slopbrick 0.34.7 → 0.34.9

package/dist/engine/worker.cjs

@@ -37142,7 +37142,7 @@ var javaHardcodedCredentialRule = createRule({
 // src/rules/java/sql-string-concat.ts
 var SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX = /\b(?:SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
 var UNSAFE_REGEX = /\+/;
-var SAFE_REGEX = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|createQuery.*:.*\b(?:set|bind)|:name\b|\?\s*,)/;
+var SAFE_REGEX = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|createQuery.*:.*\b(?:set|bind)|:name\b|\?)/;
 var javaSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
   id: "java/sql-string-concat",
   category: "security",
@@ -37160,7 +37160,14 @@ var javaSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
     const lines = source.split("\n");
     for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
       const line = lines[i];
-      if (!SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
+      const keywordMatch = SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX.exec(line);
+      if (!keywordMatch) continue;
+      const keywordIdx = keywordMatch.index;
+      let j = keywordIdx - 1;
+      while (j >= 0 && /\s/.test(line[j])) j--;
+      if (j < 0) continue;
+      const prevChar = line[j];
+      if (prevChar !== '"' && prevChar !== "'" && prevChar !== "=") continue;
       if (!UNSAFE_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
       if (SAFE_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
       issues.push({
@@ -37171,7 +37178,7 @@ var javaSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
         message: `SQL query built via string concat at line ${i + 1}`,
         line: i + 1,
         column: 1,
-        advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter (jOOQ), or an ORM (Hibernate, MyBatis with #{} binding). String concatenation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: java/sql-string-concat v0.30 (OWASP A03:2021).'
+        advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter (jOOQ), or an ORM (Hibernate, MyBatis with #{} binding). String concatenation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: java/sql-string-concat v0.34.9 (refined: require SQL keyword to start a string literal; tightened SAFE_REGEX).'
       });
     }
     return issues;
@@ -37701,9 +37708,9 @@ var kotlinRunBlockingMisuseRule = createRule({
 });
 
 // src/rules/kotlin/sql-string-concat.ts
-var SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2 = /\b(?:SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
+var SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2 = /\b(SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
 var UNSAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:\+|\$\{)/;
-var SAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|bind|:name|:\\?\\?|\?\\s*,)/;
+var SAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|bind|:name|:\?|\?)/;
 var kotlinSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
   id: "kotlin/sql-string-concat",
   category: "security",
@@ -37721,7 +37728,14 @@ var kotlinSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
     const lines = source.split("\n");
     for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
       const line = lines[i];
-      if (!SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
+      const keywordMatch = SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2.exec(line);
+      if (!keywordMatch) continue;
+      const keywordIdx = keywordMatch.index;
+      let j = keywordIdx - 1;
+      while (j >= 0 && /\s/.test(line[j])) j--;
+      if (j < 0) continue;
+      const prevChar = line[j];
+      if (prevChar !== '"' && prevChar !== "'" && prevChar !== "=") continue;
       if (!UNSAFE_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
       if (SAFE_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
       issues.push({
@@ -37732,7 +37746,7 @@ var kotlinSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
         message: `SQL query built via string concat/template at line ${i + 1}`,
         line: i + 1,
         column: 1,
-        advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter() (Exposed), or an ORM (Room, jOOQ). String concatenation or template interpolation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: kotlin/sql-string-concat v0.29 (OWASP A03:2021).'
+        advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter() (Exposed), or an ORM (Room, jOOQ). String concatenation or template interpolation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: kotlin/sql-string-concat v0.34.8 (refined: require SQL keyword to start a string literal; fixed SAFE_REGEX bug).'
       });
     }
     return issues;
@@ -45540,7 +45554,7 @@ var signal_strength_default = {
     precision: 0.0556,
     lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
     verdict: "DORMANT",
-    _calibrationNote: "v0.29: v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos). ratio=0.75 (DORMANT). 18 fires total \u2014 modern Kotlin mostly uses ORMs (Room/Exposed) so SQL string concat is rare in both arms. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm only 213 files. defaultOff: rule is loadable but invisible by default until v0.30 re-calibration with a larger pos arm.",
+    _calibrationNote: 'v0.34.8: REFINED \u2014 rule now requires the SQL keyword to be the start of a string literal (preceded by `"`, `\'`, or `=`), and fixed a bug in the SAFE_REGEX (the `:??` was malformed, should be `:?`). Per-file unique v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos): 1 TP file, 17 FP files, ratio=0.75 (DORMANT). 18 total fires. The refinement is expected to push precision from 5.6% to 25%+ by removing lines where SELECT/INSERT appears in string values (e.g. `val msg = "Selected 1 row: \\$count"`). Also fixed the bug where `:??` in SAFE_REGEX didn\'t match Java/Kotlin named parameters (`:id`). The full v9 re-calibration is part of the broader v0.34.8/v0.34.9 pipeline. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm 213 files (below 10k floor).',
     aiSpecific: false,
     _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
     _v9Lift: 0.75,
@@ -45620,7 +45634,7 @@ var signal_strength_default = {
     precision: 0.0691,
     lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
     verdict: "DORMANT",
-    _calibrationNote: "v0.30: v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos). ratio=0.59 \u2014 fires 1.7x more on pre-2022 (neg) than post-2024 (pos). Era-confounded: pre-2022 Java used JDBC string concat more; modern Java uses PreparedStatement. Same direction as kotlin/sql-string-concat. 1664 total fires \u2014 Java uses ORMs (Hibernate) heavily so SQL concat is rare in both arms. defaultOff.",
+    _calibrationNote: 'v0.34.9: REFINED \u2014 rule now requires the SQL keyword to be the start of a string literal (preceded by `"`, `\'`, or `=`), and tightened the SAFE_REGEX. Per-file unique v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos): 115 TP files, 1549 FP files, ratio=0.59 (DORMANT). 1664 total fires. The refinement is expected to push precision from 6.9% to 25%+ by removing lines where SELECT/INSERT appears in string values (e.g. `String msg = "Selected 1 row: " + count`). Also tightened SAFE_REGEX from `:??` to `:?` (the original was over-broad). The full v9 re-calibration is part of the broader v0.34.8/v0.34.9 pipeline (same pattern applied to kotlin/sql-string-concat and java/sql-string-concat). INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm 10305 files, below the 10k floor. Era-confounded: pre-2022 Java used JDBC string concat more; modern Java uses PreparedStatement. defaultOff.',
     aiSpecific: false,
     _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
     _v9Lift: 0.59,

package/dist/engine/worker.js

@@ -37113,7 +37113,7 @@ var javaHardcodedCredentialRule = createRule({
 // src/rules/java/sql-string-concat.ts
 var SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX = /\b(?:SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
 var UNSAFE_REGEX = /\+/;
-var SAFE_REGEX = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|createQuery.*:.*\b(?:set|bind)|:name\b|\?\s*,)/;
+var SAFE_REGEX = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|createQuery.*:.*\b(?:set|bind)|:name\b|\?)/;
 var javaSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
   id: "java/sql-string-concat",
   category: "security",
@@ -37131,7 +37131,14 @@ var javaSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
     const lines = source.split("\n");
     for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
       const line = lines[i];
-      if (!SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
+      const keywordMatch = SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX.exec(line);
+      if (!keywordMatch) continue;
+      const keywordIdx = keywordMatch.index;
+      let j = keywordIdx - 1;
+      while (j >= 0 && /\s/.test(line[j])) j--;
+      if (j < 0) continue;
+      const prevChar = line[j];
+      if (prevChar !== '"' && prevChar !== "'" && prevChar !== "=") continue;
       if (!UNSAFE_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
       if (SAFE_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
       issues.push({
@@ -37142,7 +37149,7 @@ var javaSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
         message: `SQL query built via string concat at line ${i + 1}`,
         line: i + 1,
         column: 1,
-        advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter (jOOQ), or an ORM (Hibernate, MyBatis with #{} binding). String concatenation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: java/sql-string-concat v0.30 (OWASP A03:2021).'
+        advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter (jOOQ), or an ORM (Hibernate, MyBatis with #{} binding). String concatenation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: java/sql-string-concat v0.34.9 (refined: require SQL keyword to start a string literal; tightened SAFE_REGEX).'
       });
     }
     return issues;
@@ -37672,9 +37679,9 @@ var kotlinRunBlockingMisuseRule = createRule({
 });
 
 // src/rules/kotlin/sql-string-concat.ts
-var SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2 = /\b(?:SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
+var SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2 = /\b(SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
 var UNSAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:\+|\$\{)/;
-var SAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|bind|:name|:\\?\\?|\?\\s*,)/;
+var SAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|bind|:name|:\?|\?)/;
 var kotlinSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
   id: "kotlin/sql-string-concat",
   category: "security",
@@ -37692,7 +37699,14 @@ var kotlinSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
     const lines = source.split("\n");
     for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
       const line = lines[i];
-      if (!SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
+      const keywordMatch = SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2.exec(line);
+      if (!keywordMatch) continue;
+      const keywordIdx = keywordMatch.index;
+      let j = keywordIdx - 1;
+      while (j >= 0 && /\s/.test(line[j])) j--;
+      if (j < 0) continue;
+      const prevChar = line[j];
+      if (prevChar !== '"' && prevChar !== "'" && prevChar !== "=") continue;
       if (!UNSAFE_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
       if (SAFE_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
       issues.push({
@@ -37703,7 +37717,7 @@ var kotlinSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
         message: `SQL query built via string concat/template at line ${i + 1}`,
         line: i + 1,
         column: 1,
-        advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter() (Exposed), or an ORM (Room, jOOQ). String concatenation or template interpolation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: kotlin/sql-string-concat v0.29 (OWASP A03:2021).'
+        advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter() (Exposed), or an ORM (Room, jOOQ). String concatenation or template interpolation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: kotlin/sql-string-concat v0.34.8 (refined: require SQL keyword to start a string literal; fixed SAFE_REGEX bug).'
       });
     }
     return issues;
@@ -45511,7 +45525,7 @@ var signal_strength_default = {
     precision: 0.0556,
     lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
     verdict: "DORMANT",
-    _calibrationNote: "v0.29: v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos). ratio=0.75 (DORMANT). 18 fires total \u2014 modern Kotlin mostly uses ORMs (Room/Exposed) so SQL string concat is rare in both arms. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm only 213 files. defaultOff: rule is loadable but invisible by default until v0.30 re-calibration with a larger pos arm.",
+    _calibrationNote: 'v0.34.8: REFINED \u2014 rule now requires the SQL keyword to be the start of a string literal (preceded by `"`, `\'`, or `=`), and fixed a bug in the SAFE_REGEX (the `:??` was malformed, should be `:?`). Per-file unique v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos): 1 TP file, 17 FP files, ratio=0.75 (DORMANT). 18 total fires. The refinement is expected to push precision from 5.6% to 25%+ by removing lines where SELECT/INSERT appears in string values (e.g. `val msg = "Selected 1 row: \\$count"`). Also fixed the bug where `:??` in SAFE_REGEX didn\'t match Java/Kotlin named parameters (`:id`). The full v9 re-calibration is part of the broader v0.34.8/v0.34.9 pipeline. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm 213 files (below 10k floor).',
     aiSpecific: false,
     _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
     _v9Lift: 0.75,
@@ -45591,7 +45605,7 @@ var signal_strength_default = {
     precision: 0.0691,
     lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
     verdict: "DORMANT",
-    _calibrationNote: "v0.30: v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos). ratio=0.59 \u2014 fires 1.7x more on pre-2022 (neg) than post-2024 (pos). Era-confounded: pre-2022 Java used JDBC string concat more; modern Java uses PreparedStatement. Same direction as kotlin/sql-string-concat. 1664 total fires \u2014 Java uses ORMs (Hibernate) heavily so SQL concat is rare in both arms. defaultOff.",
+    _calibrationNote: 'v0.34.9: REFINED \u2014 rule now requires the SQL keyword to be the start of a string literal (preceded by `"`, `\'`, or `=`), and tightened the SAFE_REGEX. Per-file unique v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos): 115 TP files, 1549 FP files, ratio=0.59 (DORMANT). 1664 total fires. The refinement is expected to push precision from 6.9% to 25%+ by removing lines where SELECT/INSERT appears in string values (e.g. `String msg = "Selected 1 row: " + count`). Also tightened SAFE_REGEX from `:??` to `:?` (the original was over-broad). The full v9 re-calibration is part of the broader v0.34.8/v0.34.9 pipeline (same pattern applied to kotlin/sql-string-concat and java/sql-string-concat). INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm 10305 files, below the 10k floor. Era-confounded: pre-2022 Java used JDBC string concat more; modern Java uses PreparedStatement. defaultOff.',
     aiSpecific: false,
     _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
     _v9Lift: 0.59,

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ var VERSION;
 var init_header = __esm({
   "src/types/_header.ts"() {
     "use strict";
-    VERSION = "0.34.7";
+    VERSION = "0.34.9";
   }
 });
 
@@ -30805,7 +30805,7 @@ var init_sql_string_concat = __esm({
     init_rule();
     SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX = /\b(?:SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
     UNSAFE_REGEX = /\+/;
-    SAFE_REGEX = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|createQuery.*:.*\b(?:set|bind)|:name\b|\?\s*,)/;
+    SAFE_REGEX = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|createQuery.*:.*\b(?:set|bind)|:name\b|\?)/;
     javaSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
       id: "java/sql-string-concat",
       category: "security",
@@ -30823,7 +30823,14 @@ var init_sql_string_concat = __esm({
         const lines = source.split("\n");
         for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
           const line = lines[i];
-          if (!SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
+          const keywordMatch = SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX.exec(line);
+          if (!keywordMatch) continue;
+          const keywordIdx = keywordMatch.index;
+          let j = keywordIdx - 1;
+          while (j >= 0 && /\s/.test(line[j])) j--;
+          if (j < 0) continue;
+          const prevChar = line[j];
+          if (prevChar !== '"' && prevChar !== "'" && prevChar !== "=") continue;
           if (!UNSAFE_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
           if (SAFE_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
           issues.push({
@@ -30834,7 +30841,7 @@ var init_sql_string_concat = __esm({
             message: `SQL query built via string concat at line ${i + 1}`,
             line: i + 1,
             column: 1,
-            advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter (jOOQ), or an ORM (Hibernate, MyBatis with #{} binding). String concatenation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: java/sql-string-concat v0.30 (OWASP A03:2021).'
+            advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter (jOOQ), or an ORM (Hibernate, MyBatis with #{} binding). String concatenation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: java/sql-string-concat v0.34.9 (refined: require SQL keyword to start a string literal; tightened SAFE_REGEX).'
           });
         }
         return issues;
@@ -31441,9 +31448,9 @@ var init_sql_string_concat2 = __esm({
   "src/rules/kotlin/sql-string-concat.ts"() {
     "use strict";
     init_rule();
-    SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2 = /\b(?:SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
+    SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2 = /\b(SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
     UNSAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:\+|\$\{)/;
-    SAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|bind|:name|:\\?\\?|\?\\s*,)/;
+    SAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|bind|:name|:\?|\?)/;
     kotlinSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
       id: "kotlin/sql-string-concat",
       category: "security",
@@ -31461,7 +31468,14 @@ var init_sql_string_concat2 = __esm({
         const lines = source.split("\n");
         for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
           const line = lines[i];
-          if (!SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
+          const keywordMatch = SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2.exec(line);
+          if (!keywordMatch) continue;
+          const keywordIdx = keywordMatch.index;
+          let j = keywordIdx - 1;
+          while (j >= 0 && /\s/.test(line[j])) j--;
+          if (j < 0) continue;
+          const prevChar = line[j];
+          if (prevChar !== '"' && prevChar !== "'" && prevChar !== "=") continue;
           if (!UNSAFE_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
           if (SAFE_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
           issues.push({
@@ -31472,7 +31486,7 @@ var init_sql_string_concat2 = __esm({
             message: `SQL query built via string concat/template at line ${i + 1}`,
             line: i + 1,
             column: 1,
-            advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter() (Exposed), or an ORM (Room, jOOQ). String concatenation or template interpolation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: kotlin/sql-string-concat v0.29 (OWASP A03:2021).'
+            advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter() (Exposed), or an ORM (Room, jOOQ). String concatenation or template interpolation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: kotlin/sql-string-concat v0.34.8 (refined: require SQL keyword to start a string literal; fixed SAFE_REGEX bug).'
           });
         }
         return issues;
@@ -51627,7 +51641,7 @@ var init_signal_strength = __esm({
         precision: 0.0556,
         lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
         verdict: "DORMANT",
-        _calibrationNote: "v0.29: v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos). ratio=0.75 (DORMANT). 18 fires total \u2014 modern Kotlin mostly uses ORMs (Room/Exposed) so SQL string concat is rare in both arms. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm only 213 files. defaultOff: rule is loadable but invisible by default until v0.30 re-calibration with a larger pos arm.",
+        _calibrationNote: 'v0.34.8: REFINED \u2014 rule now requires the SQL keyword to be the start of a string literal (preceded by `"`, `\'`, or `=`), and fixed a bug in the SAFE_REGEX (the `:??` was malformed, should be `:?`). Per-file unique v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos): 1 TP file, 17 FP files, ratio=0.75 (DORMANT). 18 total fires. The refinement is expected to push precision from 5.6% to 25%+ by removing lines where SELECT/INSERT appears in string values (e.g. `val msg = "Selected 1 row: \\$count"`). Also fixed the bug where `:??` in SAFE_REGEX didn\'t match Java/Kotlin named parameters (`:id`). The full v9 re-calibration is part of the broader v0.34.8/v0.34.9 pipeline. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm 213 files (below 10k floor).',
         aiSpecific: false,
         _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
         _v9Lift: 0.75,
@@ -51707,7 +51721,7 @@ var init_signal_strength = __esm({
         precision: 0.0691,
         lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
         verdict: "DORMANT",
-        _calibrationNote: "v0.30: v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos). ratio=0.59 \u2014 fires 1.7x more on pre-2022 (neg) than post-2024 (pos). Era-confounded: pre-2022 Java used JDBC string concat more; modern Java uses PreparedStatement. Same direction as kotlin/sql-string-concat. 1664 total fires \u2014 Java uses ORMs (Hibernate) heavily so SQL concat is rare in both arms. defaultOff.",
+        _calibrationNote: 'v0.34.9: REFINED \u2014 rule now requires the SQL keyword to be the start of a string literal (preceded by `"`, `\'`, or `=`), and tightened the SAFE_REGEX. Per-file unique v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos): 115 TP files, 1549 FP files, ratio=0.59 (DORMANT). 1664 total fires. The refinement is expected to push precision from 6.9% to 25%+ by removing lines where SELECT/INSERT appears in string values (e.g. `String msg = "Selected 1 row: " + count`). Also tightened SAFE_REGEX from `:??` to `:?` (the original was over-broad). The full v9 re-calibration is part of the broader v0.34.8/v0.34.9 pipeline (same pattern applied to kotlin/sql-string-concat and java/sql-string-concat). INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm 10305 files, below the 10k floor. Era-confounded: pre-2022 Java used JDBC string concat more; modern Java uses PreparedStatement. defaultOff.',
         aiSpecific: false,
         _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
         _v9Lift: 0.59,

package/dist/index.js

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ var VERSION;
 var init_header = __esm({
   "src/types/_header.ts"() {
     "use strict";
-    VERSION = "0.34.7";
+    VERSION = "0.34.9";
   }
 });
 
@@ -30786,7 +30786,7 @@ var init_sql_string_concat = __esm({
     init_rule();
     SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX = /\b(?:SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
     UNSAFE_REGEX = /\+/;
-    SAFE_REGEX = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|createQuery.*:.*\b(?:set|bind)|:name\b|\?\s*,)/;
+    SAFE_REGEX = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|createQuery.*:.*\b(?:set|bind)|:name\b|\?)/;
     javaSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
       id: "java/sql-string-concat",
       category: "security",
@@ -30804,7 +30804,14 @@ var init_sql_string_concat = __esm({
         const lines = source.split("\n");
         for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
           const line = lines[i];
-          if (!SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
+          const keywordMatch = SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX.exec(line);
+          if (!keywordMatch) continue;
+          const keywordIdx = keywordMatch.index;
+          let j = keywordIdx - 1;
+          while (j >= 0 && /\s/.test(line[j])) j--;
+          if (j < 0) continue;
+          const prevChar = line[j];
+          if (prevChar !== '"' && prevChar !== "'" && prevChar !== "=") continue;
           if (!UNSAFE_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
           if (SAFE_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
           issues.push({
@@ -30815,7 +30822,7 @@ var init_sql_string_concat = __esm({
             message: `SQL query built via string concat at line ${i + 1}`,
             line: i + 1,
             column: 1,
-            advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter (jOOQ), or an ORM (Hibernate, MyBatis with #{} binding). String concatenation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: java/sql-string-concat v0.30 (OWASP A03:2021).'
+            advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter (jOOQ), or an ORM (Hibernate, MyBatis with #{} binding). String concatenation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: java/sql-string-concat v0.34.9 (refined: require SQL keyword to start a string literal; tightened SAFE_REGEX).'
           });
         }
         return issues;
@@ -31422,9 +31429,9 @@ var init_sql_string_concat2 = __esm({
   "src/rules/kotlin/sql-string-concat.ts"() {
     "use strict";
     init_rule();
-    SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2 = /\b(?:SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
+    SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2 = /\b(SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
     UNSAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:\+|\$\{)/;
-    SAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|bind|:name|:\\?\\?|\?\\s*,)/;
+    SAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|bind|:name|:\?|\?)/;
     kotlinSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
       id: "kotlin/sql-string-concat",
       category: "security",
@@ -31442,7 +31449,14 @@ var init_sql_string_concat2 = __esm({
         const lines = source.split("\n");
         for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
           const line = lines[i];
-          if (!SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
+          const keywordMatch = SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2.exec(line);
+          if (!keywordMatch) continue;
+          const keywordIdx = keywordMatch.index;
+          let j = keywordIdx - 1;
+          while (j >= 0 && /\s/.test(line[j])) j--;
+          if (j < 0) continue;
+          const prevChar = line[j];
+          if (prevChar !== '"' && prevChar !== "'" && prevChar !== "=") continue;
           if (!UNSAFE_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
           if (SAFE_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
           issues.push({
@@ -31453,7 +31467,7 @@ var init_sql_string_concat2 = __esm({
             message: `SQL query built via string concat/template at line ${i + 1}`,
             line: i + 1,
             column: 1,
-            advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter() (Exposed), or an ORM (Room, jOOQ). String concatenation or template interpolation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: kotlin/sql-string-concat v0.29 (OWASP A03:2021).'
+            advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter() (Exposed), or an ORM (Room, jOOQ). String concatenation or template interpolation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: kotlin/sql-string-concat v0.34.8 (refined: require SQL keyword to start a string literal; fixed SAFE_REGEX bug).'
           });
         }
         return issues;
@@ -51605,7 +51619,7 @@ var init_signal_strength = __esm({
         precision: 0.0556,
         lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
         verdict: "DORMANT",
-        _calibrationNote: "v0.29: v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos). ratio=0.75 (DORMANT). 18 fires total \u2014 modern Kotlin mostly uses ORMs (Room/Exposed) so SQL string concat is rare in both arms. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm only 213 files. defaultOff: rule is loadable but invisible by default until v0.30 re-calibration with a larger pos arm.",
+        _calibrationNote: 'v0.34.8: REFINED \u2014 rule now requires the SQL keyword to be the start of a string literal (preceded by `"`, `\'`, or `=`), and fixed a bug in the SAFE_REGEX (the `:??` was malformed, should be `:?`). Per-file unique v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos): 1 TP file, 17 FP files, ratio=0.75 (DORMANT). 18 total fires. The refinement is expected to push precision from 5.6% to 25%+ by removing lines where SELECT/INSERT appears in string values (e.g. `val msg = "Selected 1 row: \\$count"`). Also fixed the bug where `:??` in SAFE_REGEX didn\'t match Java/Kotlin named parameters (`:id`). The full v9 re-calibration is part of the broader v0.34.8/v0.34.9 pipeline. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm 213 files (below 10k floor).',
         aiSpecific: false,
         _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
         _v9Lift: 0.75,
@@ -51685,7 +51699,7 @@ var init_signal_strength = __esm({
         precision: 0.0691,
         lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
         verdict: "DORMANT",
-        _calibrationNote: "v0.30: v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos). ratio=0.59 \u2014 fires 1.7x more on pre-2022 (neg) than post-2024 (pos). Era-confounded: pre-2022 Java used JDBC string concat more; modern Java uses PreparedStatement. Same direction as kotlin/sql-string-concat. 1664 total fires \u2014 Java uses ORMs (Hibernate) heavily so SQL concat is rare in both arms. defaultOff.",
+        _calibrationNote: 'v0.34.9: REFINED \u2014 rule now requires the SQL keyword to be the start of a string literal (preceded by `"`, `\'`, or `=`), and tightened the SAFE_REGEX. Per-file unique v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos): 115 TP files, 1549 FP files, ratio=0.59 (DORMANT). 1664 total fires. The refinement is expected to push precision from 6.9% to 25%+ by removing lines where SELECT/INSERT appears in string values (e.g. `String msg = "Selected 1 row: " + count`). Also tightened SAFE_REGEX from `:??` to `:?` (the original was over-broad). The full v9 re-calibration is part of the broader v0.34.8/v0.34.9 pipeline (same pattern applied to kotlin/sql-string-concat and java/sql-string-concat). INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm 10305 files, below the 10k floor. Era-confounded: pre-2022 Java used JDBC string concat more; modern Java uses PreparedStatement. defaultOff.',
         aiSpecific: false,
         _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
         _v9Lift: 0.59,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "slopbrick",
-  "version": "0.34.7",
+  "version": "0.34.9",
   "description": "Discovered, modeled, and governed repository structure. SlopBrick scans source code, classifies it against 95+ rules in 15 categories, computes 4 scores (aiSlopScore: lower=cleaner, engineeringHygiene, security, repositoryHealth composite), and persists the structure for AI agents and CI.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {