ssh-mcp 1.5.0 → 2.0.1

package/README.md

@@ -1,204 +1,549 @@
-# SSH MCP Server
+# SSH MCP Server v2
 
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+**SSH MCP Server** is a security-first Model Context Protocol server that gives LLM agents controlled SSH access to remote hosts — with command classification, policy-based authorization, human-in-the-loop approval, and full audit logging.
 
-**SSH MCP Server** is a local Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that exposes SSH control for Linux and Windows systems, enabling LLMs and other MCP clients to execute shell commands securely via SSH.
+> **WARNING — Lethal Trifecta Risk.** Giving an LLM SSH access creates a ["Lethal Trifecta"](https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/) (private data + untrusted input + network egress). **Never run as root. Never enable `auto` approval on production.** See [SECURITY.md](./SECURITY.md) for the full threat model and mitigation checklist.
 
-## Contents
-
-- [Quick Start](#quick-start)
-- [Features](#features)
-- [Installation](#installation)
-- [Client Setup](#client-setup)
-- [Testing](#testing)
-- [Disclaimer](#disclaimer)
-- [Support](#support)
+---
 
 ## Quick Start
 
-- [Install](#installation) SSH MCP Server
-- [Configure](#configuration) SSH MCP Server
-- [Set up](#client-setup) your MCP Client (e.g. Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc)
-- Execute remote shell commands on your Linux or Windows server via natural language
+### 1. Install
 
-## Features
+```bash
+npm install -g ssh-mcp
+```
 
-- MCP-compliant server exposing SSH capabilities
-- Execute shell commands on remote Linux and Windows systems
-- Secure authentication via password or SSH key
-- Built with TypeScript and the official MCP SDK
-- **Configurable timeout protection** with automatic process abortion
-- **Graceful timeout handling** - attempts to kill hanging processes before closing connections
+### 2. Configure
 
-### Tools
+Create `~/.config/ssh-mcp/config.toml` (Linux/macOS) or `%APPDATA%\ssh-mcp\config.toml` (Windows):
+
+```toml
+[defaults]
+defaultProfile = "dev"
+approvalMode = "ask-destructive"
+
+[[profiles]]
+name = "dev"
+host = "192.168.1.100"
+port = 22
+user = "deploy"           # NOT root!
+auth = "key"
+keyRef = "~/.ssh/id_ed25519"
+role = "admin"
+approvalPolicy = "auto"    # dev is permissive
+```
+
+```bash
+chmod 600 ~/.config/ssh-mcp/config.toml
+```
+
+### 3. Set credentials via environment variables
+
+```bash
+export SSH_MCP_PASSWORD="your-password"        # if using auth=password
+# OR use SSH agent (recommended):
+export SSH_AUTH_SOCK="$SSH_AUTH_SOCK"           # already set if agent running
+```
+
+### 4. Connect from your MCP client
 
-- `exec`: Execute a shell command on the remote server
-  - **Parameters:**
-    - `command` (required): Shell command to execute on the remote SSH server
-    - `description` (optional): Optional description of what this command will do (appended as a comment)
-  - **Timeout Configuration:**
-
-- `sudo-exec`: Execute a shell command with sudo elevation
-  - **Parameters:**
-    - `command` (required): Shell command to execute as root using sudo
-    - `description` (optional): Optional description of what this command will do (appended as a comment)
-  - **Notes:**
-    - Requires `--sudoPassword` to be set for password-protected sudo
-    - Can be disabled by passing the `--disableSudo` flag at startup if sudo access is not needed or not available
-    - For persistent root access, consider using `--suPassword` instead which establishes a root shell
-    - Tool will not be available at all if server is started with `--disableSudo`
-  - **Timeout Configuration:**
-    - Timeout is configured via command line argument `--timeout` (in milliseconds)
-    - Default timeout: 60000ms (1 minute)
-    - When a command times out, the server automatically attempts to abort the running process before closing the connection
-  - **Max Command Length Configuration:**
-    - Max command characters are configured via `--maxChars`
-    - Default: `1000`
-    - No-limit mode: set `--maxChars=none` or any `<= 0` value (e.g. `--maxChars=0`)
-
-## Installation
-
-1. **Clone the repository:**
-   ```bash
-   git clone https://github.com/tufantunc/ssh-mcp.git
-   cd ssh-mcp
-   ```
-2. **Install dependencies:**
-   ```bash
-   npm install
-   ```
-
-## Client Setup
-
-You can configure your IDE or LLM like Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Desktop to use this MCP Server.
-
-**Required Parameters:**
-- `host`: Hostname or IP of the Linux or Windows server
-- `user`: SSH username
-
-**Optional Parameters:**
-- `port`: SSH port (default: 22)
-- `password`: SSH password (or use `key` for key-based auth)
-- `key`: Path to private SSH key
-- `sudoPassword`: Password for sudo elevation (when executing commands with sudo)
-- `suPassword`: Password for su elevation (when you need a persistent root shell)
-- `timeout`: Command execution timeout in milliseconds (default: 60000ms = 1 minute)
-- `maxChars`: Maximum allowed characters for the `command` input (default: 1000). Use `none` or `0` to disable the limit.
-- `disableSudo`: Flag to disable the `sudo-exec` tool completely. Useful when sudo access is not needed or not available.
-
-
-```commandline
+**Claude Code:**
+```bash
+claude mcp add --transport stdio ssh-mcp -- ssh-mcp
+```
+
+**Claude Desktop / Cursor / Windsurf:**
+```json
 {
-    "mcpServers": {
-        "ssh-mcp": {
-            "command": "npx",
-            "args": [
-                "ssh-mcp",
-                "-y",
-                "--",
-                "--host=1.2.3.4",
-                "--port=22",
-                "--user=root",
-                "--password=pass",
-                "--key=path/to/key",
-                "--timeout=30000",
-                "--maxChars=none"
-            ]
-        }
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "ssh-mcp": {
+      "command": "ssh-mcp",
+      "env": {
+        "SSH_MCP_PASSWORD": "your-password"
+      }
     }
+  }
 }
 ```
 
-### Claude Code
+**Never pass passwords as CLI arguments** — they're visible via `ps aux`. Use env vars, config files, SSH agent, or OS keychain.
+
+---
+
+## Tools (11)
+
+| Tool | Purpose | readOnly | destructive |
+|------|---------|:--------:|:----------:|
+| `list-connections` | Discover available hosts and connection status | ✅ | — |
+| `list-sessions` | List active sessions per host | ✅ | — |
+| `open-session` | Create a named interactive (stateful) or background session | — | — |
+| `close-session` | Close a session, releasing resources | — | ✅ |
+| `read-session-output` | Read output from background sessions (e.g., `tail -f`) | ✅ | — |
+| `read-command` | Execute allowlisted read-only commands (`ls`, `cat`, `grep`, ...) | ✅ | — |
+| `run-command` | Execute arbitrary commands (destructive ones need approval) | — | — |
+| `privileged-command` | Execute with sudo (always requires approval) | — | ✅ |
+| `sftp-upload` | Upload a file via SFTP | — | ✅ |
+| `sftp-download` | Download a file via SFTP | ✅ | — |
+| `signal-process` | Send INT/TERM/KILL to a remote PID | — | ✅ |
+
+### Interactive Sessions
+
+Sessions maintain state (CWD, environment variables) between commands:
+
+```
+Agent: open-session(name="deploy", type="interactive")
+Agent: run-command(session="deploy", command="cd /opt/myapp")
+Agent: run-command(session="deploy", command="git pull")    # runs in /opt/myapp
+Agent: run-command(session="deploy", command="npm ci")      # CWD persists
+Agent: close-session(name="deploy")
+```
+
+### Background Sessions
+
+Long-running processes (logs, builds):
+
+```
+Agent: open-session(name="logs", type="background", command="tail -f /var/log/syslog")
+Agent: read-session-output(name="logs", lines=20)   # poll
+Agent: close-session(name="logs")
+```
+
+### Remote host support
+
+Tested against Linux (Debian/bash, Alpine/busybox ash), Dropbear, and Windows
+OpenSSH on Windows 11.
+
+| | Linux / BSD / macOS | Windows OpenSSH |
+|---|:---:|:---:|
+| `read-command`, `run-command`, `privileged-command`, `signal-process` | ✅ | ✅ |
+| `sftp-upload`, `sftp-download` | ✅ | ✅ |
+| Background sessions | ✅ | ✅ |
+| **Interactive sessions** | ✅ | ❌ |
+
+**Interactive sessions require a POSIX shell** (sh, bash, ash, zsh). They work by
+bracketing each command with `printf` markers and reading `$?` and `$PWD` from a
+trailer — none of which exist in `cmd.exe`, the default shell for Windows
+OpenSSH. Opening one against such a host fails immediately with an explicit
+error rather than timing out; everything else works normally.
+
+Setting PowerShell as the OpenSSH `DefaultShell` does not help: the protocol is
+POSIX-specific, not merely non-`cmd`.
+
+---
+
+## Configuration
+
+### Profile options
+
+```toml
+[defaults]
+defaultProfile = "dev"
+sessionMaxPerConnection = 5
+sessionIdleTimeoutMs = 600000       # 10min
+sessionBackgroundMaxMs = 3600000    # 1hr
+commandTimeoutMs = 60000
+commandMaxChars = 5000
+commandMaxOutputBytes = 1048576     # 1MB
+connectionIdleReapMs = 900000       # 15min
+commandQuotaPerDay = 0              # 0 = unlimited; circuit breaker for runaway agents
+approvalGrantTtlMs = 0              # 0 = always prompt; see "Approval Grants"
+approvalMode = "ask-destructive"    # auto | ask-destructive | ask-all | deny
+
+[[profiles]]
+name = "prod-web-1"
+host = "10.0.1.50"
+port = 22
+user = "deploy"
+auth = "agent"                      # agent | key | password | keychain
+keyRef = "~/.ssh/id_ed25519"        # for auth=key
+keychainEntry = "ssh-mcp/prod"      # for auth=keychain (requires @napi-rs/keyring)
+via = "bastion"                     # ProxyJump — route through bastion profile
+group = "prod"                      # Policy tier: prod | staging | dev
+workdir = "/var/www"
+trustedHostKey = "SHA256:..."       # Pin host key (optional)
+tty = false
+role = "operator"                   # viewer | operator | admin
+readOnly = false
+approvalPolicy = "ask-all"
+cert = false                        # SSH CA cert auth — auto-detects keyRef-cert.pub
+sessionMaxPerConnection = 3         # per-profile override
+sessionIdleTimeoutMs = 300000       # stricter for prod
+commandQuotaPerDay = 200            # per-profile override
+```
+
+### ProxyJump (Bastion)
+
+Reach internal hosts behind a bastion/jump server. The `via` field specifies a profile name to tunnel through:
+
+```toml
+[[profiles]]
+name = "bastion"
+host = "bastion.example.com"
+user = "deploy"
+auth = "agent"
+
+[[profiles]]
+name = "internal-db"
+host = "10.0.1.50"                 # private IP — not directly reachable
+user = "dbadmin"
+auth = "key"
+keyRef = "~/.ssh/db_key"
+via = "bastion"                     # tunnel through bastion
+```
+
+No agent forwarding — only a TCP tunnel via `forwardOut`. The bastion stays connected and reusable for multiple internal hosts.
+
+### SSH CA Certificates
+
+For enterprise setups with a central SSH Certificate Authority:
+
+```toml
+[[profiles]]
+name = "prod-db"
+host = "db.internal"
+user = "admin"
+auth = "key"
+keyRef = "~/.ssh/id_ed25519"
+cert = true                         # enable CA cert auth
+```
+
+The certificate file is auto-detected using OpenSSH convention (`keyRef` + `-cert.pub`, e.g. `~/.ssh/id_ed25519-cert.pub`). You can override the path with `SSH_MCP_<NAME>_CERT` env var. The cert is concatenated with the private key per ssh2 convention.
+
+### Credential Resolution Order
+
+1. **SSH agent** (`SSH_AUTH_SOCK`) — no key material in process memory
+2. **OS keychain** (macOS Keychain / Windows Credential Manager / Linux Secret Service) — requires `auth = "keychain"` and `@napi-rs/keyring`
+3. **Environment variables** — `SSH_MCP_PASSWORD`, `SSH_MCP_KEY`, `SSH_MCP_SUDO_PASSWORD`, or profile-specific `SSH_MCP_<NAME>_PASSWORD`
+4. **Key file** — `keyRef` path or `SSH_MCP_KEY` env var
+
+**Never CLI arguments.** v2 removes `--password`, `--sudoPassword`, `--suPassword` entirely.
+
+---
+
+## Policy Engine
+
+### Roles
+
+| Role | Dev | Staging | Prod |
+|------|-----|---------|------|
+| **viewer** | read-only | read-only | read-only |
+| **operator** | read-only, safe, destructive | read-only, safe, destructive | read-only, safe |
+| **admin** | all | all | read-only, safe, destructive |
+
+Which column applies comes from the profile's `group`. Set it explicitly —
+without it the tier is guessed from the profile name (`prod`/`staging`/`dev`,
+`local`, `test`, `sandbox`), and **an unrecognised name resolves to `prod`**,
+the strictest tier. A production host named `web-01` is therefore treated as
+production rather than silently getting dev permissions.
+
+### Command Classification
+
+Every command is classified before execution:
+
+- **read-only**: Allowlisted commands (`ls`, `cat`, `grep`, `df`, `stat`, `systemctl status`, ...)
+- **safe**: Non-destructive mutations (`npm install`, `git pull`, ...)
+- **destructive**: mutations that need approval (`rm -rf /tmp/build`, ...)
+- **privileged**: `sudo`, `su`, `doas`, `pkexec`
+
+A separate **forbidden** list is never allowed, whatever the role or approval
+policy: `rm -rf /`, `mkfs`, `dd of=/dev/`, `shutdown`, `curl|sh`, fork bombs,
+writes to `/etc/cron`, `/etc/systemd` or `authorized_keys`, `iptables -F`, and
+recursive `chmod 777 /` / `chown /`. Add your own patterns via the policy
+denylist; an invalid pattern fails at startup rather than degrading silently.
+
+### Approval Modes
+
+- `auto` — no prompts (dev only!)
+- `ask-destructive` — prompt for destructive/privileged (default)
+- `ask-all` — prompt for every command
+- `deny` — reject destructive/privileged commands outright (no prompt)
+
+### Approval Grants (just-in-time)
 
-You can add this MCP server to Claude Code using the `claude mcp add` command. This is the recommended method for Claude Code.
+`approvalGrantTtlMs` lets one explicit approval cover repeats of the **exact
+same** command on the same profile for a bounded time (e.g. `300000` for five
+minutes). It exists because approving `rm -rf /tmp/build` every few seconds
+during an iterative task trains you to click through prompts — which is worse
+for safety than a grant you chose deliberately.
 
-**Basic Installation:**
+A grant is bound to the exact command text, the profile and the command class:
+approving `rm -rf /tmp/build` does not cover `rm -rf /tmp/build-prod`, the same
+command on another host, or the same command escalated to `sudo`. Runs covered
+by a grant appear in the audit log with `approver: "jit-grant"`, so they stay
+distinguishable from a fresh human answer.
+
+**Off by default** (`0` = always prompt). Auto-approval weakens the gate that
+makes destructive commands safe, so turning it on should be a decision.
+
+### Command Quota
+
+`commandQuotaPerDay` bounds how many commands a profile may run in a rolling
+24-hour window (0 = unlimited). The approval gate stops *destructive* commands
+and the HTTP rate limiter caps request rate, but neither bounds total work — a
+prompt-injected agent looping over allowed commands stays under both. The quota
+is the circuit breaker for that case.
+
+Counted after policy allows a command and before it runs, so a denied command
+does not spend budget. The window slides rather than resetting at midnight,
+which would let an agent spend a full quota just before the reset and another
+immediately after.
+
+### External Policy Engine (OPA)
+
+For organizations that standardize on Open Policy Agent / Rego:
 
 ```bash
-claude mcp add --transport stdio ssh-mcp -- npx -y ssh-mcp -- --host=YOUR_HOST --user=YOUR_USER --password=YOUR_PASSWORD
+ssh-mcp --opaUrl=http://localhost:8181
 ```
 
-**Installation Examples:**
+When `--opaUrl` is set, every command is additionally evaluated by OPA after the built-in policy engine. The request shape follows the AuthZEN Access Evaluation contract:
+
+```json
+{
+  "input": {
+    "subject": { "role": "operator", "profile": "prod-web-1" },
+    "action": { "tool": "run-command", "commandClass": "destructive" },
+    "resource": { "command": "rm -rf /tmp/cache", "binary": "rm", "host": "10.0.1.50" },
+    "context": { "readOnly": false }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+OPA responds with `{ "result": true/false }`. If OPA denies (`result: false`), the command is blocked even if the built-in engine allows it. If OPA is unreachable, the built-in engine's decision stands (fail-open to avoid locking out access).
+
+Example Rego policy (`ssh-mcp.rego`):
+```rego
+package ssh.mcp
+
+default allow := false
+
+# Admins can run anything on dev hosts
+allow if {
+  input.subject.role == "admin"
+  startswith(input.subject.profile, "dev")
+}
+
+# Deny all destructive commands on prod
+deny if {
+  input.action.commandClass == "destructive"
+  startswith(input.subject.profile, "prod")
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Security
+
+### Threat Model
+
+See [SECURITY.md](./SECURITY.md) for the full threat model, vulnerability reporting policy, and deployment checklist.
+
+### Safe Defaults
+
+- **Non-root** user in all examples
+- **TOFU** host key verification (accept on first connect, verify after)
+- **RFC 9142** algorithm allow-list (no SHA-1, no CBC, no ssh-rsa)
+- **exec()-only** (no persistent su shells — fixes PTY leak)
+- **Sudo via stdin** (not argv — fixes process list leak)
+- **Sanitizer** strips CR/LF/NUL from all metadata
+- **3-layer redaction** (field → regex → entropy) on audit logs
+- **No CLI-arg secrets** (use env vars, keychain, or config)
+
+### Hardening Checklist
+
+- [ ] Create dedicated low-privilege service account on target hosts
+- [ ] Use command-specific `sudoers` instead of `NOPASSWD: ALL`
+- [ ] Enable `ask-all` approval for production profiles
+- [ ] Restrict network egress on target hosts
+- [ ] Use `readOnly = true` for monitoring profiles
+- [ ] Review audit logs regularly
+- [ ] Run `chmod 600 config.toml`
+
+---
+
+## Transports
+
+### stdio (default)
+
+For local MCP clients (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf). No network exposure.
 
-**With Password Authentication:**
 ```bash
-claude mcp add --transport stdio ssh-mcp -- npx -y ssh-mcp -- --host=192.168.1.100 --port=22 --user=admin --password=your_password
+ssh-mcp                          # reads config from XDG path
+ssh-mcp --config=/path/to.toml   # custom config path
 ```
 
-**With SSH Key Authentication:**
+### HTTP (optional)
+
+For remote/web clients behind a reverse proxy with TLS:
+
 ```bash
-claude mcp add --transport stdio ssh-mcp -- npx -y ssh-mcp -- --host=example.com --user=root --key=/path/to/private/key
+ssh-mcp --transport=http --httpPort=3000 --bearerToken=secret
+ssh-mcp --transport=http --httpPort=3000 --bearerToken=secret --rateLimit=60
 ```
 
-**With Custom Timeout and No Character Limit:**
+| Flag | Default | Description |
+|------|---------|-------------|
+| `--bearerToken` | required | Bearer token for authentication (all routes except `GET /health`) |
+| `--httpPort` | 3000 | HTTP listen port |
+| `--httpHost` | 127.0.0.1 | Bind address |
+| `--rateLimit` | 0 (off) | Max requests per minute (0 = unlimited) |
+
+Endpoints: `POST /` (MCP Streamable HTTP), `GET /status`, `GET /health`
+
+When rate limit is exceeded, the server returns HTTP 429 with `Retry-After` header and a JSON-RPC error body so MCP clients can handle it gracefully.
+
+**Always terminate TLS at a reverse proxy** (Caddy/nginx). The server listens on `127.0.0.1` only.
+
+---
+
+## Docker
+
 ```bash
-claude mcp add --transport stdio ssh-mcp -- npx -y ssh-mcp -- --host=192.168.1.100 --user=admin --password=your_password --timeout=120000 --maxChars=none
+# Build
+docker build -t ssh-mcp .
+
+# Run (config file + env vars for credentials)
+docker run -i \
+  -v ./config.toml:/home/appuser/.config/ssh-mcp/config.toml:ro \
+  -e SSH_MCP_PASSWORD=secret \
+  ssh-mcp
 ```
 
-**With Sudo and Su Support:**
+Or with docker-compose:
+
 ```bash
-claude mcp add --transport stdio ssh-mcp -- npx -y ssh-mcp -- --host=192.168.1.100 --user=admin --password=your_password --sudoPassword=sudo_pass --suPassword=root_pass
+docker-compose --profile app up
 ```
 
-**Installation Scopes:**
+The Docker image runs as non-root UID 65532, with a minimal `node:22-slim` base.
+
+---
+
+## CLI Flags (v2)
+
+Secrets are **never** passed as CLI arguments.
+
+| Flag | Default | Description |
+|------|---------|-------------|
+| `--config` | XDG path | Path to TOML config file |
+| `--host` | — | Quick start: SSH host (creates single-profile config) |
+| `--user` | — | Quick start: SSH username |
+| `--port` | 22 | Quick start: SSH port |
+| `--key` | — | Quick start: Path to private key |
+| `--workdir` | — | Quick start: Working directory for commands and sessions |
+| `--timeout` | 60000 | Command timeout in ms |
+| `--maxChars` | 5000 | Max command length (`none` or `0` disables the limit) |
+| `--sessionMax` | 5 | Max concurrent sessions per connection |
+| `--sessionTtl` | 600000 | Session idle timeout in ms |
+| `--transport` | stdio | `stdio` or `http` |
+| `--httpPort` | 3000 | HTTP transport port |
+| `--httpHost` | 127.0.0.1 | HTTP bind address |
+| `--bearerToken` | — | Bearer token for HTTP transport auth (required for `--transport=http`) |
+| `--rateLimit` | 0 | HTTP requests per minute on the MCP route (0 = unlimited) |
+| `--allowedHosts` | bind address + localhost | Comma-separated Host headers accepted by the DNS-rebinding guard |
+| `--insecureHostKey` | false | Disable host key verification (test only!) |
+| `--disableApproval` | false | Skip the approval gate (quick start profile only) |
+| `--opaUrl` | — | OPA sidecar URL for external policy |
+| `--commandQuota` | 0 (off) | Max commands per rolling 24h per profile |
+| `--approvalGrantTtl` | 0 (off) | Auto-approve an identical command for this many ms after approval |
+| `--auditEntropyScan` | false | Enable entropy-based secret scanning in audit |
+| `--auditTamperEvident` | false | Enable hash-chained tamper-evident audit log |
+| `--otelEndpoint` | — | OTLP/HTTP endpoint for OpenTelemetry traces |
+| `--otelServiceName` | ssh-mcp | Service name reported on trace spans |
+| `--dumpToolHashes` | — | Print SHA-256 hashes of the tool descriptions and exit |
+
+---
+
+## Migrating from v1
+
+v2 is a breaking release. Passing a removed flag now fails at startup with the
+replacement, rather than failing later as a confusing auth error.
 
-You can specify the scope when adding the server:
+### Tools
 
-- **Local scope** (default): For personal use in the current project
-  ```bash
-  claude mcp add --transport stdio ssh-mcp --scope local -- npx -y ssh-mcp -- --host=YOUR_HOST --user=YOUR_USER --password=YOUR_PASSWORD
-  ```
+| v1 | v2 | Notes |
+|----|----|-------|
+| `exec` | `read-command` | Allowlisted read-only commands. Prefer this for reads. |
+| `exec` | `run-command` | Arbitrary commands. Destructive ones go through the approval gate. |
+| `sudo-exec` | `privileged-command` | Always requires approval. Password is piped via stdin. |
+| `description` parameter | — | Removed. It was an injection vector (#44) and never reached the host. |
 
-- **Project scope**: Share with your team via `.mcp.json` file
-  ```bash
-  claude mcp add --transport stdio ssh-mcp --scope project -- npx -y ssh-mcp -- --host=YOUR_HOST --user=YOUR_USER --password=YOUR_PASSWORD
-  ```
+**Command results now carry status.** In v1 a failed command rejected with
+`Error (code N)`. In v2 a non-zero exit comes back as an error result including
+the exit code and stderr — so an empty response no longer means "it worked".
 
-- **User scope**: Available across all your projects
-  ```bash
-  claude mcp add --transport stdio ssh-mcp --scope user -- npx -y ssh-mcp -- --host=YOUR_HOST --user=YOUR_USER --password=YOUR_PASSWORD
-  ```
+### Flags
 
+| v1 flag | Replacement |
+|---------|-------------|
+| `--password` | `SSH_MCP_PASSWORD` env var (or `SSH_MCP_<PROFILE>_PASSWORD`) |
+| `--suPassword` | `SSH_MCP_SUDO_PASSWORD` env var |
+| `--sudoPassword` | `SSH_MCP_SUDO_PASSWORD` env var |
+| `--disableSudo` | Use a role/policy that disallows the `privileged` class |
 
-**Verify Installation:**
+Credentials moved off the command line because CLI arguments are world-readable
+via `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` on Linux (CWE-214). Credentials now resolve through an
+SSH agent → OS keychain → env var → key file cascade.
 
-After adding the server, restart Claude Code and ask Cascade to execute a command:
-```
-"Can you run 'ls -la' on the remote server?"
+### Example
+
+```jsonc
+// v1
+{ "command": "npx", "args": ["ssh-mcp", "--host=1.2.3.4", "--user=root", "--password=hunter2"] }
+
+// v2 — credentials via env
+{
+  "command": "npx",
+  "args": ["ssh-mcp", "--host=1.2.3.4", "--user=root"],
+  "env": { "SSH_MCP_PASSWORD": "hunter2" }
+}
 ```
 
-For more information about MCP in Claude Code, see the [official documentation](https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code/mcp).
+For more than one host, move to a TOML config file (see [Configuration](#configuration))
+and pass `--config <path>`; profiles carry per-host roles and approval policy.
+
+### Host key verification
+
+v1 did not verify host keys. v2 defaults to trust-on-first-use and records the
+key; a later mismatch fails the connection. Pin explicitly with `trustedHostKey`
+in a profile, or pass `--insecureHostKey` to opt out (test environments only).
+
+---
 
 ## Testing
 
-You can use the [MCP Inspector](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/tools/inspector) for visual debugging of this MCP Server.
+```bash
+# Start test SSH server
+docker-compose --profile test up -d
 
-```sh
-npm run inspect
-```
+# Run all tests
+npm test
 
-## Disclaimer
+# Run only unit tests
+npm test -- test/unit/
 
-SSH MCP Server is provided under the [MIT License](./LICENSE). Use at your own risk. This project is not affiliated with or endorsed by any SSH or MCP provider.
+# Run with coverage
+npm run coverage
+```
 
-## Contributing
+## MCP Inspector
 
-We welcome contributions! Please see our [Contributing Guidelines](./CONTRIBUTING.md) for more information.
+```bash
+npm run inspect
+```
+
+---
 
-## Code of Conduct
+## Contributing
 
-This project follows a [Code of Conduct](./CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md) to ensure a welcoming environment for everyone.
+See [CONTRIBUTING.md](./CONTRIBUTING.md). Please follow the [security checklist](./SECURITY.md#security-checklist-for-contributors) in all PRs.
 
 ## Support
 
-If you find SSH MCP Server helpful, consider starring the repository or contributing! Pull requests and feedback are welcome. 
+If you find SSH MCP Server helpful, consider starring the repository or [sponsoring](https://github.com/sponsors/tufantunc)!