step-node-agent 3.29.1 → 3.29.3-customJava25

package/node_modules/har-validator/node_modules/ajv/lib/ajv.d.ts

@@ -203,6 +203,11 @@ declare namespace ajv {
     logger?: CustomLogger | false;
     nullable?: boolean;
     serialize?: ((schema: object | boolean) => any) | false;
+    regExp?: (pattern: string) => RegExpLike;
+  }
+
+  interface RegExpLike {
+    test: (s: string) => boolean;
   }
 
   type FormatValidator = string | RegExp | ((data: string) => boolean | PromiseLike<any>);

package/node_modules/har-validator/node_modules/ajv/lib/compile/index.js

@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ function compile(schema, root, localRefs, baseId) {
     , defaultsHash = {}
     , customRules = [];
 
+  function patternCode(i, patterns) {
+    var regExpCode = opts.regExp ? 'regExp' : 'new RegExp';
+    return 'var pattern' + i + ' = ' + regExpCode + '(' + util.toQuotedString(patterns[i]) + ');';
+  }
+
   root = root || { schema: schema, refVal: refVal, refs: refs };
 
   var c = checkCompiling.call(this, schema, root, baseId);
@@ -128,6 +133,7 @@ function compile(schema, root, localRefs, baseId) {
         'equal',
         'ucs2length',
         'ValidationError',
+        'regExp',
         sourceCode
       );
 
@@ -141,7 +147,8 @@ function compile(schema, root, localRefs, baseId) {
         customRules,
         equal,
         ucs2length,
-        ValidationError
+        ValidationError,
+        opts.regExp
       );
 
       refVal[0] = validate;
@@ -358,11 +365,6 @@ function compIndex(schema, root, baseId) {
 }
 
 
-function patternCode(i, patterns) {
-  return 'var pattern' + i + ' = new RegExp(' + util.toQuotedString(patterns[i]) + ');';
-}
-
-
 function defaultCode(i) {
   return 'var default' + i + ' = defaults[' + i + '];';
 }

package/node_modules/har-validator/node_modules/ajv/lib/dot/pattern.jst

@@ -4,11 +4,22 @@
 {{# def.$data }}
 
 {{
-  var $regexp = $isData
-                ? '(new RegExp(' + $schemaValue + '))'
-                : it.usePattern($schema);
+  var $regExpCode = it.opts.regExp ? 'regExp' : 'new RegExp';
 }}
 
-if ({{# def.$dataNotType:'string' }} !{{=$regexp}}.test({{=$data}}) ) {
+{{? $isData }}
+  var {{=$valid}} = true;
+  try {
+    {{=$valid}} = {{=$regExpCode}}({{=$schemaValue}}).test({{=$data}});
+  } catch(e) {
+    {{=$valid}} = false;
+  }
+  if ({{# def.$dataNotType:'string' }} !{{=$valid}}) {
+{{??}}
+  {{
+    var $regexp = it.usePattern($schema);
+  }}
+  if ({{# def.$dataNotType:'string' }} !{{=$regexp}}.test({{=$data}}) ) {
+{{?}}
   {{# def.error:'pattern' }}
 } {{? $breakOnError }} else { {{?}}

package/node_modules/har-validator/node_modules/ajv/lib/dotjs/pattern.js

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ module.exports = function generate_pattern(it, $keyword, $ruleType) {
   var $errSchemaPath = it.errSchemaPath + '/' + $keyword;
   var $breakOnError = !it.opts.allErrors;
   var $data = 'data' + ($dataLvl || '');
+  var $valid = 'valid' + $lvl;
   var $isData = it.opts.$data && $schema && $schema.$data,
     $schemaValue;
   if ($isData) {
@@ -16,12 +17,21 @@ module.exports = function generate_pattern(it, $keyword, $ruleType) {
   } else {
     $schemaValue = $schema;
   }
-  var $regexp = $isData ? '(new RegExp(' + $schemaValue + '))' : it.usePattern($schema);
-  out += 'if ( ';
+  var $regExpCode = it.opts.regExp ? 'regExp' : 'new RegExp';
   if ($isData) {
-    out += ' (' + ($schemaValue) + ' !== undefined && typeof ' + ($schemaValue) + ' != \'string\') || ';
+    out += ' var ' + ($valid) + ' = true; try { ' + ($valid) + ' = ' + ($regExpCode) + '(' + ($schemaValue) + ').test(' + ($data) + '); } catch(e) { ' + ($valid) + ' = false; } if ( ';
+    if ($isData) {
+      out += ' (' + ($schemaValue) + ' !== undefined && typeof ' + ($schemaValue) + ' != \'string\') || ';
+    }
+    out += ' !' + ($valid) + ') {';
+  } else {
+    var $regexp = it.usePattern($schema);
+    out += ' if ( ';
+    if ($isData) {
+      out += ' (' + ($schemaValue) + ' !== undefined && typeof ' + ($schemaValue) + ' != \'string\') || ';
+    }
+    out += ' !' + ($regexp) + '.test(' + ($data) + ') ) {';
   }
-  out += ' !' + ($regexp) + '.test(' + ($data) + ') ) {   ';
   var $$outStack = $$outStack || [];
   $$outStack.push(out);
   out = ''; /* istanbul ignore else */

package/node_modules/har-validator/node_modules/ajv/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "ajv",
-  "version": "6.12.6",
+  "version": "6.14.0",
   "description": "Another JSON Schema Validator",
   "main": "lib/ajv.js",
   "typings": "lib/ajv.d.ts",
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
     "mocha": "^8.0.1",
     "nyc": "^15.0.0",
     "pre-commit": "^1.1.1",
+    "re2": "^1.21.4",
     "require-globify": "^1.3.0",
     "typescript": "^3.9.5",
     "uglify-js": "^3.6.9",

package/node_modules/minimatch/README.md

@@ -10,6 +10,43 @@ This is the matching library used internally by npm.
 It works by converting glob expressions into JavaScript `RegExp`
 objects.
 
+## Important Security Consideration!
+
+> [!WARNING]  
+> This library uses JavaScript regular expressions. Please read
+> the following warning carefully, and be thoughtful about what
+> you provide to this library in production systems.
+
+_Any_ library in JavaScript that deals with matching string
+patterns using regular expressions will be  subject to
+[ReDoS](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular_expression_Denial_of_Service_-_ReDoS)
+if the pattern is generated using untrusted input.
+
+Efforts have been made to mitigate risk as much as is feasible in
+such a library, providing maximum recursion depths and so forth,
+but these measures can only ultimately protect against accidents,
+not malice. A dedicated attacker can _always_ find patterns that
+cannot be defended against by a bash-compatible glob pattern
+matching system that uses JavaScript regular expressions.
+
+To be extremely clear:
+
+> [!WARNING]  
+> **If you create a system where you take user input, and use
+> that input as the source of a Regular Expression pattern, in
+> this or any extant glob matcher in JavaScript, you will be
+> pwned.**
+
+A future version of this library _may_ use a different matching
+algorithm which does not exhibit backtracking problems. If and
+when that happens, it will likely be a sweeping change, and those
+improvements will **not** be backported to legacy versions.
+
+In the near term, it is not reasonable to continue to play
+whack-a-mole with security advisories, and so any future ReDoS
+reports will be considered "working as intended", and resolved
+entirely by this warning.
+
 ## Usage
 
 ```javascript

package/node_modules/minimatch/minimatch.js

@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ function Minimatch (pattern, options) {
   }
 
   this.options = options
+  this.maxGlobstarRecursion = options.maxGlobstarRecursion !== undefined
+    ? options.maxGlobstarRecursion : 200
   this.set = []
   this.pattern = pattern
   this.regexp = null
@@ -390,6 +392,9 @@ function parse (pattern, isSub) {
           continue
         }
 
+        // coalesce consecutive non-globstar * characters
+        if (c === '*' && stateChar === '*') continue
+
         // if we already have a stateChar, then it means
         // that there was something like ** or +? in there.
         // Handle the stateChar, then proceed with this one.
@@ -784,109 +789,173 @@ Minimatch.prototype.match = function match (f, partial) {
 // out of pattern, then that's fine, as long as all
 // the parts match.
 Minimatch.prototype.matchOne = function (file, pattern, partial) {
-  var options = this.options
+  if (pattern.indexOf(GLOBSTAR) !== -1) {
+    return this._matchGlobstar(file, pattern, partial, 0, 0)
+  }
+  return this._matchOne(file, pattern, partial, 0, 0)
+}
 
-  this.debug('matchOne',
-    { 'this': this, file: file, pattern: pattern })
+Minimatch.prototype._matchGlobstar = function (file, pattern, partial, fileIndex, patternIndex) {
+  var i
 
-  this.debug('matchOne', file.length, pattern.length)
+  // find first globstar from patternIndex
+  var firstgs = -1
+  for (i = patternIndex; i < pattern.length; i++) {
+    if (pattern[i] === GLOBSTAR) { firstgs = i; break }
+  }
 
-  for (var fi = 0,
-      pi = 0,
-      fl = file.length,
-      pl = pattern.length
-      ; (fi < fl) && (pi < pl)
-      ; fi++, pi++) {
-    this.debug('matchOne loop')
-    var p = pattern[pi]
-    var f = file[fi]
+  // find last globstar
+  var lastgs = -1
+  for (i = pattern.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+    if (pattern[i] === GLOBSTAR) { lastgs = i; break }
+  }
 
-    this.debug(pattern, p, f)
+  var head = pattern.slice(patternIndex, firstgs)
+  var body = partial ? pattern.slice(firstgs + 1) : pattern.slice(firstgs + 1, lastgs)
+  var tail = partial ? [] : pattern.slice(lastgs + 1)
 
-    // should be impossible.
-    // some invalid regexp stuff in the set.
-    /* istanbul ignore if */
-    if (p === false) return false
-
-    if (p === GLOBSTAR) {
-      this.debug('GLOBSTAR', [pattern, p, f])
-
-      // "**"
-      // a/**/b/**/c would match the following:
-      // a/b/x/y/z/c
-      // a/x/y/z/b/c
-      // a/b/x/b/x/c
-      // a/b/c
-      // To do this, take the rest of the pattern after
-      // the **, and see if it would match the file remainder.
-      // If so, return success.
-      // If not, the ** "swallows" a segment, and try again.
-      // This is recursively awful.
-      //
-      // a/**/b/**/c matching a/b/x/y/z/c
-      // - a matches a
-      // - doublestar
-      //   - matchOne(b/x/y/z/c, b/**/c)
-      //     - b matches b
-      //     - doublestar
-      //       - matchOne(x/y/z/c, c) -> no
-      //       - matchOne(y/z/c, c) -> no
-      //       - matchOne(z/c, c) -> no
-      //       - matchOne(c, c) yes, hit
-      var fr = fi
-      var pr = pi + 1
-      if (pr === pl) {
-        this.debug('** at the end')
-        // a ** at the end will just swallow the rest.
-        // We have found a match.
-        // however, it will not swallow /.x, unless
-        // options.dot is set.
-        // . and .. are *never* matched by **, for explosively
-        // exponential reasons.
-        for (; fi < fl; fi++) {
-          if (file[fi] === '.' || file[fi] === '..' ||
-            (!options.dot && file[fi].charAt(0) === '.')) return false
-        }
-        return true
+  // check the head
+  if (head.length) {
+    var fileHead = file.slice(fileIndex, fileIndex + head.length)
+    if (!this._matchOne(fileHead, head, partial, 0, 0)) {
+      return false
+    }
+    fileIndex += head.length
+  }
+
+  // check the tail
+  var fileTailMatch = 0
+  if (tail.length) {
+    if (tail.length + fileIndex > file.length) return false
+
+    var tailStart = file.length - tail.length
+    if (this._matchOne(file, tail, partial, tailStart, 0)) {
+      fileTailMatch = tail.length
+    } else {
+      // affordance for stuff like a/**/* matching a/b/
+      if (file[file.length - 1] !== '' ||
+          fileIndex + tail.length === file.length) {
+        return false
+      }
+      tailStart--
+      if (!this._matchOne(file, tail, partial, tailStart, 0)) {
+        return false
       }
+      fileTailMatch = tail.length + 1
+    }
+  }
 
-      // ok, let's see if we can swallow whatever we can.
-      while (fr < fl) {
-        var swallowee = file[fr]
-
-        this.debug('\nglobstar while', file, fr, pattern, pr, swallowee)
-
-        // XXX remove this slice.  Just pass the start index.
-        if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) {
-          this.debug('globstar found match!', fr, fl, swallowee)
-          // found a match.
-          return true
-        } else {
-          // can't swallow "." or ".." ever.
-          // can only swallow ".foo" when explicitly asked.
-          if (swallowee === '.' || swallowee === '..' ||
-            (!options.dot && swallowee.charAt(0) === '.')) {
-            this.debug('dot detected!', file, fr, pattern, pr)
-            break
-          }
-
-          // ** swallows a segment, and continue.
-          this.debug('globstar swallow a segment, and continue')
-          fr++
-        }
+  // if body is empty (single ** between head and tail)
+  if (!body.length) {
+    var sawSome = !!fileTailMatch
+    for (i = fileIndex; i < file.length - fileTailMatch; i++) {
+      var f = String(file[i])
+      sawSome = true
+      if (f === '.' || f === '..' ||
+          (!this.options.dot && f.charAt(0) === '.')) {
+        return false
       }
+    }
+    return partial || sawSome
+  }
+
+  // split body into segments at each GLOBSTAR
+  var bodySegments = [[[], 0]]
+  var currentBody = bodySegments[0]
+  var nonGsParts = 0
+  var nonGsPartsSums = [0]
+  for (var bi = 0; bi < body.length; bi++) {
+    var b = body[bi]
+    if (b === GLOBSTAR) {
+      nonGsPartsSums.push(nonGsParts)
+      currentBody = [[], 0]
+      bodySegments.push(currentBody)
+    } else {
+      currentBody[0].push(b)
+      nonGsParts++
+    }
+  }
+
+  var idx = bodySegments.length - 1
+  var fileLength = file.length - fileTailMatch
+  for (var si = 0; si < bodySegments.length; si++) {
+    bodySegments[si][1] = fileLength -
+      (nonGsPartsSums[idx--] + bodySegments[si][0].length)
+  }
+
+  return !!this._matchGlobStarBodySections(
+    file, bodySegments, fileIndex, 0, partial, 0, !!fileTailMatch
+  )
+}
 
-      // no match was found.
-      // However, in partial mode, we can't say this is necessarily over.
-      // If there's more *pattern* left, then
-      /* istanbul ignore if */
-      if (partial) {
-        // ran out of file
-        this.debug('\n>>> no match, partial?', file, fr, pattern, pr)
-        if (fr === fl) return true
+// return false for "nope, not matching"
+// return null for "not matching, cannot keep trying"
+Minimatch.prototype._matchGlobStarBodySections = function (
+  file, bodySegments, fileIndex, bodyIndex, partial, globStarDepth, sawTail
+) {
+  var bs = bodySegments[bodyIndex]
+  if (!bs) {
+    // just make sure there are no bad dots
+    for (var i = fileIndex; i < file.length; i++) {
+      sawTail = true
+      var f = file[i]
+      if (f === '.' || f === '..' ||
+          (!this.options.dot && f.charAt(0) === '.')) {
+        return false
       }
+    }
+    return sawTail
+  }
+
+  var body = bs[0]
+  var after = bs[1]
+  while (fileIndex <= after) {
+    var m = this._matchOne(
+      file.slice(0, fileIndex + body.length),
+      body,
+      partial,
+      fileIndex,
+      0
+    )
+    // if limit exceeded, no match. intentional false negative,
+    // acceptable break in correctness for security.
+    if (m && globStarDepth < this.maxGlobstarRecursion) {
+      var sub = this._matchGlobStarBodySections(
+        file, bodySegments,
+        fileIndex + body.length, bodyIndex + 1,
+        partial, globStarDepth + 1, sawTail
+      )
+      if (sub !== false) {
+        return sub
+      }
+    }
+    var f = file[fileIndex]
+    if (f === '.' || f === '..' ||
+        (!this.options.dot && f.charAt(0) === '.')) {
       return false
     }
+    fileIndex++
+  }
+  return partial || null
+}
+
+Minimatch.prototype._matchOne = function (file, pattern, partial, fileIndex, patternIndex) {
+  var fi, pi, fl, pl
+  for (
+    fi = fileIndex, pi = patternIndex, fl = file.length, pl = pattern.length
+    ; (fi < fl) && (pi < pl)
+    ; fi++, pi++
+  ) {
+    this.debug('matchOne loop')
+    var p = pattern[pi]
+    var f = file[fi]
+
+    this.debug(pattern, p, f)
+
+    // should be impossible.
+    // some invalid regexp stuff in the set.
+    /* istanbul ignore if */
+    if (p === false || p === GLOBSTAR) return false
 
     // something other than **
     // non-magic patterns just have to match exactly
@@ -903,17 +972,6 @@ Minimatch.prototype.matchOne = function (file, pattern, partial) {
     if (!hit) return false
   }
 
-  // Note: ending in / means that we'll get a final ""
-  // at the end of the pattern.  This can only match a
-  // corresponding "" at the end of the file.
-  // If the file ends in /, then it can only match a
-  // a pattern that ends in /, unless the pattern just
-  // doesn't have any more for it. But, a/b/ should *not*
-  // match "a/b/*", even though "" matches against the
-  // [^/]*? pattern, except in partial mode, where it might
-  // simply not be reached yet.
-  // However, a/b/ should still satisfy a/*
-
   // now either we fell off the end of the pattern, or we're done.
   if (fi === fl && pi === pl) {
     // ran out of pattern and filename at the same time.

package/node_modules/minimatch/package.json

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
   "author": "Isaac Z. Schlueter <i@izs.me> (http://blog.izs.me)",
   "name": "minimatch",
   "description": "a glob matcher in javascript",
-  "version": "3.1.2",
+  "version": "3.1.5",
   "publishConfig": {
-    "tag": "v3-legacy"
+    "tag": "legacy-v3"
   },
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",

package/node_modules/qs/.editorconfig

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ end_of_line = lf
 charset = utf-8
 trim_trailing_whitespace = true
 insert_final_newline = true
-max_line_length = 160
+max_line_length = 180
 quote_type = single
 
 [test/*]

package/node_modules/qs/.github/SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# Security
+
+Please file a private vulnerability report via GitHub, email [@ljharb](https://github.com/ljharb), or see https://tidelift.com/security if you have a potential security vulnerability to report.
+
+## Incident Response Plan
+
+Please see our [Incident Response Plan](https://github.com/ljharb/.github/blob/main/INCIDENT_RESPONSE_PLAN.md).
+
+## Threat Model
+
+Please see [THREAT_MODEL.md](./THREAT_MODEL.md).

package/node_modules/qs/.github/THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+## Threat Model for qs (querystring parsing library)
+
+### 1. Library Overview
+
+- **Library Name:** qs
+- **Brief Description:** A JavaScript library for parsing and stringifying URL query strings, supporting nested objects and arrays. It is widely used in Node.js and web applications for processing query parameters[2][6][8].
+- **Key Public APIs/Functions:** `qs.parse()`, `qs.stringify()`
+
+### 2. Define Scope
+
+This threat model focuses on the core parsing and stringifying functionality, specifically the handling of nested objects and arrays, option validation, and cycle management in stringification.
+
+### 3. Conceptual System Diagram
+
+```
+Caller Application → qs.parse(input, options) → Parsing Engine → Output Object
+                           │
+                           └→ Options Handling
+
+Caller Application → qs.stringify(obj, options) → Stringifying Engine → Output String
+                           │
+                           └→ Options Handling
+                           └→ Cycle Tracking
+```
+
+**Trust Boundaries:**
+- **Input string (parse):** May come from untrusted sources (e.g., user input, network requests)
+- **Input object (stringify):** May contain cycles, which can lead to infinite loops during stringification
+- **Options:** Provided by the caller
+- **Cycle Tracking:** Used only during stringification to detect and handle circular references
+
+### 4. Identify Assets
+
+- **Integrity of parsed output:** Prevent malicious manipulation of the output object structure, especially ensuring builtins/globals are not modified as a result of parse[3][4][8].
+- **Confidentiality of processed data:** Avoid leaking sensitive information through errors or output.
+- **Availability/performance for host application:** Prevent crashes or resource exhaustion in the consuming application.
+- **Security of host application:** Prevent the library from being a vector for attacks (e.g., prototype pollution, DoS).
+- **Reputation of library:** Maintain trust by avoiding supply chain attacks and vulnerabilities[1].
+
+### 5. Identify Threats
+
+| Component / API / Interaction         | S  | T  | R  | I  | D  | E  |
+|---------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|
+| Public API Call (`parse`)             | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | ✓  | ✓  |
+| Public API Call (`stringify`)         | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | ✓  | –  |
+| Options Handling                      | ✓  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  |
+| Dependency Interaction                | –  | –  | –  | –  | ✓  | –  |
+
+**Key Threats:**
+- **Tampering:** Malicious input can, if not prevented, alter parsed output (e.g., prototype pollution via `__proto__`, modification of builtins/globals)[3][4][8].
+- **Information Disclosure:** Error messages may expose internal details or sensitive data.
+- **Denial of Service:** Large or malformed input can exhaust memory or CPU.
+- **Elevation of Privilege:** Prototype pollution can lead to unintended privilege escalation in the host application[3][4][8].
+
+### 6. Mitigation/Countermeasures
+
+| Threat Identified                                 | Proposed Mitigation |
+|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------|
+| Tampering (malicious input, prototype pollution)  | Strict input validation; keep `allowPrototypes: false` by default; use `plainObjects` for output; ensure builtins/globals are never modified by parse[4][8]. |
+| Information Disclosure (error messages)           | Generic error messages without stack traces or internal paths. |
+| Denial of Service (memory/CPU exhaustion)         | Enforce `arrayLimit` and `parameterLimit` with safe defaults; enable `throwOnLimitExceeded`; limit nesting depth[7]. |
+| Elevation of Privilege (prototype pollution)      | Keep `allowPrototypes: false`; validate options against allowlist; use `plainObjects` to avoid prototype pollution[4][8]. |
+
+### 7. Risk Ranking
+
+- **High:** Denial of Service via array parsing or malformed input (historical vulnerability)
+- **Medium:** Prototype pollution via options or input (if `allowPrototypes` enabled)
+- **Low:** Information disclosure in errors
+
+### 8. Next Steps & Review
+
+1. **Audit option validation logic.**
+2. **Add depth limiting to nested parsing and stringification.**
+3. **Implement fuzz testing for parser and stringifier edge cases.**
+4. **Regularly review dependencies for vulnerabilities.**
+5. **Keep documentation and threat model up to date.**
+6. **Ensure builtins/globals are never modified as a result of parse.**
+7. **Support round-trip consistency between parse and stringify as a non-security goal, with the right options[5][9].**

package/node_modules/qs/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,25 @@
+## **6.14.2**
+- [Fix] `parse`: mark overflow objects for indexed notation exceeding `arrayLimit` (#546)
+- [Fix] `arrayLimit` means max count, not max index, in `combine`/`merge`/`parseArrayValue`
+- [Fix] `parse`: throw on `arrayLimit` exceeded with indexed notation when `throwOnLimitExceeded` is true (#529)
+- [Fix] `parse`: enforce `arrayLimit` on `comma`-parsed values
+- [Fix] `parse`: fix error message to reflect arrayLimit as max index; remove extraneous comments (#545)
+- [Robustness] avoid `.push`, use `void`
+- [readme] document that `addQueryPrefix` does not add `?` to empty output (#418)
+- [readme] clarify `parseArrays` and `arrayLimit` documentation (#543)
+- [readme] replace runkit CI badge with shields.io check-runs badge
+- [meta] fix changelog typo (`arrayLength` → `arrayLimit`)
+- [actions] fix rebase workflow permissions
+
+## **6.14.1**
+- [Fix] ensure `arrayLimit` applies to `[]` notation as well
+- [Fix] `parse`: when a custom decoder returns `null` for a key, ignore that key
+- [Refactor] `parse`: extract key segment splitting helper
+- [meta] add threat model
+- [actions] add workflow permissions
+- [Tests] `stringify`: increase coverage
+- [Dev Deps] update `eslint`, `@ljharb/eslint-config`, `npmignore`, `es-value-fixtures`, `for-each`, `object-inspect`
+
 ## **6.14.0**
 - [New] `parse`: add `throwOnParameterLimitExceeded` option (#517)
 - [Refactor] `parse`: use `utils.combine` more