skyloom 1.13.5 → 1.13.7

package/src/core/security.ts

@@ -1,243 +1,243 @@
-/**
- * 安全与对齐模块 — Security & Alignment
- *
- * Danger level grading, red-line enforcement, audit trail, human-in-the-loop.
- * All security decisions flow through this module before tool execution.
- */
-
-import { getLogger } from "./logger";
-
-const log = getLogger("security");
-
-/* ── Danger levels ── */
-export enum DangerLevel {
-  /** Read-only, no side effects — auto-approved */
-  SAFE = 0,
-  /** Minor side effects (write single file, git status) — logged */
-  LOW = 1,
-  /** Significant side effects (overwrite, delete, git push) — notify */
-  MEDIUM = 2,
-  /** Dangerous (sudo, remote deploy, mass delete) — confirm */
-  HIGH = 3,
-  /** Red-line — NEVER execute without human-in-the-loop */
-  CRITICAL = 4,
-}
-
-/* ═══════════════════════════════════════
-   Red-line list: operations that are NEVER auto-approved
-   ═══════════════════════════════════════ */
-const REDLINE_PATTERNS = [
-  /rm\s+-rf/,           /format\s+\w:/,         /dd\s+if=/,
-  />\s*\/dev\/sd/,      /mkfs\./,               /:(){ :\|:& };:/,
-  /sudo\s+rm/,          /chmod\s+777\s+\//,     /wget.*\|.*sh/,
-  /curl.*\|.*bash/,     /eval\s+\$/,            /exec\s+\$/,
-  /subprocess\.call.*rm/, /os\.system.*rm/,
-];
-
-const REDLINE_COMMANDS = [
-  "shutdown", "reboot", "init 0", "init 6",
-  "del /f /s /q C:\\*", "rd /s /q C:\\",
-];
-
-/* ═══════════════════════════════════════
-   Per-tool danger level mapping
-   ═══════════════════════════════════════ */
-const TOOL_DANGER_MAP: Record<string, DangerLevel> = {
-  read_file: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  list_directory: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  tree: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  file_search: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  code_search: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  grep: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  git_status: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  git_diff: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  git_log: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  system_info: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  system_diagnose: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  list_processes: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  list_installed_apps: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  list_skills: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  recall_facts: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-  mcp_list_servers: DangerLevel.SAFE,
-
-  write_file: DangerLevel.LOW,
-  edit_file: DangerLevel.LOW,
-  copy_file: DangerLevel.LOW,
-  move_file: DangerLevel.LOW,
-  http_get: DangerLevel.LOW,
-  fetch_page: DangerLevel.LOW,
-  web_search: DangerLevel.LOW,
-  remember_fact: DangerLevel.LOW,
-  use_skill: DangerLevel.LOW,
-  task_done: DangerLevel.LOW,
-
-  delete_file: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
-  git_add: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
-  git_commit: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
-  git_checkout: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
-  http_post: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
-  mcp_add_server: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
-  mcp_remove_server: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
-  launch_app: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
-  open_path: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
-  browser_open: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
-
-  run_bash: DangerLevel.HIGH,
-  shell_exec: DangerLevel.HIGH,
-  kill_process: DangerLevel.HIGH,
-  package_manager: DangerLevel.HIGH,
-  service_control: DangerLevel.HIGH,
-  delegate_to: DangerLevel.HIGH,
-  mcp_scaffold_server: DangerLevel.HIGH,
-};
-
-/* ═══════════════════════════════════════
-   Audit trail entry
-   ═══════════════════════════════════════ */
-export interface AuditEntry {
-  ts: string;
-  agent: string;
-  tool: string;
-  args: Record<string, any>;
-  dangerLevel: DangerLevel;
-  approved: boolean;
-  result: string;
-  durationMs: number;
-  traceId: string;
-}
-
-/* ═══════════════════════════════════════
-   Security context — per-session security state
-   ═══════════════════════════════════════ */
-export class SecurityContext {
-  public auditLog: AuditEntry[] = [];
-  public deniedCount = 0;
-  public autoApprovedCount = 0;
-  public manualApprovedCount = 0;
-  public approvalMode: "auto" | "interactive" | "strict" = "auto";
-
-  private approvalCallback: ((tool: string, args: Record<string, any>, level: DangerLevel) => Promise<boolean>) | null = null;
-
-  constructor(opts?: { mode?: "auto" | "interactive" | "strict"; onApprove?: (tool: string, args: Record<string, any>, level: DangerLevel) => Promise<boolean> }) {
-    if (opts?.mode) this.approvalMode = opts.mode;
-    if (opts?.onApprove) this.approvalCallback = opts.onApprove;
-  }
-
-  /** Get the danger level for a tool. Defaults to SAFE for unknown tools. */
-  getDangerLevel(toolName: string): DangerLevel {
-    return TOOL_DANGER_MAP[toolName] ?? DangerLevel.SAFE;
-  }
-
-  /** Check if arguments contain red-line patterns (critical danger). */
-  checkRedline(toolName: string, args: Record<string, any>): string | null {
-    if (toolName !== "run_bash" && toolName !== "shell_exec") return null;
-    const cmd = String(args.command || args.cmd || "").toLowerCase();
-    for (const pattern of REDLINE_PATTERNS) {
-      if (pattern.test(cmd)) return `Red-line pattern detected: ${pattern.source.slice(0, 40)}`;
-    }
-    for (const forbidden of REDLINE_COMMANDS) {
-      if (cmd.includes(forbidden)) return `Red-line command: ${forbidden}`;
-    }
-    return null;
-  }
-
-  /** Determine whether a tool call is permitted. Returns [approved, reason]. */
-  async checkApproval(toolName: string, args: Record<string, any>, agentName: string): Promise<[boolean, string]> {
-    const level = this.getDangerLevel(toolName);
-
-    // Red-line check
-    const redline = this.checkRedline(toolName, args);
-    if (redline) {
-      log.warn("redline_blocked", { agent: agentName, tool: toolName, reason: redline });
-      return [false, redline];
-    }
-
-    // Safe — always allow
-    if (level === DangerLevel.SAFE) return [true, "safe"];
-
-    // Strict mode — deny all non-safe
-    if (this.approvalMode === "strict") {
-      return [false, `Strict mode: tool '${toolName}' (level ${level}) requires manual approval`];
-    }
-
-    // Auto mode — allow LOW, prompt for MEDIUM+, deny CRITICAL
-    if (this.approvalMode === "auto") {
-      if (level <= DangerLevel.LOW) return [true, "auto-low"];
-      if (level === DangerLevel.CRITICAL) return [false, `CRITICAL tool '${toolName}' requires explicit human approval`];
-      // MEDIUM/HIGH with auto mode => need callback
-      if (this.approvalCallback) {
-        const approved = await this.approvalCallback(toolName, args, level);
-        return [approved, approved ? "user-approved" : "user-denied"];
-      }
-      return [true, "auto-med"]; // no callback → auto-allow but log
-    }
-
-    // Interactive mode — prompt for LOW+
-    if (this.approvalCallback) {
-      const approved = await this.approvalCallback(toolName, args, level);
-      return [approved, approved ? "user-approved" : "user-denied"];
-    }
-    return [true, "no-callback"];
-  }
-
-  /** Record an audit entry. */
-  recordAudit(tool: string, agent: string, args: Record<string, any>, dangerLevel: DangerLevel, approved: boolean, resultPreview: string, durationMs: number, traceId: string): void {
-    const entry: AuditEntry = {
-      ts: new Date().toISOString(),
-      agent, tool, args, dangerLevel, approved,
-      result: resultPreview.slice(0, 500),
-      durationMs, traceId,
-    };
-    this.auditLog.push(entry);
-    if (this.auditLog.length > 5000) this.auditLog.shift();
-
-    if (approved) {
-      if (dangerLevel >= DangerLevel.HIGH) this.manualApprovedCount++;
-      else this.autoApprovedCount++;
-    } else {
-      this.deniedCount++;
-    }
-
-    log.info(dangerLevel >= DangerLevel.HIGH ? "dangerous_tool_executed" : "tool_executed", {
-      tool, agent, level: dangerLevel, approved,
-    });
-  }
-
-  /** Get summary statistics. */
-  getStats() {
-    return {
-      total: this.auditLog.length,
-      denied: this.deniedCount,
-      autoApproved: this.autoApprovedCount,
-      manualApproved: this.manualApprovedCount,
-      byLevel: {
-        safe: this.auditLog.filter(e => e.dangerLevel === DangerLevel.SAFE).length,
-        low: this.auditLog.filter(e => e.dangerLevel === DangerLevel.LOW).length,
-        medium: this.auditLog.filter(e => e.dangerLevel === DangerLevel.MEDIUM).length,
-        high: this.auditLog.filter(e => e.dangerLevel === DangerLevel.HIGH).length,
-        critical: this.auditLog.filter(e => e.dangerLevel === DangerLevel.CRITICAL).length,
-      },
-      lastDenied: this.auditLog.filter(e => !e.approved).slice(-5).map(e => `${e.tool}: ${e.result}`),
-    };
-  }
-
-  /** Install approval callback for interactive mode. */
-  setApprovalCallback(fn: (tool: string, args: Record<string, any>, level: DangerLevel) => Promise<boolean>) {
-    this.approvalCallback = fn;
-  }
-}
-
-/* ── Global security context ── */
-let globalSecurity: SecurityContext | null = null;
-
-export function getSecurity(): SecurityContext {
-  if (!globalSecurity) globalSecurity = new SecurityContext();
-  return globalSecurity;
-}
-
-export function resetSecurity(): void {
-  globalSecurity = null;
-}
-
-/** Red-line patterns for reference (used by tools to self-check). */
-export { REDLINE_PATTERNS, REDLINE_COMMANDS };
+/**
+ * 安全与对齐模块 — Security & Alignment
+ *
+ * Danger level grading, red-line enforcement, audit trail, human-in-the-loop.
+ * All security decisions flow through this module before tool execution.
+ */
+
+import { getLogger } from "./logger";
+
+const log = getLogger("security");
+
+/* ── Danger levels ── */
+export enum DangerLevel {
+  /** Read-only, no side effects — auto-approved */
+  SAFE = 0,
+  /** Minor side effects (write single file, git status) — logged */
+  LOW = 1,
+  /** Significant side effects (overwrite, delete, git push) — notify */
+  MEDIUM = 2,
+  /** Dangerous (sudo, remote deploy, mass delete) — confirm */
+  HIGH = 3,
+  /** Red-line — NEVER execute without human-in-the-loop */
+  CRITICAL = 4,
+}
+
+/* ═══════════════════════════════════════
+   Red-line list: operations that are NEVER auto-approved
+   ═══════════════════════════════════════ */
+const REDLINE_PATTERNS = [
+  /rm\s+-rf/,           /format\s+\w:/,         /dd\s+if=/,
+  />\s*\/dev\/sd/,      /mkfs\./,               /:(){ :\|:& };:/,
+  /sudo\s+rm/,          /chmod\s+777\s+\//,     /wget.*\|.*sh/,
+  /curl.*\|.*bash/,     /eval\s+\$/,            /exec\s+\$/,
+  /subprocess\.call.*rm/, /os\.system.*rm/,
+];
+
+const REDLINE_COMMANDS = [
+  "shutdown", "reboot", "init 0", "init 6",
+  "del /f /s /q C:\\*", "rd /s /q C:\\",
+];
+
+/* ═══════════════════════════════════════
+   Per-tool danger level mapping
+   ═══════════════════════════════════════ */
+const TOOL_DANGER_MAP: Record<string, DangerLevel> = {
+  read_file: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  list_directory: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  tree: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  file_search: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  code_search: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  grep: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  git_status: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  git_diff: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  git_log: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  system_info: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  system_diagnose: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  list_processes: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  list_installed_apps: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  list_skills: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  recall_facts: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+  mcp_list_servers: DangerLevel.SAFE,
+
+  write_file: DangerLevel.LOW,
+  edit_file: DangerLevel.LOW,
+  copy_file: DangerLevel.LOW,
+  move_file: DangerLevel.LOW,
+  http_get: DangerLevel.LOW,
+  fetch_page: DangerLevel.LOW,
+  web_search: DangerLevel.LOW,
+  remember_fact: DangerLevel.LOW,
+  use_skill: DangerLevel.LOW,
+  task_done: DangerLevel.LOW,
+
+  delete_file: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
+  git_add: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
+  git_commit: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
+  git_checkout: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
+  http_post: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
+  mcp_add_server: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
+  mcp_remove_server: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
+  launch_app: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
+  open_path: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
+  browser_open: DangerLevel.MEDIUM,
+
+  run_bash: DangerLevel.HIGH,
+  shell_exec: DangerLevel.HIGH,
+  kill_process: DangerLevel.HIGH,
+  package_manager: DangerLevel.HIGH,
+  service_control: DangerLevel.HIGH,
+  delegate_to: DangerLevel.HIGH,
+  mcp_scaffold_server: DangerLevel.HIGH,
+};
+
+/* ═══════════════════════════════════════
+   Audit trail entry
+   ═══════════════════════════════════════ */
+export interface AuditEntry {
+  ts: string;
+  agent: string;
+  tool: string;
+  args: Record<string, any>;
+  dangerLevel: DangerLevel;
+  approved: boolean;
+  result: string;
+  durationMs: number;
+  traceId: string;
+}
+
+/* ═══════════════════════════════════════
+   Security context — per-session security state
+   ═══════════════════════════════════════ */
+export class SecurityContext {
+  public auditLog: AuditEntry[] = [];
+  public deniedCount = 0;
+  public autoApprovedCount = 0;
+  public manualApprovedCount = 0;
+  public approvalMode: "auto" | "interactive" | "strict" = "auto";
+
+  private approvalCallback: ((tool: string, args: Record<string, any>, level: DangerLevel) => Promise<boolean>) | null = null;
+
+  constructor(opts?: { mode?: "auto" | "interactive" | "strict"; onApprove?: (tool: string, args: Record<string, any>, level: DangerLevel) => Promise<boolean> }) {
+    if (opts?.mode) this.approvalMode = opts.mode;
+    if (opts?.onApprove) this.approvalCallback = opts.onApprove;
+  }
+
+  /** Get the danger level for a tool. Defaults to SAFE for unknown tools. */
+  getDangerLevel(toolName: string): DangerLevel {
+    return TOOL_DANGER_MAP[toolName] ?? DangerLevel.SAFE;
+  }
+
+  /** Check if arguments contain red-line patterns (critical danger). */
+  checkRedline(toolName: string, args: Record<string, any>): string | null {
+    if (toolName !== "run_bash" && toolName !== "shell_exec") return null;
+    const cmd = String(args.command || args.cmd || "").toLowerCase();
+    for (const pattern of REDLINE_PATTERNS) {
+      if (pattern.test(cmd)) return `Red-line pattern detected: ${pattern.source.slice(0, 40)}`;
+    }
+    for (const forbidden of REDLINE_COMMANDS) {
+      if (cmd.includes(forbidden)) return `Red-line command: ${forbidden}`;
+    }
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  /** Determine whether a tool call is permitted. Returns [approved, reason]. */
+  async checkApproval(toolName: string, args: Record<string, any>, agentName: string): Promise<[boolean, string]> {
+    const level = this.getDangerLevel(toolName);
+
+    // Red-line check
+    const redline = this.checkRedline(toolName, args);
+    if (redline) {
+      log.warn("redline_blocked", { agent: agentName, tool: toolName, reason: redline });
+      return [false, redline];
+    }
+
+    // Safe — always allow
+    if (level === DangerLevel.SAFE) return [true, "safe"];
+
+    // Strict mode — deny all non-safe
+    if (this.approvalMode === "strict") {
+      return [false, `Strict mode: tool '${toolName}' (level ${level}) requires manual approval`];
+    }
+
+    // Auto mode — allow LOW, prompt for MEDIUM+, deny CRITICAL
+    if (this.approvalMode === "auto") {
+      if (level <= DangerLevel.LOW) return [true, "auto-low"];
+      if (level === DangerLevel.CRITICAL) return [false, `CRITICAL tool '${toolName}' requires explicit human approval`];
+      // MEDIUM/HIGH with auto mode => need callback
+      if (this.approvalCallback) {
+        const approved = await this.approvalCallback(toolName, args, level);
+        return [approved, approved ? "user-approved" : "user-denied"];
+      }
+      return [true, "auto-med"]; // no callback → auto-allow but log
+    }
+
+    // Interactive mode — prompt for LOW+
+    if (this.approvalCallback) {
+      const approved = await this.approvalCallback(toolName, args, level);
+      return [approved, approved ? "user-approved" : "user-denied"];
+    }
+    return [true, "no-callback"];
+  }
+
+  /** Record an audit entry. */
+  recordAudit(tool: string, agent: string, args: Record<string, any>, dangerLevel: DangerLevel, approved: boolean, resultPreview: string, durationMs: number, traceId: string): void {
+    const entry: AuditEntry = {
+      ts: new Date().toISOString(),
+      agent, tool, args, dangerLevel, approved,
+      result: resultPreview.slice(0, 500),
+      durationMs, traceId,
+    };
+    this.auditLog.push(entry);
+    if (this.auditLog.length > 5000) this.auditLog.shift();
+
+    if (approved) {
+      if (dangerLevel >= DangerLevel.HIGH) this.manualApprovedCount++;
+      else this.autoApprovedCount++;
+    } else {
+      this.deniedCount++;
+    }
+
+    log.info(dangerLevel >= DangerLevel.HIGH ? "dangerous_tool_executed" : "tool_executed", {
+      tool, agent, level: dangerLevel, approved,
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** Get summary statistics. */
+  getStats() {
+    return {
+      total: this.auditLog.length,
+      denied: this.deniedCount,
+      autoApproved: this.autoApprovedCount,
+      manualApproved: this.manualApprovedCount,
+      byLevel: {
+        safe: this.auditLog.filter(e => e.dangerLevel === DangerLevel.SAFE).length,
+        low: this.auditLog.filter(e => e.dangerLevel === DangerLevel.LOW).length,
+        medium: this.auditLog.filter(e => e.dangerLevel === DangerLevel.MEDIUM).length,
+        high: this.auditLog.filter(e => e.dangerLevel === DangerLevel.HIGH).length,
+        critical: this.auditLog.filter(e => e.dangerLevel === DangerLevel.CRITICAL).length,
+      },
+      lastDenied: this.auditLog.filter(e => !e.approved).slice(-5).map(e => `${e.tool}: ${e.result}`),
+    };
+  }
+
+  /** Install approval callback for interactive mode. */
+  setApprovalCallback(fn: (tool: string, args: Record<string, any>, level: DangerLevel) => Promise<boolean>) {
+    this.approvalCallback = fn;
+  }
+}
+
+/* ── Global security context ── */
+let globalSecurity: SecurityContext | null = null;
+
+export function getSecurity(): SecurityContext {
+  if (!globalSecurity) globalSecurity = new SecurityContext();
+  return globalSecurity;
+}
+
+export function resetSecurity(): void {
+  globalSecurity = null;
+}
+
+/** Red-line patterns for reference (used by tools to self-check). */
+export { REDLINE_PATTERNS, REDLINE_COMMANDS };

package/src/core/skill.ts

@@ -303,6 +303,48 @@ export class SkillRegistry {
     }
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Load folder-style skills: `<root>/<skill-name>/SKILL.md` (the Claude
+   * Code layout). Only SKILL.md is parsed — sibling files (reference.md,
+   * scripts/…) are the skill's resources, not separate skills. The skill's
+   * resourceDir is its own folder so relative references resolve.
+   */
+  loadSkillFolders(rootDir: string): Skill[] {
+    const loaded: Skill[] = [];
+    let root: string;
+    try {
+      root = path.resolve(rootDir.replace(/^~/, process.env.HOME || process.env.USERPROFILE || ''));
+    } catch {
+      return loaded;
+    }
+    if (!fs.existsSync(root)) return loaded;
+
+    let entries: string[];
+    try {
+      entries = fs.readdirSync(root);
+    } catch {
+      return loaded;
+    }
+    for (const entry of entries.sort()) {
+      if (entry.startsWith('.') || entry.startsWith('_')) continue;
+      const skillDir = path.join(root, entry);
+      try {
+        if (!fs.statSync(skillDir).isDirectory()) continue;
+      } catch {
+        continue;
+      }
+      const skillFile = path.join(skillDir, 'SKILL.md');
+      if (!fs.existsSync(skillFile)) continue;
+      const skill = Skill.fromMarkdown(skillFile);
+      if (skill) {
+        skill.resourceDir = skillDir;
+        this.register(skill);
+        loaded.push(skill);
+      }
+    }
+    return loaded;
+  }
+
   /**
    * Load all .md skill files from a directory (Anthropic format).
    */