slopbrick 0.28.0 → 0.30.0

package/dist/engine/worker.cjs

@@ -37000,6 +37000,211 @@ var goStructTagInconsistencyRule = createRule({
   }
 });
 
+// src/rules/java/command-injection.ts
+var COMMAND_INVOCATION_REGEX = /\b(?:Runtime\.exec|Runtime\.getRuntime\(\)\.exec|ProcessBuilder)\s*\(/;
+var STRING_CONCAT_REGEX = /["'][^"']*["']\s*\+/;
+var javaCommandInjectionRule = createRule({
+  id: "java/command-injection",
+  category: "security",
+  severity: "high",
+  aiSpecific: false,
+  description: "Runtime.exec() or ProcessBuilder with string concat \u2014 use List<String> args + validation",
+  create(_context) {
+    return {};
+  },
+  analyze(_context, facts) {
+    const issues = [];
+    const source = facts.v2?._source;
+    if (!source) return issues;
+    if (!/\.java$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    const lines = source.split("\n");
+    for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+      const line = lines[i];
+      if (!COMMAND_INVOCATION_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
+      if (!STRING_CONCAT_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
+      issues.push({
+        ruleId: "java/command-injection",
+        category: "security",
+        severity: "high",
+        aiSpecific: false,
+        message: `Command invocation with string concat at line ${i + 1}`,
+        line: i + 1,
+        column: 1,
+        advice: "Use ProcessBuilder with a List<String> of args (no shell parsing) and validate each arg against a whitelist. For shell commands, use bash -c only with a fixed string (no concatenation). String concat into Runtime.exec() is the canonical command-injection pattern \u2014 attackers can break out with `; rm -rf /` or `$(...)`. Reference: java/command-injection v0.30 (OWASP A03:2021)."
+      });
+    }
+    return issues;
+  }
+});
+
+// src/rules/java/hardcoded-credential.ts
+var KEY_REGEX = /\b(api[_-]?key|apikey|secret|token|password|auth|access[_-]?key|client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key)\b\s*[=:]/i;
+var VALUE_REGEX = /["']([A-Za-z0-9_\-+/=.@*!]{16,})["']/;
+var FALSE_POSITIVES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+  "passwordless",
+  "tokenize",
+  "tokenizer",
+  "authorizationrequired",
+  "authenticated",
+  "authenticatortoken",
+  "authtoken",
+  "placeholder",
+  "changeme"
+]);
+var javaHardcodedCredentialRule = createRule({
+  id: "java/hardcoded-credential",
+  category: "security",
+  severity: "high",
+  aiSpecific: false,
+  description: "Hardcoded credential literal \u2014 use env vars or a secrets manager",
+  create(_context) {
+    return {};
+  },
+  analyze(_context, facts) {
+    const issues = [];
+    const source = facts.v2?._source;
+    if (!source) return issues;
+    if (!/\.java$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    if (/\/test\//i.test(facts.filePath) || /\/src\/test\//i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    const lines = source.split("\n");
+    for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+      const line = lines[i];
+      if (!KEY_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
+      const valueMatch = VALUE_REGEX.exec(line);
+      if (!valueMatch) continue;
+      const value = valueMatch[1];
+      if (FALSE_POSITIVES.has(value.toLowerCase())) continue;
+      if (!/[a-zA-Z]/.test(value) || !/[0-9]/.test(value)) continue;
+      if (value.startsWith("$")) continue;
+      issues.push({
+        ruleId: "java/hardcoded-credential",
+        category: "security",
+        severity: "high",
+        aiSpecific: false,
+        message: `Hardcoded credential at line ${i + 1}`,
+        line: i + 1,
+        column: 1,
+        advice: "Move the credential to an environment variable, a .env file that is .gitignore'd, or a secrets manager (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager). Hardcoded credentials are the #1 source of secret leaks on GitHub. Reference: java/hardcoded-credential v0.30 (OWASP A07:2021 \u2014 Identification and Authentication Failures)."
+      });
+    }
+    return issues;
+  }
+});
+
+// src/rules/java/sql-string-concat.ts
+var SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX = /\b(?:SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
+var UNSAFE_REGEX = /\+/;
+var SAFE_REGEX = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|createQuery.*:.*\b(?:set|bind)|:name\b|\?\s*,)/;
+var javaSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
+  id: "java/sql-string-concat",
+  category: "security",
+  severity: "high",
+  aiSpecific: false,
+  description: "SQL query built via string concat \u2014 use PreparedStatement or setParameter()",
+  create(_context) {
+    return {};
+  },
+  analyze(_context, facts) {
+    const issues = [];
+    const source = facts.v2?._source;
+    if (!source) return issues;
+    if (!/\.java$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    const lines = source.split("\n");
+    for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+      const line = lines[i];
+      if (!SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
+      if (!UNSAFE_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
+      if (SAFE_REGEX.test(line)) continue;
+      issues.push({
+        ruleId: "java/sql-string-concat",
+        category: "security",
+        severity: "high",
+        aiSpecific: false,
+        message: `SQL query built via string concat at line ${i + 1}`,
+        line: i + 1,
+        column: 1,
+        advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter (jOOQ), or an ORM (Hibernate, MyBatis with #{} binding). String concatenation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: java/sql-string-concat v0.30 (OWASP A03:2021).'
+      });
+    }
+    return issues;
+  }
+});
+
+// src/rules/java/system-out-println.ts
+var SYSTEM_OUT_REGEX = /\bSystem\.out\.println\s*\(/g;
+var REAL_LOGGING_IMPORT_REGEX = /\bimport\s+(?:org\.slf4j\.|org\.apache\.logging\.log4j|org\.apache\.log4j|java\.util\.logging|com\.google\.common\.logging|io\.github\.oshai\.kotlinlogging)/;
+var javaSystemOutPrintlnRule = createRule({
+  id: "java/system-out-println",
+  category: "logic",
+  severity: "low",
+  aiSpecific: false,
+  description: "System.out.println() used for logging \u2014 use SLF4J, Log4j2, or java.util.logging",
+  create(_context) {
+    return {};
+  },
+  analyze(_context, facts) {
+    const issues = [];
+    const source = facts.v2?._source;
+    if (!source) return issues;
+    if (!/\.java$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    if (/\/test\//i.test(facts.filePath) || /\/src\/test\//i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    if (REAL_LOGGING_IMPORT_REGEX.test(source)) return issues;
+    let m;
+    SYSTEM_OUT_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
+    while ((m = SYSTEM_OUT_REGEX.exec(source)) !== null) {
+      const line = source.slice(0, m.index).split("\n").length;
+      issues.push({
+        ruleId: "java/system-out-println",
+        category: "logic",
+        severity: "low",
+        aiSpecific: false,
+        message: `System.out.println() at line ${line}`,
+        line,
+        column: 1,
+        advice: "Use a real logging library: SLF4J (the standard facade), Log4j2, or java.util.logging. System.out has no log level, no timestamp, no correlation ID, and cannot be filtered. Migration: add `private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(MyClass.class);` and replace `System.out.println(x)` with `log.info(x)`. Reference: java/system-out-println v0.30."
+      });
+    }
+    return issues;
+  }
+});
+
+// src/rules/java/thread-sleep-in-loop.ts
+var THREAD_SLEEP_REGEX = /\bThread\.sleep\s*\(/g;
+var javaThreadSleepInLoopRule = createRule({
+  id: "java/thread-sleep-in-loop",
+  category: "perf",
+  severity: "medium",
+  aiSpecific: false,
+  description: "Thread.sleep() in a loop \u2014 use ScheduledExecutorService or BlockingQueue",
+  create(_context) {
+    return {};
+  },
+  analyze(_context, facts) {
+    const issues = [];
+    const source = facts.v2?._source;
+    if (!source) return issues;
+    if (!/\.java$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    if (!/\bThread\.sleep\s*\(/.test(source)) return issues;
+    if (!/\b(?:for|while|do)\b/.test(source)) return issues;
+    let m;
+    THREAD_SLEEP_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
+    while ((m = THREAD_SLEEP_REGEX.exec(source)) !== null) {
+      const line = source.slice(0, m.index).split("\n").length;
+      issues.push({
+        ruleId: "java/thread-sleep-in-loop",
+        category: "perf",
+        severity: "medium",
+        aiSpecific: false,
+        message: `Thread.sleep() at line ${line}`,
+        line,
+        column: 1,
+        advice: 'Use ScheduledExecutorService for periodic work, or BlockingQueue.take() for event-driven work. Thread.sleep in a loop is the classic "polling with sleep" anti-pattern \u2014 the thread blocks for the sleep duration each iteration. In server contexts this ties up Tomcat/Jetty/Netty threads. Reference: java/thread-sleep-in-loop v0.30.'
+      });
+    }
+    return issues;
+  }
+});
+
 // src/rules/kotlin/coroutine-global-scope.ts
 var GLOBAL_SCOPE_REGEX = /GlobalScope\s*\.\s*(?:launch|async|runBlocking)\s*[({]/g;
 var kotlinCoroutineGlobalScopeRule = createRule({
@@ -37092,6 +37297,101 @@ var kotlinDataClassDefaultsOveruseRule = createRule({
   }
 });
 
+// src/rules/kotlin/force-unwrap.ts
+var FORCE_UNWRAP_REGEX = /!!(?=\s*[.\)}\};,\n\[])/g;
+var kotlinForceUnwrapRule = createRule({
+  id: "kotlin/force-unwrap",
+  category: "logic",
+  severity: "medium",
+  aiSpecific: false,
+  description: "!! force-unwrap \u2014 use ?. (safe call) or a proper null check",
+  create(_context) {
+    return {};
+  },
+  analyze(_context, facts) {
+    const issues = [];
+    const source = facts.v2?._source;
+    if (!source) return issues;
+    if (!/\.kts?$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    let m;
+    FORCE_UNWRAP_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
+    while ((m = FORCE_UNWRAP_REGEX.exec(source)) !== null) {
+      const line = source.slice(0, m.index).split("\n").length;
+      const lineStart = source.lastIndexOf("\n", m.index) + 1;
+      const lineText = source.slice(lineStart, m.index);
+      const quoteCount = (lineText.match(/"/g) || []).length;
+      if (quoteCount % 2 === 1) continue;
+      issues.push({
+        ruleId: "kotlin/force-unwrap",
+        category: "logic",
+        severity: "medium",
+        aiSpecific: false,
+        message: `!! force-unwrap at line ${line}`,
+        line,
+        column: m.index - lineStart + 1,
+        advice: "Use ?. (safe call) with ?: (Elvis) for a default, or a proper when/if check. !! throws NullPointerException at runtime \u2014 it bypasses Kotlin's type system. Reference: kotlin/force-unwrap v0.29."
+      });
+    }
+    return issues;
+  }
+});
+
+// src/rules/kotlin/hardcoded-credential.ts
+var KEY_REGEX2 = /\b(api[_-]?key|apikey|secret|token|password|auth|access[_-]?key|client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key)\b\s*[=:]/i;
+var VALUE_REGEX2 = /["']([A-Za-z0-9_\-+/=.@*!]{16,})["']/;
+var FALSE_POSITIVES2 = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+  "passwordless",
+  "tokenize",
+  "tokenizer",
+  "authorizationrequired",
+  "authenticated",
+  "authenticatortoken",
+  "authtoken",
+  "placeholder",
+  // common in test fixtures
+  "changeme"
+  // placeholder, but still suspicious — kept for review
+]);
+var kotlinHardcodedCredentialRule = createRule({
+  id: "kotlin/hardcoded-credential",
+  category: "security",
+  severity: "high",
+  aiSpecific: false,
+  description: "Hardcoded credential literal \u2014 use env vars or a secrets manager",
+  create(_context) {
+    return {};
+  },
+  analyze(_context, facts) {
+    const issues = [];
+    const source = facts.v2?._source;
+    if (!source) return issues;
+    if (!/\.kts?$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    const lines = source.split("\n");
+    for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+      const line = lines[i];
+      if (!KEY_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
+      const valueMatch = VALUE_REGEX2.exec(line);
+      if (!valueMatch) continue;
+      const value = valueMatch[1];
+      if (FALSE_POSITIVES2.has(value.toLowerCase())) continue;
+      if (!/[a-zA-Z]/.test(value) || !/[0-9]/.test(value)) continue;
+      if (value.startsWith("$")) continue;
+      if (/\/test\//i.test(facts.filePath) || /\.test\.kts?$/i.test(facts.filePath)) continue;
+      issues.push({
+        ruleId: "kotlin/hardcoded-credential",
+        category: "security",
+        severity: "high",
+        aiSpecific: false,
+        message: `Hardcoded credential at line ${i + 1}`,
+        line: i + 1,
+        column: 1,
+        advice: "Move the credential to an environment variable, a .env file that is .gitignore'd, or a secrets manager (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager). Hardcoded credentials are the #1 source of secret leaks on GitHub. Reference: kotlin/hardcoded-credential v0.29 (OWASP A07:2021 \u2014 Identification and Authentication Failures)."
+      });
+    }
+    return issues;
+  }
+});
+
 // src/rules/kotlin/object-singleton-misuse.ts
 var OBJECT_DECL_REGEX = /\bobject\s+(?!\w*Companion\b)(\w+)\s*\{/g;
 var kotlinObjectSingletonMisuseRule = createRule({
@@ -37142,8 +37442,46 @@ var kotlinObjectSingletonMisuseRule = createRule({
   }
 });
 
+// src/rules/kotlin/println-as-log.ts
+var PRINTLN_REGEX = /\bprintln\s*\(/g;
+var REAL_LOGGING_IMPORT_REGEX2 = /\bimport\s+(?:android\.util\.Log|org\.slf4j\.|io\.github\.oshai\.kotlinlogging|kotlin\.logging|co\.touchlab\.kermit|com\.github\.ajalt\.timber|org\.apache\.logging\.log4j)/;
+var kotlinPrintlnAsLogRule = createRule({
+  id: "kotlin/println-as-log",
+  category: "logic",
+  severity: "low",
+  aiSpecific: false,
+  description: "println() used for logging \u2014 use slf4j, kermit, or android.util.Log",
+  create(_context) {
+    return {};
+  },
+  analyze(_context, facts) {
+    const issues = [];
+    const source = facts.v2?._source;
+    if (!source) return issues;
+    if (!/\.kts?$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    if (/\/test\//i.test(facts.filePath) || /\.test\.kts?$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    if (REAL_LOGGING_IMPORT_REGEX2.test(source)) return issues;
+    let m;
+    PRINTLN_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
+    while ((m = PRINTLN_REGEX.exec(source)) !== null) {
+      const line = source.slice(0, m.index).split("\n").length;
+      issues.push({
+        ruleId: "kotlin/println-as-log",
+        category: "logic",
+        severity: "low",
+        aiSpecific: false,
+        message: `println() as logger at line ${line}`,
+        line,
+        column: 1,
+        advice: "Use a real logging library: slf4j (JVM), android.util.Log (Android), Timber (Android), kermit (multiplatform), or kotlin-logging. println() has no log level, no timestamp, no correlation ID, and cannot be filtered. Reference: kotlin/println-as-log v0.29."
+      });
+    }
+    return issues;
+  }
+});
+
 // src/rules/kotlin/println-debug.ts
-var PRINTLN_REGEX = /^\s*println\s*\(/gm;
+var PRINTLN_REGEX2 = /^\s*println\s*\(/gm;
 var DEFAULT_THRESHOLD = 1;
 var kotlinPrintlnDebugRule = createRule({
   id: "kotlin/println-debug",
@@ -37161,8 +37499,8 @@ var kotlinPrintlnDebugRule = createRule({
     if (!/\.kts?$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
     const matches = [];
     let m;
-    PRINTLN_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
-    while ((m = PRINTLN_REGEX.exec(source)) !== null) {
+    PRINTLN_REGEX2.lastIndex = 0;
+    while ((m = PRINTLN_REGEX2.exec(source)) !== null) {
       matches.push(m.index);
     }
     if (matches.length <= context.threshold) return issues;
@@ -37185,8 +37523,83 @@ var kotlinPrintlnDebugRule = createRule({
   }
 });
 
+// src/rules/kotlin/runblocking-misuse.ts
+var RUN_BLOCKING_REGEX = /\brunBlocking\s*[({]/g;
+var kotlinRunBlockingMisuseRule = createRule({
+  id: "kotlin/runblocking-misuse",
+  category: "perf",
+  severity: "medium",
+  aiSpecific: false,
+  description: "runBlocking { ... } \u2014 blocks the calling thread; use coroutineScope {} or call suspend fun directly",
+  create(_context) {
+    return {};
+  },
+  analyze(_context, facts) {
+    const issues = [];
+    const source = facts.v2?._source;
+    if (!source) return issues;
+    if (!/\.kts?$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    if (/\bfun\s+main\s*\(/.test(source)) return issues;
+    let m;
+    RUN_BLOCKING_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
+    while ((m = RUN_BLOCKING_REGEX.exec(source)) !== null) {
+      const line = source.slice(0, m.index).split("\n").length;
+      issues.push({
+        ruleId: "kotlin/runblocking-misuse",
+        category: "perf",
+        severity: "medium",
+        aiSpecific: false,
+        message: `runBlocking { ... } at line ${line}`,
+        line,
+        column: 1,
+        advice: 'runBlocking blocks the calling thread, defeating the purpose of coroutines. Use coroutineScope { } for structured concurrency, or call the suspend function directly. The Kotlin coroutines docs: runBlocking "should rarely (if ever) be used outside of main()". Reference: kotlin/runblocking-misuse v0.29.'
+      });
+    }
+    return issues;
+  }
+});
+
+// src/rules/kotlin/sql-string-concat.ts
+var SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2 = /\b(?:SELECT|INSERT\s+INTO|UPDATE|DELETE\s+FROM|CREATE\s+TABLE|DROP\s+TABLE|ALTER\s+TABLE)\b/i;
+var UNSAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:\+|\$\{)/;
+var SAFE_REGEX2 = /(?:PreparedStatement|setParameter|setString|setInt|setLong|bind|:name|:\\?\\?|\?\\s*,)/;
+var kotlinSqlStringConcatRule = createRule({
+  id: "kotlin/sql-string-concat",
+  category: "security",
+  severity: "high",
+  aiSpecific: false,
+  description: "SQL query built via string concat / template \u2014 use PreparedStatement or setParameter()",
+  create(_context) {
+    return {};
+  },
+  analyze(_context, facts) {
+    const issues = [];
+    const source = facts.v2?._source;
+    if (!source) return issues;
+    if (!/\.kts?$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
+    const lines = source.split("\n");
+    for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+      const line = lines[i];
+      if (!SQL_KEYWORD_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
+      if (!UNSAFE_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
+      if (SAFE_REGEX2.test(line)) continue;
+      issues.push({
+        ruleId: "kotlin/sql-string-concat",
+        category: "security",
+        severity: "high",
+        aiSpecific: false,
+        message: `SQL query built via string concat/template at line ${i + 1}`,
+        line: i + 1,
+        column: 1,
+        advice: 'Use a PreparedStatement (JDBC), setParameter() (Exposed), or an ORM (Room, jOOQ). String concatenation or template interpolation into a SQL query is the canonical SQL-injection pattern \u2014 even "trusted" inputs (signed JWT, internal config) can be influenced by an attacker. Reference: kotlin/sql-string-concat v0.29 (OWASP A03:2021).'
+      });
+    }
+    return issues;
+  }
+});
+
 // src/rules/kotlin/string-concat-loop.ts
-var STRING_CONCAT_REGEX = /\b(\w+)\s*=\s*\1\s*\+\s*[^;}]+[;}\n]/g;
+var STRING_CONCAT_REGEX2 = /\b(\w+)\s*=\s*\1\s*\+\s*[^;}]+[;}\n]/g;
 var kotlinStringConcatLoopRule = createRule({
   id: "kotlin/string-concat-loop",
   category: "perf",
@@ -37203,8 +37616,8 @@ var kotlinStringConcatLoopRule = createRule({
     if (!/\.kts?$/i.test(facts.filePath)) return issues;
     if (!/\b(?:for|while|repeat|forEach)\b/.test(source)) return issues;
     let m;
-    STRING_CONCAT_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
-    while ((m = STRING_CONCAT_REGEX.exec(source)) !== null) {
+    STRING_CONCAT_REGEX2.lastIndex = 0;
+    while ((m = STRING_CONCAT_REGEX2.exec(source)) !== null) {
       const line = source.slice(0, m.index).split("\n").length;
       const lineText = source.slice(0, m.index).split("\n").pop() ?? "";
       if (/\.append\s*\(/.test(lineText)) continue;
@@ -42745,10 +43158,20 @@ var builtinRules = [
   goErrorWrapWithoutContextRule,
   goNilSliceVsEmptyRule,
   goStructTagInconsistencyRule,
+  javaCommandInjectionRule,
+  javaHardcodedCredentialRule,
+  javaSqlStringConcatRule,
+  javaSystemOutPrintlnRule,
+  javaThreadSleepInLoopRule,
   kotlinCoroutineGlobalScopeRule,
   kotlinDataClassDefaultsOveruseRule,
+  kotlinForceUnwrapRule,
+  kotlinHardcodedCredentialRule,
   kotlinObjectSingletonMisuseRule,
+  kotlinPrintlnAsLogRule,
   kotlinPrintlnDebugRule,
+  kotlinRunBlockingMisuseRule,
+  kotlinSqlStringConcatRule,
   kotlinStringConcatLoopRule,
   gapMonopolyRule,
   mathElementUniformityRule,
@@ -44967,6 +45390,166 @@ var signal_strength_default = {
     _v9Precision: 0.125,
     defaultOff: true
   },
+  "kotlin/sql-string-concat": {
+    recall: 469e-5,
+    fpRate: 63e-4,
+    ratio: 0.75,
+    precision: 0.0556,
+    lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
+    verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _calibrationNote: "v0.29: v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos). ratio=0.75 (DORMANT). 18 fires total \u2014 modern Kotlin mostly uses ORMs (Room/Exposed) so SQL string concat is rare in both arms. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm only 213 files. defaultOff: rule is loadable but invisible by default until v0.30 re-calibration with a larger pos arm.",
+    aiSpecific: false,
+    _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _v9Lift: 0.75,
+    _v9Recall: 469e-5,
+    _v9FpRate: 63e-4,
+    _v9Precision: 0.0556,
+    defaultOff: true
+  },
+  "kotlin/hardcoded-credential": {
+    recall: 0,
+    fpRate: 0,
+    ratio: 0,
+    precision: 0,
+    lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
+    verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _calibrationNote: "v0.29: v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos). 0 fires. The 16-char value threshold + letters+digit heuristic is too strict for the corpus; real-world secrets are in env vars / config files, not source. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: needs different corpus (CI configs, .env samples). defaultOff: loadable but invisible by default.",
+    aiSpecific: false,
+    _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _v9Lift: 0,
+    _v9Recall: 0,
+    _v9FpRate: 0,
+    _v9Precision: 0,
+    defaultOff: true
+  },
+  "kotlin/runblocking-misuse": {
+    recall: 0.10798,
+    fpRate: 0.21534,
+    ratio: 0.5,
+    precision: 0.0381,
+    lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
+    verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _calibrationNote: "v0.29: v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos). ratio=0.50 \u2014 fires 2x more on pre-2022 (neg) than post-2024 (pos). Era-confounded: pre-2022 Kotlin coroutines used runBlocking more; modern Kotlin uses coroutineScope. Same direction as kotlin/coroutine-global-scope (0.09). defaultOff: loadable but invisible by default until v0.30 re-calibration.",
+    aiSpecific: false,
+    _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _v9Lift: 0.5,
+    _v9Recall: 0.10798,
+    _v9FpRate: 0.21534,
+    _v9Precision: 0.0381,
+    defaultOff: true
+  },
+  "kotlin/println-as-log": {
+    recall: 0.08451,
+    fpRate: 0.04596,
+    ratio: 1.84,
+    precision: 0.1268,
+    lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
+    verdict: "OK",
+    _calibrationNote: "v0.29: v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos). ratio=1.84 (\u22651.5) \u2014 first rule in this entire session with a positive direction! Fires 1.84x more on post-2024 AI/demos than pre-2022 production. Precision=12.7% (below 50% USEFUL threshold); verdict=OK. The signal is real: post-2024 Kotlin code (especially AI-generated examples) uses println for output; pre-2022 production code uses slf4j/kermit. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: pos arm only 213 files. defaultOff: still set to true (verdict is OK but precision is below 50% \u2014 the guardrail expects OK/USEFUL rules to be defaultOff:false only when calibrated with a meaningful pos arm).",
+    aiSpecific: false,
+    _v9Verdict: "OK",
+    _v9Lift: 1.84,
+    _v9Recall: 0.08451,
+    _v9FpRate: 0.04596,
+    _v9Precision: 0.1268,
+    defaultOff: true
+  },
+  "kotlin/force-unwrap": {
+    recall: 0.11737,
+    fpRate: 0.33284,
+    ratio: 0.35,
+    precision: 0.0271,
+    lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
+    verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _calibrationNote: "v0.29: v9 Kotlin calibration (2698 neg, 213 pos). ratio=0.35 \u2014 fires 3x more on pre-2022 (neg) than post-2024 (pos). Era-confounded: pre-2022 Kotlin code uses !! freely; modern Kotlin relies on ?./?: and Result<T> wrappers. Stronger era signal than runblocking-misuse. defaultOff: loadable but invisible by default.",
+    aiSpecific: false,
+    _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _v9Lift: 0.35,
+    _v9Recall: 0.11737,
+    _v9FpRate: 0.33284,
+    _v9Precision: 0.0271,
+    defaultOff: true
+  },
+  "java/sql-string-concat": {
+    recall: 0.01116,
+    fpRate: 0.01892,
+    ratio: 0.59,
+    precision: 0.0691,
+    lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
+    verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _calibrationNote: "v0.30: v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos). ratio=0.59 \u2014 fires 1.7x more on pre-2022 (neg) than post-2024 (pos). Era-confounded: pre-2022 Java used JDBC string concat more; modern Java uses PreparedStatement. Same direction as kotlin/sql-string-concat. 1664 total fires \u2014 Java uses ORMs (Hibernate) heavily so SQL concat is rare in both arms. defaultOff.",
+    aiSpecific: false,
+    _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _v9Lift: 0.59,
+    _v9Recall: 0.01116,
+    _v9FpRate: 0.01892,
+    _v9Precision: 0.0691,
+    defaultOff: true
+  },
+  "java/hardcoded-credential": {
+    recall: 0,
+    fpRate: 4e-5,
+    ratio: 0,
+    precision: 0,
+    lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
+    verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _calibrationNote: "v0.30: v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos). 3 fires total \u2014 only in pre-2022 (neg). Real secrets are in env vars / config files, not source. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: needs different corpus (CI configs, .env samples, leaked-secret datasets). defaultOff.",
+    aiSpecific: false,
+    _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _v9Lift: 0,
+    _v9Recall: 0,
+    _v9FpRate: 4e-5,
+    _v9Precision: 0,
+    defaultOff: true
+  },
+  "java/thread-sleep-in-loop": {
+    recall: 0.0228,
+    fpRate: 0.02343,
+    ratio: 0.97,
+    precision: 0.1091,
+    lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
+    verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _calibrationNote: "v0.30: v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos). ratio=0.97 (just below 1.0) \u2014 fires equally on both arms. Borderline era-confound: pre-2022 Java had more Thread.sleep in loops (less mature concurrency APIs); modern Java uses ScheduledExecutorService. Same direction as kotlin/runblocking-misuse (0.50). 2154 total fires \u2014 high absolute count, meaningful measurement. defaultOff.",
+    aiSpecific: false,
+    _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _v9Lift: 0.97,
+    _v9Recall: 0.0228,
+    _v9FpRate: 0.02343,
+    _v9Precision: 0.1091,
+    defaultOff: true
+  },
+  "java/system-out-println": {
+    recall: 0.16681,
+    fpRate: 0.05064,
+    ratio: 3.29,
+    precision: 0.293,
+    lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
+    verdict: "OK",
+    _calibrationNote: "v0.30: v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos). ratio=3.29 (\u22651.5) \u2014 second positive-signal rule in v9 history (after kotlin/println-as-log at 1.84). Fires 3.29x more on post-2024 (pos) AI code than pre-2022 (neg) production. 5866 total fires (highest of any v0.30 rule). Precision=29.3% (below 50% USEFUL threshold); verdict=OK. The signal is real: post-2024 Java (especially AI-generated examples) uses System.out for output; pre-2022 production uses slf4j. With 10k pos files, this is a production-grade measurement (vs kotlin/println-as-log's 213 files). defaultOff: still set true because the guardrail expects OK/USEFUL rules to be default-on only with sufficient precision. The v0.31+ re-calibration may flip this if precision improves.",
+    aiSpecific: false,
+    _v9Verdict: "OK",
+    _v9Lift: 3.29,
+    _v9Recall: 0.16681,
+    _v9FpRate: 0.05064,
+    _v9Precision: 0.293,
+    defaultOff: true
+  },
+  "java/command-injection": {
+    recall: 0,
+    fpRate: 1e-4,
+    ratio: 0,
+    precision: 0,
+    lastCalibratedAt: "2026-07-03T00:00:00Z",
+    verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _calibrationNote: "v0.30: v9 Java calibration (81891 neg, 10305 pos). 8 fires total, all in neg. Command injection is rare in modern Java \u2014 most apps use ProcessBuilder with List<String> args, not Runtime.exec with concat. INSUFFICIENT_DATA: needs different corpus (security benchmarks, CVE samples). defaultOff.",
+    aiSpecific: false,
+    _v9Verdict: "DORMANT",
+    _v9Lift: 0,
+    _v9Recall: 0,
+    _v9FpRate: 1e-4,
+    _v9Precision: 0,
+    defaultOff: true
+  },
   "swift/force-unwrap": {
     recall: 0,
     fpRate: 0,