specrails-desktop 2.43.0 → 2.43.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
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@@ -314,3 +314,56 @@ delivery row — stranded uncommitted work. Loops disabled ⇒ the legacy QueueM
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unchanged. Relatedly, the agent-chat operator prompt gained the ask-confirmation-once
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turn-discipline rule (`server/agent-operator-prompt.ts`): a confirmation question is asked
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exactly once and ends the reply — the answer arrives as the next user message.
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## Decider starved by its own tool budget (2026-09-07)
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A two-repo `factory:implement` run (pipeline run `47b9a423`) finished its work, and the
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verify step answered `VERIFICATION: PASS` with a freshly re-run receipt across both
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repositories. The loop continued anyway. The Decider step's log line was the tell:
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```
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Decision: continue — error_max_turns: Reached maximum number of turns (1)
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```
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That is not a verdict. The Decider never emitted one — it died before answering, and the
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executor's fail-open default did the rest.
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- **The starvation.** `runDecider` spawned with `maxTurns: 1` *and* `toolPolicy:
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'read-only'`, which on claude is `--tools Read,Grep,Glob` **plus `--permission-mode plan
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--safe-mode`**. One tool call — a repo read, or plan mode's own exit call — consumes the
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single allowed turn, so the run ends `error_max_turns` **before** the JSON verdict is
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produced. Nothing about it is intermittent: a Decider that touches any tool can never
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answer. The step burned 2 turns and ~$0.09 to say nothing.
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- **Reproduced across loops and tiers.** A `SDD Quick (OpenSpec)` run on claude/**sonnet**
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showed the identical signature — every Decider step `2 turns`, ~7 s, `Decision: continue
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— error_max_turns`. Its verify step reported `VERIFICATION: PASS` twice, and the loop
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still cycled `opsx:ff → opsx:apply → opsx:verify` for two full iterations (the fix steps
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correctly finding nothing to do and saying so) until the user cancelled it. So the bug is
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not model-, tier- or loop-specific: it is every Decider on claude.
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- **Why it became a `continue`.** A failed Decider invocation is deliberately forced to
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`{ continue: true, parsed: false }` — a streamed verdict from an interrupted run is not
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an authoritative completion gate, and `maxIterations`/`timeout` are the hard stop. Sound
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in isolation, but combined with the starvation above it meant *every* such run silently
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discarded a real STOP and paid for another iteration: here a fix step that invented work
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(tautological cascade tests, a mutation probe, a wrong conclusion, then a full revert)
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plus a second full re-verification, for no change to the delivered candidate.
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- **The fix.** The Decider judges from the prompt it is GIVEN (goal + spec + iteration
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history) and must answer with one JSON object, so it needs no tools at all.
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`runDecider` now picks the tightest boundary the CLI enforces via
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`pureOutputToolPolicy(adapter)`: `'none'` on claude (`--tools __none__`, no approval
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bypass needed), `'read-only'` on codex/gemini — byte-identical there, since neither has
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a native no-tools mode. The null case is unreachable: `LoopRunManager.run` already
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rejects a decider-bearing graph whose provider cannot enforce `read-only` natively
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(kimi), before allocating or persisting the run. `'none'` also drops the plan-mode flags
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(the adapter attaches them only to `read-only`), removing the second way the single turn
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could be consumed. This aligns the Decider with the repo's other single-turn spawns —
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`file-summary-generator.ts` and both `contract-refine-runner.ts` invocations already
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resolve a pure-output policy rather than hardcoding `read-only`; the Decider was the last
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one left with tools it could not afford to use.
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- **Deliberately NOT changed:** the fail-open `continue` on a genuinely failed Decider
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(timeout, spawn failure, non-zero exit, provider limit). The starvation was the bug; the
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default is the safety net, and with tools gone it stops firing on every healthy run.
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- **Adjacent, still open:** the verify step re-ran the full cross-repository suite each
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iteration because the Core receipt is invalidated per session (*"Verification environment
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changed: ./mvnw / npm"*) even when the candidate hash is identical. That is a receipt
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env-hash question in specrails-core, not a desktop one.
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package/package.json
CHANGED
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@@ -488,7 +488,20 @@ function createLoopExecutors(opts = {}) {
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const decEnv = aiStepEnv(baseEnv, repoDir, executionManifest);
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// spec-gen is a one-shot, system-prompted invocation (workspace-write on
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// codex, not full-access) — appropriate for a read-only judgment.
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-
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//
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// The Decider judges the goal from the prompt it is GIVEN (goal + spec +
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// iteration history) and must answer with a single JSON object, so it
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// needs no tools. Granting them was actively harmful on claude: with
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// `--max-turns 1`, one Read/Grep call consumes the whole turn budget and
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// the run ends `error_max_turns` BEFORE the verdict is emitted. A failed
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// Decider invocation is forced to `continue` below, so every such run
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// silently discarded a real STOP verdict and burned another iteration.
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// `pureOutputToolPolicy` picks the tightest boundary the CLI enforces:
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// 'none' on claude, 'read-only' on codex/gemini (byte-identical to the
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// previous behaviour there). The null case is unreachable — `run()`
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// rejects a decider graph whose provider cannot enforce 'read-only'.
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const toolPolicy = (0, runtime_1.pureOutputToolPolicy)(adapter) ?? 'read-only';
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const buildOpts = { prompt: userPrompt, systemPrompt, model, maxTurns: 1, reasoning_effort: effort, toolPolicy, ...(executionManifest ? { extraArgs: aiStepExtraArgs(adapter, cwd, repoDir, executionManifest) } : {}) };
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const wallStartedAt = Date.now();
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const res = await (0, spawn_lifecycle_1.runAiCliInvocation)({
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adapter,
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