switchroom 0.15.22 → 0.15.23

package/dist/agent-scheduler/index.js

@@ -11001,11 +11001,11 @@ var ActionSpecSchema = exports_external.discriminatedUnion("type", [
 var ScheduleEntrySchema = exports_external.object({
   cron: exports_external.string().describe("Cron expression (e.g., '0 8 * * *')"),
   prompt: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Prompt to send at the scheduled time (the escalation prompt when " + "kind=poll; templated with {{diff}}). Required for kind prompt/poll; " + "absent for kind=action (an action has no model fire, so no prompt)."),
-  kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates — zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt are honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on; an action is model-free regardless (the " + "kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic actions)."),
+  kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates — zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt tiering is on by default " + "(SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch); an action is model-free " + "regardless (the kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic " + "actions)."),
   poll: PollSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=poll. The declarative poll spec."),
   action: ActionSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=action. The declarative action spec (telegram-message or webhook)."),
   model: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Cron model hint. Reactivated by SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON (was DEPRECATED/" + "IGNORED in v0.8). A known-cheap id (sonnet/haiku family) routes the " + "fire to a fresh cheap cron session (Tier 1, `context: fresh`); 'opus', " + "a custom id, or unset routes to the agent's live session (Tier 2, " + "`context: agent`) — the conservative default that preserves pre-v0.8 " + "behaviour. Note: a live session's model is fixed at launch, so on Tier " + "2 this is informational. See docs/scheduling.md."),
-  context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' → a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' → the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset → inferred from " + "`model` (cheap→fresh, else agent). Honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on."),
+  context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' → a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' → the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset → inferred from " + "`model` (cheap→fresh, else agent). On by default; " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch."),
   secrets: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-/]+$/, "Secret key names must contain only alphanumeric characters, underscores, hyphens, and forward slashes")).default([]).describe("Vault key names this cron task may read via the vault-broker daemon. " + "Empty by default — broker requests for unlisted keys are denied. " + "Note: this is misconfiguration protection (a typo in cron-A doesn't " + "accidentally read cron-B's keys) rather than a security boundary — " + "anyone who can edit cron scripts can also edit switchroom.yaml, and " + "anyone with the vault passphrase can read the vault file directly. " + "See docs/configuration.md for the full framing."),
   topic: exports_external.union([
     exports_external.string().min(1, "topic alias must be non-empty"),
@@ -11517,8 +11517,8 @@ var WebServiceConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
   managed: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Whether `switchroom update` refreshes the web-service container " + "(dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) via `switchroom webd " + "install`. Default: false — existing installs run the web server " + "as the legacy `switchroom-web.service` systemd unit and must not " + "be surprised by a container takeover of host loopback 127.0.0.1:" + "8080 mid-update. Set true ONLY after cutting over to the " + "container (stop+disable the systemd unit, `switchroom webd " + "install`). The container runs in its own compose project " + "(`switchroom-web`), separate from the agent fleet, with " + "network_mode: host so it keeps owning loopback:8080 for the " + "cloudflared tunnel + tailscale serve consumers.")
 });
 var HostdConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
-  config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit §3). Default false — the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true (and once PR 1c lands the apply path), " + "admin agents can propose unified-diff patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
-  config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit §5). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Implemented as a sqlite token bucket in PR 1c; the " + "field is wired here in PR 1a so operators can pin it before the " + "limiter is live. Above the cap, the verb returns " + "`E_RATE_LIMITED` without raising a card.")
+  config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit §3). Default false — the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true, admin agents can propose unified-diff " + "patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
+  config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit §5). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Configurable now, but the rate limiter is not yet enforced " + "(no `E_RATE_LIMITED` is currently raised); the field is reserved so " + "operators can pin the cap ahead of the limiter going live.")
 });
 var CronEgressSchema = exports_external.object({
   allowed_hosts: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().min(1)).default([]).describe("Hosts a poll may reach (exact, https-only). loopback/private/IP-literal are always rejected."),
@@ -11555,7 +11555,7 @@ var SwitchroomConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
   notion_workspace: NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema.describe("RFC docs/rfcs/notion-integration.md. Top-level Notion integration " + "config — vault key for the integration token, friendly-name → " + "database UUID map, optional MCP-package version pin, and optional " + "global rate-limit override (default 3 rps, Notion's documented " + "public-API limit). Block is optional; when omitted no agent gets a " + "Notion MCP entry regardless of per-agent config."),
   quota: QuotaConfigSchema.optional().describe("Optional weekly/monthly USD spend budgets rendered in the session " + "greeting. Usage is read from ccusage at runtime; no network calls."),
   host_control: HostControlConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Host-control daemon configuration. Defaults to enabled=true since " + "RFC C Phase 2 (docs/rfcs/host-control-daemon.md). Omit the block " + "to accept defaults; set `enabled: false` only on legacy systemd-" + "mode installs (removal tracked as RFC C Phase 3)."),
-  hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Currently scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the new " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (PR 1a — disabled by default)."),
+  hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (disabled by default)."),
   web_service: WebServiceConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Web-service container (dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) config. " + "Defaults to managed=false so existing systemd-mode installs are " + "untouched. Set managed: true after cutting over to the " + "`switchroom-web` container — then `switchroom update` keeps it " + "refreshed. See `switchroom webd install`."),
   google_accounts: exports_external.record(exports_external.string().regex(/^[^@\s:]+@[^@\s:]+\.[^@\s:]+$/, {
     message: "Account key must be a Google account email like 'alice@example.com' (colons not allowed)"

package/dist/auth-broker/index.js

@@ -11001,11 +11001,11 @@ var ActionSpecSchema = exports_external.discriminatedUnion("type", [
 var ScheduleEntrySchema = exports_external.object({
   cron: exports_external.string().describe("Cron expression (e.g., '0 8 * * *')"),
   prompt: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Prompt to send at the scheduled time (the escalation prompt when " + "kind=poll; templated with {{diff}}). Required for kind prompt/poll; " + "absent for kind=action (an action has no model fire, so no prompt)."),
-  kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates — zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt are honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on; an action is model-free regardless (the " + "kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic actions)."),
+  kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates — zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt tiering is on by default " + "(SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch); an action is model-free " + "regardless (the kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic " + "actions)."),
   poll: PollSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=poll. The declarative poll spec."),
   action: ActionSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=action. The declarative action spec (telegram-message or webhook)."),
   model: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Cron model hint. Reactivated by SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON (was DEPRECATED/" + "IGNORED in v0.8). A known-cheap id (sonnet/haiku family) routes the " + "fire to a fresh cheap cron session (Tier 1, `context: fresh`); 'opus', " + "a custom id, or unset routes to the agent's live session (Tier 2, " + "`context: agent`) — the conservative default that preserves pre-v0.8 " + "behaviour. Note: a live session's model is fixed at launch, so on Tier " + "2 this is informational. See docs/scheduling.md."),
-  context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' → a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' → the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset → inferred from " + "`model` (cheap→fresh, else agent). Honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on."),
+  context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' → a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' → the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset → inferred from " + "`model` (cheap→fresh, else agent). On by default; " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch."),
   secrets: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-/]+$/, "Secret key names must contain only alphanumeric characters, underscores, hyphens, and forward slashes")).default([]).describe("Vault key names this cron task may read via the vault-broker daemon. " + "Empty by default — broker requests for unlisted keys are denied. " + "Note: this is misconfiguration protection (a typo in cron-A doesn't " + "accidentally read cron-B's keys) rather than a security boundary — " + "anyone who can edit cron scripts can also edit switchroom.yaml, and " + "anyone with the vault passphrase can read the vault file directly. " + "See docs/configuration.md for the full framing."),
   topic: exports_external.union([
     exports_external.string().min(1, "topic alias must be non-empty"),
@@ -11517,8 +11517,8 @@ var WebServiceConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
   managed: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Whether `switchroom update` refreshes the web-service container " + "(dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) via `switchroom webd " + "install`. Default: false — existing installs run the web server " + "as the legacy `switchroom-web.service` systemd unit and must not " + "be surprised by a container takeover of host loopback 127.0.0.1:" + "8080 mid-update. Set true ONLY after cutting over to the " + "container (stop+disable the systemd unit, `switchroom webd " + "install`). The container runs in its own compose project " + "(`switchroom-web`), separate from the agent fleet, with " + "network_mode: host so it keeps owning loopback:8080 for the " + "cloudflared tunnel + tailscale serve consumers.")
 });
 var HostdConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
-  config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit §3). Default false — the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true (and once PR 1c lands the apply path), " + "admin agents can propose unified-diff patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
-  config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit §5). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Implemented as a sqlite token bucket in PR 1c; the " + "field is wired here in PR 1a so operators can pin it before the " + "limiter is live. Above the cap, the verb returns " + "`E_RATE_LIMITED` without raising a card.")
+  config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit §3). Default false — the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true, admin agents can propose unified-diff " + "patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
+  config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit §5). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Configurable now, but the rate limiter is not yet enforced " + "(no `E_RATE_LIMITED` is currently raised); the field is reserved so " + "operators can pin the cap ahead of the limiter going live.")
 });
 var CronEgressSchema = exports_external.object({
   allowed_hosts: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().min(1)).default([]).describe("Hosts a poll may reach (exact, https-only). loopback/private/IP-literal are always rejected."),
@@ -11555,7 +11555,7 @@ var SwitchroomConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
   notion_workspace: NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema.describe("RFC docs/rfcs/notion-integration.md. Top-level Notion integration " + "config — vault key for the integration token, friendly-name → " + "database UUID map, optional MCP-package version pin, and optional " + "global rate-limit override (default 3 rps, Notion's documented " + "public-API limit). Block is optional; when omitted no agent gets a " + "Notion MCP entry regardless of per-agent config."),
   quota: QuotaConfigSchema.optional().describe("Optional weekly/monthly USD spend budgets rendered in the session " + "greeting. Usage is read from ccusage at runtime; no network calls."),
   host_control: HostControlConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Host-control daemon configuration. Defaults to enabled=true since " + "RFC C Phase 2 (docs/rfcs/host-control-daemon.md). Omit the block " + "to accept defaults; set `enabled: false` only on legacy systemd-" + "mode installs (removal tracked as RFC C Phase 3)."),
-  hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Currently scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the new " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (PR 1a — disabled by default)."),
+  hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (disabled by default)."),
   web_service: WebServiceConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Web-service container (dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) config. " + "Defaults to managed=false so existing systemd-mode installs are " + "untouched. Set managed: true after cutting over to the " + "`switchroom-web` container — then `switchroom update` keeps it " + "refreshed. See `switchroom webd install`."),
   google_accounts: exports_external.record(exports_external.string().regex(/^[^@\s:]+@[^@\s:]+\.[^@\s:]+$/, {
     message: "Account key must be a Google account email like 'alice@example.com' (colons not allowed)"

package/dist/cli/notion-write-pretool.mjs

@@ -11749,11 +11749,11 @@ var ActionSpecSchema = exports_external.discriminatedUnion("type", [
 var ScheduleEntrySchema = exports_external.object({
   cron: exports_external.string().describe("Cron expression (e.g., '0 8 * * *')"),
   prompt: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Prompt to send at the scheduled time (the escalation prompt when " + "kind=poll; templated with {{diff}}). Required for kind prompt/poll; " + "absent for kind=action (an action has no model fire, so no prompt)."),
-  kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates \u2014 zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt are honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on; an action is model-free regardless (the " + "kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic actions)."),
+  kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates \u2014 zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt tiering is on by default " + "(SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch); an action is model-free " + "regardless (the kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic " + "actions)."),
   poll: PollSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=poll. The declarative poll spec."),
   action: ActionSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=action. The declarative action spec (telegram-message or webhook)."),
   model: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Cron model hint. Reactivated by SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON (was DEPRECATED/" + "IGNORED in v0.8). A known-cheap id (sonnet/haiku family) routes the " + "fire to a fresh cheap cron session (Tier 1, `context: fresh`); 'opus', " + "a custom id, or unset routes to the agent's live session (Tier 2, " + "`context: agent`) \u2014 the conservative default that preserves pre-v0.8 " + "behaviour. Note: a live session's model is fixed at launch, so on Tier " + "2 this is informational. See docs/scheduling.md."),
-  context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' \u2192 a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' \u2192 the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset \u2192 inferred from " + "`model` (cheap\u2192fresh, else agent). Honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on."),
+  context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' \u2192 a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' \u2192 the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset \u2192 inferred from " + "`model` (cheap\u2192fresh, else agent). On by default; " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch."),
   secrets: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-/]+$/, "Secret key names must contain only alphanumeric characters, underscores, hyphens, and forward slashes")).default([]).describe("Vault key names this cron task may read via the vault-broker daemon. " + "Empty by default \u2014 broker requests for unlisted keys are denied. " + "Note: this is misconfiguration protection (a typo in cron-A doesn't " + "accidentally read cron-B's keys) rather than a security boundary \u2014 " + "anyone who can edit cron scripts can also edit switchroom.yaml, and " + "anyone with the vault passphrase can read the vault file directly. " + "See docs/configuration.md for the full framing."),
   topic: exports_external.union([
     exports_external.string().min(1, "topic alias must be non-empty"),
@@ -12265,8 +12265,8 @@ var WebServiceConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
   managed: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Whether `switchroom update` refreshes the web-service container " + "(dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) via `switchroom webd " + "install`. Default: false \u2014 existing installs run the web server " + "as the legacy `switchroom-web.service` systemd unit and must not " + "be surprised by a container takeover of host loopback 127.0.0.1:" + "8080 mid-update. Set true ONLY after cutting over to the " + "container (stop+disable the systemd unit, `switchroom webd " + "install`). The container runs in its own compose project " + "(`switchroom-web`), separate from the agent fleet, with " + "network_mode: host so it keeps owning loopback:8080 for the " + "cloudflared tunnel + tailscale serve consumers.")
 });
 var HostdConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
-  config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit \u00a73). Default false \u2014 the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true (and once PR 1c lands the apply path), " + "admin agents can propose unified-diff patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
-  config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit \u00a75). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Implemented as a sqlite token bucket in PR 1c; the " + "field is wired here in PR 1a so operators can pin it before the " + "limiter is live. Above the cap, the verb returns " + "`E_RATE_LIMITED` without raising a card.")
+  config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit \u00a73). Default false \u2014 the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true, admin agents can propose unified-diff " + "patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
+  config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit \u00a75). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Configurable now, but the rate limiter is not yet enforced " + "(no `E_RATE_LIMITED` is currently raised); the field is reserved so " + "operators can pin the cap ahead of the limiter going live.")
 });
 var CronEgressSchema = exports_external.object({
   allowed_hosts: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().min(1)).default([]).describe("Hosts a poll may reach (exact, https-only). loopback/private/IP-literal are always rejected."),
@@ -12303,7 +12303,7 @@ var SwitchroomConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
   notion_workspace: NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema.describe("RFC docs/rfcs/notion-integration.md. Top-level Notion integration " + "config \u2014 vault key for the integration token, friendly-name \u2192 " + "database UUID map, optional MCP-package version pin, and optional " + "global rate-limit override (default 3 rps, Notion's documented " + "public-API limit). Block is optional; when omitted no agent gets a " + "Notion MCP entry regardless of per-agent config."),
   quota: QuotaConfigSchema.optional().describe("Optional weekly/monthly USD spend budgets rendered in the session " + "greeting. Usage is read from ccusage at runtime; no network calls."),
   host_control: HostControlConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Host-control daemon configuration. Defaults to enabled=true since " + "RFC C Phase 2 (docs/rfcs/host-control-daemon.md). Omit the block " + "to accept defaults; set `enabled: false` only on legacy systemd-" + "mode installs (removal tracked as RFC C Phase 3)."),
-  hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Currently scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the new " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (PR 1a \u2014 disabled by default)."),
+  hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (disabled by default)."),
   web_service: WebServiceConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Web-service container (dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) config. " + "Defaults to managed=false so existing systemd-mode installs are " + "untouched. Set managed: true after cutting over to the " + "`switchroom-web` container \u2014 then `switchroom update` keeps it " + "refreshed. See `switchroom webd install`."),
   google_accounts: exports_external.record(exports_external.string().regex(/^[^@\s:]+@[^@\s:]+\.[^@\s:]+$/, {
     message: "Account key must be a Google account email like 'alice@example.com' (colons not allowed)"

package/dist/cli/switchroom.js

@@ -13565,11 +13565,11 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
   ScheduleEntrySchema = exports_external.object({
     cron: exports_external.string().describe("Cron expression (e.g., '0 8 * * *')"),
     prompt: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Prompt to send at the scheduled time (the escalation prompt when " + "kind=poll; templated with {{diff}}). Required for kind prompt/poll; " + "absent for kind=action (an action has no model fire, so no prompt)."),
-    kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates \u2014 zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt are honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on; an action is model-free regardless (the " + "kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic actions)."),
+    kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates \u2014 zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt tiering is on by default " + "(SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch); an action is model-free " + "regardless (the kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic " + "actions)."),
     poll: PollSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=poll. The declarative poll spec."),
     action: ActionSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=action. The declarative action spec (telegram-message or webhook)."),
     model: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Cron model hint. Reactivated by SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON (was DEPRECATED/" + "IGNORED in v0.8). A known-cheap id (sonnet/haiku family) routes the " + "fire to a fresh cheap cron session (Tier 1, `context: fresh`); 'opus', " + "a custom id, or unset routes to the agent's live session (Tier 2, " + "`context: agent`) \u2014 the conservative default that preserves pre-v0.8 " + "behaviour. Note: a live session's model is fixed at launch, so on Tier " + "2 this is informational. See docs/scheduling.md."),
-    context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' \u2192 a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' \u2192 the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset \u2192 inferred from " + "`model` (cheap\u2192fresh, else agent). Honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on."),
+    context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' \u2192 a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' \u2192 the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset \u2192 inferred from " + "`model` (cheap\u2192fresh, else agent). On by default; " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch."),
     secrets: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-/]+$/, "Secret key names must contain only alphanumeric characters, underscores, hyphens, and forward slashes")).default([]).describe("Vault key names this cron task may read via the vault-broker daemon. " + "Empty by default \u2014 broker requests for unlisted keys are denied. " + "Note: this is misconfiguration protection (a typo in cron-A doesn't " + "accidentally read cron-B's keys) rather than a security boundary \u2014 " + "anyone who can edit cron scripts can also edit switchroom.yaml, and " + "anyone with the vault passphrase can read the vault file directly. " + "See docs/configuration.md for the full framing."),
     topic: exports_external.union([
       exports_external.string().min(1, "topic alias must be non-empty"),
@@ -14081,8 +14081,8 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     managed: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Whether `switchroom update` refreshes the web-service container " + "(dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) via `switchroom webd " + "install`. Default: false \u2014 existing installs run the web server " + "as the legacy `switchroom-web.service` systemd unit and must not " + "be surprised by a container takeover of host loopback 127.0.0.1:" + "8080 mid-update. Set true ONLY after cutting over to the " + "container (stop+disable the systemd unit, `switchroom webd " + "install`). The container runs in its own compose project " + "(`switchroom-web`), separate from the agent fleet, with " + "network_mode: host so it keeps owning loopback:8080 for the " + "cloudflared tunnel + tailscale serve consumers.")
   });
   HostdConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
-    config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit \u00a73). Default false \u2014 the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true (and once PR 1c lands the apply path), " + "admin agents can propose unified-diff patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
-    config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit \u00a75). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Implemented as a sqlite token bucket in PR 1c; the " + "field is wired here in PR 1a so operators can pin it before the " + "limiter is live. Above the cap, the verb returns " + "`E_RATE_LIMITED` without raising a card.")
+    config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit \u00a73). Default false \u2014 the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true, admin agents can propose unified-diff " + "patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
+    config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit \u00a75). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Configurable now, but the rate limiter is not yet enforced " + "(no `E_RATE_LIMITED` is currently raised); the field is reserved so " + "operators can pin the cap ahead of the limiter going live.")
   });
   CronEgressSchema = exports_external.object({
     allowed_hosts: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().min(1)).default([]).describe("Hosts a poll may reach (exact, https-only). loopback/private/IP-literal are always rejected."),
@@ -14119,7 +14119,7 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     notion_workspace: NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema.describe("RFC docs/rfcs/notion-integration.md. Top-level Notion integration " + "config \u2014 vault key for the integration token, friendly-name \u2192 " + "database UUID map, optional MCP-package version pin, and optional " + "global rate-limit override (default 3 rps, Notion's documented " + "public-API limit). Block is optional; when omitted no agent gets a " + "Notion MCP entry regardless of per-agent config."),
     quota: QuotaConfigSchema.optional().describe("Optional weekly/monthly USD spend budgets rendered in the session " + "greeting. Usage is read from ccusage at runtime; no network calls."),
     host_control: HostControlConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Host-control daemon configuration. Defaults to enabled=true since " + "RFC C Phase 2 (docs/rfcs/host-control-daemon.md). Omit the block " + "to accept defaults; set `enabled: false` only on legacy systemd-" + "mode installs (removal tracked as RFC C Phase 3)."),
-    hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Currently scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the new " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (PR 1a \u2014 disabled by default)."),
+    hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (disabled by default)."),
     web_service: WebServiceConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Web-service container (dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) config. " + "Defaults to managed=false so existing systemd-mode installs are " + "untouched. Set managed: true after cutting over to the " + "`switchroom-web` container \u2014 then `switchroom update` keeps it " + "refreshed. See `switchroom webd install`."),
     google_accounts: exports_external.record(exports_external.string().regex(/^[^@\s:]+@[^@\s:]+\.[^@\s:]+$/, {
       message: "Account key must be a Google account email like 'alice@example.com' (colons not allowed)"
@@ -50424,7 +50424,7 @@ var init_server4 = __esm(() => {
     },
     {
       name: "config_propose_edit",
-      description: "Propose a unified-diff patch against /state/config/switchroom.yaml " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit). When fully shipped the host validates " + "the patch (applies cleanly + post-patch yaml parses against the " + "config schema) and raises a Telegram approval card in the OPERATOR's " + "primary chat \u2014 NOT yours; the requesting agent's chat is not the " + "approval surface. Admin-only at the wire layer. " + "Current status (PR 1a \u2014 skeleton): the tool is registered but the " + "feature is OFF by default; calling it returns " + "E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED until the operator sets " + "hostd.config_edit_enabled=true in switchroom.yaml. Even when enabled " + "in this PR, the call returns E_NOT_IMPLEMENTED \u2014 the validation " + "pipeline (PR 1b) and apply path (PR 1c) ship in follow-up PRs.",
+      description: "Propose a unified-diff patch against /state/config/switchroom.yaml. " + "The host validates the patch (applies cleanly + post-patch yaml parses " + "against the config schema + no secret leak), raises a Telegram approval " + "card in the OPERATOR's primary chat (NOT yours \u2014 the requesting agent's " + "chat is not the approval surface), and on Allow applies it in place and " + "reconciles (rolling back if reconcile fails); returns " + `result:"completed" on success. Use this \u2014 behind the operator's tap \u2014 ` + "to amend config instead of asking the operator to hand-edit the yaml. " + "Admin agents may propose ANY field; non-admin agents are confined to " + "their own agents.<self>.tools.allow. Requires " + "hostd.config_edit_enabled=true (operator opt-in; default off) \u2014 returns " + "E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED otherwise. An applied edit is not live in the " + "running agent until it restarts (the approval card names which agents " + "to bounce).",
       inputSchema: {
         type: "object",
         required: ["unified_diff", "reason", "target_path"],
@@ -50432,7 +50432,7 @@ var init_server4 = __esm(() => {
           unified_diff: {
             type: "string",
             minLength: 1,
-            description: "Unified diff against switchroom.yaml. Must have \u22653 lines " + "context (enforced in PR 1b); no path-traversal or multi-file " + "diffs. LF-only, \u22641 MB."
+            description: "Unified diff against switchroom.yaml. Any context level (a " + "zero-context diff is fine); single-file, no path-traversal. " + "LF-only, \u22641 MB."
           },
           reason: {
             type: "string",
@@ -50477,8 +50477,8 @@ var {
 } = import__.default;
 
 // src/build-info.ts
-var VERSION = "0.15.22";
-var COMMIT_SHA = "a6c13429";
+var VERSION = "0.15.23";
+var COMMIT_SHA = "4c70a87a";
 
 // src/cli/agent.ts
 init_source();
@@ -76387,9 +76387,8 @@ async function stepGoogleWorkspace(config, nonInteractive) {
     console.log(source_default.gray(`    Step 2 \u2014 enable the account on ${source_default.bold(firstName)}:`));
     console.log(source_default.cyan(`      ${enableCmd}`));
     console.log();
-    console.log(source_default.gray(`    (\`account add\` is a stub today \u2014 Phase 3b.2d wires the OAuth flow.`));
-    console.log(source_default.gray(`     Until then, use the v0.6.0 fallback:`));
-    console.log(source_default.gray(`       ${fallbackCmd})`));
+    console.log(source_default.gray(`    (\`account add\` runs the OAuth flow in your browser. Older`));
+    console.log(source_default.gray(`     single-agent alternative: ${fallbackCmd})`));
   } else {
     console.log(source_default.gray(`  ${STEP_DONE} Skipped \u2014 connect later with:`));
     console.log(source_default.cyan(`    ${accountAddCmd}`));
@@ -84003,7 +84002,7 @@ function scheduleRemove(opts) {
 }
 function registerAgentConfigWriteCommands(program3) {
   const schedule = program3.command("schedule").description("Add / remove an agent's scheduled cron entries (overlay-backed)");
-  schedule.command("add").description("Append a schedule entry to the agent's overlay dir").requiredOption("--cron <expr>", "Cron expression").requiredOption("--prompt <text>", "Prompt to fire at the scheduled time").option("--agent <name>", "Target agent (defaults to $SWITCHROOM_AGENT_NAME)").option("--secrets <list>", "Comma-separated vault keys (REJECTED for agent-authored overlays)").option("--name <slug>", "Optional human-readable name (a-z 0-9 -)").option("--model <id>", "Cheap-cron tier hint: a known-cheap model (sonnet/haiku) routes this fire to a fresh, minimal-context cron session (Tier 1) instead of the agent's full live session (Tier 2), cutting token cost. Inert unless SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on.").option("--context <mode>", "Tier hint: 'fresh' (minimal-context cheap session) or 'agent' (full live session). Unset \u2192 inferred from --model.").option("--stage-on-reject", "When a security gate trips (secrets/quota/min-interval), stage the entry under .pending/ for operator approval instead of rejecting with exit 9. Used by the MCP path; operator CLI defaults to off.").action(async (opts) => {
+  schedule.command("add").description("Append a schedule entry to the agent's overlay dir").requiredOption("--cron <expr>", "Cron expression").requiredOption("--prompt <text>", "Prompt to fire at the scheduled time").option("--agent <name>", "Target agent (defaults to $SWITCHROOM_AGENT_NAME)").option("--secrets <list>", "Comma-separated vault keys (REJECTED for agent-authored overlays)").option("--name <slug>", "Optional human-readable name (a-z 0-9 -)").option("--model <id>", "Cheap-cron tier hint: a known-cheap model (sonnet/haiku) routes this fire to a fresh, minimal-context cron session (Tier 1) instead of the agent's full live session (Tier 2), cutting token cost. Active by default; SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch.").option("--context <mode>", "Tier hint: 'fresh' (minimal-context cheap session) or 'agent' (full live session). Unset \u2192 inferred from --model.").option("--stage-on-reject", "When a security gate trips (secrets/quota/min-interval), stage the entry under .pending/ for operator approval instead of rejecting with exit 9. Used by the MCP path; operator CLI defaults to off.").action(async (opts) => {
     if (opts.context && opts.context !== "fresh" && opts.context !== "agent") {
       emitError("E_INVALID_PROMPT", "--context must be 'fresh' or 'agent'");
       process.exit(1);
@@ -85969,8 +85968,14 @@ services:
       # resolve there. Mounting the file directly forces docker to
       # follow the symlink at mount time and bind the underlying file
       # to the container path. Mirrors how the agent containers expose
-      # the config (also at /state/config/switchroom.yaml).
-      - ${hostHome}/.switchroom/switchroom.yaml:/state/config/switchroom.yaml:ro
+      # the config (also at /state/config/switchroom.yaml) \u2014 but RW here,
+      # not ro: hostd is the SANCTIONED config writer (config_propose_edit
+      # applies an operator-approved diff in place via O_RDWR). With :ro the
+      # write fails EROFS and every config_propose_edit rolls back
+      # (E_RECONCILE_FAILED_ROLLED_BACK) \u2014 agents could never amend the yaml.
+      # Agents themselves still mount it ro; only hostd, the tap-gated writer,
+      # gets rw. The in-place writer preserves the file's owner/mode.
+      - ${hostHome}/.switchroom/switchroom.yaml:/state/config/switchroom.yaml:rw
       # docker.sock is the whole reason hostd exists \u2014 agents shouldn't
       # have it, but hostd (auditing every shell-out via run-hook.sh's
       # pattern) is the controlled chokepoint.

package/dist/host-control/main.js

@@ -13736,11 +13736,11 @@ var ActionSpecSchema = exports_external.discriminatedUnion("type", [
 var ScheduleEntrySchema = exports_external.object({
   cron: exports_external.string().describe("Cron expression (e.g., '0 8 * * *')"),
   prompt: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Prompt to send at the scheduled time (the escalation prompt when " + "kind=poll; templated with {{diff}}). Required for kind prompt/poll; " + "absent for kind=action (an action has no model fire, so no prompt)."),
-  kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates — zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt are honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on; an action is model-free regardless (the " + "kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic actions)."),
+  kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates — zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt tiering is on by default " + "(SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch); an action is model-free " + "regardless (the kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic " + "actions)."),
   poll: PollSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=poll. The declarative poll spec."),
   action: ActionSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=action. The declarative action spec (telegram-message or webhook)."),
   model: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Cron model hint. Reactivated by SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON (was DEPRECATED/" + "IGNORED in v0.8). A known-cheap id (sonnet/haiku family) routes the " + "fire to a fresh cheap cron session (Tier 1, `context: fresh`); 'opus', " + "a custom id, or unset routes to the agent's live session (Tier 2, " + "`context: agent`) — the conservative default that preserves pre-v0.8 " + "behaviour. Note: a live session's model is fixed at launch, so on Tier " + "2 this is informational. See docs/scheduling.md."),
-  context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' → a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' → the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset → inferred from " + "`model` (cheap→fresh, else agent). Honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on."),
+  context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' → a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' → the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset → inferred from " + "`model` (cheap→fresh, else agent). On by default; " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch."),
   secrets: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-/]+$/, "Secret key names must contain only alphanumeric characters, underscores, hyphens, and forward slashes")).default([]).describe("Vault key names this cron task may read via the vault-broker daemon. " + "Empty by default — broker requests for unlisted keys are denied. " + "Note: this is misconfiguration protection (a typo in cron-A doesn't " + "accidentally read cron-B's keys) rather than a security boundary — " + "anyone who can edit cron scripts can also edit switchroom.yaml, and " + "anyone with the vault passphrase can read the vault file directly. " + "See docs/configuration.md for the full framing."),
   topic: exports_external.union([
     exports_external.string().min(1, "topic alias must be non-empty"),
@@ -14252,8 +14252,8 @@ var WebServiceConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
   managed: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Whether `switchroom update` refreshes the web-service container " + "(dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) via `switchroom webd " + "install`. Default: false — existing installs run the web server " + "as the legacy `switchroom-web.service` systemd unit and must not " + "be surprised by a container takeover of host loopback 127.0.0.1:" + "8080 mid-update. Set true ONLY after cutting over to the " + "container (stop+disable the systemd unit, `switchroom webd " + "install`). The container runs in its own compose project " + "(`switchroom-web`), separate from the agent fleet, with " + "network_mode: host so it keeps owning loopback:8080 for the " + "cloudflared tunnel + tailscale serve consumers.")
 });
 var HostdConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
-  config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit §3). Default false — the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true (and once PR 1c lands the apply path), " + "admin agents can propose unified-diff patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
-  config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit §5). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Implemented as a sqlite token bucket in PR 1c; the " + "field is wired here in PR 1a so operators can pin it before the " + "limiter is live. Above the cap, the verb returns " + "`E_RATE_LIMITED` without raising a card.")
+  config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit §3). Default false — the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true, admin agents can propose unified-diff " + "patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
+  config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit §5). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Configurable now, but the rate limiter is not yet enforced " + "(no `E_RATE_LIMITED` is currently raised); the field is reserved so " + "operators can pin the cap ahead of the limiter going live.")
 });
 var CronEgressSchema = exports_external.object({
   allowed_hosts: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().min(1)).default([]).describe("Hosts a poll may reach (exact, https-only). loopback/private/IP-literal are always rejected."),
@@ -14290,7 +14290,7 @@ var SwitchroomConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
   notion_workspace: NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema.describe("RFC docs/rfcs/notion-integration.md. Top-level Notion integration " + "config — vault key for the integration token, friendly-name → " + "database UUID map, optional MCP-package version pin, and optional " + "global rate-limit override (default 3 rps, Notion's documented " + "public-API limit). Block is optional; when omitted no agent gets a " + "Notion MCP entry regardless of per-agent config."),
   quota: QuotaConfigSchema.optional().describe("Optional weekly/monthly USD spend budgets rendered in the session " + "greeting. Usage is read from ccusage at runtime; no network calls."),
   host_control: HostControlConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Host-control daemon configuration. Defaults to enabled=true since " + "RFC C Phase 2 (docs/rfcs/host-control-daemon.md). Omit the block " + "to accept defaults; set `enabled: false` only on legacy systemd-" + "mode installs (removal tracked as RFC C Phase 3)."),
-  hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Currently scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the new " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (PR 1a — disabled by default)."),
+  hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (disabled by default)."),
   web_service: WebServiceConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Web-service container (dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) config. " + "Defaults to managed=false so existing systemd-mode installs are " + "untouched. Set managed: true after cutting over to the " + "`switchroom-web` container — then `switchroom update` keeps it " + "refreshed. See `switchroom webd install`."),
   google_accounts: exports_external.record(exports_external.string().regex(/^[^@\s:]+@[^@\s:]+\.[^@\s:]+$/, {
     message: "Account key must be a Google account email like 'alice@example.com' (colons not allowed)"

package/dist/vault/approvals/kernel-server.js

@@ -11344,11 +11344,11 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
   ScheduleEntrySchema = exports_external.object({
     cron: exports_external.string().describe("Cron expression (e.g., '0 8 * * *')"),
     prompt: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Prompt to send at the scheduled time (the escalation prompt when " + "kind=poll; templated with {{diff}}). Required for kind prompt/poll; " + "absent for kind=action (an action has no model fire, so no prompt)."),
-    kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates — zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt are honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on; an action is model-free regardless (the " + "kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic actions)."),
+    kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates — zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt tiering is on by default " + "(SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch); an action is model-free " + "regardless (the kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic " + "actions)."),
     poll: PollSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=poll. The declarative poll spec."),
     action: ActionSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=action. The declarative action spec (telegram-message or webhook)."),
     model: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Cron model hint. Reactivated by SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON (was DEPRECATED/" + "IGNORED in v0.8). A known-cheap id (sonnet/haiku family) routes the " + "fire to a fresh cheap cron session (Tier 1, `context: fresh`); 'opus', " + "a custom id, or unset routes to the agent's live session (Tier 2, " + "`context: agent`) — the conservative default that preserves pre-v0.8 " + "behaviour. Note: a live session's model is fixed at launch, so on Tier " + "2 this is informational. See docs/scheduling.md."),
-    context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' → a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' → the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset → inferred from " + "`model` (cheap→fresh, else agent). Honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on."),
+    context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' → a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' → the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset → inferred from " + "`model` (cheap→fresh, else agent). On by default; " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch."),
     secrets: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-/]+$/, "Secret key names must contain only alphanumeric characters, underscores, hyphens, and forward slashes")).default([]).describe("Vault key names this cron task may read via the vault-broker daemon. " + "Empty by default — broker requests for unlisted keys are denied. " + "Note: this is misconfiguration protection (a typo in cron-A doesn't " + "accidentally read cron-B's keys) rather than a security boundary — " + "anyone who can edit cron scripts can also edit switchroom.yaml, and " + "anyone with the vault passphrase can read the vault file directly. " + "See docs/configuration.md for the full framing."),
     topic: exports_external.union([
       exports_external.string().min(1, "topic alias must be non-empty"),
@@ -11860,8 +11860,8 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     managed: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Whether `switchroom update` refreshes the web-service container " + "(dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) via `switchroom webd " + "install`. Default: false — existing installs run the web server " + "as the legacy `switchroom-web.service` systemd unit and must not " + "be surprised by a container takeover of host loopback 127.0.0.1:" + "8080 mid-update. Set true ONLY after cutting over to the " + "container (stop+disable the systemd unit, `switchroom webd " + "install`). The container runs in its own compose project " + "(`switchroom-web`), separate from the agent fleet, with " + "network_mode: host so it keeps owning loopback:8080 for the " + "cloudflared tunnel + tailscale serve consumers.")
   });
   HostdConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
-    config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit §3). Default false — the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true (and once PR 1c lands the apply path), " + "admin agents can propose unified-diff patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
-    config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit §5). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Implemented as a sqlite token bucket in PR 1c; the " + "field is wired here in PR 1a so operators can pin it before the " + "limiter is live. Above the cap, the verb returns " + "`E_RATE_LIMITED` without raising a card.")
+    config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit §3). Default false — the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true, admin agents can propose unified-diff " + "patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
+    config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit §5). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Configurable now, but the rate limiter is not yet enforced " + "(no `E_RATE_LIMITED` is currently raised); the field is reserved so " + "operators can pin the cap ahead of the limiter going live.")
   });
   CronEgressSchema = exports_external.object({
     allowed_hosts: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().min(1)).default([]).describe("Hosts a poll may reach (exact, https-only). loopback/private/IP-literal are always rejected."),
@@ -11898,7 +11898,7 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     notion_workspace: NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema.describe("RFC docs/rfcs/notion-integration.md. Top-level Notion integration " + "config — vault key for the integration token, friendly-name → " + "database UUID map, optional MCP-package version pin, and optional " + "global rate-limit override (default 3 rps, Notion's documented " + "public-API limit). Block is optional; when omitted no agent gets a " + "Notion MCP entry regardless of per-agent config."),
     quota: QuotaConfigSchema.optional().describe("Optional weekly/monthly USD spend budgets rendered in the session " + "greeting. Usage is read from ccusage at runtime; no network calls."),
     host_control: HostControlConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Host-control daemon configuration. Defaults to enabled=true since " + "RFC C Phase 2 (docs/rfcs/host-control-daemon.md). Omit the block " + "to accept defaults; set `enabled: false` only on legacy systemd-" + "mode installs (removal tracked as RFC C Phase 3)."),
-    hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Currently scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the new " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (PR 1a — disabled by default)."),
+    hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (disabled by default)."),
     web_service: WebServiceConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Web-service container (dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) config. " + "Defaults to managed=false so existing systemd-mode installs are " + "untouched. Set managed: true after cutting over to the " + "`switchroom-web` container — then `switchroom update` keeps it " + "refreshed. See `switchroom webd install`."),
     google_accounts: exports_external.record(exports_external.string().regex(/^[^@\s:]+@[^@\s:]+\.[^@\s:]+$/, {
       message: "Account key must be a Google account email like 'alice@example.com' (colons not allowed)"

package/dist/vault/broker/server.js

@@ -11344,11 +11344,11 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
   ScheduleEntrySchema = exports_external.object({
     cron: exports_external.string().describe("Cron expression (e.g., '0 8 * * *')"),
     prompt: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Prompt to send at the scheduled time (the escalation prompt when " + "kind=poll; templated with {{diff}}). Required for kind prompt/poll; " + "absent for kind=action (an action has no model fire, so no prompt)."),
-    kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates — zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt are honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on; an action is model-free regardless (the " + "kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic actions)."),
+    kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates — zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt tiering is on by default " + "(SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch); an action is model-free " + "regardless (the kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic " + "actions)."),
     poll: PollSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=poll. The declarative poll spec."),
     action: ActionSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=action. The declarative action spec (telegram-message or webhook)."),
     model: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Cron model hint. Reactivated by SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON (was DEPRECATED/" + "IGNORED in v0.8). A known-cheap id (sonnet/haiku family) routes the " + "fire to a fresh cheap cron session (Tier 1, `context: fresh`); 'opus', " + "a custom id, or unset routes to the agent's live session (Tier 2, " + "`context: agent`) — the conservative default that preserves pre-v0.8 " + "behaviour. Note: a live session's model is fixed at launch, so on Tier " + "2 this is informational. See docs/scheduling.md."),
-    context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' → a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' → the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset → inferred from " + "`model` (cheap→fresh, else agent). Honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on."),
+    context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' → a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' → the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset → inferred from " + "`model` (cheap→fresh, else agent). On by default; " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch."),
     secrets: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-/]+$/, "Secret key names must contain only alphanumeric characters, underscores, hyphens, and forward slashes")).default([]).describe("Vault key names this cron task may read via the vault-broker daemon. " + "Empty by default — broker requests for unlisted keys are denied. " + "Note: this is misconfiguration protection (a typo in cron-A doesn't " + "accidentally read cron-B's keys) rather than a security boundary — " + "anyone who can edit cron scripts can also edit switchroom.yaml, and " + "anyone with the vault passphrase can read the vault file directly. " + "See docs/configuration.md for the full framing."),
     topic: exports_external.union([
       exports_external.string().min(1, "topic alias must be non-empty"),
@@ -11860,8 +11860,8 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     managed: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Whether `switchroom update` refreshes the web-service container " + "(dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) via `switchroom webd " + "install`. Default: false — existing installs run the web server " + "as the legacy `switchroom-web.service` systemd unit and must not " + "be surprised by a container takeover of host loopback 127.0.0.1:" + "8080 mid-update. Set true ONLY after cutting over to the " + "container (stop+disable the systemd unit, `switchroom webd " + "install`). The container runs in its own compose project " + "(`switchroom-web`), separate from the agent fleet, with " + "network_mode: host so it keeps owning loopback:8080 for the " + "cloudflared tunnel + tailscale serve consumers.")
   });
   HostdConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
-    config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit §3). Default false — the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true (and once PR 1c lands the apply path), " + "admin agents can propose unified-diff patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
-    config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit §5). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Implemented as a sqlite token bucket in PR 1c; the " + "field is wired here in PR 1a so operators can pin it before the " + "limiter is live. Above the cap, the verb returns " + "`E_RATE_LIMITED` without raising a card.")
+    config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit §3). Default false — the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true, admin agents can propose unified-diff " + "patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
+    config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit §5). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Configurable now, but the rate limiter is not yet enforced " + "(no `E_RATE_LIMITED` is currently raised); the field is reserved so " + "operators can pin the cap ahead of the limiter going live.")
   });
   CronEgressSchema = exports_external.object({
     allowed_hosts: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().min(1)).default([]).describe("Hosts a poll may reach (exact, https-only). loopback/private/IP-literal are always rejected."),
@@ -11898,7 +11898,7 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     notion_workspace: NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema.describe("RFC docs/rfcs/notion-integration.md. Top-level Notion integration " + "config — vault key for the integration token, friendly-name → " + "database UUID map, optional MCP-package version pin, and optional " + "global rate-limit override (default 3 rps, Notion's documented " + "public-API limit). Block is optional; when omitted no agent gets a " + "Notion MCP entry regardless of per-agent config."),
     quota: QuotaConfigSchema.optional().describe("Optional weekly/monthly USD spend budgets rendered in the session " + "greeting. Usage is read from ccusage at runtime; no network calls."),
     host_control: HostControlConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Host-control daemon configuration. Defaults to enabled=true since " + "RFC C Phase 2 (docs/rfcs/host-control-daemon.md). Omit the block " + "to accept defaults; set `enabled: false` only on legacy systemd-" + "mode installs (removal tracked as RFC C Phase 3)."),
-    hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Currently scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the new " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (PR 1a — disabled by default)."),
+    hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (disabled by default)."),
     web_service: WebServiceConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Web-service container (dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) config. " + "Defaults to managed=false so existing systemd-mode installs are " + "untouched. Set managed: true after cutting over to the " + "`switchroom-web` container — then `switchroom update` keeps it " + "refreshed. See `switchroom webd install`."),
     google_accounts: exports_external.record(exports_external.string().regex(/^[^@\s:]+@[^@\s:]+\.[^@\s:]+$/, {
       message: "Account key must be a Google account email like 'alice@example.com' (colons not allowed)"

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "switchroom",
-  "version": "0.15.22",
+  "version": "0.15.23",
   "description": "Run Claude Code 24/7 on your Claude Pro/Max subscription over Telegram. Open-source alternative to OpenClaw and NanoClaw — no API keys.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
     "test:vitest": "vitest run",
     "test:bun": "bun test src/watchdog/state.test.ts src/watchdog/policy.test.ts src/vault/grants.test.ts src/vault/write-grants.test.ts src/vault/broker/server-grants.test.ts src/vault/broker/server-write-grants.test.ts src/vault/broker/server-mint-grant-passphrase-attest.test.ts src/vault/broker/server-passphrase-attest.test.ts src/vault/broker/server-mint-grant-posture-attest.test.ts src/vault/broker/server-admin-only-keys.test.ts src/vault/broker/client-token.test.ts src/vault/broker/server-unlock.test.ts src/vault/broker/auto-unlock.test.ts src/vault/broker/drift-detection.test.ts tests/vault-broker-passphrase.test.ts src/cli/vault-get-broker.test.ts src/vault/resolver-via-broker.test.ts src/vault/broker/scope.test.ts src/vault/broker/server.test.ts src/drive/disconnect.test.ts src/drive/grants.test.ts src/drive/oauth.test.ts src/drive/onboarding.test.ts src/drive/reconciler.test.ts src/drive/vault-slots.test.ts src/drive/wrapper.test.ts src/vault/approvals/kernel.test.ts src/vault/approvals/approval-origin.test.ts src/vault/approvals/schema-idempotent.test.ts src/vault/broker/server-approvals.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/boot-probes.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/boot-version-string.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/history.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/history-reaper.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/ipc-server-client.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/ipc-server-race.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/gateway-bridge.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/gateway-startup-mutex.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/gateway-clean-shutdown-marker.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/boot-card-dedupe.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/boot-card-reason.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/progress-update.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/quota-cache.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/silent-reply-guard.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/unhandled-rejection-policy.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/registry-turns.test.ts telegram-plugin/registry/subagents.test.ts telegram-plugin/registry/subagents-bugs.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/subagent-watcher-parent-turn-key.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/turns-writer.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/resume-inbound-builder.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/subagent-tracker-hooks.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/resolve-calling-subagent.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/gateway-update-placeholder-dispatch.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/reaction-trigger.test.ts telegram-plugin/tests/reaction-trigger-flow.test.ts telegram-plugin/uat/load-env.test.ts telegram-plugin/uat/feed-matcher.test.ts telegram-plugin/gateway/webhook-ingest-server.test.ts",
     "test:watch": "vitest",
-    "lint": "tsc --noEmit && node scripts/check-plugin-references.mjs && bash scripts/check-bot-api-wrapping.sh && node scripts/check-bun-test-imports.mjs && node scripts/check-no-pii-secrets.mjs && node scripts/check-vault-test-hermeticity.mjs && node scripts/check-no-broadcast-delivery.mjs",
+    "lint": "tsc --noEmit && node scripts/check-plugin-references.mjs && bash scripts/check-bot-api-wrapping.sh && node scripts/check-bun-test-imports.mjs && node scripts/check-no-pii-secrets.mjs && node scripts/check-vault-test-hermeticity.mjs && node scripts/check-no-broadcast-delivery.mjs && node scripts/check-stale-tool-descriptions.mjs",
     "lint:tsc": "tsc --noEmit",
     "lint:plugin-references": "node scripts/check-plugin-references.mjs",
     "lint:bot-api-wrapping": "bash scripts/check-bot-api-wrapping.sh",

package/profiles/default/CLAUDE.md.hbs

@@ -131,9 +131,13 @@ A config-summary greeting card is sent automatically by the SessionStart hook
 {{#if admin}}
 ## Admin surface
 
-You're `admin: true`. Fleet operations live on the `hostd` MCP server: `agent_restart` / `agent_start` / `agent_stop` (lifecycle of any peer), `agent_logs` (peer container logs), `agent_exec` (read-only inspection inside any peer — argv[0] must be on the safe-command allowlist), `update_check` / `update_apply`. Treat these like a root shell on the host: confirm intent before destructive actions, refuse if unsure who's asking.
+You're `admin: true`. Fleet operations live on the `hostd` MCP server: `agent_restart` / `agent_start` / `agent_stop` (lifecycle of any peer), `agent_logs` (peer container logs), `agent_exec` (read-only inspection inside any peer — argv[0] must be on the safe-command allowlist), `update_check` / `update_apply`, `get_status` (look up a prior mutation's outcome by request_id), and `config_propose_edit`. Treat these like a root shell on the host: confirm intent before destructive actions, refuse if unsure who's asking.
 
-Only `update_check` (a read-only dry-run) runs immediately. Every mutating / host verb — `update_apply`, `agent_exec`, `agent_restart` / `agent_start` / `agent_stop`, `agent_logs` — pauses for an **operator approval card in Telegram before it executes**: a human must tap approve. This is deliberate (you are a prompt-injectable process; the human in the loop is the safety boundary, not your own judgement). Expect the call to block until approved or denied; if denied, don't retry — relay the denial and stop.
+**Editing `switchroom.yaml` — use `config_propose_edit`, don't hand the operator a snippet.** When `hostd.config_edit_enabled` is on (it returns `E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` if not), this is the sanctioned way to amend config: you propose a unified diff, the operator gets a Telegram approval card, and on Allow the host applies + reconciles it. As admin you may propose any field. An applied edit isn't live in the affected agent until it restarts — the result card names which agents to bounce (use `agent_restart`, or tell the operator). The vault is different: `vault remove` / secret deletes stay operator-only host-CLI ops — there's no agent tool for those, so for those you DO hand the operator the command.
+
+After a tapped `update_apply`, call `get_status` with its request_id to confirm what actually rolled out before reporting success — don't assume.
+
+Only `update_check` (a read-only dry-run) and `get_status` run immediately. Every mutating / host verb — `update_apply`, `agent_exec`, `agent_restart` / `agent_start` / `agent_stop`, `agent_logs`, `config_propose_edit` — pauses for an **operator approval card in Telegram before it executes**: a human must tap approve. This is deliberate (you are a prompt-injectable process; the human in the loop is the safety boundary, not your own judgement). Expect the call to block until approved or denied; if denied, don't retry — relay the denial and stop.
 {{else}}
 ## Admin operations
 

package/telegram-plugin/dist/gateway/gateway.js

@@ -23847,11 +23847,11 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
   ScheduleEntrySchema = exports_external.object({
     cron: exports_external.string().describe("Cron expression (e.g., '0 8 * * *')"),
     prompt: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Prompt to send at the scheduled time (the escalation prompt when " + "kind=poll; templated with {{diff}}). Required for kind prompt/poll; " + "absent for kind=action (an action has no model fire, so no prompt)."),
-    kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates \u2014 zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt are honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on; an action is model-free regardless (the " + "kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic actions)."),
+    kind: exports_external.enum(["poll", "prompt", "action"]).optional().describe("Tier-0 routing (docs/rfcs/cheap-cron-sessions.md). 'prompt' (default) " + "fires a model turn every tick (Tier 1/2 per `context`). 'poll' runs a " + "model-free deterministic check (requires `poll`) and only escalates to " + "a model fire on a hit. 'action' runs a model-free deterministic verb " + "(requires `action`) that COMPLETES the work and never escalates \u2014 zero " + "tokens, no session. poll/prompt tiering is on by default " + "(SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch); an action is model-free " + "regardless (the kill-switch governs model tiering, not deterministic " + "actions)."),
     poll: PollSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=poll. The declarative poll spec."),
     action: ActionSpecSchema.optional().describe("Required iff kind=action. The declarative action spec (telegram-message or webhook)."),
     model: exports_external.string().optional().describe("Cron model hint. Reactivated by SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON (was DEPRECATED/" + "IGNORED in v0.8). A known-cheap id (sonnet/haiku family) routes the " + "fire to a fresh cheap cron session (Tier 1, `context: fresh`); 'opus', " + "a custom id, or unset routes to the agent's live session (Tier 2, " + "`context: agent`) \u2014 the conservative default that preserves pre-v0.8 " + "behaviour. Note: a live session's model is fixed at launch, so on Tier " + "2 this is informational. See docs/scheduling.md."),
-    context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' \u2192 a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' \u2192 the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset \u2192 inferred from " + "`model` (cheap\u2192fresh, else agent). Honoured only when " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON is on."),
+    context: exports_external.enum(["fresh", "agent"]).optional().describe("Does this cron need the agent, or just a model? 'fresh' \u2192 a minimal-" + "context cheap cron session (Tier 1). 'agent' \u2192 the agent's live " + "session with full persona/memory (Tier 2). Unset \u2192 inferred from " + "`model` (cheap\u2192fresh, else agent). On by default; " + "SWITCHROOM_CHEAP_CRON=0 is the kill-switch."),
     secrets: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-/]+$/, "Secret key names must contain only alphanumeric characters, underscores, hyphens, and forward slashes")).default([]).describe("Vault key names this cron task may read via the vault-broker daemon. " + "Empty by default \u2014 broker requests for unlisted keys are denied. " + "Note: this is misconfiguration protection (a typo in cron-A doesn't " + "accidentally read cron-B's keys) rather than a security boundary \u2014 " + "anyone who can edit cron scripts can also edit switchroom.yaml, and " + "anyone with the vault passphrase can read the vault file directly. " + "See docs/configuration.md for the full framing."),
     topic: exports_external.union([
       exports_external.string().min(1, "topic alias must be non-empty"),
@@ -24363,8 +24363,8 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     managed: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Whether `switchroom update` refreshes the web-service container " + "(dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) via `switchroom webd " + "install`. Default: false \u2014 existing installs run the web server " + "as the legacy `switchroom-web.service` systemd unit and must not " + "be surprised by a container takeover of host loopback 127.0.0.1:" + "8080 mid-update. Set true ONLY after cutting over to the " + "container (stop+disable the systemd unit, `switchroom webd " + "install`). The container runs in its own compose project " + "(`switchroom-web`), separate from the agent fleet, with " + "network_mode: host so it keeps owning loopback:8080 for the " + "cloudflared tunnel + tailscale serve consumers.")
   });
   HostdConfigSchema = exports_external.object({
-    config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit \u00a73). Default false \u2014 the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true (and once PR 1c lands the apply path), " + "admin agents can propose unified-diff patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
-    config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit \u00a75). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Implemented as a sqlite token bucket in PR 1c; the " + "field is wired here in PR 1a so operators can pin it before the " + "limiter is live. Above the cap, the verb returns " + "`E_RATE_LIMITED` without raising a card.")
+    config_edit_enabled: exports_external.boolean().default(false).describe("Opt-in toggle for the `config_propose_edit` hostd verb (RFC " + "admin-agent-config-edit \u00a73). Default false \u2014 the verb returns " + "`E_CONFIG_EDIT_DISABLED` until the operator explicitly flips " + "this to true. When true, admin agents can propose unified-diff " + "patches against " + "`/state/config/switchroom.yaml`, gated by an operator approval " + "card in the primary chat. Same trust posture as `update_apply` " + "and `agent_restart`: the human-in-the-loop tap is the security " + "boundary, not the agent's judgement."),
+    config_edit_rate_per_hour: exports_external.number().int().min(1).max(20).default(3).describe("Per-requesting-agent rate cap for `config_propose_edit` cards " + "(RFC admin-agent-config-edit \u00a75). Default 3 cards/hour; min 1, " + "max 20. Configurable now, but the rate limiter is not yet enforced " + "(no `E_RATE_LIMITED` is currently raised); the field is reserved so " + "operators can pin the cap ahead of the limiter going live.")
   });
   CronEgressSchema = exports_external.object({
     allowed_hosts: exports_external.array(exports_external.string().min(1)).default([]).describe("Hosts a poll may reach (exact, https-only). loopback/private/IP-literal are always rejected."),
@@ -24401,7 +24401,7 @@ var init_schema = __esm(() => {
     notion_workspace: NotionWorkspaceConfigSchema.describe("RFC docs/rfcs/notion-integration.md. Top-level Notion integration " + "config \u2014 vault key for the integration token, friendly-name \u2192 " + "database UUID map, optional MCP-package version pin, and optional " + "global rate-limit override (default 3 rps, Notion's documented " + "public-API limit). Block is optional; when omitted no agent gets a " + "Notion MCP entry regardless of per-agent config."),
     quota: QuotaConfigSchema.optional().describe("Optional weekly/monthly USD spend budgets rendered in the session " + "greeting. Usage is read from ccusage at runtime; no network calls."),
     host_control: HostControlConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Host-control daemon configuration. Defaults to enabled=true since " + "RFC C Phase 2 (docs/rfcs/host-control-daemon.md). Omit the block " + "to accept defaults; set `enabled: false` only on legacy systemd-" + "mode installs (removal tracked as RFC C Phase 3)."),
-    hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Currently scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the new " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (PR 1a \u2014 disabled by default)."),
+    hostd: HostdConfigSchema.default({}).describe("hostd verb-level knobs (RFC admin-agent-config-edit). Distinct " + "from `host_control:` which governs whether the daemon runs at " + "all. Scopes the opt-in flag and rate cap for the " + "`config_propose_edit` verb (disabled by default)."),
     web_service: WebServiceConfigSchema.default({}).describe("Web-service container (dashboard + GitHub-webhook receiver) config. " + "Defaults to managed=false so existing systemd-mode installs are " + "untouched. Set managed: true after cutting over to the " + "`switchroom-web` container \u2014 then `switchroom update` keeps it " + "refreshed. See `switchroom webd install`."),
     google_accounts: exports_external.record(exports_external.string().regex(/^[^@\s:]+@[^@\s:]+\.[^@\s:]+$/, {
       message: "Account key must be a Google account email like 'alice@example.com' (colons not allowed)"
@@ -54420,11 +54420,11 @@ function readTurnActiveMarkerAgeMs(stateDir, now) {
 }
 
 // ../src/build-info.ts
-var VERSION = "0.15.22";
-var COMMIT_SHA = "a6c13429";
-var COMMIT_DATE = "2026-06-14T03:27:21Z";
-var LATEST_PR = 2349;
-var COMMITS_AHEAD_OF_TAG = 0;
+var VERSION = "0.15.23";
+var COMMIT_SHA = "4c70a87a";
+var COMMIT_DATE = "2026-06-14T15:15:27+10:00";
+var LATEST_PR = null;
+var COMMITS_AHEAD_OF_TAG = 2;
 
 // gateway/boot-version.ts
 function formatRelativeAgo(iso) {