prior stage for
   // the same target so the operator never sees stacked cards.
   for (const [sid, p] of pendingSecretRequests) {
-    if (p.chat_id === chat_id && p.key === key) pendingSecretRequests.delete(sid)
+    if (p.chat_id === chat_id && p.key === key) {
+      pendingSecretRequests.delete(sid)
+      pendingCardStore.remove(sid)
+    }
   }
 
   const stageId = randomBytes(4).toString('hex')
@@ -11753,6 +12558,21 @@ async function executeRequestSecret(args: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<{ co
     { threadId, chat_id, verb: 'request_secret.card' },
   )
   pending.card_message_id = sent.message_id
+  // Persist card metadata so a gateway restart doesn't strand the parked
+  // agent. request_secret holds NO value at staging time (the value arrives
+  // after the operator taps [Provide securely]), so nothing sensitive lands
+  // on disk here.
+  pendingCardStore.add({
+    family: 'request_secret',
+    stageId,
+    agent: pending.agent,
+    chatId: pending.chat_id,
+    ...(pending.card_message_id != null ? { cardMessageId: pending.card_message_id } : {}),
+    ...(pending.threadId != null ? { threadId: pending.threadId } : {}),
+    key: pending.key,
+    ...(pending.reason != null ? { reason: pending.reason } : {}),
+    stagedAt: pending.staged_at,
+  })
 
   return {
     content: [
@@ -11801,6 +12621,7 @@ async function captureProvidedSecret(
   armedSecretCaptures.delete(chat_id)
   const pending = pendingSecretRequests.get(armed.stageId)
   pendingSecretRequests.delete(armed.stageId)
+  pendingCardStore.remove(armed.stageId)
 
   // Delete the raw message FIRST — surfaces a warning if it fails.
   if (msgId != null) await deleteSensitiveMessage(chat_id, msgId, 'provided secret value')
@@ -11916,6 +12737,7 @@ async function handleSecretRequestCallback(ctx: Context, data: string): Promise<
 
   if (action === 'decline') {
     pendingSecretRequests.delete(stageId)
+    pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
     armedSecretCaptures.delete(pending.chat_id)
     await ctx.answerCallbackQuery({ text: 'Declined.' }).catch(() => {})
     if (pending.card_message_id != null) {
@@ -12083,12 +12905,27 @@ async function executeVaultRequestAccess(args: Record<string, unknown>): Promise
     { threadId, chat_id, verb: 'vault_request_access.card' },
   )
   pending.card_message_id = sent.message_id
+  // Persist card metadata (no secret material — this flow stages only the ACL
+  // request) so a gateway restart doesn't strand the parked agent.
+  pendingCardStore.add({
+    family: 'vault_request_access',
+    stageId,
+    agent: pending.agent,
+    chatId: pending.chat_id,
+    ...(pending.card_message_id != null ? { cardMessageId: pending.card_message_id } : {}),
+    ...(pending.threadId != null ? { threadId: pending.threadId } : {}),
+    key: pending.key,
+    scope: pending.scope,
+    ...(pending.reason != null ? { reason: pending.reason } : {}),
+    ttlSeconds: pending.ttl_seconds,
+    stagedAt: pending.staged_at,
+  })
 
   return {
     content: [
       {
         type: 'text',
-        text: `vault_request_access: card sent (stage_id=${stageId}, key=${key}, scope=${scopeRaw}). Wait for the operator to tap Approve or Deny — do not retry the vault read until you see a confirmation message. If the card times out (10 min) you can re-request.`,
+        text: `vault_request_access: card sent (stage_id=${stageId}, key=${key}, scope=${scopeRaw}). Wait for the operator to tap Approve or Deny — do not retry the vault read until you see a confirmation message. If the card times out (${Math.round(VAULT_REQUEST_ACCESS_TTL_MS / 60000)} min) you can re-request.`,
       },
     ],
   }
@@ -12252,6 +13089,19 @@ async function executeMentalModelPropose(args: Record<string, unknown>): Promise
     { threadId, chat_id, verb: 'mental_model_propose.card' },
   )
   pending.card_message_id = sent.message_id
+  // Persist card metadata (the proposed DECLARATION is not secret material) so
+  // a gateway restart doesn't strand the parked agent.
+  pendingCardStore.add({
+    family: 'mental_model_propose',
+    stageId,
+    agent: pending.agent,
+    chatId: pending.chat_id,
+    ...(pending.card_message_id != null ? { cardMessageId: pending.card_message_id } : {}),
+    ...(pending.threadId != null ? { threadId: pending.threadId } : {}),
+    spec: pending.spec,
+    ...(pending.reason != null ? { reason: pending.reason } : {}),
+    stagedAt: pending.staged_at,
+  })
   // Only count a proposal against the rate budget once its card actually
   // posted (validation errors / dupes don't consume the budget).
   mentalModelProposeTimes.push(Date.now())
@@ -12657,6 +13507,7 @@ function composeTurnActivity(turn: CurrentTurn, final = false, liveSuffix = ''):
     elapsedMs: turn.startedAt > 0 ? Date.now() - turn.startedAt : 0,
     toolCount: turn.labeledToolCount,
     state: final ? 'done' : 'running',
+    model: turn.currentModel,
   }
   return renderActivityFeedWithNested(turn.mirrorLines, childLines, final, liveSuffix, stepCount, header)
 }
@@ -12896,7 +13747,22 @@ async function drainActivitySummary(
         turn.activityLastSentRender = target
       } catch (err) {
         const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
-        if (!msg.includes('message is not modified')) {
+        const low = msg.toLowerCase()
+        // Transport-class failures (429, message gone, "not modified") must
+        // NOT inflate `activityDrainFailures` — that counter flags a turn as
+        // DEGRADED on turn-end, and a transient rate-limit or an
+        // already-deleted message is not a logic defect. Counting them would
+        // false-flag a healthy turn. "not modified" is success; gone/429 are
+        // retried or harmless. Only a genuine send/open failure counts.
+        const isTransport =
+          low.includes('not modified') ||
+          low.includes('not found') ||
+          low.includes("can't be edited") ||
+          low.includes('cannot be edited') ||
+          low.includes('not enough rights') ||
+          low.includes('429') ||
+          low.includes('retry after')
+        if (!isTransport) {
           turn.activityDrainFailures += 1
           // Surface the failing anchor + topic: the resume-400 bug fed a
           // fabricated 13-digit message_id as the reply anchor here, so every
@@ -12959,6 +13825,7 @@ function openLivenessFeedIfDue(turn: CurrentTurn): void {
   const lines = turn.mirrorLines.length > 0 ? turn.mirrorLines : ['Working…']
   const livenessHeader: SessionActivityHeader = {
     label: 'Agent', elapsedMs: age, toolCount: turn.labeledToolCount, state: 'running',
+    model: turn.currentModel,
   }
   // Liveness card is a single "step" whose start is the turn start, so `age`
   // IS the step's own elapsed. formatStepSuffix keeps the `→` line timer-free
@@ -13089,6 +13956,7 @@ function feedHeartbeatTick(): void {
     const age = Date.now() - turn.startedAt
     const livenessHeader: SessionActivityHeader = {
       label: 'Agent', elapsedMs: age, toolCount: turn.labeledToolCount, state: 'running',
+      model: turn.currentModel,
     }
     const lines = turn.mirrorLines.length > 0 ? turn.mirrorLines : ['Working in background…']
     // `subagentAt` is the worker's last ADVANCE — the current step's start —
@@ -13246,7 +14114,23 @@ function clearActivitySummary(turn: CurrentTurn, finalHtmlOverride?: string | nu
           { chat_id: chat, ...(thread != null ? { threadId: thread } : {}), verb: 'activity-summary.delete' },
         )
       } catch (err) {
-        process.stderr.write(`telegram gateway: activity-summary delete failed: ${err}\n`)
+        // Best-effort teardown of a status card. A transport-class failure
+        // (message already deleted, chat gone, 429) is not a liveness-logic
+        // error — "message to delete not found" is the desired end state
+        // here, and a 429 on a teardown delete is retried by robustApiCall.
+        // Stay silent on those; warn only on a genuinely unexpected error.
+        const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
+        const low = msg.toLowerCase()
+        if (
+          low.includes('not modified') ||
+          low.includes('not found') ||
+          low.includes('not enough rights') ||
+          low.includes('429') ||
+          low.includes('retry after')
+        ) {
+          return
+        }
+        process.stderr.write(`telegram gateway: activity-summary delete failed: ${msg}\n`)
       }
       return
     }
@@ -13262,6 +14146,7 @@ function clearActivitySummary(turn: CurrentTurn, finalHtmlOverride?: string | nu
       const livenessElapsed = turn.startedAt > 0 ? Date.now() - turn.startedAt : 0
       const livenessHeader: SessionActivityHeader = {
         label: 'Agent', elapsedMs: livenessElapsed, toolCount: turn.labeledToolCount, state: 'done',
+        model: turn.currentModel,
       }
       finalHtml = renderActivityFeedWithNested(['Working…'], [], true, '', undefined, livenessHeader)
     }
@@ -13272,10 +14157,26 @@ function clearActivitySummary(turn: CurrentTurn, finalHtmlOverride?: string | nu
         { chat_id: chat, ...(thread != null ? { threadId: thread } : {}), verb: 'activity-summary.finalize' },
       )
     } catch (err) {
+      // Same transport-class discipline as the delete path: the card
+      // finalize is a best-effort liveness edit. "not modified" = the card
+      // already shows the finalized body (success); "not found" / "not
+      // enough rights" = the message is gone (nothing to finalize); 429 is
+      // retried by robustApiCall. None of those are liveness-logic errors
+      // and none warrant a stderr warning. Warn only on the unexpected.
       const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
-      if (!msg.includes('message is not modified')) {
-        process.stderr.write(`telegram gateway: activity-summary finalize failed: ${msg}\n`)
+      const low = msg.toLowerCase()
+      if (
+        low.includes('not modified') ||
+        low.includes('not found') ||
+        low.includes("can't be edited") ||
+        low.includes('cannot be edited') ||
+        low.includes('not enough rights') ||
+        low.includes('429') ||
+        low.includes('retry after')
+      ) {
+        return
       }
+      process.stderr.write(`telegram gateway: activity-summary finalize failed: ${msg}\n`)
     }
   })
 }
@@ -13736,6 +14637,22 @@ function handleSessionEvent(ev: SessionEvent): void {
       return
     }
     case 'dequeue': return
+    case 'model': {
+      // Live model capture for the main turn. The session-tail projection
+      // already filtered sentinels (`<synthetic>` compaction lines), so any
+      // value reaching here is a real resolved model id. Record it on the turn
+      // (update-on-change) so the activity/liveness card header and /status
+      // render the model actually serving this turn's API calls — transcript-
+      // sourced, never config. Also note it on the freshness-aware session-model
+      // source so a /status query between turns still reflects the last model
+      // (and a fresh assistant line reclaims the source from a /model override).
+      const turn = currentTurn
+      if (turn != null) {
+        turn.currentModel = ev.model
+      }
+      sessionModelSource.noteTranscriptModel(ev.model)
+      return
+    }
     case 'thinking': {
       // #1067: snapshot the turn atom at handler entry. Even though this
       // handler is sync, the principle is uniform across all event arms
@@ -16650,12 +17567,28 @@ async function handleInbound(
     TOPIC_FRAMING_ENABLED && messageThreadId != null
       ? 'This message belongs to the current topic only — answer ONLY this question, in this topic. Do not also answer a pending message from another topic.'
       : undefined
+  // person_id name resolution (docs/configuration.md, resolve-person.ts):
+  // chat-scoped, boot-time-static lookup — falls back to today's raw
+  // id/username behavior (fail-open) whenever unresolved or when group
+  // membership can't be positively confirmed from access.json's allowFrom.
+  // Never touches access.json itself and never blocks/denies anything.
+  const rawUser = from.username ?? String(from.id)
+  const displayUser = safeResolvePersonName(
+    PERSON_DIRECTORY,
+    {
+      telegramId: String(from.id),
+      username: from.username,
+      isDm: isDmChatId(chat_id),
+      groupAllowFrom: access.groups[chat_id]?.allowFrom,
+    },
+    rawUser,
+  )
   const inboundMsg: InboundMessage = {
     type: 'inbound',
     chatId: chat_id,
     ...(messageThreadId != null ? { threadId: messageThreadId } : {}),
     messageId: msgId ?? 0,
-    user: from.username ?? String(from.id),
+    user: displayUser,
     userId: from.id,
     ts: ctx.message?.date ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
     text: effectiveText,
@@ -16670,7 +17603,7 @@ async function handleInbound(
     meta: {
       chat_id,
       ...(msgId != null ? { message_id: String(msgId) } : {}),
-      user: from.username ?? String(from.id),
+      user: displayUser,
       user_id: String(from.id),
       ts: new Date((ctx.message?.date ?? 0) * 1000).toISOString(),
       ...(messageThreadId != null ? { message_thread_id: String(messageThreadId) } : {}),
@@ -18286,13 +19219,12 @@ function buildAgentAudit(agentName: string): AgentAudit | undefined {
 // broker's fleet-wide `ListStateData` payload via
 // `buildAuthSummaryFromBroker`, with billingType pulled from the
 // agent's `.claude.json` (the broker doesn't track plan tier).
-/**
- * Live session-model override set by the `/model` picker (session-only). Held
- * in gateway memory so it clears on restart, the same point at which claude's
- * session reverts to the configured model — keeping `/status` honest without
- * a persisted store. Null when no session switch is active.
- */
-let activeSessionModelOverride: string | null = null
+// The live session-model override set by the `/model` picker (session-only)
+// lives on `sessionModelSource` (setOverride/getOverride, declared beside the
+// currentTurn globals). Held in gateway memory so it clears on restart, the
+// same point at which claude's session reverts to the configured model —
+// keeping `/status` honest without a persisted store. `resolve()` arbitrates
+// freshness against the transcript-observed model (#2982 idle-switch window).
 
 async function buildAgentMetadata(agentName: string): Promise<AgentMetadata> {
   type AgentListResp = {
@@ -18322,7 +19254,18 @@ async function buildAgentMetadata(agentName: string): Promise<AgentMetadata> {
   return {
     agentName,
     model: a?.model ?? null,
-    sessionModel: activeSessionModelOverride,
+    // The FRESHEST session-model observation wins (session-model-source.ts):
+    // the transcript's `message.model` (ground truth for the last API call)
+    // vs the #2982 /model override (the only truthful source in the idle-
+    // after-switch window, before the next assistant line). Both rendered
+    // through formatModelLabel for a consistent short form; an override value
+    // that isn't model-shaped (an already-friendly "Opus 4.8" label) passes
+    // through verbatim. Never sourced from config.
+    sessionModel: (() => {
+      const resolved = sessionModelSource.resolve()
+      if (resolved == null) return null
+      return formatModelLabel(resolved.model) ?? resolved.model
+    })(),
     extendsProfile: (a?.extends ?? a?.template) ?? null,
     topicName: a?.topic_name ?? null,
     topicEmoji: a?.topic_emoji ?? null,
@@ -18553,7 +19496,7 @@ function buildModelDeps(restartCtx?: ModelDepsRestartContext): ModelMenuDeps & M
     },
     escapeHtml: escapeHtmlForTg,
     preBlock,
-    getActiveSessionModel: () => activeSessionModelOverride,
+    getActiveSessionModel: () => sessionModelSource.getOverride(),
     /**
      * Graceful restart for sr-* → Claude model switch. Same mechanism as
      * the /restart command: writes a restart marker (so the post-restart
@@ -18563,9 +19506,18 @@ function buildModelDeps(restartCtx?: ModelDepsRestartContext): ModelMenuDeps & M
     scheduleRestart: async (reason: string) => {
       const name = getMyAgentName()
       // Debounce: mirror the /restart command's 15 s guard to prevent
-      // double-dispatch on a rapid double-tap of /model <claude-alias>.
+      // double-dispatch on a rapid double-tap of /model <claude-alias>. This
+      // path previously `return`ed silently — indistinguishable from a
+      // successful dispatch — so a model switch caught in the window was a
+      // silent no-op while the caller reported success. THROW a tagged error
+      // so scheduleModelRelaunch can react (keep the in-flight restart's carrier,
+      // tell the operator honestly) instead of falsely claiming the switch stuck.
       const existing = readRestartMarker()
-      if (existing && Date.now() - existing.ts < 15_000) return
+      if (existing && Date.now() - existing.ts < 15_000) {
+        const e = new Error('a restart is already in flight — try again in ~15s')
+        ;(e as { code?: string }).code = 'restart_in_flight'
+        throw e
+      }
       if (restartCtx) {
         writeRestartMarker({
           chat_id: restartCtx.chatId,
@@ -18615,9 +19567,25 @@ function buildModelDeps(restartCtx?: ModelDepsRestartContext): ModelMenuDeps & M
       if (!agentDir) throw new Error('agent dir unresolvable — cannot write session-model carrier')
       // Carrier: single line, token + newline, no quoting (start.sh strips
       // whitespace and shape-gates). One-shot — consumed on the next boot.
+      const prevOverride = sessionModelSource.getOverride()
       writeFileSync(join(agentDir, '.session-model-override'), `${model}\n`, 'utf8')
-      activeSessionModelOverride = model
-      await deps.scheduleRestart(reason)
+      sessionModelSource.setOverride(model)
+      try {
+        await deps.scheduleRestart(reason)
+      } catch (err) {
+        const carrierPath = join(agentDir, '.session-model-override')
+        // A restart already in flight OWNS the carrier we just wrote — it will
+        // consume our token at boot, so the switch is queued, not lost: keep the
+        // carrier + override and let the caller tell the operator "~15s". Any
+        // OTHER dispatch failure means no restart is coming, so roll BOTH back —
+        // a lingering carrier/override would lie to /status and mis-launch the
+        // NEXT ordinary restart.
+        if ((err as { code?: string })?.code !== 'restart_in_flight') {
+          try { rmSync(carrierPath, { force: true }) } catch { /* best-effort */ }
+          sessionModelSource.setOverride(prevOverride)
+        }
+        throw err
+      }
     },
   }
   return deps
@@ -18646,6 +19614,15 @@ bot.command('model', async ctx => {
     return
   }
   const reply = await handleModelCommand(parsed, deps)
+  // Record a POSITIVELY-CONFIRMED typed switch so /status reflects what's
+  // actually running — the SAME in-memory override the menu callback path sets
+  // (buildAgentMetadata resolves it via sessionModelSource). Only
+  // set on the confirmed inject path; the sr-*/relaunch paths already set the
+  // override inside scheduleModelRelaunch, and an unverified switch carries no
+  // selectedModel so /status is never lied to.
+  if (reply.selectedModel) {
+    sessionModelSource.setOverride(reply.selectedModel)
+  }
   await switchroomReply(ctx, reply.text, { html: reply.html })
 })
 
@@ -20941,6 +21918,7 @@ async function performVaultAccessApproval(
       const visible = await listViaBroker()
       if (visible !== null && visible.includes(pending.key)) {
         pendingVaultRequestAccesses.delete(stageId)
+        pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
         if (pending.card_message_id != null) {
           await ctx.api
             .editMessageText(
@@ -21039,6 +22017,7 @@ async function performVaultAccessApproval(
     // the agent to re-issue, or the broker error message will tell
     // them the next step.
     pendingVaultRequestAccesses.delete(stageId)
+    pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
     if (pending.card_message_id != null) {
       await ctx.api
         .editMessageText(
@@ -21070,6 +22049,7 @@ async function performVaultAccessApproval(
   }
 
   pendingVaultRequestAccesses.delete(stageId)
+  pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
   if (pending.card_message_id != null) {
     const days = Math.round(pending.ttl_seconds / 86400)
     const footer =
@@ -21278,23 +22258,17 @@ async function handleMentalModelProposeCallback(ctx: Context, data: string): Pro
   // this, a card left untapped past its TTL is still resolvable if no fresh
   // proposal has run the sweep — an operator could approve a stale proposal.
   if (Date.now() - pending.staged_at > MENTAL_MODEL_PROPOSE_TTL_MS) {
-    pendingMentalModelProposes.delete(stageId)
-    await ctx.answerCallbackQuery({ text: 'Card expired — ask the agent to re-propose.' }).catch(() => {})
-    if (pending.card_message_id != null) {
-      await ctx.api
-        .editMessageText(
-          pending.chat_id,
-          pending.card_message_id,
-          richMessage('⌛ _This mental-model proposal card expired before you tapped. Ask the agent to re-propose if it still stands._'),
-          { reply_markup: { inline_keyboard: [] } },
-        )
-        .catch(() => {})
-    }
+    // Expired between post and tap: route through the shared expiry path so the
+    // parked agent is WOKEN (timeout synthetic + missed-approvals re-offer) and
+    // the durable store entry is cleared — not just a silent map delete.
+    expireMentalModelProposeCard(stageId, pending, Date.now())
+    await ctx.answerCallbackQuery({ text: 'Card expired — the agent was notified.' }).catch(() => {})
     return
   }
   // Single-shot: remove the pending entry immediately so a double-tap can't
   // resolve twice.
   pendingMentalModelProposes.delete(stageId)
+  pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
 
   const proposal: MentalModelPendingProposal = {
     agent: pending.agent,
@@ -21436,6 +22410,7 @@ async function handleVaultRequestAccessCallback(ctx: Context, data: string): Pro
 
   if (action === 'deny') {
     pendingVaultRequestAccesses.delete(stageId)
+    pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
     await ctx.answerCallbackQuery({ text: '🚫 Denied' }).catch(() => {})
     if (pending.card_message_id != null) {
       await ctx.api
@@ -21658,6 +22633,7 @@ async function handleVaultRequestSaveCallback(ctx: Context, data: string): Promi
 
   if (action === 'discard') {
     pendingVaultRequestSaves.delete(stageId)
+    pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
     await ctx.answerCallbackQuery({ text: '🚫 Discarded' }).catch(() => {})
     if (pending.card_message_id != null) {
       await ctx.api
@@ -21728,6 +22704,43 @@ async function handleVaultRequestSaveCallback(ctx: Context, data: string): Promi
     // stale "spinning" state on the button while we run the write.
     await ctx.answerCallbackQuery({ text: '⏳ Saving…' }).catch(() => {})
 
+    // Restored-after-restart guard: the staged secret VALUE is held in gateway
+    // memory only and is never persisted (secrets hygiene). If this card was
+    // restored from disk after a gateway restart, the value is gone — we CANNOT
+    // complete the write. Degrade gracefully: strip the card, wake the agent
+    // with a save-failed (value-lost) synthetic so it re-requests, and stop.
+    if (pending.restoredWithoutValue || pending.value.length === 0) {
+      pendingVaultRequestSaves.delete(stageId)
+      pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
+      if (pending.card_message_id != null) {
+        await ctx.api
+          .editMessageText(
+            pending.chat_id,
+            pending.card_message_id,
+            richMessage(`⚠️ _The staged value for \`${escapeHtmlForTg(pending.key)}\` was lost to a gateway restart — nothing was saved. Ask **${escapeHtmlForTg(pending.agent)}** to re-issue \`vault_request_save\` if you still want to store it._`),
+            { reply_markup: { inline_keyboard: [] } },
+          )
+          .catch(() => {})
+      }
+      const lostInbound = buildVaultSaveFailedInbound({
+        ctx: {
+          agent: pending.agent,
+          key: pending.key,
+          chat_id: pending.chat_id,
+          ...(pending.threadId != null ? { threadId: pending.threadId } : {}),
+        },
+        stageId,
+        operatorId: senderId,
+        reason: 'staged value lost to a gateway restart — re-request the save',
+      })
+      const lDelivered = deliverResumeSyntheticOrBuffer(pending.agent, lostInbound)
+      process.stderr.write(
+        `telegram gateway: vault_request_save value lost to restart — wake agent=${pending.agent} ` +
+        `key=${pending.key} stage=${stageId} delivered=${lDelivered}\n`,
+      )
+      return
+    }
+
     // #1115 follow-up: the save-approve flow now mirrors the access-
     // approve flow under telegram-id mode — broker `put` accepts
     // `attest_via_posture: true` (server.ts:1448-1500), so the
@@ -21763,6 +22776,7 @@ async function handleVaultRequestSaveCallback(ctx: Context, data: string): Promi
             .catch(() => {})
         }
         pendingVaultRequestSaves.delete(stageId)
+        pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
         return
       }
       // defaultVaultWrite spawns `switchroom vault set <key>` with the
@@ -21794,6 +22808,7 @@ async function handleVaultRequestSaveCallback(ctx: Context, data: string): Promi
       // retry by re-invoking the same MCP tool, but the value will be
       // re-staged with a new ID. Drop the current stage.
       pendingVaultRequestSaves.delete(stageId)
+      pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
       // Wake the waiting agent with the failure (symmetric with the
       // success/discard paths) so it doesn't assume vault:<key> exists.
       const failReason =
@@ -21819,6 +22834,7 @@ async function handleVaultRequestSaveCallback(ctx: Context, data: string): Promi
 
     // Success — mask the value in the card for visual confirmation.
     pendingVaultRequestSaves.delete(stageId)
+    pendingCardStore.remove(stageId)
     if (pending.card_message_id != null) {
       await ctx.api
         .editMessageText(
@@ -22841,7 +23857,15 @@ async function handleAuthDashboardCallback(ctx: Context): Promise<void> {
         tz,
         now: renderNow,
         demo: refreshDemo,
-        ...(staleCachedAtMs != null ? { staleCachedAtMs } : { liveProbedAtMs: renderNow.getTime() }),
+        // Honesty backstop (same as /usage): a TOTAL probe failure (zero
+        // result rows, nothing served from cache) renders an explicit
+        // "probe failed" marker instead of a false "Live" footer next to
+        // no-data rows.
+        ...(staleCachedAtMs != null
+          ? { staleCachedAtMs }
+          : probeResp.results.length > 0
+            ? { liveProbedAtMs: renderNow.getTime() }
+            : { probeFailed: true }),
       })
       const kbRows = buildSnapshotKeyboard(snapshots, { now: renderNow, demo: refreshDemo })
       const inline_keyboard = kbRows.map((row) =>
@@ -23307,21 +24331,49 @@ bot.command('usage', async ctx => {
         // flight; a TTL-hit or failed-probe fallback is tagged served:"cache",
         // which we surface as a "⚠ cached Nm ago" footer instead of a false
         // live stamp.
+        const renderNow = new Date()
         const probeResp = await client.probeQuota(state.accounts.map((a) => a.label)).catch(() => ({ results: [] }))
         const { quotas, staleCachedAtMs } = zipProbeResults(
           state.accounts.map((a) => a.label),
           probeResp.results,
         )
-        const { renderAuthSnapshotFormat2, buildSnapshotsFromState, buildSnapshotKeyboard } = await import(
+        const { buildSnapshotsFromState, buildSnapshotKeyboard } = await import(
           '../auth-snapshot-format.js'
         )
-        const tz = process.env.SWITCHROOM_TIMEZONE ?? process.env.TZ ?? 'UTC'
+        const { renderUsageCard } = await import('../quota-bar-format.js')
         const snapshots = buildSnapshotsFromState(state, quotas)
-        const text = renderAuthSnapshotFormat2(snapshots, {
-          tz,
-          now: new Date(),
+        // /usage renders the compact quota-bar block (at-a-glance headroom +
+        // pace tick per window) plus a two-line footer — the actionable
+        // cross-account recommendation verdict and the freshness marker (`⚠
+        // cached Nm ago` when the probe was served stale from cache, else
+        // `Live · refreshed Nm ago`). The old Format 2 table
+        // (renderAuthSnapshotFormat2) is no longer appended here (operator
+        // call, 2026-07-10): the two views were redundant and the table
+        // doubled the message length. Every per-window reset the table
+        // carried has an equivalent in the bar rows' `pct% / <time-left>`
+        // segment, just relative instead of absolute — no info lost; the
+        // recommendation + cached/live footer the table used to carry are
+        // preserved by renderUsageCard.
+        const exhaustedByLabel = new Map<string, boolean>(
+          state.accounts.map((a) => [a.label, a.exhausted]),
+        )
+        const text = renderUsageCard(snapshots, exhaustedByLabel, {
+          now: renderNow,
           demo,
-          ...(staleCachedAtMs != null ? { staleCachedAtMs } : { liveProbedAtMs: Date.now() }),
+          // #2495 Change 2 — a TTL-hit / failed-probe fallback is tagged
+          // served:"cache"; surface it as `⚠ cached Nm ago` instead of a
+          // false live stamp. Otherwise stamp the live refresh time.
+          // Honesty backstop: a TOTAL probe failure (the .catch above
+          // returned `{results: []}` and nothing was served from cache)
+          // must render an explicit "probe failed" marker, NOT a false
+          // "Live" stamp next to "⚠️ no data" rows. Without this the
+          // footer claimed "Live · refreshed 0s ago" while every account
+          // row said "no data — probe failed" (#2959 review finding).
+          ...(staleCachedAtMs != null
+            ? { staleCachedAtMs }
+            : probeResp.results.length > 0
+              ? { liveProbedAtMs: renderNow.getTime() }
+              : { probeFailed: true }),
         })
         // Preserve the Switch/Refresh/usage/Add inline keyboard on the
         // rich-message render — the table card carries the same actions the
@@ -23708,13 +24760,13 @@ bot.on('callback_query:data', async ctx => {
     }
     const didInterimSrEdit = false
     try {
-      const prevSessionModel = activeSessionModelOverride
+      const prevSessionModel = sessionModelSource.getOverride()
       const outcome = await handleModelMenuCallback(data, modelDeps)
       // Record a successful session switch so /status reflects what's
       // actually running. In-memory only → clears when the gateway (and thus
       // claude's session) restarts, exactly matching the session-only scope.
       if (outcome.selectedModel) {
-        activeSessionModelOverride = outcome.selectedModel
+        sessionModelSource.setOverride(outcome.selectedModel)
       }
       // toastOnly: leave the menu untouched — but only if we haven't already
       // cleared its buttons with the interim sr-* edit. If we have, fall
@@ -23736,6 +24788,25 @@ bot.on('callback_query:data', async ctx => {
             { reply_markup: { inline_keyboard: [] } },
           )
           .catch(() => {})
+        // Carry the requested Claude model across the restart via the SAME
+        // `.session-model-override` carrier a Claude → sr-* switch uses — otherwise
+        // boot launches the CONFIGURED default and the tapped model is silently
+        // dropped. `selectedModelToken` is a real `claude --model` token (alias or
+        // full claude-* id); a "Default"-row tap yields no token → boot the
+        // configured default (correct). start.sh's LiteLLM-down guard only drops
+        // sr-* overrides, so a Claude token is never dropped.
+        {
+          const agentDir = resolveAgentDirFromEnv()
+          const token = outcome.selectedModelToken
+          if (agentDir && token) {
+            try {
+              writeFileSync(join(agentDir, '.session-model-override'), `${token}\n`, 'utf8')
+              sessionModelSource.setOverride(token)
+            } catch (e) {
+              process.stderr.write(`telegram gateway: sr-to-claude carrier write failed: ${(e as Error)?.message ?? String(e)}\n`)
+            }
+          }
+        }
         // Write the restart marker so the post-restart boot card edits into this chat.
         writeRestartMarker({ chat_id: cbChatId, thread_id: cbThreadId ?? null, ack_message_id: null, ts: Date.now() })
         stampUserRestartReason('user: sr-to-claude model switch (menu)')
@@ -24277,17 +25348,17 @@ bot.on('callback_query:data', async ctx => {
     process.stderr.write(
       `telegram gateway: button_callback chatId=${cbChatId} user=${ctx.from.id} data=${JSON.stringify(agentCb.raw)} btnText=${JSON.stringify(buttonText ?? null)}\n`,
     )
-    // Registered-keyed delivery + buffer-on-miss (same fix as the
-    // normal-inbound path above): broadcast()/clientCount() lost the
-    // tap whenever the bridge was mid-reconnect (clientCount() counts
-    // unregistered sockets, so the notice was suppressed AND nothing
-    // was actually queued). sendToAgent → pendingInboundBuffer (drained
-    // by onClientRegistered) makes the "queued" promise real.
+    // #271 turn-safety: route the tap through the SAME turn-safe delivery
+    // machinery as a normal inbound (deliverButtonTapInbound) instead of a raw
+    // sendToAgent. A tap landing mid-turn now buffers until idle (never strands
+    // in the composer, #1556), a delivered tap is composer-cleared first and
+    // tracked so the redelivery sweep rescues a strand, and a bridge-offline tap
+    // still spools + shows the restart notice below (unchanged UX). The old raw
+    // path (sendToAgent → pendingInboundBuffer, drained by onClientRegistered)
+    // fixed only the bridge-mid-reconnect drop; it never gated on turn state.
     const selfAgentBtn = process.env.SWITCHROOM_AGENT_NAME ?? ''
-    const btnDelivered = ipcServer.sendToAgent(selfAgentBtn, inboundMsg)
-    if (btnDelivered) markClaudeBusyForInbound(inboundMsg)
-    if (!btnDelivered) {
-      pendingInboundBuffer.push(selfAgentBtn, inboundMsg)
+    const btnOutcome = await deliverButtonTapInbound(selfAgentBtn, inboundMsg)
+    if (btnOutcome === 'buffered-bridge-offline') {
       // No registered bridge — the agent's mid-restart. Tell the user
       // so they don't think the button silently swallowed their tap;
       // the tap is genuinely buffered now and replays on reconnect.
@@ -24516,6 +25587,36 @@ bot.on('callback_query:data', async ctx => {
           process.stderr.write(
             `telegram gateway: always-allow hostd FAILED: ${failReason} (request_id=${request_id})\n`,
           )
+          // #2973 pt.2 — enqueue for the durable retry queue UNLESS the
+          // failure is non-retryable (config edits locked — retrying
+          // won't help until the operator flips the flag; that case
+          // keeps today's honest "did NOT save" card only). Everything
+          // else (stale config view, transient hostd error, rate limit)
+          // gets picked up by the boot/periodic drain instead of quietly
+          // requiring the operator to notice and re-tap.
+          if (!editLockHint) {
+            try {
+              await alwaysAllowPersistQueue.enqueue({
+                agentName,
+                rule: chosen.rule,
+                grantPhrase,
+                chatId: ctx.chat?.id != null ? String(ctx.chat.id) : undefined,
+                threadId: (ctx.callbackQuery?.message as { message_thread_id?: number } | undefined)?.message_thread_id,
+                error: failReason,
+              })
+            } catch (enqueueErr) {
+              // The retry queue's own write failed (disk full, perms, …) —
+              // don't pretend this landed. Fold it into the operator-facing
+              // failReason so the "did NOT save" card is honest about the
+              // retry mechanism ALSO having failed, not just the original
+              // dispatch (#2973 adversarial review pt.2).
+              const enqueueMsg = (enqueueErr as Error).message
+              process.stderr.write(
+                `telegram gateway: always-allow enqueue for retry FAILED: ${enqueueMsg} (request_id=${request_id})\n`,
+              )
+              failReason = `${failReason} (retry queue also failed to persist: ${enqueueMsg})`
+            }
+          }
         }
       }
 
@@ -26380,6 +27481,38 @@ void (async () => {
 
       if (!didOneTimeSetup) {
         didOneTimeSetup = true
+
+        // person_id name resolution (docs/configuration.md, resolve-person.ts):
+        // ONE-TIME boot validation, NOT periodic. `PERSON_DIRECTORY` is
+        // built exactly once, here, from the static in-memory `people.json`
+        // the scaffold projected from `switchroom.yaml`'s `users:` block —
+        // a config change requires an agent restart, this never re-reads.
+        // The orchestration (per-entry validation + dead-man's-switch) is
+        // in the pure, unit-tested `runPersonDirectoryBootCheck` — this
+        // block only performs the resulting I/O (stderr log + the EXISTING
+        // fleet-alert path at low/config severity, kind: 'config-warning',
+        // which must never page like a real outage).
+        {
+          const bootCheck = runPersonDirectoryBootCheck(readPeopleFile)
+          PERSON_DIRECTORY = bootCheck.directory
+          process.stderr.write(bootCheck.logLine + '\n')
+          if (bootCheck.alertDetail != null) {
+            emitGatewayOperatorEvent({
+              kind: 'config-warning',
+              agent: process.env.SWITCHROOM_AGENT_NAME ?? '-',
+              detail: bootCheck.alertDetail,
+              suggestedActions: [],
+              firstSeenAt: new Date(),
+            })
+          }
+        }
+
+        // #2973 pt.2 — drain any always-allow persists left queued by a
+        // prior gateway process (e.g. one that restarted mid-persist),
+        // then keep draining periodically for the rest of this process's
+        // lifetime.
+        scheduleAlwaysAllowPersistDrain()
+
         void registerSwitchroomBotCommands().catch(() => {})
 
         // #613 fix: pre-warm the chatAvailableReactions cache for every
@@ -26493,6 +27626,18 @@ void (async () => {
           }
         }
 
+        // Restore the four agent-initiated approval-card families from the
+        // durable store so a post-restart tap on a still-valid card resolves
+        // normally instead of hitting the "Card expired" tombstone (and an
+        // already-expired entry gets woken by the reaper's next tick).
+        try {
+          restorePendingApprovalCards()
+        } catch (err) {
+          process.stderr.write(
+            `telegram gateway: pending approval-card restore failed: ${(err as Error).message}\n`,
+          )
+        }
+
         // Boot-time pin sweep
         try {
           const bootAccess = loadAccess()
@@ -26722,8 +27867,9 @@ void (async () => {
                   // a phantom session override.
                   return resolveMainModel(raw ?? undefined)
                 })()
-                activeSessionModelOverride =
-                  launched.length > 0 && launched !== configured ? launched : null
+                sessionModelSource.setOverride(
+                  launched.length > 0 && launched !== configured ? launched : null,
+                )
               } catch { /* leave override as-is on a bad read */ }
             }
 
@@ -27037,7 +28183,7 @@ void (async () => {
               // Gated to background completions: foreground sub-agents
               // need nothing here, and 'orphan' is a stale historical-at-
               // boot row, not a fresh completion the user is waiting on.
-              onFinish: ({ agentId, outcome, description, resultText, toolCount, durationMs }) => {
+              onFinish: ({ agentId, outcome, description, resultText, toolCount, durationMs, background: entryBackground }) => {
                 // Reaction promotion: if the parent turn already ended
                 // with this (or another) worker still running, its 👍 was
                 // deferred (held on ✍️/⚡). Now that a worker finished,
@@ -27068,13 +28214,32 @@ void (async () => {
                 // (worker-feed-dispatch.ts, pinned by its test). Best-effort:
                 // a DB hiccup keeps the watcher's generic label rather than
                 // throwing out of the terminal handler.
-                let dispatch: WorkerFeedDispatch = resolveWorkerFeedDispatch(null, description)
+                let dispatch: WorkerFeedDispatch = resolveWorkerFeedDispatch(null, description, entryBackground)
                 if (turnsDb != null) {
                   try {
-                    dispatch = resolveWorkerFeedDispatch(getSubagentByJsonlId(turnsDb, agentId), description)
+                    dispatch = resolveWorkerFeedDispatch(getSubagentByJsonlId(turnsDb, agentId), description, entryBackground)
                   } catch { /* best-effort */ }
                 }
-                const isBackground = dispatch.isBackground
+                let isBackground = dispatch.isBackground
+                // Fix #1(+#2): the registry row never linked AND the watcher
+                // entry's own cached background flag was never observed
+                // either (both `resolveWorkerFeedDispatch` fallbacks came up
+                // empty) — this is the "DB row is unlinked" bug's worst
+                // case. A finished worker with actual narrative result text
+                // is far more likely a dropped background handback than a
+                // legitimate foreground no-op (a foreground sub-agent's
+                // result returns inline as the Task tool result — the
+                // gateway wouldn't otherwise need to route anything here).
+                // Degrade to background so the result is delivered instead
+                // of silently lost. Idempotency: this only flips the
+                // dispatch classification for THIS single onFinish call —
+                // all the existing dedup/idempotency guards below
+                // (decideSubagentHandback's spool key, completionNotified,
+                // etc.) still apply unchanged, so this cannot cause a
+                // double-handback.
+                if (!dispatch.hasRow && entryBackground == null && resultText.trim().length > 0) {
+                  isBackground = true
+                }
                 // NESTED (depth-2+) worker terminal: its live status surfaced
                 // via the worker feed (see onProgress), so finalize that card
                 // cleanly — never leave it frozen mid-"→ step". But NO user
@@ -27091,6 +28256,10 @@ void (async () => {
                       latestSummary: resultText,
                       elapsedMs: durationMs,
                       state: outcome === 'failed' ? 'failed' : 'done',
+                      // Persisted (registry) model — the last one the watcher
+                      // recorded from the worker's transcript — so the terminal
+                      // card keeps the model tag even with no live entry.
+                      model: dispatch.feedModel ?? undefined,
                     })
                     reconcileWorkerPin(agentId, null, false)
                   }
@@ -27168,6 +28337,7 @@ void (async () => {
                       latestSummary: resultText,
                       elapsedMs: durationMs,
                       state: outcome === 'failed' ? 'failed' : 'done',
+                      model: dispatch.feedModel ?? undefined,
                     })
                     // Status-pin: worker done — drop its pin.
                     reconcileWorkerPin(agentId, null, false)
@@ -27187,6 +28357,7 @@ void (async () => {
                     latestSummary: resultText,
                     elapsedMs: durationMs,
                     state: outcome === 'failed' ? 'failed' : 'done',
+                    model: dispatch.feedModel ?? undefined,
                   })
                   // Status-pin: worker done — drop its pin.
                   reconcileWorkerPin(agentId, null, false)
@@ -27273,7 +28444,7 @@ void (async () => {
               // suppresses stale-after-restart delivery (a 4-h-old
               // "still working (5m)" would be a lie). Sweep on handback
               // lives in the `onFinish` block just above.
-              onProgress: ({ agentId, description, latestSummary, elapsedMs, prevBucketIdx, setBucketIdx, lastTool, toolCount, progressLine }) => {
+              onProgress: ({ agentId, description, latestSummary, elapsedMs, prevBucketIdx, setBucketIdx, lastTool, toolCount, progressLine, model }) => {
                 let fleetChatId = ''
                 try {
                   const fleets = progressDriver?.peekAllFleets() ?? []
@@ -27307,6 +28478,13 @@ void (async () => {
                 // never grew past "starting…" (the frozen-card symptom). The
                 // foreground nest path below already used this precedence.
                 const stepLine = (progressLine != null && progressLine.length > 0) ? progressLine : latestSummary
+                // Live model for the worker card: prefer the transcript-sourced
+                // model on the entry (threaded via onProgress) and fall back to
+                // the dispatch-time model persisted on the registry row
+                // (tool_input.model) until the worker's first assistant line
+                // lands. Undefined when neither is known — the card omits it,
+                // never guessing from config.
+                const feedModel = model ?? dispatch.feedModel ?? undefined
                 if (!isBackground) {
                   // Model A — a foreground sub-agent runs inside the parent's
                   // turn, so its live narrative nests under the parent's
@@ -27334,8 +28512,8 @@ void (async () => {
                     orphanStatusEnabled,
                   })
                   if (surface === 'worker-feed') {
-                    const origin = resolveSubagentOriginChat(agentId)
-                    const wkChat = origin?.chatId || fleetChatId || (loadAccess().allowFrom[0] ?? '')
+                    const wk = resolveWorkerFeedChat(agentId, fleetChatId)
+                    const wkChat = wk.chatId
                     void workerActivityFeed?.update(
                       agentId,
                       wkChat,
@@ -27346,8 +28524,9 @@ void (async () => {
                         latestSummary: stepLine,
                         elapsedMs,
                         state: 'running',
+                        model: feedModel,
                       },
-                      origin?.threadId,
+                      wk.threadId,
                     )?.then(() => reconcileWorkerPin(agentId, wkChat, true))
                     return
                   }
@@ -27472,8 +28651,8 @@ void (async () => {
                 // resolved (the pinned-card fleet that used to carry the chat
                 // is gone — see resolveSubagentOriginChat).
                 if (workerFeedEnabled) {
-                  const origin = resolveSubagentOriginChat(agentId)
-                  const wkChat = origin?.chatId || fleetChatId || (loadAccess().allowFrom[0] ?? '')
+                  const wk = resolveWorkerFeedChat(agentId, fleetChatId)
+                  const wkChat = wk.chatId
                   void workerActivityFeed?.update(
                     agentId,
                     wkChat,
@@ -27487,8 +28666,9 @@ void (async () => {
                       latestSummary: stepLine,
                       elapsedMs,
                       state: 'running',
+                      model: feedModel,
                     },
-                    origin?.threadId,
+                    wk.threadId,
                   )?.then(() => reconcileWorkerPin(agentId, wkChat, true))
                   return
                 }