summrise-agent 1.2.509 → 1.2.511

package/summrise-desktop-electron/src/url-policy.js

@@ -1,238 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-// Pure URL/origin policy for the desktop shell — extracted from main.ts so
-// the security predicates carry unit tests (main.ts imports electron and is
-// unimportable under plain node). SHIPPED ALONGSIDE main.js: the npm build
-// chain copies it, and `summrise update` stages + swaps it with main/preload.
-//
-// IPC audit #1 (HIGH): startsWith(BASE) was BYPASSABLE — the string
-// 'http://127.0.0.1:18080@evil.com/x' passes the prefix test but Chromium
-// parses its host as evil.com (userinfo trick). Every origin decision here
-// compares the PARSED origin.
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.BASE_ORIGIN = exports.BASE = void 0;
-exports.setAgentPort = setAgentPort;
-exports.getAgentPort = getAgentPort;
-exports.agentBase = agentBase;
-exports.parseAgentPort = parseAgentPort;
-exports.isBaseOrigin = isBaseOrigin;
-exports.frameUrlOk = frameUrlOk;
-exports.controlOriginOk = controlOriginOk;
-exports.isDesktopSpaUrl = isDesktopSpaUrl;
-exports.isPrivateHost = isPrivateHost;
-exports.certBypassAllowed = certBypassAllowed;
-exports.sanitizeBrowserUrl = sanitizeBrowserUrl;
-exports.setDshPort = setDshPort;
-exports.getDshPort = getDshPort;
-exports.dshBase = dshBase;
-exports.isDshUrl = isDshUrl;
-exports.BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:18080";
-exports.BASE_ORIGIN = new URL(exports.BASE).origin;
-// Configurable agent port (custom-port installs): the shell follows the
-// agent's config.yaml server.port (main.ts resolves it at boot via
-// SUMMRISE_AGENT_PORT env, else the registry install/data dirs). Predicates
-// below compare against the CONFIGURED origin — a hardcoded 18080 would
-// deafen the IPC bridge and strand the desktop on any custom port.
-// Default stays 18080 (canonical); tests reset via setAgentPort(18080).
-let agentPort = null;
-function setAgentPort(port) {
-    if (Number.isInteger(port) && port > 0 && port < 65536)
-        agentPort = port;
-}
-function getAgentPort() {
-    return agentPort ?? 18080;
-}
-function agentBase() {
-    return `http://127.0.0.1:${getAgentPort()}`;
-}
-function agentOrigin() {
-    return new URL(agentBase()).origin;
-}
-// server.port out of an agent config.yaml (first `port:` inside the
-// top-level `server:` section; null when absent/invalid). Pure so the
-// shell's file/registry glue stays untestable-thin and this stays pinned.
-function parseAgentPort(yamlText) {
-    let inServer = false;
-    for (const raw of String(yamlText || "").split(/\r?\n/)) {
-        const line = raw.trimEnd();
-        if (/^\S/.test(line))
-            inServer = /^server\s*:/.test(line);
-        if (!inServer)
-            continue;
-        const m = /^\s*port\s*:\s*"?(\d{1,5})"?\s*(?:#.*)?$/.exec(line);
-        if (m) {
-            const n = Number(m[1]);
-            if (Number.isInteger(n) && n > 0 && n < 65536)
-                return n;
-            return null;
-        }
-    }
-    return null;
-}
-function isBaseOrigin(url) {
-    try {
-        return new URL(url).origin === agentOrigin();
-    }
-    catch {
-        return false;
-    }
-}
-// IPC audit #2: preload runs in EVERY frame; a frame may invoke the bridge
-// only when its URL carries the pinned origin (main.ts feeds this the raw
-// event.senderFrame.url).
-function frameUrlOk(url) {
-    return isBaseOrigin(url || "");
-}
-// THE LOOPBACK CONTROL API'S ORIGIN VETO (port 9444), and the reason it lives
-// here: the HTTP twin of IPC audit #1 was never fixed. `main.ts` tested the
-// caller's Origin with
-//
-//   /^(https?:\/\/(127\.0\.0\.1|localhost)(:\d+)?|file:\/\/)/i
-//
-// which has NO `$` ANCHOR — so `http://127.0.0.1.evil.com`, `http://localhost.evil.com`
-// and `http://127.0.0.1x` all passed, and the API reflects the caller's Origin,
-// so a foreign page could READ /api/browser-session/list (session URLs) and
-// /api/shell/icon-status (local paths) and POST /api/browser-session/open and
-// /api/shell/start-agent. That is the SAME class as the `startsWith(BASE)` bug
-// this module was extracted to kill; `isDesktopSpaUrl`'s own test pins the
-// sibling-host lookalike, and the HTTP path kept the old shape because it was
-// the one decision that never moved in here.
-//
-// An ABSENT Origin is allowed deliberately: the API is also driven by `curl`
-// and native tooling, which send none, and `main.ts` documents that carve-out.
-// This is a nuisance barrier for browser pages, NOT authentication — the IPC
-// bridge stays separately gated on the frame's own origin.
-function controlOriginOk(origin) {
-    if (!origin || origin === "null")
-        return true; // native tooling / the data: wait page
-    try {
-        const u = new URL(origin);
-        if (u.protocol === "file:")
-            return true;
-        if (u.protocol !== "http:" && u.protocol !== "https:")
-            return false;
-        return u.hostname === "127.0.0.1" || u.hostname === "localhost";
-    }
-    catch {
-        // Unparseable is NOT allowed: a value the policy cannot read must never be
-        // treated as one it recognises.
-        return false;
-    }
-}
-// Main-window tripwire allow-list (did-navigate backstop): the desktop SPA
-// subtree of the base origin. STRING-PREFIX check (startsWith(BASE +
-// "/desktop")) was the exact class IPC audit #1 flagged — compare the PARSED
-// origin and the parsed pathname instead. data: (the wait page) and
-// about:blank are handled by the caller.
-function isDesktopSpaUrl(url) {
-    try {
-        const u = new URL(url);
-        if (u.origin !== agentOrigin())
-            return false;
-        // Segment semantics: /desktop and /desktop/* — /desktopx is a different
-        // path, not the SPA mount.
-        return u.pathname === "/desktop" || u.pathname.startsWith("/desktop/");
-    }
-    catch {
-        return false;
-    }
-}
-// Lab-device TLS bypass predicate (device-caught: OpenWrt-style
-// self-signed defaults, e.g. the GPON ONT web UI, fail every navigation
-// with ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID). Private-network hosts MAY bypass cert
-// errors; the public internet keeps full validation — a bypassed MITM on
-// a lab LAN is contained, on the open web it is not. Pure + unit-tested;
-// main.ts feeds it the raw certificate-error URL.
-function isPrivateHost(hostname) {
-    const h = String(hostname || "").trim().toLowerCase();
-    if (!h)
-        return false;
-    if (h === "localhost" || h === "::1" || h === "[::1]")
-        return true;
-    if (h.endsWith(".local") || h.endsWith(".local."))
-        return true;
-    const parts = h.split(".");
-    if (parts.length !== 4)
-        return false;
-    const nums = [];
-    for (const p of parts) {
-        if (!/^\d{1,3}$/.test(p))
-            return false;
-        const n = Number(p);
-        if (n > 255)
-            return false;
-        nums.push(n);
-    }
-    const [a, b] = nums;
-    if (a === 10)
-        return true;
-    if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31)
-        return true;
-    if (a === 192 && b === 168)
-        return true;
-    if (a === 127)
-        return true;
-    if (a === 169 && b === 254)
-        return true;
-    return false;
-}
-// Certificate-error gate for app.on("certificate-error"): true = bypass
-// (preventDefault + callback(true)), false = deny. http(s) URLs on
-// private hosts only — anything else (public hosts, weird schemes,
-// unparsable input) stays fully validated.
-function certBypassAllowed(url) {
-    let u;
-    try {
-        u = new URL(String(url || ""));
-    }
-    catch {
-        return false;
-    }
-    if (u.protocol !== "http:" && u.protocol !== "https:")
-        return false;
-    return isPrivateHost(u.hostname);
-}
-// AI-opened browser windows must never reach file://, javascript: or
-// arbitrary schemes through the CDP-driven session windows.
-function sanitizeBrowserUrl(url) {
-    // stage-n preload audit LOW: coerce to string BEFORE trim() — a renderer
-    // passing a number/object would throw TypeError in the main process (DoS).
-    const t = String(url || "about:blank").trim();
-    if (t === "about:blank")
-        return t;
-    try {
-        const u = new URL(t);
-        if (u.protocol === "http:" || u.protocol === "https:")
-            return u.toString();
-    }
-    catch { /* fall through */ }
-    return "about:blank";
-}
-// THE DSH VIEW'S DOOR. The shell's SECOND embedded view shows the harness's own UI, which
-// runs on THIS machine's loopback — so this door is one origin and nothing else, and it is a
-// SEPARATE predicate from sanitizeBrowserUrl on purpose: the browser view's door is the open
-// internet (an AI drives it), this one is a single port, and a door that is wide for one view
-// must not quietly become wide for the other. The DSH view has no address bar and nothing
-// drives it but the operator, so there is nothing here to widen it for.
-//
-// The port is the DSH's own (default 18081 — main.ts resolves SUMMRISE_DSH_PORT first), and
-// it is deliberately NOT the agent's port: the agent's origin is where the panel lives, and a
-// view that could load the panel could also load /api/* with the panel's own authority.
-let dshPort = null;
-function setDshPort(port) {
-    if (Number.isInteger(port) && port > 0 && port < 65536)
-        dshPort = port;
-}
-function getDshPort() {
-    return dshPort ?? 18081;
-}
-function dshBase() {
-    return `http://127.0.0.1:${getDshPort()}`;
-}
-function isDshUrl(url) {
-    try {
-        return new URL(url).origin === new URL(dshBase()).origin;
-    }
-    catch {
-        return false;
-    }
-}