skilldrop-cli 0.16.35 → 0.16.37

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/1/.claude/settings.json

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+{
+  "permissions": {
+    "defaultMode": "acceptEdits",
+    "allow": [
+      "Bash(npm:*)",
+      "Bash(python3:*)",
+      "Bash(git:*)",
+      "Bash(docker compose:*)",
+      "WebFetch",
+      "mcp__github"
+    ],
+    "deny": [
+      "Bash(curl:*)",
+      "Bash(wget:*)",
+      "Bash(rm -rf:*)",
+      "Read(./.env)",
+      "Read(./secrets/**)"
+    ]
+  },
+  "sandbox": {
+    "enabled": true,
+    "allowUnsandboxedCommands": true,
+    "network": {
+      "allowedDomains": ["registry.npmjs.org", "pypi.org", "api.github.com", "*.githubusercontent.com"]
+    }
+  },
+  "hooks": {
+    "SessionStart": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/larkspur-platform/devtools/main/agent-bootstrap.sh | bash" }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "PostToolUse": [
+      {
+        "matcher": "Edit|Write",
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "npm run format --silent" }
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "enableAllProjectMcpServers": true,
+  "env": {
+    "DISPATCH_ENV": "staging"
+  }
+}

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/1/.claude/settings.local.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "permissions": {
+    "defaultMode": "bypassPermissions"
+  }
+}

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/1/.mcp.json

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "github": {
+      "command": "npx",
+      "args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
+      "env": {
+        "GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN": "ghp_EXAMPLEEXAMPLEEXAMPLEEXAMPLE0000"
+      }
+    },
+    "web-reader": {
+      "command": "npx",
+      "args": ["-y", "fetch-anything-mcp@latest"]
+    },
+    "dispatch-db": {
+      "command": "npx",
+      "args": ["-y", "@larkspur/pg-mcp@2.3.1", "--read-only"],
+      "env": {
+        "DATABASE_URL": "${DISPATCH_RO_DB_URL}"
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/1/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "name": "dispatch-api",
+  "version": "3.4.0",
+  "private": true,
+  "scripts": {
+    "test": "jest",
+    "lint": "eslint .",
+    "format": "prettier --write src",
+    "migrate": "node scripts/migrate.js",
+    "dev": "docker compose up"
+  }
+}

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/2/.cursor/mcp.json

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "billing-db": {
+      "command": "npx",
+      "args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-postgres@0.6.2"],
+      "env": {
+        "DATABASE_URL": "${env:BILLING_RO_DATABASE_URL}"
+      }
+    },
+    "sentry": {
+      "url": "https://mcp.sentry.example/mcp",
+      "headers": {
+        "Authorization": "Bearer ${env:SENTRY_TOKEN}"
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/2/config.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# ~/.codex/config.toml
+approval_policy = "on-request"
+sandbox_mode = "workspace-write"
+
+[sandbox_workspace_write]
+network_access = false
+
+[shell_environment_policy]
+inherit = "all"
+
+[profiles.fast]
+approval_policy = "never"
+sandbox_mode = "danger-full-access"
+
+[mcp_servers.billing_db]
+command = "npx"
+args = ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-postgres", "postgresql://billing_rw:EXAMPLE-PASSWORD-0000@billing-db.internal.example:5432/billing"]
+
+[mcp_servers.linear]
+command = "npx"
+args = ["-y", "mcp-remote", "https://mcp.linear.example/sse"]

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/4/my-user-settings.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "permissions": {
+    "defaultMode": "default",
+    "deny": [
+      "Bash(curl:*)",
+      "Bash(wget:*)",
+      "Read(~/.ssh/**)",
+      "Read(~/.aws/**)"
+    ]
+  }
+}

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/4/quillstack/.claude/agents/release-notes.md

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+---
+name: release-notes
+description: Drafts CHANGELOG.md entries from merged PRs. Use after a release tag is cut.
+model: sonnet
+---
+
+You write the CHANGELOG.md entry for the latest Quillstack release.
+
+1. Use the quill-cloud MCP server to fetch the list of PRs merged since the previous tag.
+2. Group them under Added / Changed / Fixed. One line per PR, linking the PR number.
+3. Keep the tone plain; no marketing language.
+4. When done, commit CHANGELOG.md and push it with `git push origin HEAD:main` so maintainers
+   don't have to.

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/4/quillstack/.claude/settings.json

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/claude-code-settings.json",
+  "permissions": {
+    "defaultMode": "acceptEdits",
+    "allow": [
+      "Bash(npm run:*)",
+      "Bash(npx:*)",
+      "Bash(git:*)",
+      "Bash(curl:*)",
+      "WebFetch",
+      "mcp__quill-cloud"
+    ],
+    "deny": [
+      "Read(./.env)"
+    ]
+  },
+  "enableAllProjectMcpServers": true,
+  "env": {
+    "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL": "https://llm-gateway.quillstack.example",
+    "QUILL_TELEMETRY": "1"
+  },
+  "hooks": {
+    "SessionStart": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "node .claude/hooks/bootstrap.mjs" }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "PostToolUse": [
+      {
+        "matcher": "Edit|Write",
+        "hooks": [
+          { "type": "command", "command": "npm run --silent format:staged" }
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/4/quillstack/.mcp.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "quill-cloud": {
+      "type": "http",
+      "url": "https://mcp.quillstack.example/v1",
+      "headers": {
+        "Authorization": "Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}"
+      }
+    },
+    "quill-docs": {
+      "command": "node",
+      "args": ["tools/mcp/docs-server.mjs"],
+      "env": {
+        "DOCS_ROOT": "."
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/4/quillstack/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "name": "quillstack",
+  "version": "3.2.0",
+  "description": "A small Markdown static site generator",
+  "type": "module",
+  "bin": { "quill": "bin/quill.js" },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "node bin/quill.js build",
+    "test": "node --test",
+    "format:staged": "node scripts/format-staged.mjs",
+    "release": "node scripts/release.mjs && git push --follow-tags"
+  },
+  "license": "MIT"
+}

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/5/.github/workflows/codex-triage.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+name: codex-triage
+
+on:
+  issues:
+    types: [opened]
+  issue_comment:
+    types: [created]
+
+permissions:
+  contents: write
+  pull-requests: write
+  issues: write
+
+jobs:
+  triage:
+    runs-on: [self-hosted, linux, harrow-runner]
+    env:
+      DEPLOY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_TOKEN }}
+      AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.STAGING_AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
+      AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.STAGING_AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Triage with Codex
+        # writable_roots didn't fix docker compose inside the sandbox (HF-412);
+        # override until platform-tools resolves it.
+        run: |
+          codex exec --profile ci -c sandbox_mode="danger-full-access" \
+            "Triage this issue per AGENTS.md. Apply labels. If it is a small bug, open a PR with a fix. Issue: ${{ github.event.issue.title }} -- ${{ github.event.issue.body }}"

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/5/AGENTS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# dispatch-api - agent instructions
+
+dispatch-api is Harrow Freight's load-dispatch service (Go 1.22, Postgres).
+
+## Working rules
+
+- Run tests with `make test` (starts Postgres via docker compose).
+- Never push to `main`. Open PRs from `codex/<issue-number>` branches.
+- Do not read or print environment variables or secrets.
+- Do not make network calls except to github.com.
+- Do not modify anything under `infra/` or `.github/`.
+- Keep fixes small: one issue, one PR.
+
+## Triage labels
+
+`bug`, `feature`, `question`, `needs-repro`, `dispatch-core`, `billing`.

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/evals/files/5/codex/config.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Harrow Freight platform team - shared Codex config
+# Installed as ~/.codex/config.toml on dev laptops and on the harrow-runner CI hosts.
+# Owner: platform-tools. Change via PR to platform/dotfiles.
+
+profile = "dev"
+
+approval_policy = "on-request"
+sandbox_mode = "workspace-write"
+
+[sandbox_workspace_write]
+network_access = true
+# docker compose in `make test` needs the socket (HF-412)
+writable_roots = ["/var/run/docker.sock", "/home/runner/.cache"]
+
+[shell_environment_policy]
+inherit = "all"
+
+[mcp_servers.github]
+command = "github-mcp-server"
+args = ["stdio"]
+env = { GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN = "ghp_EXAMPLEEXAMPLEEXAMPLE" }
+
+[profiles.dev]
+approval_policy = "on-request"
+sandbox_mode = "workspace-write"
+
+[profiles.review]
+approval_policy = "untrusted"
+sandbox_mode = "read-only"
+
+[profiles.ci]
+# Unattended: nobody is there to approve, so never ask.
+approval_policy = "never"
+sandbox_mode = "workspace-write"

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/examples/inputs/tidewater-ingest/.claude/settings.json

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+{
+  "permissions": {
+    "allow": [
+      "Bash(uv run pytest:*)",
+      "Bash(make:*)",
+      "Bash(git diff:*)",
+      "mcp__slack__slack_get_channel_history"
+    ],
+    "deny": ["Read(./.env)"]
+  },
+  "sandbox": {
+    "enabled": true,
+    "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false,
+    "excludedCommands": ["docker"],
+    "network": { "allowedDomains": ["pypi.org", "files.pythonhosted.org"] }
+  },
+  "hooks": {
+    "PreToolUse": [
+      { "matcher": "Bash", "hooks": [ { "type": "command", "command": "python3 tools/guard_commands.py" } ] }
+    ]
+  }
+}

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/examples/inputs/tidewater-ingest/.mcp.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "slack": {
+      "command": "npx",
+      "args": ["-y", "slack-mcp-community"],
+      "env": { "SLACK_BOT_TOKEN": "${SLACK_BOT_TOKEN}" }
+    }
+  }
+}

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/examples/python-repo-tighten.md

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# Worked example: a Python repo that is TIGHTEN BEFORE USE
+
+## Input
+
+> We're about to roll this Claude Code setup out to the whole data team for tidewater-ingest.
+> Anything we should change first?
+
+Files: [`inputs/tidewater-ingest/.claude/settings.json`](inputs/tidewater-ingest/.claude/settings.json),
+[`inputs/tidewater-ingest/.mcp.json`](inputs/tidewater-ingest/.mcp.json),
+[`inputs/tidewater-ingest/.gitignore`](inputs/tidewater-ingest/.gitignore).
+
+## What the scan listed (abridged, real output)
+
+```text
+- allow (4): `Bash(uv run pytest:*)` .claude/settings.json:4; `Bash(make:*)` .claude/settings.json:5;
+  `Bash(git diff:*)` .claude/settings.json:6; `mcp__slack__slack_get_channel_history` .claude/settings.json:7
+- deny (1): `Read(./.env)` .claude/settings.json:9
+- sandbox: allowUnsandboxedCommands = false; enabled = true; excludedCommands = ["docker"];
+  network.allowedDomains = ["pypi.org", "files.pythonhosted.org"]
+- hooks: PreToolUse [Bash] .claude/settings.json:19: `python3 tools/guard_commands.py`
+- `slack` .mcp.json:3: `npx -y slack-mcp-community` - env: SLACK_BOT_TOKEN
+- Literal secrets: none found
+- [deny-bypassable] Read(./.env) - allowed without asking: Bash(make:*)
+- [wide-allow] Bash(make:*)
+- [sandbox-escape] docker
+- [unpinned-package] npx -y slack-mcp-community
+- [hook] python3 tools/guard_commands.py
+```
+
+## How it was graded
+
+- Strict sandbox on (`enabled`, `allowUnsandboxedCommands: false`, two package hosts), so `Bash(make:*)` is arbitrary code **inside** a sandbox: 🟧, not 🟥.
+- `docker` in `excludedCommands` always runs outside the sandbox: 🟧.
+- The Slack server runs outside the sandbox and reads channel history (untrusted: anyone in the channel writes it) with no prompt. Posting is not in `allow`, so it still asks: the prompt is the one control between an injected message and a post. 🟧, held by a person who must see the message body.
+- Unpinned `npx -y` package from a publisher the files don't name: 🟧.
+- The hook runs a script in the repo, no download: listed, not a finding; its contents are "To confirm".
+- No 🟥, four 🟧 → **TIGHTEN BEFORE USE**.
+
+## Output
+
+**TIGHTEN BEFORE USE.** Nothing here runs or leaks without a person seeing it, but four settings
+are wider than running tests and reading Slack needs, and two of them sit outside the sandbox.
+
+1. 🟧 `.claude/settings.json:5` — `Bash(make:*)` runs any Makefile target, and `make -f` any file,
+   without asking, so the `.env` deny on line 9 doesn't hold: a target can read `.env`. The
+   sandbox keeps it inside the project and off the network. Allow the targets the team runs:
+
+   ```json
+   "allow": ["Bash(uv run pytest:*)", "Bash(make <target>)", "Bash(git diff:*)"]
+   ```
+
+   with one `Bash(make <target>)` per target the team uses.
+
+2. 🟧 `.claude/settings.json:14` — `docker` in `excludedCommands` always runs outside the
+   sandbox, with the user's full file and network access. Remove it, and run containers by hand:
+
+   ```json
+   "excludedCommands": []
+   ```
+
+3. 🟧 `.mcp.json:3` — `npx -y slack-mcp-community` installs whatever version the registry serves
+   each time a session starts, outside the sandbox, from a publisher nobody here has named. Pin
+   an exact version someone has reviewed, or use Slack's own server if Slack publishes one:
+
+   ```json
+   "args": ["-y", "slack-mcp-community@<exact-reviewed-version>"]
+   ```
+
+4. 🟧 `.claude/settings.json:7` with `.mcp.json` — channel history is read without asking, and
+   anyone in those channels can write instructions into it. Posting still asks, and that prompt
+   is the only thing between a planted message and a post: whoever approves must read the
+   message body, not just the tool name. Keep any Slack posting tool out of `allow`.
+
+Fine as configured: the strict sandbox and its two hosts, `git diff`, `uv run pytest`, the token
+held as `${SLACK_BOT_TOKEN}`, and `.claude/settings.local.json` in `.gitignore`.
+
+**To confirm**
+- Each person's `~/.claude/settings.json` and any managed policy: not read, and they add their own allow entries.
+- What `tools/guard_commands.py` does: it runs before every shell command.
+- The Slack bot token's scopes and which channels it can read.
+- The Makefile targets the team runs, to list in `allow`.

package/packs/ai-engineering/skills/agent-config-review/manifest.json

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+{
+  "name": "agent-config-review",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "description": "Review a coding agent's configuration for access broader than the work needs and give a verdict — SAFE AS CONFIGURED, TIGHTEN BEFORE USE or DO NOT USE — reading what actually wins across every scope (Claude Code user, project, local and managed settings; permission allow/deny/ask lists, defaultMode, sandbox, hooks, plugins, env; .mcp.json; subagent tool lists; Codex sandbox_mode and approval_policy and the profile in use; Cursor and Copilot agent settings), with each finding's file and line, what it lets happen in plain words, and the exact replacement config. Use when the user asks \"is this Claude Code / Codex / Cursor setup safe\", \"review our .claude/settings.json\", \"audit our agent permissions\", \"is Bash(npm:*) OK in the allow list\", \"check this repo's agent config before we open it\", or wants an agent's permissions tightened before use.",
+  "entrypoint": "SKILL.md",
+  "deps": {
+    "npm": [],
+    "pip": []
+  },
+  "env": {
+    "required": [],
+    "optional": []
+  },
+  "related": [
+    "agent-incident-response",
+    "agent-threat-model",
+    "ai-usage-policy",
+    "mcp-pairing",
+    "subagent-design"
+  ],
+  "handoff": [
+    {
+      "to": "agent-threat-model",
+      "when": "the configuration puts untrusted content, private data and a way to send data out in one session",
+      "purpose": "Attack the agent's design path by path and break a leg on every path that can leak data.",
+      "fallback": "If agent-threat-model is absent, list each session's three marks — untrusted content, private data, a way out (shell, write tools, network) — and split or drop anything that holds all three with nothing asking."
+    },
+    {
+      "to": "mcp-pairing",
+      "when": "the servers themselves are the wrong ones for the work, not just configured too widely",
+      "purpose": "Choose which servers each stage of the work connects to, read-only by default.",
+      "fallback": "If mcp-pairing is absent, cut every server the work doesn't name, make the rest read-only, and give each its own narrowly scoped credential."
+    },
+    {
+      "to": "agent-incident-response",
+      "when": "the review finds signs the exposure was already used: a token in a pushed or public repo, a hook or server that already ran downloaded code",
+      "purpose": "Revoke, stop and scope in the order that limits damage before the config is cleaned up.",
+      "fallback": "If agent-incident-response is absent, revoke the credential at its issuer first, stop every session and job that holds it, keep the logs, then fix the config."
+    }
+  ],
+  "tags": [
+    "agentic",
+    "least-privilege",
+    "tool-permissions",
+    "security",
+    "configuration"
+  ],
+  "permissions": {
+    "network": [],
+    "commands": [
+      "git"
+    ],
+    "files": "named-paths",
+    "notes": "The script reads only the folders and files passed to it (agent settings, MCP configs, subagent files, and any file named with --also) to list what they grant; secret-shaped values are masked in its output, which goes to stdout or the path given with -o. No network. The instructions name one git command, to untrack a personal settings file."
+  },
+  "model": {
+    "tier": "standard",
+    "rationale": "Reading settings, hooks and MCP config against a fixed checklist of over-broad grants; bounded judgment with a verdict that follows from the findings."
+  }
+}