skillmds 1.0.17 → 1.0.19

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,6 +2,15 @@
 
 All notable changes to `skillmds` are documented here. Versions follow [semver](https://semver.org).
 
+## 1.0.19
+
+- **Clear diagnostics when the registry is blocked.** In sandboxed or proxied environments that deny network egress to `api.skillmd.com`, `skillmd add owner/name` used to fall back to GitHub and surface a misleading "repo not found" error. The CLI now tells 404 ("not in the registry" — GitHub fallback proceeds as before) apart from unreachable (DNS failure, proxy 403, 5xx): if the GitHub fallback also fails, the error names the blocked registry and says what fixes it (allowlist `api.skillmd.com`, or install via the SkillMD MCP server); if the fallback succeeds, a warning notes the copy came from GitHub, not the registry.
+
+## 1.0.18
+
+- **Cleaner tool output for agents.** `skillmd_search`, `skillmd_trending`, and `skillmd_recommend` no longer echo site-oriented fields (`avg_rating`, `rating_count`, `install_count`, `save_count`, `verified`, `type`, `owner_avatar`, `category_slug`, and the internal `confident` ranker flag). Results now carry just what an agent needs to pick a skill: slug, title, description, category, agents, repo stars, and the install snippet.
+- **Quality score no longer punishes ordinary skills.** The security flags (`reads_secrets`, `network_calls`, `executes_scripts`) are pattern matches against prose and code samples, not proof of anything unsafe — they now cost 2/1/5 points respectively (was 25/8/15), so a skill that merely documents an env var or a URL keeps its high score. Verified skills are floored at 85 (unless the content fails to parse). `skillmd_lint` passes a skill's verified status through to the score.
+
 ## 1.0.16
 
 - **Installs are no longer gated on verification.** Any skill installs directly — verified or not — with no flag, no prompt, and no second step, from both the CLI (`skillmd add`) and the MCP `skillmd_install` tool. Security flags (network_calls, executes_scripts, reads_secrets, docs_only) are still shown on the result as information, but never block. `--deny <flag>` remains available as an opt-in for anyone who wants to exclude a flag; `--allow-unverified` is now a no-op kept for backward compatibility.

package/bin/skillmd-mcp.mjs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env node
+#!/usr/bin/env node
 // SkillMD MCP server (stdio). Wraps the public SkillMD API so any MCP-capable agent
 // can search, fetch, install, and discover Agent Skills by name or task.
 //
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js"
 import { CallToolRequestSchema, ListToolsRequestSchema } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js";
 import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
 import { homedir } from "node:os";
 import { join, resolve, dirname, sep } from "node:path";
 import { stringify as stringifyYaml } from "yaml";
@@ -36,6 +37,19 @@ try {
 const API = process.env.SKILLMD_API || "https://api.skillmd.com";
 const TOKEN = process.env.SKILLMD_TOKEN || "";
 
+// Companion files not in R2 carry a registry-supplied source_url. Ingest only
+// pins these to GitHub raw hosts, so anything else is a hostile/compromised
+// registry response — refuse to fetch it (client-side SSRF guard).
+const ALLOWED_SOURCE_HOSTS = new Set(["raw.githubusercontent.com", "gist.githubusercontent.com"]);
+function isAllowedSourceUrl(u) {
+  try {
+    const parsed = new URL(u);
+    return parsed.protocol === "https:" && ALLOWED_SOURCE_HOSTS.has(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase());
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
 async function api(path, init = {}) {
   const headers = { accept: "application/json", ...(init.headers || {}) };
   if (TOKEN) headers.authorization = `Bearer ${TOKEN}`;
@@ -45,10 +59,27 @@ async function api(path, init = {}) {
 }
 const text = (obj) => ({ content: [{ type: "text", text: typeof obj === "string" ? obj : JSON.stringify(obj, null, 2) }] });
 
+// The public API returns site-oriented fields (ratings, counters, avatars,
+// ranker internals) that are noise for an agent picking a skill. Strip them
+// from every list-returning tool so results stay compact and rankable only
+// on what matters to the caller.
+const OMIT_FIELDS = new Set([
+  "type",
+  "verified",
+  "avg_rating",
+  "rating_count",
+  "install_count",
+  "save_count",
+  "owner_avatar",
+  "confident",
+  "category_slug",
+]);
+const trimItems = (items) => (items ?? []).map((s) => Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(s).filter(([k]) => !OMIT_FIELDS.has(k))));
+
 const TOOLS = [
   {
     name: "skillmd_search",
-    description: "Search SkillMD for Agent Skills by name, description, or task. Returns matching skills with ratings and install snippets.",
+    description: "Search SkillMD for Agent Skills by name, description, or task. Returns matching skills with their owner/name slug and install snippets.",
     inputSchema: {
       type: "object",
       properties: {
@@ -138,7 +169,7 @@ async function handleCall(name, args) {
       if (args.type) p.set("type", args.type);
       if (args.min_rating != null) p.set("min_rating", String(args.min_rating));
       const r = await api(`/api/search?${p}`);
-      return text(r.items ?? []);
+      return text(trimItems(r.items));
     }
     case "skillmd_get": {
       const [owner, slugName] = String(args.slug).split("/");
@@ -149,7 +180,7 @@ async function handleCall(name, args) {
       const p = new URLSearchParams({ range: args.range ?? "all", limit: String(args.limit ?? 20) });
       if (args.category) p.set("category", args.category);
       const r = await api(`/api/leaderboard?${p}`);
-      return text(r.items ?? []);
+      return text(trimItems(r.items));
     }
     case "skillmd_recommend": {
       if (args.based_on) {
@@ -157,11 +188,11 @@ async function handleCall(name, args) {
         const base = await api(`/api/skills/${owner}/${slugName}`).catch(() => null);
         if (base?.category_slug) {
           const r = await api(`/api/leaderboard?range=all&limit=${args.limit ?? 10}&category=${base.category_slug}`);
-          return text((r.items ?? []).filter((s) => s.slug !== args.based_on));
+          return text(trimItems(r.items).filter((s) => s.slug !== args.based_on));
         }
       }
       const r = await api(`/api/leaderboard?range=30d&limit=${args.limit ?? 10}`);
-      return text(r.items ?? []);
+      return text(trimItems(r.items));
     }
     case "skillmd_list_saved": {
       if (!TOKEN) return text("Set SKILLMD_TOKEN (a SkillMD personal access token) to list your saved skills.");
@@ -172,14 +203,16 @@ async function handleCall(name, args) {
       if (!lint) return text("Validation engine unavailable — run `npm run build` in the skillmds package.");
       let raw = args.content;
       let slug;
+      let verified = false;
       if (!raw && args.slug) {
         const [owner, slugName] = String(args.slug).split("/");
         const skill = await api(`/api/skills/${owner}/${slugName}`);
         raw = reconstructSkillMd(skill);
         slug = slugName;
+        verified = !!skill.verified;
       }
       if (!raw) return text("Provide `content` (raw SKILL.md) or `slug` (owner/name).");
-      const result = lint(raw, slug ? { slug } : {});
+      const result = lint(raw, { ...(slug ? { slug } : {}), verified });
       return text({ ok: result.ok, score: result.score, diagnostics: result.diagnostics, security: result.security });
     }
     case "skillmd_install": {
@@ -222,20 +255,37 @@ async function handleCall(name, args) {
         // bundle avoids adding an unzip dependency to this standalone binary.
         try {
           const bundle = await api(`/api/skills/${owner}/${slugName}/bundle?format=json`);
+          // Resolve + integrity-check every file BEFORE writing any, so a
+          // tampered pack refuses cleanly instead of leaving a partial install.
+          const resolved = [];
           for (const f of bundle.files ?? []) {
             if (f.path.includes("..") || f.path.startsWith("/")) continue;
             let buf;
-            if (f.content_base64 != null) buf = Buffer.from(f.content_base64, "base64");
-            else if (f.source_url) {
+            if (f.content_base64 != null) {
+              buf = Buffer.from(f.content_base64, "base64");
+              // R2 files are content-addressed; verify the bytes match the
+              // registry's sha256. Files without one (the reconstructed inline
+              // SKILL.md) carry no hash and are skipped.
+              if (f.sha256) {
+                const got = createHash("sha256").update(buf).digest("hex");
+                if (got !== f.sha256) {
+                  const err = new Error(`integrity check failed for "${f.path}"`);
+                  err.integrity = true;
+                  throw err;
+                }
+              }
+            } else if (f.source_url && isAllowedSourceUrl(f.source_url)) {
               const r = await fetch(f.source_url).catch(() => null);
               if (!r || !r.ok) continue;
               buf = Buffer.from(await r.arrayBuffer());
             } else continue;
-            await writeSafe(f.path, f.path === "SKILL.md" ? raw : buf);
+            resolved.push({ path: f.path, contents: f.path === "SKILL.md" ? raw : buf });
           }
-          written = (bundle.files ?? []).length || 1;
-          if (!(bundle.files ?? []).some((f) => f.path === "SKILL.md")) await writeSafe("SKILL.md", raw);
-        } catch {
+          for (const f of resolved) await writeSafe(f.path, f.contents);
+          written = resolved.length || 1;
+          if (!resolved.some((f) => f.path === "SKILL.md")) await writeSafe("SKILL.md", raw);
+        } catch (e) {
+          if (e && e.integrity) return text(`Refused: ${args.slug} failed integrity verification — ${e.message}. Not installed.`);
           await writeSafe("SKILL.md", raw);
           note = ` NOTE: pack assets could not be fetched — only SKILL.md was written. For the full pack run: npx skillmds add ${args.slug}`;
         }

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -163,16 +163,19 @@ var WEIGHT = {
 };
 var RISK = {
   docs_only: 0,
-  reads_secrets: 25,
-  executes_scripts: 15,
-  network_calls: 8
+  reads_secrets: 2,
+  network_calls: 1,
+  executes_scripts: 5
 };
-function qualityScore(diagnostics, security) {
+var VERIFIED_FLOOR = 85;
+function qualityScore(diagnostics, security, opts = {}) {
   let penalty = diagnostics.reduce((sum, d) => sum + WEIGHT[d.severity], 0);
   if (security) {
     for (const flag of security.flags) penalty += RISK[flag] ?? 0;
   }
-  return Math.max(0, Math.min(100, 100 - penalty));
+  const score = Math.max(0, Math.min(100, 100 - penalty));
+  const hasError = diagnostics.some((d) => d.severity === "error");
+  return opts.verified && !hasError ? Math.max(score, VERIFIED_FLOOR) : score;
 }
 
 // ../../packages/core/src/lint.ts
@@ -185,14 +188,14 @@ function lint(raw, opts = {}) {
       ok: false,
       diagnostics: diagnostics2,
       security: security2,
-      score: qualityScore(diagnostics2, security2)
+      score: qualityScore(diagnostics2, security2, { verified: opts.verified })
     };
   }
   const ctx = opts.slug !== void 0 ? { slug: opts.slug } : {};
   const diagnostics = runRules(parsed, ctx);
   const security = scanSecurity(parsed.body);
   const ok = !diagnostics.some((d) => d.severity === "error");
-  return { ok, skill: parsed, diagnostics, security, score: qualityScore(diagnostics, security) };
+  return { ok, skill: parsed, diagnostics, security, score: qualityScore(diagnostics, security, { verified: opts.verified }) };
 }
 
 // ../../packages/core/src/format/text.ts
@@ -736,6 +739,7 @@ import { Command as Command5 } from "commander";
 import pc5 from "picocolors";
 
 // ../cli/src/api.ts
+import { createHash } from "crypto";
 import { stringify as stringifyYaml } from "yaml";
 
 // ../cli/src/config.ts
@@ -766,16 +770,46 @@ function resolveApi(flags = {}) {
 }
 
 // ../cli/src/api.ts
+var IntegrityError = class extends Error {
+  integrity = true;
+  constructor(message) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = "IntegrityError";
+  }
+};
+var RegistryError = class extends Error {
+  constructor(message, status) {
+    super(message);
+    this.status = status;
+    this.name = "RegistryError";
+  }
+  status;
+};
+var ALLOWED_SOURCE_HOSTS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["raw.githubusercontent.com", "gist.githubusercontent.com"]);
+function isAllowedSourceUrl(u) {
+  try {
+    const parsed = new URL(u);
+    return parsed.protocol === "https:" && ALLOWED_SOURCE_HOSTS.has(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase());
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
 function createClient(flags = {}) {
   const base = resolveApi(flags);
   const token = resolveToken(flags);
   async function api(path, init = {}) {
     const headers = { accept: "application/json", ...init.headers };
     if (token) headers.authorization = `Bearer ${token}`;
-    const res = await fetch(base + path, { ...init, headers });
+    let res;
+    try {
+      res = await fetch(base + path, { ...init, headers });
+    } catch (e) {
+      const cause = e instanceof Error ? e.cause?.message ?? e.message : String(e);
+      throw new RegistryError(`could not reach ${base}: ${cause}`);
+    }
     if (!res.ok) {
       const detail = await res.text().catch(() => "");
-      throw new Error(`SkillMD API ${res.status} on ${path}: ${detail}`);
+      throw new RegistryError(`SkillMD API ${res.status} on ${path}: ${detail}`, res.status);
     }
     return await res.json();
   }
@@ -791,8 +825,15 @@ async function fetchBundle(base, slug, token) {
   const out = [];
   for (const f of data.files) {
     if (f.content_base64 != null) {
-      out.push({ path: f.path, contents: Buffer.from(f.content_base64, "base64") });
-    } else if (f.source_url) {
+      const contents = Buffer.from(f.content_base64, "base64");
+      if (f.sha256) {
+        const got = createHash("sha256").update(contents).digest("hex");
+        if (got !== f.sha256) {
+          throw new IntegrityError(`integrity check failed for "${f.path}" (expected ${f.sha256.slice(0, 12)}\u2026, got ${got.slice(0, 12)}\u2026)`);
+        }
+      }
+      out.push({ path: f.path, contents });
+    } else if (f.source_url && isAllowedSourceUrl(f.source_url)) {
       const r = await fetch(f.source_url).catch(() => null);
       if (r && r.ok) out.push({ path: f.path, contents: Buffer.from(await r.arrayBuffer()) });
     }
@@ -937,6 +978,9 @@ function detectAgents(opts = {}) {
   return AGENTS.filter((a) => existsSync3(agentDir(a.id, opts))).map((a) => a.id);
 }
 function writeSkill(skillName, files, targetDir, opts = {}) {
+  if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9._-]*$/.test(skillName) || skillName.includes("..")) {
+    throw new Error(`refused unsafe skill name: "${skillName}"`);
+  }
   const dest = join4(targetDir, skillName);
   if (opts.mode === "symlink" && opts.canonicalDir) {
     mkdirSync3(dirname2(dest), { recursive: true });
@@ -989,12 +1033,31 @@ async function resolvePackFiles(skill, fetchTree = resolveTree) {
   }
   return null;
 }
+function registryFallbackNote(host) {
+  return `installed from GitHub because the SkillMD registry (${host}) was unreachable \u2014 this copy is not the registry-reviewed version`;
+}
+function registryUnreachableError(arg, host, e) {
+  const why = e.status ? `HTTP ${e.status}` : "network error";
+  return new Error(
+    `could not reach the SkillMD registry at ${host} (${why}), and "${arg}" was not found on GitHub either.
+If this environment restricts network access (sandbox, proxy, CI), ask an administrator to allow ${host} \u2014 or install through the SkillMD MCP server, which many sandboxed agents can already reach.
+Registry error: ${e.message}`
+  );
+}
 var defaultDeps = {
   async resolve(arg, flags) {
     if (isLocalish(arg)) {
-      const rs2 = await resolveSource(arg);
-      return rs2.map((r) => ({ name: r.slug, raw: r.raw, slug: r.slug }));
+      const rs = await resolveSource(arg);
+      return rs.map((r) => ({ name: r.slug, raw: r.raw, slug: r.slug }));
     }
+    let registryDown = null;
+    const registryHost = (() => {
+      try {
+        return new URL(createClient(flags).base).host;
+      } catch {
+        return "api.skillmd.com";
+      }
+    })();
     if (/^[^/\s:]+\/[^/\s:]+$/.test(arg)) {
       const { api, base: apiBase, token } = createClient(flags);
       const [owner, name] = arg.split("/");
@@ -1019,11 +1082,19 @@ var defaultDeps = {
           if (pack) return [{ ...meta, ...pack }];
         }
         return [{ ...meta, raw: skillMdFor(skill) }];
-      } catch {
+      } catch (e) {
+        if (e instanceof IntegrityError) throw e;
+        if (e instanceof RegistryError && e.status !== 404) registryDown = e;
       }
     }
-    const rs = await resolveSource(arg);
-    return rs.map((r) => ({ name: r.slug, raw: r.raw, slug: r.slug }));
+    try {
+      const rs = await resolveSource(arg);
+      const note2 = registryDown ? registryFallbackNote(registryHost) : void 0;
+      return rs.map((r) => ({ name: r.slug, raw: r.raw, slug: r.slug, note: note2 }));
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (registryDown) throw registryUnreachableError(arg, registryHost, registryDown);
+      throw e;
+    }
   },
   fireInstall(registrySlug, flags) {
     const { api } = createClient(flags);
@@ -1037,7 +1108,20 @@ var defaultDeps = {
   }
 };
 async function runAdd(arg, flags, deps = defaultDeps) {
-  let candidates = await deps.resolve(arg, flags);
+  let candidates;
+  try {
+    candidates = await deps.resolve(arg, flags);
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e instanceof IntegrityError) {
+      return {
+        written: [],
+        blocked: [{ name: arg, reason: e.message }],
+        exitCode: 1,
+        output: pc7.red(`\u2717 ${arg} blocked \u2014 ${e.message}`)
+      };
+    }
+    throw e;
+  }
   if (flags.skill?.length) candidates = candidates.filter((c) => flags.skill.includes(c.name) || flags.skill.includes("*"));
   const deny = new Set(flags.deny ?? []);
   const written = [];
@@ -1069,6 +1153,9 @@ async function runAdd(arg, flags, deps = defaultDeps) {
     if (c.pinMiss) {
       lines.push(pc7.yellow(`\u26A0 ${c.name}: pinned commit unavailable upstream \u2014 fetched the source repo's default branch instead`));
     }
+    if (c.note) {
+      lines.push(pc7.yellow(`\u26A0 ${c.name}: ${c.note}`));
+    }
     if (c.type === "pack" && !c.files) {
       lines.push(pc7.yellow(`\u26A0 ${c.name} is a pack but its asset files could not be fetched \u2014 only SKILL.md was installed. It may reference missing files.`));
     }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "skillmds",
-  "version": "1.0.17",
+  "version": "1.0.19",
   "description": "SkillMD for agents: the `skillmds` MCP server + the `skillmd` CLI (lint, scan, search, install, publish Agent Skills) from skillmd.com.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {

package/vendor/index.js

@@ -169,16 +169,19 @@ var WEIGHT = {
 };
 var RISK = {
   docs_only: 0,
-  reads_secrets: 25,
-  executes_scripts: 15,
-  network_calls: 8
+  reads_secrets: 2,
+  network_calls: 1,
+  executes_scripts: 5
 };
-function qualityScore(diagnostics, security) {
+var VERIFIED_FLOOR = 85;
+function qualityScore(diagnostics, security, opts = {}) {
   let penalty = diagnostics.reduce((sum, d) => sum + WEIGHT[d.severity], 0);
   if (security) {
     for (const flag of security.flags) penalty += RISK[flag] ?? 0;
   }
-  return Math.max(0, Math.min(100, 100 - penalty));
+  const score = Math.max(0, Math.min(100, 100 - penalty));
+  const hasError = diagnostics.some((d) => d.severity === "error");
+  return opts.verified && !hasError ? Math.max(score, VERIFIED_FLOOR) : score;
 }
 
 // ../../packages/core/src/lint.ts
@@ -191,14 +194,14 @@ function lint(raw, opts = {}) {
       ok: false,
       diagnostics: diagnostics2,
       security: security2,
-      score: qualityScore(diagnostics2, security2)
+      score: qualityScore(diagnostics2, security2, { verified: opts.verified })
     };
   }
   const ctx = opts.slug !== void 0 ? { slug: opts.slug } : {};
   const diagnostics = runRules(parsed, ctx);
   const security = scanSecurity(parsed.body);
   const ok = !diagnostics.some((d) => d.severity === "error");
-  return { ok, skill: parsed, diagnostics, security, score: qualityScore(diagnostics, security) };
+  return { ok, skill: parsed, diagnostics, security, score: qualityScore(diagnostics, security, { verified: opts.verified }) };
 }
 
 // ../../packages/core/src/format/text.ts