switchroom 0.12.22 → 0.12.23

package/telegram-plugin/tests/inbound-delivery-machine.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,475 @@
+/**
+ * Property tests for `inbound-delivery-machine.ts`.
+ *
+ * Per RFC `docs/rfcs/inbound-delivery-state-machine.md`: 5 invariants
+ * validated over arbitrary event schedules. A counterexample is the
+ * minimal evidence that the machine has a bug. The wedge-cluster
+ * bugs (v0.12.22 boot-wedge, overlapping-turn silence, #1564 sibling
+ * keys) become FAILING property tests if reintroduced.
+ *
+ * Schedules are generated by a seeded PRNG so failures are
+ * reproducible. We don't use fast-check (not a dependency) — the
+ * randomness is sufficient for the invariant shapes we're checking,
+ * and pure random + shrink-on-failure is documented in the RFC as
+ * acceptable for v1.
+ */
+
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
+import {
+  type ChatKey,
+  type Effect,
+  type Event,
+  type InboundMessage,
+  type PermissionVerdict,
+  type State,
+  initialState,
+  OUTBOUND_RECENT_MS,
+  transition,
+  TURN_TTL_MS,
+  __chatIdOfKeyForTests,
+} from '../gateway/inbound-delivery-machine'
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Seeded PRNG (deterministic for reproducible failures)
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+function mulberry32(seed: number): () => number {
+  let s = seed >>> 0
+  return () => {
+    s = (s + 0x6d2b79f5) >>> 0
+    let t = s
+    t = Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 15), t | 1)
+    t ^= t + Math.imul(t ^ (t >>> 7), t | 61)
+    return ((t ^ (t >>> 14)) >>> 0) / 4294967296
+  }
+}
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Event generators
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+const CHATS = ['c1', 'c2', 'c3'] as const
+const THREADS = ['_', '1', '2', '0'] as const // includes '_' AND '0' to flag any latent sibling-key handling
+
+function makeKey(chat: string, thread: string): ChatKey {
+  return `${chat}:${thread}` as ChatKey
+}
+
+interface ScheduleContext {
+  readonly rand: () => number
+  now: number
+  msgIdCounter: number
+  permIdCounter: number
+}
+
+function randomKey(ctx: ScheduleContext): ChatKey {
+  const c = CHATS[Math.floor(ctx.rand() * CHATS.length)]
+  const t = THREADS[Math.floor(ctx.rand() * THREADS.length)]
+  return makeKey(c, t)
+}
+
+function nextMsg(ctx: ScheduleContext, isSteering = false): InboundMessage {
+  const msgId = ++ctx.msgIdCounter
+  return { msgId, isSteering, payload: { id: msgId } }
+}
+
+function nextVerdict(ctx: ScheduleContext): PermissionVerdict {
+  const requestId = `req-${++ctx.permIdCounter}`
+  return { requestId, behavior: 'allow', payload: { requestId } }
+}
+
+function advanceTime(ctx: ScheduleContext, range: number): void {
+  ctx.now += Math.floor(ctx.rand() * range)
+}
+
+type EventKind = Event['kind']
+const EVENT_KINDS: readonly EventKind[] = [
+  'bridgeUp',
+  'bridgeDown',
+  'inbound',
+  'turnStart',
+  'turnEnd',
+  'modelOutbound',
+  'permVerdict',
+  'tick',
+]
+
+function generateEvent(ctx: ScheduleContext, prior: State): Event {
+  // Weight inbound + tick + turnEnd higher than rare ops so schedules
+  // exercise the steady-state hot path.
+  const r = ctx.rand()
+  let kind: EventKind
+  if (r < 0.3) kind = 'inbound'
+  else if (r < 0.45) kind = 'tick'
+  else if (r < 0.55) kind = 'turnEnd'
+  else if (r < 0.65) kind = 'modelOutbound'
+  else if (r < 0.75) kind = 'turnStart'
+  else if (r < 0.82) kind = 'permVerdict'
+  else if (r < 0.91) kind = 'bridgeUp'
+  else kind = 'bridgeDown'
+
+  switch (kind) {
+    case 'bridgeUp':
+      return { kind: 'bridgeUp', at: ctx.now }
+    case 'bridgeDown':
+      return { kind: 'bridgeDown', at: ctx.now }
+    case 'inbound': {
+      const isSteering = ctx.rand() < 0.1
+      return { kind: 'inbound', key: randomKey(ctx), msg: nextMsg(ctx, isSteering), at: ctx.now }
+    }
+    case 'turnStart':
+      return { kind: 'turnStart', key: randomKey(ctx), at: ctx.now }
+    case 'turnEnd': {
+      // Bias toward an actually-active key so turnEnd is meaningful
+      // most of the time.
+      const activeKeys = [...prior.perKey.entries()]
+        .filter(([, v]) => v.turnStartedAt != null)
+        .map(([k]) => k)
+      const key = activeKeys.length > 0 && ctx.rand() < 0.8
+        ? activeKeys[Math.floor(ctx.rand() * activeKeys.length)]
+        : randomKey(ctx)
+      return { kind: 'turnEnd', key, at: ctx.now, outboundEmitted: ctx.rand() < 0.85 }
+    }
+    case 'modelOutbound':
+      return { kind: 'modelOutbound', key: randomKey(ctx), at: ctx.now }
+    case 'permVerdict':
+      return { kind: 'permVerdict', verdict: nextVerdict(ctx), at: ctx.now }
+    case 'tick':
+      // Tick advances time meaningfully — sometimes a small step,
+      // sometimes a big one that crosses TURN_TTL_MS so the fallback
+      // path is exercised.
+      advanceTime(ctx, ctx.rand() < 0.1 ? TURN_TTL_MS * 2 : 5_000)
+      return { kind: 'tick', now: ctx.now }
+  }
+}
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Property: simulate a schedule and assert invariants
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+interface TraceEntry {
+  readonly event: Event
+  readonly stateBefore: State
+  readonly stateAfter: State
+  readonly effects: readonly Effect[]
+}
+
+function runSchedule(seed: number, eventCount: number): TraceEntry[] {
+  const ctx: ScheduleContext = {
+    rand: mulberry32(seed),
+    now: 0,
+    msgIdCounter: 0,
+    permIdCounter: 0,
+  }
+  let state = initialState()
+  const trace: TraceEntry[] = []
+  for (let i = 0; i < eventCount; i++) {
+    const event = generateEvent(ctx, state)
+    const { state: stateAfter, effects } = transition(state, event)
+    trace.push({ event, stateBefore: state, stateAfter, effects })
+    state = stateAfter
+    // Advance clock a small amount between events so timestamps don't
+    // cluster at zero.
+    advanceTime(ctx, 1_000)
+  }
+  return trace
+}
+
+function formatCounterexample(seed: number, trace: TraceEntry[]): string {
+  const lines = [`seed=${seed}, len=${trace.length}`, '']
+  for (let i = 0; i < trace.length; i++) {
+    const t = trace[i]
+    lines.push(`#${i} ${t.event.kind} ${JSON.stringify(t.event)}`)
+    if (t.effects.length > 0) {
+      lines.push(`   → ${t.effects.map((e) => e.kind).join(', ')}`)
+    }
+  }
+  return lines.join('\n')
+}
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Invariant #1 — Every inbound is delivered XOR persisted
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('Invariant #1 — every inbound is delivered XOR persisted', () => {
+  it('holds across 1000 random schedules of 50 events', () => {
+    for (let seed = 1; seed <= 1000; seed++) {
+      const trace = runSchedule(seed, 50)
+      for (let i = 0; i < trace.length; i++) {
+        const t = trace[i]
+        if (t.event.kind !== 'inbound') continue
+        const msgId = t.event.msg.msgId
+        const delivered = t.effects.some(
+          (e) => e.kind === 'deliverToBridge' && e.msg.msgId === msgId,
+        )
+        const buffered = t.effects.some(
+          (e) => e.kind === 'bufferInbound' && e.msg.msgId === msgId,
+        )
+        const persisted = t.effects.some(
+          (e) => e.kind === 'persistInbound' && e.msg.msgId === msgId,
+        )
+        // Contract: delivered XOR (buffered AND persisted). Never both
+        // delivered AND buffered. Never neither.
+        if (delivered && (buffered || persisted)) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `Invariant #1 violated at event #${i}: msg ${msgId} both delivered and buffered.\n` +
+            formatCounterexample(seed, trace.slice(0, i + 1)),
+          )
+        }
+        if (!delivered && !buffered) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `Invariant #1 violated at event #${i}: msg ${msgId} neither delivered nor buffered.\n` +
+            formatCounterexample(seed, trace.slice(0, i + 1)),
+          )
+        }
+        if (buffered && !persisted) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `Invariant #1 violated at event #${i}: msg ${msgId} buffered but not persisted.\n` +
+            formatCounterexample(seed, trace.slice(0, i + 1)),
+          )
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    expect(true).toBe(true)
+  })
+})
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Invariant #2 — setTurnStarted has a matching clearTurnStarted
+// before the next end-of-life event (turnEnd, bridgeDown for active,
+// or tick past TURN_TTL).
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('Invariant #2 — turnStarted is matched by clearTurnStarted before EOL', () => {
+  it('holds across 1000 random schedules of 100 events', () => {
+    for (let seed = 1; seed <= 1000; seed++) {
+      const trace = runSchedule(seed, 100)
+      // For each turn started, track when it was started and find the
+      // matching clear. The clear must come strictly before:
+      //  - the next turnEnd for that key
+      //  - OR the next tick that crosses TURN_TTL
+      //  - OR bridgeDown (if the active turn — bridgeDown can clear
+      //    state implicitly per the RFC's state machine; we don't
+      //    require clear in that case, the bridge_dead state takes
+      //    over)
+      // Simpler equivalent: at the end of every schedule step, the
+      // perKey set should never contain a turnStartedAt entry that's
+      // STALE BEYOND TTL. The tick handler is the gate.
+      for (let i = 0; i < trace.length; i++) {
+        const t = trace[i]
+        for (const [k, v] of t.stateAfter.perKey) {
+          if (v.turnStartedAt == null) continue
+          const age = t.event.kind === 'tick'
+            ? t.event.now - v.turnStartedAt
+            : 0
+          // Note: we don't have a single "current time" outside
+          // tick events. Only ticks can detect TTL expiration; so
+          // a stale entry persists across non-tick events until a
+          // tick processes it. That's the design.
+          if (t.event.kind === 'tick' && age > TURN_TTL_MS) {
+            // Recent outbound suppresses fallback (invariant #5) — if
+            // suppressed, the entry stays. Confirm the suppression
+            // condition holds.
+            if (v.lastOutboundAt == null || t.event.now - v.lastOutboundAt >= OUTBOUND_RECENT_MS) {
+              throw new Error(
+                `Invariant #2 violated at event #${i}: key ${k} has stale turnStartedAt ` +
+                `(age=${age}ms > ${TURN_TTL_MS}ms) after a tick.\n` +
+                formatCounterexample(seed, trace.slice(0, i + 1)),
+              )
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    expect(true).toBe(true)
+  })
+})
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Invariant #3 — per-chat sibling-key cleanup on turnEnd
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('Invariant #3 — turnEnd sweeps sibling keys for the same chatId', () => {
+  it('holds across 1000 random schedules of 100 events', () => {
+    for (let seed = 1; seed <= 1000; seed++) {
+      const trace = runSchedule(seed, 100)
+      for (let i = 0; i < trace.length; i++) {
+        const t = trace[i]
+        if (t.event.kind !== 'turnEnd') continue
+        const chatId = __chatIdOfKeyForTests(t.event.key)
+        // After turnEnd, no sibling key for this chatId should retain
+        // turnStartedAt != null.
+        for (const [k, v] of t.stateAfter.perKey) {
+          if (__chatIdOfKeyForTests(k) !== chatId) continue
+          if (v.turnStartedAt != null) {
+            throw new Error(
+              `Invariant #3 violated at event #${i}: turnEnd for ${t.event.key} ` +
+              `left sibling key ${k} with turnStartedAt=${v.turnStartedAt}.\n` +
+              formatCounterexample(seed, trace.slice(0, i + 1)),
+            )
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    expect(true).toBe(true)
+  })
+})
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Invariant #4 — permVerdict delivered iff bridge alive
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('Invariant #4 — permVerdict delivered iff bridge alive', () => {
+  it('holds across 1000 random schedules of 50 events', () => {
+    for (let seed = 1; seed <= 1000; seed++) {
+      const trace = runSchedule(seed, 50)
+      for (let i = 0; i < trace.length; i++) {
+        const t = trace[i]
+        if (t.event.kind !== 'permVerdict') continue
+        const alive = t.stateBefore.global.kind !== 'bridge_dead'
+        const delivered = t.effects.some((e) => e.kind === 'deliverPermVerdict')
+        const persisted = t.effects.some((e) => e.kind === 'persistPermVerdict')
+        if (alive && !delivered) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `Invariant #4 violated at #${i}: bridge alive but permVerdict not delivered.\n` +
+            formatCounterexample(seed, trace.slice(0, i + 1)),
+          )
+        }
+        if (!alive && !persisted) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `Invariant #4 violated at #${i}: bridge dead but permVerdict not persisted.\n` +
+            formatCounterexample(seed, trace.slice(0, i + 1)),
+          )
+        }
+        if (delivered && persisted) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `Invariant #4 violated at #${i}: permVerdict both delivered and persisted.\n` +
+            formatCounterexample(seed, trace.slice(0, i + 1)),
+          )
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    expect(true).toBe(true)
+  })
+})
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Invariant #5 — spurious-fallback suppression (the 2026-05-20
+// overlapping-turn silence bug becomes unrepresentable)
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('Invariant #5 — fallback poke suppressed if model recently broke silence', () => {
+  it('holds across 1000 random schedules of 100 events', () => {
+    for (let seed = 1; seed <= 1000; seed++) {
+      const trace = runSchedule(seed, 100)
+      for (let i = 0; i < trace.length; i++) {
+        const t = trace[i]
+        if (t.event.kind !== 'tick') continue
+        const now = t.event.now
+        for (const eff of t.effects) {
+          if (eff.kind !== 'firePoke' || eff.level !== 'fallback') continue
+          // Look up the key's lastOutboundAt at stateBefore.
+          const perKey = t.stateBefore.perKey.get(eff.key)
+          if (perKey == null) continue
+          if (perKey.lastOutboundAt == null) continue
+          const sinceOutbound = now - perKey.lastOutboundAt
+          if (sinceOutbound < OUTBOUND_RECENT_MS) {
+            throw new Error(
+              `Invariant #5 violated at #${i}: fallback fired for ${eff.key} ` +
+              `but model produced outbound only ${sinceOutbound}ms ago ` +
+              `(threshold ${OUTBOUND_RECENT_MS}ms).\n` +
+              formatCounterexample(seed, trace.slice(0, i + 1)),
+            )
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    expect(true).toBe(true)
+  })
+})
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Targeted regression: the v0.12.22 boot-wedge case
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('Targeted regression — v0.12.22 boot-wedge', () => {
+  it('first inbound on a fresh bridge delivers, not buffers', () => {
+    let s = initialState()
+    s = transition(s, { kind: 'bridgeUp', at: 0 }).state
+    const { state: s2, effects } = transition(s, {
+      kind: 'inbound',
+      key: 'c1:_' as ChatKey,
+      msg: { msgId: 1, isSteering: false, payload: {} },
+      at: 100,
+    })
+    const delivered = effects.some((e) => e.kind === 'deliverToBridge')
+    const buffered = effects.some((e) => e.kind === 'bufferInbound')
+    expect(delivered).toBe(true)
+    expect(buffered).toBe(false)
+    expect(s2.global.kind).toBe('bridge_alive_in_turn')
+  })
+})
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Targeted regression: the 2026-05-20 overlapping-turn silence case
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('Targeted regression — overlapping-turn silence (the post-v0.12.22 case)', () => {
+  it("suppresses fallback when model produced outbound in prior overlapping turn", () => {
+    let s = initialState()
+    s = transition(s, { kind: 'bridgeUp', at: 0 }).state
+
+    // Turn A starts and ends with an outbound at t=5000
+    s = transition(s, {
+      kind: 'inbound',
+      key: 'c1:_' as ChatKey,
+      msg: { msgId: 1, isSteering: false, payload: {} },
+      at: 1000,
+    }).state
+    s = transition(s, {
+      kind: 'turnEnd',
+      key: 'c1:_' as ChatKey,
+      at: 5000,
+      outboundEmitted: true,
+    }).state
+
+    // Turn B starts at t=6000 (immediately after A)
+    s = transition(s, {
+      kind: 'inbound',
+      key: 'c1:_' as ChatKey,
+      msg: { msgId: 2, isSteering: false, payload: {} },
+      at: 6000,
+    }).state
+
+    // Tick at t=310,000: turn B is 304s old (past TURN_TTL_MS=300_000).
+    // But the model emitted an outbound at t=5000 (less than 60s ago
+    // RELATIVE TO TURN B'S START, but 305s before now).
+    // Per invariant #5: suppress fallback iff lastOutbound is within
+    // OUTBOUND_RECENT_MS (60s) of NOW. 310_000 - 5_000 = 305_000 ms;
+    // not within the suppression window. So fallback SHOULD fire here.
+    const tickResult = transition(s, { kind: 'tick', now: 310_000 })
+    const fired = tickResult.effects.some(
+      (e) => e.kind === 'firePoke' && e.level === 'fallback',
+    )
+    expect(fired).toBe(true)
+
+    // Now reset and verify the suppression case: outbound at t=305_000,
+    // tick at t=310_000 — only 5s elapsed since outbound.
+    let s2 = initialState()
+    s2 = transition(s2, { kind: 'bridgeUp', at: 0 }).state
+    s2 = transition(s2, {
+      kind: 'inbound',
+      key: 'c2:_' as ChatKey,
+      msg: { msgId: 3, isSteering: false, payload: {} },
+      at: 1000,
+    }).state
+    // Model emitted an outbound very recently
+    s2 = transition(s2, { kind: 'modelOutbound', key: 'c2:_' as ChatKey, at: 305_000 }).state
+    // Tick: turn is 309s old, outbound was 5s ago → suppress
+    const suppress = transition(s2, { kind: 'tick', now: 310_000 })
+    const firedSuppressed = suppress.effects.some(
+      (e) => e.kind === 'firePoke' && e.level === 'fallback',
+    )
+    expect(firedSuppressed).toBe(false)
+  })
+})

package/telegram-plugin/uat/scenarios/jtbd-fast-trivial-dm.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/**
+ * JTBD scenario — short happy path: trivial questions reply FAST.
+ *
+ * Serves: `reference/know-what-my-agent-is-doing.md` — the short-path
+ * contract: a question with no real work should produce a plain reply
+ * with no ceremony (no soft-commit, no progress chunks) within a tight
+ * budget. Users judge agent speed on THIS path more than any other.
+ *
+ * Also serves: the always-on vision (`reference/vision.md`). An agent
+ * that takes 30+ seconds to answer "what's 2+2" is not "always-on" —
+ * it's awake but unresponsive.
+ *
+ * ## Targets
+ *
+ * From `reference/conversational-pacing.md` and the post-v0.12.22
+ * baseline measurements:
+ *
+ *   - **TTFO p95 (vision target):** < 30s — the published contract.
+ *     This test asserts the FAST-trivial case, not p95, so we tighten.
+ *   - **Trivial-prompt TTFO (this test):** < 12s as hard contract,
+ *     < 6s as the vision target. The mtcute post-restart UAT measured
+ *     19.4s on a COLD-START fresh-restart; a warm fast-trivial should
+ *     be materially faster — the dominant cost on cold start is
+ *     boot+session-resume which doesn't apply here.
+ *   - **Soft-commit ceremony:** must NOT fire for trivial prompts.
+ *     If the reply contains a soft-commit preamble ("let me check
+ *     that for you, back in a few"), the conversational-pacing
+ *     prompt classified the trivial prompt as slow — a regression.
+ *
+ * ## What this catches that other UATs don't
+ *
+ * - `jtbd-soft-commit-dm.test.ts` exercises slow prompts (the soft
+ *   commit SHOULD fire). This test asserts the inverse — fast prompts
+ *   should skip ceremony.
+ * - `jtbd-always-on-after-restart-dm.test.ts` asserts <120s after a
+ *   cold restart. This test asserts <12s on a warm agent — a much
+ *   tighter bar that catches steady-state latency regressions
+ *   (model swap, MCP server slowdown, gateway middleware cost, etc.).
+ * - `smoke-dm-reply.test.ts` confirms the agent replies AT ALL but
+ *   has no latency assertion — a 50s reply would pass smoke. This
+ *   one fails.
+ *
+ * ## Forensic signal on a yellow-band pass
+ *
+ * If TTFO lands in 6-12s, the test passes but logs a forensic warning
+ * so a future regression in this code path is visible BEFORE it
+ * crosses the hard contract. Yellow-band drift is the canary for
+ * "something's getting slower" — better to chase it at 8s than at 28s.
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
+import { spinUp } from "../harness.js";
+
+const AGENT = "test-harness";
+
+// Hard contract for trivial-prompt TTFO.
+const HARD_TTFO_MS = 12_000;
+
+// Vision target: trivial prompts feel near-instant.
+const VISION_TTFO_MS = 6_000;
+
+const TRIVIAL_PROMPT = "Reply with just the number: what is 2 + 2?";
+
+const SOFT_COMMIT_PHRASES = [
+  /let me/i,
+  /back in/i,
+  /one (sec|moment)/i,
+  /checking/i,
+  /looking into/i,
+  /hold on/i,
+];
+
+describe("uat: short happy path — trivial prompt is FAST", () => {
+  it(
+    `trivial prompt → reply lands within ${HARD_TTFO_MS / 1000}s`,
+    async () => {
+      const sc = await spinUp({ agent: AGENT });
+      try {
+        const sendStart = Date.now();
+        await sc.sendDM(TRIVIAL_PROMPT);
+
+        const firstReply = await sc.expectMessage(/\S/, {
+          from: "bot",
+          timeout: HARD_TTFO_MS + 5_000,
+        });
+        const ttfo = Date.now() - sendStart;
+
+        expect(firstReply.text.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+        if (ttfo >= HARD_TTFO_MS) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `[fast-trivial] TTFO=${ttfo}ms exceeds hard contract ` +
+            `${HARD_TTFO_MS}ms — trivial-prompt latency regression.`,
+          );
+        }
+        expect(ttfo).toBeLessThan(HARD_TTFO_MS);
+
+        const triggeredSoftCommit = SOFT_COMMIT_PHRASES.some((re) =>
+          re.test(firstReply.text),
+        );
+        if (triggeredSoftCommit) {
+          console.warn(
+            `[fast-trivial] First reply contains soft-commit phrasing — ` +
+            `the conversational-pacing prompt likely classified the ` +
+            `trivial prompt as slow. Text: ${JSON.stringify(firstReply.text.slice(0, 200))}`,
+          );
+        }
+
+        if (ttfo >= VISION_TTFO_MS) {
+          console.warn(
+            `[fast-trivial] TTFO=${ttfo}ms — passed hard contract ` +
+            `(${HARD_TTFO_MS}ms) but slower than the vision target ` +
+            `(${VISION_TTFO_MS}ms). Forensic canary for delivery-path drift.`,
+          );
+        } else {
+          console.log(
+            `[fast-trivial] TTFO=${ttfo}ms — within vision target ` +
+            `(<${VISION_TTFO_MS}ms). Snappy.`,
+          );
+        }
+      } finally {
+        await sc.tearDown();
+      }
+    },
+    HARD_TTFO_MS + 15_000,
+  );
+});