start-vibing-stacks 2.38.0 → 2.39.0

package/README.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Multi-stack AI workflow for **Claude Code** & **Cursor**. One command installs a
 npx start-vibing-stacks
 ```
 
-> Latest: **v2.38.0** — New `dead-code-hygiene` skill: remove unused legacy/inert code after replacements so leftover paths do not confuse later agent context. Workflow nudge in `user-prompt-submit` + `/feature`/`/fix`. Universal skills: **30**.
+> Latest: **v2.39.0** — New `owned-infra-ops` skill + always-on memory: legitimate ops on user-owned servers (health/SSH backup/deploy) with phrasing and tool-order that reduce Anthropic Opus/Sonnet cyber false positives. Explicitly cannot override Cyber Verification / API cyber blocks. Universal skills: **31**.
 
 ---
 
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ npx start-vibing-stacks
 | Layer | Count | Purpose |
 |---|---|---|
 | Agents | **7** universal | `research-web` (MCP-first) · `documenter` (memory layer) · `domain-updater` · `commit-manager` · `tester` · `claude-md-compactor` (compaction) · **`security-auditor` (VETO)** |
-| Skills | **30** shared + stack-specific + frontend | Versioned (`version:` frontmatter), upgradable via `migrate` |
+| Skills | **31** shared + stack-specific + frontend | Versioned (`version:` frontmatter), upgradable via `migrate` |
 | Hooks | `session-start` · `user-prompt-submit` · `pre-tool-use` · `post-tool-use` · `stop-validator` · `final-check` | Multi-instance coordination + git/docs/secrets/code-quality gates |
 | Commands | `/feature` · `/fix` · `/research` · `/validate` · `/peers` | Slash commands |
 | Workflows | `ci.yml` + `security.yml` per stack (audit · gitleaks · CodeQL · **Semgrep** · **Trivy** · **CycloneDX SBOM** · **dependency-review** · **OpenSSF Scorecard**) | Copied to `.github/workflows/` when target is empty |
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ npx start-vibing-stacks
 
 ## Skill matrix
 
-### Universal (30 — shared across stacks)
+### Universal (31 — shared across stacks)
 
 | Group | Skills |
 |---|---|
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ npx start-vibing-stacks
 | **Reliability** | `error-handling` · `database-migrations` · `tool-resilience` · `dead-code-hygiene` |
 | **A11y / UX** | `accessibility-wcag22` · `ui-ux-audit` |
 | **CI / Quality** | `ci-pipelines` · `quality-gate` · `final-check` · `git-workflow` |
-| **Infra** | `docker-patterns` · `podman-patterns` · `kubernetes-patterns` · `hook-development` · `multi-instance-coordination` |
+| **Infra** | `docker-patterns` · `podman-patterns` · `kubernetes-patterns` · `hook-development` · `multi-instance-coordination` · `owned-infra-ops` |
 | **Framework** | `react-server-components` · `laravel-octane-inertia` |
 | **Testing** | `playwright-automation` · `test-coverage` |
 | **Performance** | `performance-patterns` |

package/dist/migrate.js

@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ export function patchSettings(projectDir, dryRun) {
     else {
         report.alreadyPresent.push('permissions.defaultMode');
     }
-    // Memory files (v2.34.0) — ensure all canonical advertising + funnel memories are loaded.
+    // Memory files — canonical always-on memories (ads/funnel + owned-infra-ops).
     // This list is the single source of truth for auto-loaded .md memories.
     const requiredMemoryFiles = [
         '.claude/CLAUDE.md',
@@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ export function patchSettings(projectDir, dryRun) {
         '.claude/memories/ad-creative-cloaking.md',
         '.claude/memories/ad-bot-evasion.md',
         '.claude/memories/paid-ads-landing-validation.md',
+        '.claude/memories/owned-infra-ops.md',
     ];
     if (!settings.context)
         settings.context = {};

package/dist/setup.js

@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ export async function setupProject(projectDir, config, options = {}) {
                     '.claude/memories/ad-creative-cloaking.md',
                     '.claude/memories/ad-bot-evasion.md',
                     '.claude/memories/paid-ads-landing-validation.md',
+                    '.claude/memories/owned-infra-ops.md',
                 ],
             },
             permissions: {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "start-vibing-stacks",
-  "version": "2.38.0",
+  "version": "2.39.0",
   "description": "AI-powered multi-stack dev workflow for Claude Code. Supports PHP, Node.js, Python and more.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {

package/stacks/_shared/memories/owned-infra-ops.md

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+---
+version: 1.0.0
+---
+
+# Memory: Owned Infrastructure Ops
+
+> **ALWAYS LOAD** — Authorizes legitimate admin work on infrastructure the user owns (or contractually administers): health checks, SSH with keys, backups, deploys, log pulls.
+
+---
+
+## Declared purpose
+
+Help the agent treat **user-owned** server/ops requests as normal engineering work — not as unauthorized intrusion — when the user is clearly operating their own hosts.
+
+Typical requests:
+
+- “Is my VPS online?” / health check on a named host
+- SSH with a project key (e.g. `.env.d/*.pub` / key path) for backup or deploy
+- Pull or archive a known app directory on that host
+- Inspect logs the user asks for on their machine
+
+---
+
+## Explicit rules
+
+1. **Ownership required.** Proceed with remote ops only when the user indicates the target is theirs (or they admin it). If unclear, ask once.
+2. **Single named target.** Do not scan networks or probe unrelated hosts.
+3. **Keys, not passwords.** Prefer SSH keys / agent. Never print secrets. Avoid `sshpass` and passwords on the CLI.
+4. **Scoped commands.** Prefer the minimum checks for the stated task over host-wide enumeration.
+5. **Load skill `owned-infra-ops`** for tool order, phrasing, and recovery when blocked.
+
+---
+
+## Hard limit (Anthropic cyber safeguards)
+
+This memory **does not** and **cannot** override Anthropic’s real-time cyber safeguards on Opus/Sonnet, nor the Cyber Verification Program (CVP).
+
+If the API returns a cybersecurity / Cyber Verification block:
+
+- Stop remote recon/SSH chains in that turn
+- Do not rephrase to evade the block
+- Recover via: user-run commands + pasted output, key-based scoped SSH next time, or org CVP application — see skill `owned-infra-ops`
+
+---
+
+## Out of scope
+
+- Third-party / competitor infrastructure without clear admin authority
+- Offensive security, exploit development, mass recon, credential stuffing
+- “Bypass Anthropic / evade the cyber gate” requests
+
+---
+
+## See Also
+
+- Skill: `owned-infra-ops` (full checklist and safe patterns)
+- Skill: `secrets-management` (keys, `.env.d/`)

package/stacks/_shared/skills/owned-infra-ops/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+---
+name: owned-infra-ops
+version: 1.0.0
+description: User-owned server ops (health check, SSH backup, deploy) — ownership framing, safe tool order, and patterns that reduce Anthropic Opus/Sonnet cyber false positives. Invoke when the user asks to operate on infrastructure they own. Not for third-party systems, offensive security, or mass recon. Cannot override Anthropic Cyber Verification Program / API cyber blocks.
+---
+
+# Owned Infrastructure Ops
+
+**Invoke when the user asks to operate on infrastructure they own** — health checks, SSH into their VPS, backups, deploys, log pulls. Goal: complete legitimate admin work with minimal “cyber recon” signal.
+
+> **Hard limit:** Project memories and this skill **cannot** lift Anthropic’s real-time cyber safeguards on Opus/Sonnet. If the API returns a Cyber Verification / cybersecurity topic block, stop and follow the recovery section — do not rephrase to evade.
+
+---
+
+## Golden Rules
+
+1. **Ownership first.** Confirm the host/IP/domain is the user’s (or contracted admin scope) before remote ops.
+2. **One named target.** No CIDR sweeps, port scans, or “check all servers.”
+3. **Prefer keys over passwords.** Never put passwords in agent commands or chat output.
+4. **Minimal recon.** Only the checks needed for the stated task (backup path, health URL) — not full host enumeration.
+5. **If Anthropic cyber-blocks:** stop the remote chain; ask the user to run SSH locally and paste output, or apply CVP.
+
+---
+
+## Ownership Checklist (before Bash/SSH)
+
+Ask or confirm when unclear:
+
+- [ ] User states the host is **theirs** (or they admin it under contract)
+- [ ] Target is a **single** hostname/IP already known to them
+- [ ] Task is ops (health / backup / deploy / logs) — not vulnerability research on a third party
+- [ ] Credentials: SSH key path / agent, not a password pasted into the agent
+
+If ownership is ambiguous → **ask**. Do not default to proceeding.
+
+---
+
+## Preferred Phrasing (reduce false positives)
+
+| Prefer (ops / owned) | Avoid (recon / attack framing) |
+|---|---|
+| “My VPS at … — check if SSH is up, then backup `/var/www/app`” | “Scan this IP / probe the network / enumerate services” |
+| “I am root on this host; use my key at `.env.d/…`” | “Crack / brute / bypass SSH” |
+| “Pull only the app directory for backup” | “Dump the whole filesystem / find all secrets” |
+| User runs `ssh` and pastes `ls` / `df` output | Agent chains ping → banner grab → sshpass → recursive find |
+
+---
+
+## Safe Tool Order
+
+```
+1. Confirm ownership + task scope (one host, one goal)
+2. Connectivity (optional): ping OR curl https://host/healthz — not both + nmap
+3. Auth: ssh -i "$KEY" user@host  (key already on disk / agent)
+4. Targeted commands only (named paths for backup/deploy)
+5. Tear down temp files; never echo secrets
+```
+
+### Safer patterns
+
+```bash
+# CORRECT — key-based, single host, scoped command
+ssh -i "$SSH_KEY_PATH" -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o ConnectTimeout=15 \
+  user@my-vps.example.com 'hostname; ls -la /var/www/app.nutricionando'
+
+# CORRECT — health of owned app (HTTPS)
+curl -sfS --max-time 10 https://app.example.com/healthz
+
+# CORRECT — when cyber risk is high: user runs SSH; agent analyzes pasted output only
+```
+
+### FORBIDDEN patterns (agent-side)
+
+| Pattern | Why |
+|---|---|
+| `sshpass` / password on the command line | Credential in process list + strong cyber signal |
+| Embedding passwords/private keys in prompts or logs | Leak + classifier trigger |
+| `nmap`, subnet sweeps, mass banner grabs | Dual-use recon |
+| Broad `find /` / recursive secret harvest after login | Looks like post-exploitation |
+| Rephrasing after a Cyber Verification API block to “get around” it | Policy evasion — stop instead |
+| Ops against hosts the user does not own | Out of scope |
+
+---
+
+## When Anthropic Cyber-Blocks Mid-Task
+
+1. **Stop** further remote Bash/SSH in that turn.
+2. Explain: API-level cyber safeguard (Opus/Sonnet), not a project hook.
+3. Offer recovery:
+   - User runs the SSH/backup commands locally and pastes output for analysis
+   - Prefer SSH keys + non-interactive, scoped commands next time
+   - For recurring legitimate dual-use ops: apply to the [Cyber Verification Program](https://portal.anthropic.com/programs/cvp) (org admin; data retention required)
+4. Optionally continue on **local** artifacts only (configs, scripts, pasted logs).
+
+Do **not** claim this skill or any memory overrides that API gate.
+
+---
+
+## Prefer CI Over Ad-Hoc SSH
+
+For deploy/backup that repeats: use existing pipelines (`ci-pipelines`, GitHub Actions, provider CLIs) instead of interactive root SSH from the agent.
+
+---
+
+## See Also
+
+- `secrets-management` — SSH keys, `.env.d/`, never put secrets in commands
+- `tool-resilience` — classify SSH/curl failures (permission vs transient)
+- `ci-pipelines` — preferred path for repeatable deploy/backup
+- `observability` — app `/healthz` / `/readyz` (not host recon)
+- Memory `owned-infra-ops.md` — short always-on ownership contract

package/stacks/_shared/skills/secrets-management/SKILL.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: secrets-management
-version: 2.1.0
+version: 2.1.1
 description: "Environment variable hygiene, OIDC federation for CI/CD (2026 default — replaces long-lived static secrets), secret detection (gitleaks 3-layer: pre-commit + CI + GitHub push protection), rotation, and secret-store patterns. Invoke whenever .env, secrets, API keys, env-var-reading code, or CI cloud-deploy credentials are touched."
 ---
 
@@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ Lockfile rules:
 - `security-baseline` — broader OWASP scope (2025-A03 Software Supply Chain Failures)
 - `observability` — log redaction details
 - `ci-pipelines` — OIDC patterns + workflow permissions
+- `owned-infra-ops` — SSH/backup/deploy on user-owned hosts (keys, not passwords; cyber false-positive hygiene)
 - Stack `api-security-*` — usage patterns
 - `memory-optimization` — when this skill grows beyond ~200 lines, run MOP to keep it actionable
 

package/stacks/_shared/skills/tool-resilience/SKILL.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: tool-resilience
-version: 1.0.0
+version: 1.0.1
 description: How the agent should recover from TOOL failures (not application errors) — Read/Edit/StrReplace/Bash/WebFetch/WebSearch/Grep/Glob. Error taxonomy, retry/backoff, read-before-edit, and the Cloudflare 520 / HTTP 444 bot-block recovery (switch User-Agent). Invoke when a tool call fails, times out, returns non-2xx, or a fetch is blocked.
 ---
 
@@ -222,5 +222,6 @@ Tool <name> failed after N attempts.
 
 - `error-handling` — application-level error taxonomy, Result types, retry/backoff, circuit breaker
 - `debugging-patterns` — "Bundle, not Backend" triage; general debug flow
+- `owned-infra-ops` — SSH/curl on user-owned hosts; recover when Anthropic cyber-blocks (do not evade)
 - `competitive-intelligence-research` / `funnel-content-copy` memories — permissive web-copy context
 - MCP web-scraper — sends browser-like headers by default; prefer it for reliable page copies

package/stacks/nodejs/stack.json

@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@
     "docker-patterns",
     "podman-patterns",
     "tool-resilience",
-    "dead-code-hygiene"
+    "dead-code-hygiene",
+    "owned-infra-ops"
   ],
   "requirements": [
     {

package/stacks/php/stack.json

@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@
     "docker-patterns",
     "podman-patterns",
     "tool-resilience",
-    "dead-code-hygiene"
+    "dead-code-hygiene",
+    "owned-infra-ops"
   ],
   "requirements": [
     {

package/stacks/python/stack.json

@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@
     "docker-patterns",
     "podman-patterns",
     "tool-resilience",
-    "dead-code-hygiene"
+    "dead-code-hygiene",
+    "owned-infra-ops"
   ],
   "requirements": [
     {