studio-os 0.2.0 → 0.3.0

package/.env.example

@@ -14,9 +14,11 @@
 # Public base URL used in emails/magic links (default http://localhost:PORT)
 #BASE_URL=https://booking.example.com
 
-# Set when running behind a reverse proxy (Caddy/nginx/Traefik) so rate
-# limiting keys on the first X-Forwarded-For hop. Leave unset otherwise —
-# the header is client-spoofable without a trusted proxy in front.
+# Set when running behind a reverse proxy (Caddy/nginx/Traefik). Rate limiting
+# then keys on the first X-Forwarded-For hop, and X-Forwarded-Proto is trusted
+# so emailed magic links and Stripe redirects use https and the session cookie
+# is marked Secure. Leave unset otherwise — both headers are client-spoofable
+# without a trusted proxy in front.
 #TRUST_PROXY=1
 
 # --- SMTP (optional). When unset, emails are written to data/outbox/*.eml
@@ -29,6 +31,8 @@
 
 # --- Stripe (optional, bring-your-own account). When unset, purchase flows
 # fall back to "pay at studio" and manual activation.
+# Online payment needs BOTH of the first two. With only the secret key the app
+# keeps using pay-at-studio, because the webhook is what creates the pass.
 #STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_test_...
 #STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET=whsec_...
 #STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY=pk_test_...

package/.gitattributes

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Normalise to LF in the repository and in the working tree on every platform.
+# A Windows clone with core.autocrlf=true otherwise rewrites shebangs to CRLF,
+# and a publish from that clone ships a binary Linux rejects as "bad interpreter".
+* text=auto eol=lf
+
+# Collapsed in pull requests and excluded from the language bar. Dependabot
+# opens these weekly and the churn is machine-written, not reviewable by eye.
+package-lock.json linguist-generated=true

package/.github/FUNDING.yml

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+github: Booyaka101

package/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+name: Bug report
+description: Something didn't work the way it should
+labels: [bug]
+body:
+  - type: markdown
+    attributes:
+      value: |
+        Thanks for the report. Please **never paste Stripe keys, session cookies or customer data** — screenshots of a live studio leak more than people expect. Redact before posting.
+
+  - type: textarea
+    id: what
+    attributes:
+      label: What happened
+      description: What you ran, and what came back.
+      placeholder: |
+        $ npm start
+        Error: ...
+    validations:
+      required: true
+
+  - type: textarea
+    id: expected
+    attributes:
+      label: What you expected instead
+    validations:
+      required: true
+
+  - type: input
+    id: version
+    attributes:
+      label: Studio OS version
+      description: From `package.json`, or the tag you deployed.
+    validations:
+      required: true
+
+  - type: input
+    id: runtime
+    attributes:
+      label: How you are running it
+      description: Node version, or the Docker image tag, plus the OS and the database you pointed it at.
+      placeholder: Docker, node:22-alpine, Postgres 16 on Debian 12
+    validations:
+      required: true
+
+  - type: textarea
+    id: impact
+    attributes:
+      label: Did this affect real bookings or payments?
+      description: Say so plainly if it did. Anything touching money or a customer's booking gets looked at first.

package/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+blank_issues_enabled: true
+contact_links:
+  - name: Stripe API documentation
+    url: https://docs.stripe.com/api
+    about: Payment intents, webhooks and payout timing are Stripe's behaviour, not this app's.
+  - name: Security issue
+    url: https://github.com/Booyaka101/studio-os/security/advisories/new
+    about: Please report vulnerabilities privately, not as a public issue.

package/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+name: Feature request
+description: Suggest something Studio OS should do
+labels: [enhancement]
+body:
+  - type: markdown
+    attributes:
+      value: |
+        Self-hosted. It holds your customers' booking data and talks to your own payment account. Nothing is sent to us.
+
+  - type: textarea
+    id: problem
+    attributes:
+      label: What are you trying to do?
+      description: The situation, not the solution. What got in your way?
+    validations:
+      required: true
+
+  - type: textarea
+    id: proposal
+    attributes:
+      label: What would you like it to do?
+    validations:
+      required: false
+
+  - type: textarea
+    id: alternatives
+    attributes:
+      label: What are you doing instead today?
+    validations:
+      required: false

package/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+## What this changes
+
+<!-- And why. Link an issue if there is one. -->
+
+## How you verified it
+
+<!--
+Be specific, and keep the claims separate — they carry different weight:
+  - `npm test` passes
+  - ran it against a real project
+  - added a test case covering this
+-->
+
+## Checklist
+
+- [ ] `npm test` passes
+- [ ] Added or updated a test for this change
+- [ ] Updated `README.md` if behaviour changed
+- [ ] Added a `CHANGELOG.md` entry under "Unreleased"
+- [ ] No Stripe key, session cookie or customer data in the diff or in any screenshot

package/.github/dependabot.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+version: 2
+
+# Staying current is a standing requirement, so it is automated rather than
+# remembered.
+updates:
+  - package-ecosystem: npm
+    directory: /
+    schedule:
+      interval: weekly
+    open-pull-requests-limit: 10
+    commit-message:
+      prefix: 'chore(deps)'
+    groups:
+      # Minor and patch only. Majors deliberately arrive as their own PR so one
+      # breaking upgrade cannot redden, and block, a batch of safe ones.
+      all-minor-patch:
+        patterns: ['*']
+        update-types: ['minor', 'patch']
+
+  - package-ecosystem: github-actions
+    directory: /
+    schedule:
+      interval: weekly
+    open-pull-requests-limit: 10
+    commit-message:
+      prefix: 'chore(ci)'
+    groups:
+      # Minor and patch only. Majors deliberately arrive as their own PR so one
+      # breaking upgrade cannot redden, and block, a batch of safe ones.
+      actions-minor-patch:
+        patterns: ['*']
+        update-types: ['minor', 'patch']
+

package/.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+name: CI
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  pull_request:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v7
+
+      # Our own tool. Locks the runner image's tool versions and diffs them when
+      # GitHub bumps the image — including when a floating label like
+      # ubuntu-latest silently re-points. Report-only; no fail-on yet.
+      - name: Runner image drift
+        uses: Booyaka101/runner-drift@v1
+        with:
+          fail-on-retirement: 60
+
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v7
+        with:
+          node-version: '22'
+
+      - run: npm ci
+      - run: npm test

package/.github/workflows/guards.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+name: Guards
+
+# Our own shipped tools, run against this repo. If they are worth shipping they
+# are worth depending on ourselves — a guard that never runs on our own code is
+# an untested guard.
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  pull_request:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '0 6 * * 1'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  guards:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v7
+
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v7
+        with:
+          node-version: '22'
+
+      - name: Install-script audit
+        run: npx --yes npm-script-lens@latest audit --path .
+
+      # Version cooldown: npm worms are typically identified within hours, so
+      # refuse to be among the first to install a brand-new version.
+      - name: Dependency cooldown
+        run: npx --yes npm-script-lens@latest audit --path . --cooldown
+
+      # Drift gate: fails if a dependency gains an install script nobody approved.
+      - name: Allowlist drift
+        run: npx --yes npm-script-lens@1.4.0 sync --path . --check
+
+      # Shell/Dockerfile/Terraform/PHP — the file types GitHub gated behind paid
+      # Advanced Security. This repo ships a Dockerfile. Reports without gating.
+      - name: Free GHAS-equivalent scan
+        continue-on-error: true
+        uses: Booyaka101/ghas-free-pack@v1
+        with:
+          github-token: ${{ github.token }}

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,86 +1,124 @@
-# Changelog
-
-## 0.2.0 — 2026-07-28
-
-- **Instructor logins.** New `instructor` user role alongside the existing
-  owner/staff (admin) roles — existing accounts are untouched by the
-  migration (v2 rebuilds the `users` CHECK; SQLite cannot alter one in
-  place). Instructors sign in on the same staff login form (`/login` now
-  aliases `/admin/login`) and land on their own portal:
-  - `GET /instructor/schedule` — the classes they are assigned to, from
-    today onward, sorted by date
-  - `GET /instructor/classes/:id/roster` — attendee list with status
-    (booked / checked-in / no-show / cancelled), class time and capacity;
-    client emails are *not* exposed to instructors
-  - `POST /instructor/classes/:id/checkin/:booking_id` — check an attendee
-    in (same `markAttendance` business logic as the admin roster)
-  - Route guards: every `/admin/*` route returns **403** for instructor
-    accounts; rosters and check-in return **403** for classes the
-    instructor is not assigned to.
-- **Admin: instructor account management.** The Instructors page gains an
-  "Instructor logins" section; `/admin/instructors/new` creates an account
-  (name, email, password ≥ 8 chars, role `instructor`);
-  `/admin/instructors/:id/classes` assigns/unassigns upcoming classes via
-  checkboxes (many-to-many `instructor_class_assignments` table, cascade
-  on account/instance deletion; past assignments are left untouched).
-- 12 new tests (guards, scoping, check-in, admin CRUD, migration; the four
-  new views covered by the integrity suite) — 110 total, no network.
-  Upgrade path verified against a real v1 database file.
-
-## 0.1.0-hardening — 2026-07-28
-
-- **Fix: CSRF inputs injected inside attribute values.** The hardening pass had
-  inserted the hidden `_csrf` input at the wrong offset in 22 forms whose
-  `action` contained an EJS expression, corrupting the submit URL and leaking
-  markup as visible text. All POST forms now carry the token immediately after
-  the form open tag, enforced by a new static views-integrity test suite
-  (`test/views.test.js`), and verified with a real in-browser form submission.
-- **README screenshots**: 8 captured views of the seeded demo studio (public
-  schedule/booking/buy, admin dashboard/schedule/roster/client/reports).
-- **Docker verified end-to-end**: `docker compose build && up -d` → setup
-  wizard, admin class creation, public schedule and a guest booking all
-  exercised against the running container, then `down -v`. Fixed
-  `docker-compose.yml`: an `environment:` key with only commented entries is
-  invalid YAML for compose ("must be a mapping") — the example block is now
-  fully commented out.
-- **Rate limiting**: dependency-free in-memory fixed-window limiter
-  (`src/lib/ratelimit.js`), keyed per client IP + route: magic-link requests
-  5/15 min, admin login 10/15 min, public booking/buy POSTs 30/15 min;
-  friendly 429 with `Retry-After`. `X-Forwarded-For` is honored only when
-  `TRUST_PROXY` is set. Single-process counters (reset on restart) — see the
-  new README Security section.
-- **CSRF protection**: session-bound random token (stored in the signed
-  cookie-session, no deprecated `csurf` dependency), hidden `_csrf` input on
-  every state-changing form (public booking/buy/magic-link, client cancel,
-  setup wizard, admin login and all admin forms); POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH
-  without a valid token → 403. `/webhooks/stripe` exempt (Stripe-signature
-  verified raw body instead). `x-csrf-token` header accepted as an
-  alternative to the form field.
-
-## 0.1.0 — 2026-07-27
-
-First release. Single-studio, self-hosted, bring-your-own Stripe.
-
-- Public schedule (14-day view, filters), class pages, guest booking with
-  waiver capture, returning-client booking by email
-- Booking engine: membership → soonest-expiring pack → drop-in payment
-  resolution; atomic capacity; FIFO waitlist with auto-promotion;
-  cancellation-window refunds; late-cancel forfeit/refund policy; attendance
-- Client self-service via HMAC magic links (no client passwords): view
-  upcoming bookings, cancel within policy
-- Rolling 8-week schedule materialization from weekly rules (boot + daily +
-  on change), one-off classes, class cancellation with notify + refund
-- Admin: dashboard (today's rosters, week revenue, expiring passes), class
-  types / instructors / weekly rules CRUD, roster check-in/no-show/walk-in,
-  client profiles (manual passes, memberships, payments, waiver, magic link),
-  products (packs + membership plans), revenue & attendance reports + CSV,
-  settings, SQLite backup via `VACUUM INTO`
-- Buy page: Stripe Checkout for packs (one-time) and memberships
-  (subscription) with signature-verified, idempotent webhook fulfillment;
-  full manual "pay at studio" fallback when Stripe is unconfigured
-- Email via SMTP, or `data/outbox/*.eml` + on-screen links when unset
-- Mindbody CSV importer (clients + pricing options): CLI + admin page,
-  JSON column mapping with defaults, dry-run, idempotent by email
-- Seed script (`npm run seed`), Dockerfile + docker-compose, PWA manifest +
-  service worker, vendored htmx/Pico.css (no CDN), 67 tests (no network)
-
+# Changelog
+
+## 0.3.0 — 2026-09-17
+
+- **Security: magic links were emailed as `http://` behind a reverse proxy.**
+  `TRUST_PROXY` was read by the rate limiter but Express's own `trust proxy`
+  setting was never applied, so with TLS terminating at the proxy
+  `req.protocol` read `http` and every emailed link carried its 7-day auth
+  token over plaintext. Stripe's success/cancel redirects had the same scheme.
+  Setting `TRUST_PROXY=1` now also makes the app honour `X-Forwarded-Proto`,
+  and the session cookie picks up its `Secure` flag over https (it stays off
+  on plain http, so local dev is unchanged). If you run behind Caddy/nginx/
+  Traefik, set `TRUST_PROXY=1` or pin `BASE_URL` to your https origin.
+- **Security: the staff login could enumerate accounts.** `authenticate()`
+  returned early for an unknown email and skipped bcrypt entirely, answering
+  ~3000x faster than for a real one. Both paths now do one bcrypt comparison.
+  `app_secret` is also no longer reachable from templates.
+- **A half-configured Stripe took money and delivered nothing.** Online
+  checkout was offered whenever `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY` was set, but fulfilment
+  needs `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET` too. Without it the client paid at Stripe,
+  `/webhooks/stripe` rejected the callback with 501, and no pass and no payment
+  row was created. Checkout is now offered only when both are set, otherwise
+  purchases use the existing pay-at-studio flow. The admin dashboard and
+  settings page say which key is missing instead of reporting "connected".
+- **Membership credit cycles drifted for end-of-month joins.** Cycles were
+  stepped from the previous cycle, so February's day clamp compounded: a
+  membership joined on the 31st became the 28th and stayed there. Cycles now
+  anchor on the join date (31 Jan, 28 Feb, 31 Mar). Correcting an
+  already-drifted membership does not refill its credits mid-month.
+- **Node 22 is now the minimum** (was 20), and better-sqlite3 moves 11 → 13.
+  The Docker image already ships Node 22, so this only matters if you run the
+  app straight off your own Node. README and SPEC still said 20+; they now
+  agree with `engines`.
+- **Dependencies**: stripe 16 → 22, nodemailer 9 → 10 (clears
+  GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj), marked → 18.0.13. `npm audit` is clean.
+- **Tests**: 110 → 127. The Stripe and mailer suites only ever ran against a
+  mock client and the offline outbox, so neither package was imported under
+  test and a major bump could not have failed CI. New tests exercise the real
+  packages, including webhook signature verification.
+
+## 0.2.0 — 2026-07-28
+
+- **Instructor logins.** New `instructor` user role alongside the existing
+  owner/staff (admin) roles — existing accounts are untouched by the
+  migration (v2 rebuilds the `users` CHECK; SQLite cannot alter one in
+  place). Instructors sign in on the same staff login form (`/login` now
+  aliases `/admin/login`) and land on their own portal:
+  - `GET /instructor/schedule` — the classes they are assigned to, from
+    today onward, sorted by date
+  - `GET /instructor/classes/:id/roster` — attendee list with status
+    (booked / checked-in / no-show / cancelled), class time and capacity;
+    client emails are *not* exposed to instructors
+  - `POST /instructor/classes/:id/checkin/:booking_id` — check an attendee
+    in (same `markAttendance` business logic as the admin roster)
+  - Route guards: every `/admin/*` route returns **403** for instructor
+    accounts; rosters and check-in return **403** for classes the
+    instructor is not assigned to.
+- **Admin: instructor account management.** The Instructors page gains an
+  "Instructor logins" section; `/admin/instructors/new` creates an account
+  (name, email, password ≥ 8 chars, role `instructor`);
+  `/admin/instructors/:id/classes` assigns/unassigns upcoming classes via
+  checkboxes (many-to-many `instructor_class_assignments` table, cascade
+  on account/instance deletion; past assignments are left untouched).
+- 12 new tests (guards, scoping, check-in, admin CRUD, migration; the four
+  new views covered by the integrity suite) — 110 total, no network.
+  Upgrade path verified against a real v1 database file.
+
+## 0.1.0-hardening — 2026-07-28
+
+- **Fix: CSRF inputs injected inside attribute values.** The hardening pass had
+  inserted the hidden `_csrf` input at the wrong offset in 22 forms whose
+  `action` contained an EJS expression, corrupting the submit URL and leaking
+  markup as visible text. All POST forms now carry the token immediately after
+  the form open tag, enforced by a new static views-integrity test suite
+  (`test/views.test.js`), and verified with a real in-browser form submission.
+- **README screenshots**: 8 captured views of the seeded demo studio (public
+  schedule/booking/buy, admin dashboard/schedule/roster/client/reports).
+- **Docker verified end-to-end**: `docker compose build && up -d` → setup
+  wizard, admin class creation, public schedule and a guest booking all
+  exercised against the running container, then `down -v`. Fixed
+  `docker-compose.yml`: an `environment:` key with only commented entries is
+  invalid YAML for compose ("must be a mapping") — the example block is now
+  fully commented out.
+- **Rate limiting**: dependency-free in-memory fixed-window limiter
+  (`src/lib/ratelimit.js`), keyed per client IP + route: magic-link requests
+  5/15 min, admin login 10/15 min, public booking/buy POSTs 30/15 min;
+  friendly 429 with `Retry-After`. `X-Forwarded-For` is honored only when
+  `TRUST_PROXY` is set. Single-process counters (reset on restart) — see the
+  new README Security section.
+- **CSRF protection**: session-bound random token (stored in the signed
+  cookie-session, no deprecated `csurf` dependency), hidden `_csrf` input on
+  every state-changing form (public booking/buy/magic-link, client cancel,
+  setup wizard, admin login and all admin forms); POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH
+  without a valid token → 403. `/webhooks/stripe` exempt (Stripe-signature
+  verified raw body instead). `x-csrf-token` header accepted as an
+  alternative to the form field.
+
+## 0.1.0 — 2026-07-27
+
+First release. Single-studio, self-hosted, bring-your-own Stripe.
+
+- Public schedule (14-day view, filters), class pages, guest booking with
+  waiver capture, returning-client booking by email
+- Booking engine: membership → soonest-expiring pack → drop-in payment
+  resolution; atomic capacity; FIFO waitlist with auto-promotion;
+  cancellation-window refunds; late-cancel forfeit/refund policy; attendance
+- Client self-service via HMAC magic links (no client passwords): view
+  upcoming bookings, cancel within policy
+- Rolling 8-week schedule materialization from weekly rules (boot + daily +
+  on change), one-off classes, class cancellation with notify + refund
+- Admin: dashboard (today's rosters, week revenue, expiring passes), class
+  types / instructors / weekly rules CRUD, roster check-in/no-show/walk-in,
+  client profiles (manual passes, memberships, payments, waiver, magic link),
+  products (packs + membership plans), revenue & attendance reports + CSV,
+  settings, SQLite backup via `VACUUM INTO`
+- Buy page: Stripe Checkout for packs (one-time) and memberships
+  (subscription) with signature-verified, idempotent webhook fulfillment;
+  full manual "pay at studio" fallback when Stripe is unconfigured
+- Email via SMTP, or `data/outbox/*.eml` + on-screen links when unset
+- Mindbody CSV importer (clients + pricing options): CLI + admin page,
+  JSON column mapping with defaults, dry-run, idempotent by email
+- Seed script (`npm run seed`), Dockerfile + docker-compose, PWA manifest +
+  service worker, vendored htmx/Pico.css (no CDN), 67 tests (no network)
+