ssh-mcp 2.10.0 → 2.11.0

package/README.md

@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ claude mcp add --transport stdio ssh-mcp -- ssh-mcp
 | `read-command` | Execute allowlisted read-only commands (`ls`, `cat`, `grep`, ...) | ✅ | — |
 | `run-command` | Execute arbitrary commands (destructive/privileged need approval, unless `approvalPolicy = "auto"`) | — | — |
 | `privileged-command` | Execute with sudo (needs approval, unless `approvalPolicy = "auto"`) | — | ✅ |
-| `sftp-upload` | Upload a file via SFTP | — | ✅ |
+| `sftp-upload` | Upload a file via SFTP (replaces the destination unconditionally) | — | ✅ |
 | `sftp-download` | Download a file via SFTP | ✅ | — |
 | `sftp-list` | List a remote directory, bounded in entries and bytes | ✅ | — |
 | `sftp-upload-file` | Stream a local file to the remote host, never through model context | — | ✅ |
@@ -168,6 +168,24 @@ the text is an argument on the way out and a response on the way back. That is
 what you want for a config snippet and exactly what you do not want for a 200 MB
 tarball or anything binary.
 
+The two also differ on what they do to an existing destination, and the approved
+string now says which is which. `sftp-upload` replaces unconditionally and spells
+`--overwrite` every time, because that is what it always does; `sftp-upload-file`
+refuses unless you pass `overwrite: true`, and only then carries the flag. Since
+`sftp-upload` takes its content as an argument rather than naming a local file,
+its string also carries `--bytes=<n> --sha256=<32 hex>` — without that, two
+uploads to the same path are the same string, which means one approval covers
+both and an auditor cannot tell which set of bytes landed. The digest is 128
+bits rather than a short prefix because that claim has to hold against a caller
+who picks both payloads, not only against an accidental repeat.
+
+The path comes last in that string on purpose. `[policy].denylist` patterns are
+matched against the whole approved string, so a rule anchored on the path —
+`authorized_keys$`, the natural way to write "nothing may write here" — keeps
+working. A rule anchored on the *whole* string (`^sftp:upload /root/.*$`) does
+not: it was coupled to a format that is ours to change, and this release changes
+it. Anchor on the path segment instead.
+
 `sftp-upload-file` and `sftp-download-file` stream between the remote host and
 local disk instead. Neither the bytes nor a base64 encoding of them ever reaches
 the model — the response is a byte count and two paths.
@@ -298,6 +316,7 @@ role = "operator"                   # viewer | operator | admin
 readOnly = false
 approvalPolicy = "ask-all"
 cert = false                        # SSH CA cert auth — auto-detects keyRef-cert.pub
+announceAgent = true                # Send AI_AGENT=ssh-mcp to this host (see below); clear it for a host you do not control
 sessionMaxPerConnection = 3         # per-profile override
 sessionIdleTimeoutMs = 300000       # stricter for prod
 commandQuotaPerDay = 200            # per-profile override
@@ -322,6 +341,43 @@ and tier names: every one you write under `[policy.roleBindings]` has to be
 reachable by some profile, and every profile's role and tier has to resolve to
 real bindings. Both directions are checked at startup.
 
+### Host-side identification
+
+Every command this server runs announces itself to the host as the environment
+variable `AI_AGENT=ssh-mcp`, so an operator can tell an agent's session from a
+person's from anything on the host that reads the session environment — a
+`/etc/profile` snippet or a `ForceCommand` wrapper, for instance. It covers all
+three channels a command can run on: one-shot commands, background sessions and
+interactive sessions. SFTP transfers do not carry it, because the SSH library
+this server uses offers no way to send an environment request on a subsystem
+channel.
+
+**The variable only lands in the session if the host opts in** with
+`AcceptEnv AI_AGENT` in `sshd_config`. Without that line sshd ignores it and the
+session environment is unchanged — measured against Dropbear, which has no
+`AcceptEnv` mechanism at all, and against Windows OpenSSH on a default
+configuration: the command runs, the exit code is unchanged, the variable is
+simply absent.
+
+**The request is nevertheless sent to every host, opted in or not.** `AcceptEnv`
+is the server's policy about what it stores; it is not a gate on what this client
+transmits. A host that has not opted in — including one that is hostile — can
+still see on the wire that an agent rather than a person is driving the session.
+That is why `announceAgent = false` exists on the profile: set it for any host you
+do not control and nothing is sent to it. It is on by default, because the
+operators who benefit are the ones running the hosts you do control.
+
+No version is sent, deliberately. A version would narrow a hostile host to one
+specific build; the tool's name alone does not. (The SSH transport already
+discloses the *library* version in its identification string, which is one
+library's version across every program that uses it.)
+
+Treat the variable as a courtesy label, not an attestation. Any SSH client can
+set it and any agent can omit it, so it is useful for attributing sessions you
+already trust and must not be used as an authorization or intrusion-detection
+input. Authoritative attribution belongs to the key or principal that
+authenticated.
+
 ### ProxyJump (Bastion)
 
 Reach internal hosts behind a bastion/jump server. The `via` field specifies a profile name to tunnel through:
@@ -646,11 +702,12 @@ level number.
 - **Non-root** user in all examples
 - **TOFU** host key verification (accept on first connect, verify after — within one process; see [SECURITY.md](./SECURITY.md#host-key-trust-does-not-survive-a-restart))
 - **RFC 9142** algorithm allow-list (no SHA-1, no CBC, no ssh-rsa)
-- **exec()-only** (no persistent su shells — fixes PTY leak)
+- **exec()-only for elevation** (`privileged-command` takes no `session`, so sudo never runs in a persistent shell — fixes PTY leak. Interactive sessions exist for ordinary commands; this bullet is about elevation, not about every path being an exec channel)
 - **Sudo via stdin** (not argv — fixes process list leak)
 - **Sanitizer** strips CR/LF/NUL from all metadata
 - **3-layer redaction** (field → regex → entropy) on audit logs
 - **No CLI-arg secrets** (use env vars, keychain, or config)
+- **Agent announcement is disclosed, not hidden** — every command tells the host `AI_AGENT=ssh-mcp`, including hosts that never opted in to storing it; clear `announceAgent` on a profile pointing at a host you do not control (see [Host-side identification](#host-side-identification))
 
 ### Hardening Checklist
 
@@ -858,8 +915,10 @@ is an opt-out only for hosts you have not pinned (test environments only).
 ## Testing
 
 ```bash
-# Start test SSH server
-docker-compose --profile test up -d
+# Start test SSH servers. --build matters: compose reuses an existing image, and a
+# fixture change (such as the alpine target's AcceptEnv line) then never lands,
+# which shows up as a product failure in the integration suite.
+docker compose --profile test up -d --build
 
 # Run all tests
 npm test

package/build/cli.js

@@ -331,6 +331,9 @@ export async function buildAppConfig(argv) {
         role: 'admin',
         group: resolveHostGroup(argv),
         readOnly: false,
+        // Same default as the config schema. A CLI profile is the one-off case —
+        // --host/--user with no config file — and it announces like any other.
+        announceAgent: true,
         approvalPolicy: flagEnabled(argv, 'disableApproval') ? 'auto' : defaults.approvalMode,
         cert: false,
         sessionMaxPerConnection: defaults.sessionMaxPerConnection,

package/build/config/schema.js

@@ -161,6 +161,12 @@ export const profileSchema = z.object({
     role: z.string().default('operator'),
     readOnly: z.boolean().default(false),
     cert: z.boolean().default(false),
+    // A schema-level default rather than a [defaults] entry, like tty/readOnly/cert
+    // above: which hosts an operator trusts with the announcement is a property of
+    // the individual host, not something worth setting globally and overriding per
+    // profile. Defaults to true — the announcement is the feature; the switch is for
+    // the host you do not control.
+    announceAgent: z.boolean().default(true),
     // Left optional on purpose: normalizeConfig() fills these from [defaults], and
     // a schema-level .default() would make "user omitted it" indistinguishable
     // from "user set the default value", silently shadowing [defaults].

package/build/ssh/connection.js

@@ -7,6 +7,51 @@ import { redactText } from '../guard/redactor.js';
 import { shellSingleQuote } from '../guard/sanitizer.js';
 import { openWithRetry } from './channel-retry.js';
 import { terminateChannel, COULD_NOT_SIGNAL } from './channel-signal.js';
+/**
+ * What this server tells a host it is, on every channel it opens for a command.
+ *
+ * ssh2's `exec()` calls `reqEnv(chan, opts.env)` with no callback, so the request
+ * goes out with `want_reply=0` and the server has nothing to reply to: an
+ * unaccepted name cannot fail the exec. Measured against ssh2 1.17.0
+ * (`lib/client.js:1230` and the `wantReply` line at `:1863`), against Dropbear,
+ * and against Windows OpenSSH on a default config — the command runs, the
+ * variable is simply absent, exit code unchanged.
+ *
+ * **The request is sent to every host, `AcceptEnv` or not.** `AcceptEnv` is the
+ * server's policy about whether it *stores* the pair in the session environment;
+ * it is not a client-side gate, and nothing here consults it. Measured on the
+ * wire against Dropbear, which has no `AcceptEnv` mechanism at all:
+ *
+ *     Outbound: Sending CHANNEL_REQUEST (r:0, env: AI_AGENT=ssh-mcp)
+ *     Outbound: Sending CHANNEL_REQUEST (r:0, exec: echo hi)
+ *
+ * So a host that never opted in still learns that an agent, not a person, is
+ * driving this session. That is a disclosure, and SECURITY.md's threat model
+ * includes a host tailoring its output to inject the model — which is why
+ * `announceAgent = false` exists on the profile. An earlier draft of this comment
+ * called the declaration "inert" on a host that had not opted in; that is true of
+ * the session environment and false of the wire, and the distinction is the whole
+ * reason the profile has a switch.
+ *
+ * Name only, deliberately — no ssh-mcp build number. The transport already
+ * discloses the *library* version in its identification string (ssh2 sends
+ * `SSH-2.0-ssh2js<ver>` and nothing here overrides `ident`), but that is one
+ * library's version across every user of it; a per-build number for this tool
+ * would narrow a hostile host to one deployment.
+ *
+ * `AI_AGENT` is deliberately outside this project's `SSH_MCP_*` namespace. Every
+ * other environment name this repo owns is prefixed; this one is not, because it
+ * is a cross-tool convention read by server-side detectors that do not know or
+ * care which client sent it, and a prefixed name would defeat the only purpose it
+ * has. Renaming it to `SSH_MCP_AGENT` would look like a consistency fix and would
+ * silently break every consumer — hence this paragraph.
+ *
+ * Frozen because it is one object shared by every channel on every connection in
+ * the process. Nothing mutates it today; the first per-command addition to a
+ * channel's `env` would, and would leak across profiles for the life of the
+ * process.
+ */
+const AGENT_ENV = Object.freeze({ AI_AGENT: 'ssh-mcp' });
 /**
  * Stop the command behind `channel`, record why on the span, and return the sentence the
  * rejection should carry.
@@ -74,19 +119,46 @@ export class SSHConnection {
             openShell: async () => {
                 await this.ensureConnected();
                 return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-                    this.getClient().shell({ term: 'xterm-256color', cols: 200, rows: 50 }, (err, stream) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(stream)));
+                    this.getClient().shell({ term: 'xterm-256color', cols: 200, rows: 50 }, 
+                    // Three-argument form, deliberately. ssh2 reclassifies the first
+                    // argument as the options object when it carries `env` or `x11`
+                    // (lib/client.js:1260), so folding the announcement into the window
+                    // object above would silently drop term/cols/rows on every
+                    // interactive session.
+                    this.channelEnv(), (err, stream) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(stream)));
                 });
             },
             openExec: async (command) => {
                 await this.ensureConnected();
                 return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-                    this.getClient().exec(this.applyWorkdir(command), (err, stream) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(stream)));
+                    this.getClient().exec(this.applyWorkdir(command), this.channelEnv(), (err, stream) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(stream)));
                 });
             },
             onChannelOpened: () => { this.activeChannels++; },
             onChannelClosed: () => { this.activeChannels--; },
         });
     }
+    /**
+     * The announcement for a channel about to be opened, or nothing.
+     *
+     * One accessor rather than an object literal at each site. The first version of
+     * this feature wrote `{ env: AGENT_ENV }` at two of the three channel-opening
+     * sites and missed `openShell`, which left every command run inside an
+     * interactive session unannounced while the README claimed otherwise. Three
+     * literals give a site the chance to look complete while carrying nothing; a
+     * missing call to this does not.
+     *
+     * Read live, like every other profile field here: the profile object can be
+     * replaced after construction, so an operator clearing `announceAgent` is
+     * honoured on the next channel rather than at the next restart.
+     *
+     * The return type is the intersection both callers accept — `ExecOptions` and
+     * `ShellOptions` declare `env` identically — so one accessor serves `exec()`,
+     * `openExec` and `openShell` without naming either API.
+     */
+    channelEnv() {
+        return this.profile.announceAgent === false ? {} : { env: AGENT_ENV };
+    }
     async ensureConnected() {
         if (this.isConnected())
             return;
@@ -254,7 +326,7 @@ export class SSHConnection {
                     reject(new Error(`Command timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms${note}`));
                 }
             }, timeoutMs);
-            const execOpts = {};
+            const execOpts = { ...this.channelEnv() };
             if (opts.tty || this.profile.tty) {
                 execOpts.pty = { term: 'xterm-256color', cols: 200, rows: 50 };
             }

package/build/tools/audit-effects.js

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import { createHash } from 'crypto';
+/**
+ * How the transfer tools spell what they are about to do, in the one string the
+ * approver reads, the policy classifies and the audit record keeps.
+ *
+ * Shared because the two tools spelled one concept differently: `sftp-upload-file`
+ * already carried `--overwrite` when it would clobber, while `sftp-upload` — which
+ * always clobbers — carried nothing, so the presence of the flag read as a
+ * difference between the tools rather than between operations (#223). A second
+ * copy of `--overwrite` is one rename away from putting them back out of step, so
+ * there is one.
+ *
+ * `--mode` is *not* at parity and was left that way deliberately. `sftp-upload`
+ * applies 0o644 on a create and never says so, while an absent `--mode=` on
+ * `sftp-upload-file` means 0o600-or-inherited — one absence, two meanings, which
+ * is the same shape of defect #223 describes. Fixing it means deciding what the
+ * effective mode even is on an overwrite (createWriteStream's mode is ignored for
+ * an existing file), which is a separate question from what this module landed for.
+ */
+/**
+ * Spelled once so a rename cannot reach one tool and miss the other.
+ *
+ * Exported rather than reached through `effectSuffix(true)`: `sftp-upload` has no
+ * `overwrite` parameter, so passing a literal `true` to a two-argument helper and
+ * letting the reader constant-fold it needed three lines of comment to say what
+ * one token says.
+ */
+export const OVERWRITE_FLAG = ' --overwrite';
+/** The arguments that change what a transfer does, spelled for policy and the approver. */
+export function effectSuffix(overwrite, mode) {
+    return (overwrite ? OVERWRITE_FLAG : '') + (mode !== undefined ? ` --mode=${mode.toString(8)}` : '');
+}
+/**
+ * 128 bits, because the property claimed here is adversarial, not accidental.
+ *
+ * This was 12 characters on first writing, and 48 truncated bits is ~24 bits of
+ * birthday security — measured, a collision took 12.3 seconds and 10.9M hashes on
+ * one core, producing two 96-byte payloads with the same `--bytes` and the same
+ * digest, hence the byte-identical approved string. `--bytes` costs an attacker
+ * nothing to match, since both candidates can be padded to one length. At 32
+ * characters the same search is 2^64 and not worth describing.
+ *
+ * Length is free on the redaction axis, which is the reason a short digest looked
+ * attractive. The emitted run is `--sha256=<hex>` — `-` and `=` are both in the
+ * redactor's character class, so the run is the flag *plus* the digest, and at any
+ * digest length it is past that scan's 20-character window and is inspected. It
+ * can nonetheless never be redacted: the run draws on 20 distinct symbols, so its
+ * Shannon entropy cannot exceed log2(20) = 4.32 against a 4.5 threshold. Measured
+ * 4.24 at this length. An earlier version of this comment claimed the digest sat
+ * *under* the window; it did not, and reasoning about a length change from that
+ * claim would have started from the wrong mechanism.
+ */
+const DIGEST_CHARS = 32;
+/**
+ * What the approved string says about the bytes, for a tool whose payload is an
+ * argument rather than a named file.
+ *
+ * `sftp-upload` takes its content inline, so unlike the streaming tools there is
+ * no local path in the string to stand for it. Without this, two uploads to the
+ * same destination are the same string — to the approver deciding, to
+ * `ApprovalGrants` keying on it, and to an auditor later asking which one ran.
+ *
+ * Byte length rather than `content.length`: a JS string counts UTF-16 code units,
+ * and the upload writes `Buffer.from(content)` as utf8, so the two disagree on
+ * every multi-byte character. The digest is over the same encoding, which is why
+ * `update(content, 'utf8')` states the encoding rather than relying on a default.
+ *
+ * `string` only, though `SftpClient.upload` also accepts a Buffer: the one tool
+ * that calls this takes its content through `z.string()`, so a Buffer branch here
+ * would be a branch no test could reach honestly. Widen it when a caller needs it,
+ * with the case that needs it.
+ */
+export function payloadSuffix(content) {
+    const digest = createHash('sha256').update(content, 'utf8').digest('hex').slice(0, DIGEST_CHARS);
+    return ` --bytes=${Buffer.byteLength(content, 'utf8')} --sha256=${digest}`;
+}

package/build/tools/descriptions.js

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ export const TOOL_DESCRIPTIONS = {
     'read-command': 'Execute a READ-ONLY command from an allowlist (ls, cat, grep, find, stat, df, etc.). This tool does NOT modify the system. Prefer this tool for all read operations. Single-line only: a command containing a line break is refused, so upload a multi-line script with sftp-upload and run it by path.',
     'run-command': 'Execute an arbitrary shell command on the remote server. May modify the system. Commands classified destructive or privileged go through the approval gate; approvalPolicy on the profile decides whether that is a prompt, an automatic allow, or a refusal. Single-line only: a command containing a line break is refused, so upload a multi-line script with sftp-upload and run it by path.',
     'privileged-command': 'Execute a command with sudo elevation. Goes through the approval gate; approvalPolicy on the profile decides whether that is a prompt, an automatic allow, or a refusal. The sudo password is piped via stdin (never visible in process list). Single-line only: a command containing a line break is refused, so upload a multi-line script with sftp-upload and run it by path.',
-    'sftp-upload': 'Upload a file to the remote server via SFTP (secure file transfer, not shell-based).',
+    'sftp-upload': 'Upload a file to the remote server via SFTP (secure file transfer, not shell-based). Replaces an existing file at that path unconditionally — there is no overwrite flag and no way to require a new destination.',
     'sftp-download': 'Download a file from the remote server via SFTP.',
     'sftp-list': 'List a remote directory over SFTP, with a bounded number of entries and a bounded response size. Read-only.',
     'sftp-upload-file': 'Upload a local file to the remote host over SFTP, streaming it without passing the contents through model context. The local file must be inside the transferRoot directory the operator configured; without that setting this tool refuses. Use this for binary or large files; use sftp-upload for short text you already have.',

package/build/tools/file-tools.js

@@ -2,18 +2,27 @@ import { z } from 'zod';
 import { redactText } from '../guard/redactor.js';
 import { remotePathForAudit, sanitizeRemotePath } from '../guard/sanitizer.js';
 import { SftpClient } from '../ssh/sftp.js';
+import { OVERWRITE_FLAG, payloadSuffix } from './audit-effects.js';
 import { TOOL_DESCRIPTIONS as D } from './descriptions.js';
 import { syntheticSuccess, textResult } from './results.js';
 /**
  * SFTP transfer tools.
  *
  * Both paths go through `sanitizeRemotePath`, the same bar the streaming tools
- * hold — for the *path*, which is the only axis brought level here. `sftp-upload`
- * still truncates an existing remote file unconditionally while
- * `sftp-upload-file` refuses unless `overwrite` is passed and spells
- * `--overwrite` into the approved string, and `content` is still absent from that
- * string. Both predate this change and are tracked as #223; saying "the same
- * bar" without this sentence claimed a parity that does not exist. `synthetic: true` skips `sanitizeCommand`, and these two interpolated
+ * hold — for the *path*.
+ *
+ * `sftp-upload` truncates an existing remote file unconditionally where
+ * `sftp-upload-file` refuses unless `overwrite` is passed. What #223 changed is
+ * that the approved string says so: before it named a destination and no effect,
+ * and said nothing at all about the bytes, so two uploads to one path were one
+ * string — one approval, one indistinguishable audit record. The behaviour is
+ * unchanged on purpose: a default of `overwrite: false` would break every caller
+ * that relies on replacement. `--overwrite` is therefore constant here, which does
+ * mean it carries no per-call information — the per-call signal is `--bytes` and
+ * `--sha256`. It stays because the sibling tool omits the flag when it will not
+ * clobber, so an approver comparing the two needs its presence to mean something.
+ *
+ * `synthetic: true` skips `sanitizeCommand`, and these two interpolated
  * the caller's raw string, so nothing refused a bidi override or a zero-width
  * character in a path that is quoted back in the approval prompt and written
  * into a hash-chained audit record — the exact confusion that validator exists
@@ -32,7 +41,19 @@ export function registerFileTools({ server }, pipeline) {
         content: z.string().describe('File content to upload'),
         profile: z.string().optional().describe('Profile name'),
     }, { destructiveHint: true }, async ({ remotePath, content, profile }, extra) => {
-        return runAudited(`sftp:upload ${remotePathForAudit(remotePath)}`, {
+        return runAudited(
+        // Verb, then what the operation does, then the path it does it to — and the
+        // path LAST on purpose. The engine matches `[policy].denylist` against this
+        // whole string, so an operator rule anchored on the path (`authorized_keys$`,
+        // the natural and portable way to write "nothing may write here") keeps
+        // working only while the path ends the line. Measured: with the suffixes
+        // appended after the path instead, that rule silently stops matching and the
+        // refusal degrades to a prompt with no warning. A whole-string rule
+        // (`^sftp:upload /root.*$`) breaks either way — it is coupled to a format
+        // that is ours to change — so the layout is chosen for the form that is not.
+        // `sftp:list` and `sftp:download` carry no flags, so they already read this
+        // way and need no change.
+        `sftp:upload${OVERWRITE_FLAG}${payloadSuffix(content)} ${remotePathForAudit(remotePath)}`, {
             toolName: 'sftp-upload',
             failureClass: 'destructive',
             profile,
@@ -43,10 +64,8 @@ export function registerFileTools({ server }, pipeline) {
             await new SftpClient(rt.conn).upload({ remotePath, content });
             return {
                 audited: syntheticSuccess(rt.profileName),
-                // Byte count, not string length: `content` is a JS string, so
-                // `.length` counts UTF-16 code units and under-reports every
-                // multi-byte character. SftpClient.upload writes Buffer.from(content),
-                // which is utf8, so this is exactly what lands on the remote side.
+                // utf8 bytes, matching the count the approved string already carries —
+                // see `payloadSuffix` in audit-effects.ts for why `.length` is wrong.
                 output: textResult(`Uploaded ${Buffer.byteLength(content, 'utf8')} bytes to ${remotePath}`),
             };
         });

package/build/tools/transfer-tools.js

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { ErrorCode, McpError } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js';
 import { redactText } from '../guard/redactor.js';
 import { remotePathForAudit, sanitizeRemotePath } from '../guard/sanitizer.js';
 import { SftpClient } from '../ssh/sftp.js';
+import { effectSuffix } from './audit-effects.js';
 import { TOOL_DESCRIPTIONS as D } from './descriptions.js';
 import { createLocalDownload, localFileForRead, localPathForAudit, } from './local-path.js';
 import { syntheticSuccess, textResult } from './results.js';
@@ -142,10 +143,6 @@ export function checkMode(mode) {
     }
     return mode;
 }
-/** The arguments that change what a transfer does, spelled for policy and the approver. */
-function effectSuffix(overwrite, mode) {
-    return (overwrite ? ' --overwrite' : '') + (mode !== undefined ? ` --mode=${mode.toString(8)}` : '');
-}
 /**
  * What the audit record adds once the local path has been resolved.
  *

package/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "ssh-mcp",
   "license": "MIT",
-  "version": "2.10.0",
+  "version": "2.11.0",
   "description": "MCP server exposing policy-gated, audited SSH access for Linux and Windows hosts via the Model Context Protocol.",
   "mcpName": "io.github.tufantunc/ssh-mcp",
   "type": "module",