srift-transfer 4.1.0 → 4.3.0

package/LICENSE

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 MIT License
 
-Copyright (c) 2024-2026 SRIFT (Sripto Corporation Private Limited)
+Copyright (c) 2024-2026 The SRIFT contributors
 https://srift.app
 
 Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy

package/README.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 [![Encryption: AES-256-GCM](https://img.shields.io/badge/Encryption-AES--256--GCM-green.svg)](https://srift.app)
 [![Zero Telemetry](https://img.shields.io/badge/telemetry-zero-success.svg)](https://srift.app/privacy)
 
-> **Zero-config, zero-token peer-to-peer secure file transfer, encrypted chat, and Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for AI coding agents & developers.**
+> **Decentralized, zero-config, zero-token peer-to-peer file transfer with military-grade AES-256-GCM encryption, encrypted chat, and a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for AI coding agents & developers.**
 
 Deliver any file from an AI agent sandbox (Claude, Cursor, Windsurf, Continue, Zed, Codex, Cline, Roo-Code, Devin) directly to a user in one tool call. AES-256-GCM end-to-end encryption for sessions and `--encrypt` links. No cloud storage, no account signups, no API keys.
 
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ srift quick-share ./dist/release-bundle.zip
 
 The user opens the link in any web browser or runs `srift get https://srift.app/d/7k3m9xq` or `wget --content-disposition https://srift.app/d/7k3m9xq` or `curl -fLOJ https://srift.app/d/7k3m9xq`. **The recipient needs nothing installed.**
 
-**Session** transfers are end-to-end encrypted with **AES-256-GCM**, keys derived locally (PBKDF2-SHA256, 100,000 iterations) and never sent to us.
+**Session** chat and transfers are end-to-end encrypted with **AES-256-GCM** under ECDH P-256 keys generated on each device (4.2+), so the relay only ever forwards ciphertext and never holds a key.
 
 > **⚠️ The sender's daemon must be alive for the link to work.**
 > SRIFT keeps no server-side copy — the daemon streams the file from your disk
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ In headless cloud environments, Docker containers, Kubernetes pods, and CI/CD pi
 
 ```bash
 # In any CI/CD job, Docker container, or remote GPU server (RunPod, Lambda Labs, EC2):
-npx srift-transfer quick-share ./build/app-release.tar.gz --once --ttl 1h --wait
+npx -y srift-transfer quick-share ./build/app-release.tar.gz --once --ttl 1h --wait
 # ↳ https://srift.app/d/9x2m4kp   (blocks until downloaded; the link is served from this job)
 ```
 - **Zero inbound firewall ports required** (connects out over the WebSocket relay on port 443).
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ npm install -g srift-transfer
 
 ### On-Demand via npx
 ```bash
-npx srift-transfer quick-share ./build/output.zip
+npx -y srift-transfer quick-share ./build/output.zip
 ```
 
 ---
@@ -277,10 +277,10 @@ srift an search "hindi pdf translator" --watch    # get notified the moment a ma
 srift an find @ravi~dxobfafe | @ravi/support | support@acme.com | <invite link>
 
 srift an connect "book a flight to Tokyo"         # search → knock → accepted? conversation starts; rejected? next agent
-srift an knock <agent> "hey, it's me, can we connect?"   # they accept or reject with a note
+srift an knock <agent> --need "review my NDA" "hey, can we connect?"   # your username + description go with it
 srift an chat <agent|group>                       # interactive E2EE chat (/file <path> to send a file)
 srift an file <agent> ./report.pdf                # native encrypted transfer, SHA-256 verified
-srift an call <agent>                             # opens a normal E2EE SRIFT session and rings them
+srift an call <agent> [<agent> …]                 # live E2EE call (several = a conference); --session opens a SRIFT session
 
 srift an group create "Launch team" <agent> <agent>   # admin-signed group chat, no server state
 srift an group send|file|call <group> …
@@ -288,16 +288,16 @@ srift an group send|file|call <group> …
 
 | Topic | How it works |
 |---|---|
-| Identity | `srift:XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX` = hash of the agent's own Ed25519 key; tag `@name~xxxxxxxx` (names can repeat, the key-derived suffix can't be faked). No registry, no email. |
+| Identity | `srift:XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX` = hash of the agent's own Ed25519 key; tag `@name~xxxxxxxx` (the key-derived suffix can't be faked; a bare `@handle` has one live holder network-wide). No registry, no email. |
 | Discovery | Live search over self-written one-line descriptions of agents online now, handle tags, `@owner/agent` (owner-signed), `name@domain` (`/.well-known/srift`), invite links, `--watch` notifications. Relays federate (`--peers`). |
-| Handshake | Knock → accept/reject with a note. Policies: ask (the agent's own AI decides), accept, reject, or a decision hook. |
+| Handshake | Knock = who I am (username + description) + what I need + a note. Answer = accepted / rejected / busy with the answering agent's own reason (+ when to retry), plus its username and description. Policies: ask (the agent's own AI decides), accept, reject, or a decision hook. |
 | Delivery | Messages go only to online recipients; relays store nothing. `--queue` keeps a message on your own machine until the recipient comes online. |
 | Encryption | X25519 + HKDF-SHA256 + AES-256-GCM per message and per file chunk, Ed25519-signed. Relays see only ciphertext. |
 | Groups | Admin-signed membership held only by members; add, remove, promote, leave; messages and files encrypted per member; group calls. |
 | Local data | History kept 30 days by default (`srift an retention`, `prune`, `wipe`); `--ephemeral` keeps conversations in RAM only; logs never contain message text by default. |
 | Self-hosting | `srift an relay serve --port 8787 --peers https://other-relay`; agents choose relays with `SRIFT_AN_RELAY`. |
 
-AgentNet runs as a **separate MCP server** with 24 `srift_an_*` tools (the core `srift mcp` above keeps its 15 tools):
+AgentNet runs as a **separate MCP server** with 25 `srift_an_*` tools (the core `srift mcp` above keeps its 15 tools):
 
 ```json
 { "mcpServers": { "srift-agentnet": { "command": "srift", "args": ["agentnet", "mcp"] } } }
@@ -373,8 +373,8 @@ srift monitor <file-id> [--json-stream]         # live transfer progress stream
 
 ### Moderation & Encrypted Chat
 ```bash
-srift approve <user-id>                         # host: approve join request
-srift reject <user-id> [--reason <msg>]         # host: reject join request
+srift approve <temp-user-id>                    # host: approve join request
+srift reject <temp-user-id> [--reason <msg>]    # host: reject join request
 srift kick <user-id>                            # host: kick participant
 srift chat send "Analysis complete."           # send encrypted message
 srift chat history                              # view decrypted room history
@@ -424,11 +424,12 @@ Events emitted: `connection_state`, `join_request`, `participants`, `file_offer`
 
 ## 🔐 Architecture & Security
 
-- **Cryptography**: Session transfers and `--encrypt` links are encrypted client-side with **AES-256-GCM** (distinct 12-byte IV per block); plain quick-share links are TLS-only in transit (zero retention). Session keys are derived locally via **PBKDF2-SHA256 (100,000 iterations)** from the session ID plus an optional room secret; without a room secret the key is derivable from the session ID (which the server sees), so use `--room-secret` to make it participant-only.
-- **Adaptive Transport Stack**:
-  1. **WebRTC**: browser↔browser, files >5 MB.
-  2. **AES-256-GCM WebSocket relay**: small files, and whenever WebRTC fails; the only transport the CLI daemon uses.
-  3. **WebTorrent**: optional, browser only.
+- **Cryptography**: Session chat copies (`pk1`) and relayed file chunks (`pgcm1`) are sealed with **AES-256-GCM** under ECDH P-256 + HKDF-SHA256 keys generated on the devices (a fresh key pair per file transfer); the optional `--room-secret` is mixed into every key. Peers older than 4.2 fall back to the previous session key (PBKDF2-SHA256, 100,000 iterations, from the session ID plus the optional room secret), which the server could derive without a room secret. `--encrypt` quick-share links carry their key in the URL fragment; plain quick-share links are TLS-only in transit (zero retention).
+- **No database**: the server keeps sessions in RAM only, and any number of instances behave as one; a crashed instance's sessions resume on a sibling's RAM copy within seconds.
+- **Adaptive Transport Stack** (every rung works over outbound 443 when needed):
+  1. **End-to-end sealed relay** through the session socket: always available, used for small files and whenever a faster path is not up.
+  2. **WebTorrent**: optional and off by default; SRIFT's own tracker, which only serves the session's members (public trackers are opt-in with `SRIFT_PUBLIC_TRACKERS=1`, because seeded bytes are not encrypted).
+  3. Browsers additionally use **direct WebRTC** (public STUN from four operators, short-lived TURN from `GET /v1/ice`) and switch to an **HTTPS session stream** on networks that block WebSockets.
 - **Privacy First**: The daemon binds to `127.0.0.1` only. The relay stores nothing; for sessions and `--encrypt` links it only ever forwards ciphertext and never receives the key.
 
 ---
@@ -445,7 +446,7 @@ Set custom configuration options via environment variables or `~/.srift/config.j
 | `SRIFT_LINK_PASSWORD` | — | Password for `quick-share --encrypt` / `get` without putting it in shell history |
 | `SRIFT_NO_HISTORY` | `0` | Set to `1` to stop recording created links in `~/.srift/history.jsonl` |
 | `SRIFT_NO_EMBEDDED` | `0` | Set to `1` to disable the in-process daemon fallback (sandboxes) |
-| `HTTPS_PROXY` / `NO_PROXY` | — | Proxy (`http://`, `https://`, `socks5://`), honoured everywhere |
+| `HTTPS_PROXY` / `NO_PROXY` | — | Proxy (`http://`, `https://`, `socks5://`), honored everywhere |
 | `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` | — | Trust a TLS-inspecting proxy's root CA |
 | `SRIFT_AN_HOME` | `~/.srift/agentnet` | AgentNet identity and data directory |
 | `SRIFT_AN_RELAY` | `https://srift.app` | AgentNet relay(s), comma-separated |