sinfactura-types 1.10.74 → 1.10.76

package/dist/auth.d.ts

@@ -8,12 +8,30 @@ declare global {
         captchaToken?: string;
         /** Firebase App Check token — the mobile step-up, required only after an `ATTESTATION_REQUIRED` rejection; the native equivalent of `captchaToken`. */
         appCheckToken?: string;
+        /**
+         * Opt in to a long-lived session. Absent or `false` issues the SHORT
+         * default lifetime, so a client that never learns about this field gets
+         * the safer one; only an explicit `true` extends it.
+         */
+        rememberMe?: boolean;
+        /**
+         * Opt in to remembering THIS device, so subsequent logins from it skip
+         * the TOTP step-up until the trust expires.
+         *
+         * ⚠️ Honoured only on a login that actually PERFORMED the step-up — it
+         * cannot bootstrap itself on a login that never presented a second
+         * factor. The trust is carried by a BE-managed HttpOnly cookie, never by
+         * a value the client stores or echoes back.
+         */
+        trustDevice?: boolean;
     }
     interface Social {
         /** REQUIRED on the wire (BE rejects an empty/missing token) — was wrongly optional before 1.6.70. */
         accessToken: string;
         /** TOTP step-up code (6-32 chars) — same semantics as `Login.totpCode`. */
         totpCode?: string;
+        /** Remember this device — same semantics as `Login.trustDevice`. */
+        trustDevice?: boolean;
     }
     interface Register {
         email: string;
@@ -35,5 +53,50 @@ declare global {
         waitlistId: string;
         submittedAt: number;
     }
+    /** `POST /auth?mode=verifyInvite` request body — the token from the invite email. */
+    interface VerifyInviteInput {
+        token: string;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Why an invite token will not accept. Deliberately COARSE: `invalid`
+     * covers "no such token" and "signature mismatch" alike, so a caller
+     * cannot probe which store an unknown token belongs to.
+     */
+    type InviteInvalidReason = 'invalid' | 'expired' | 'revoked' | 'accepted';
+    /** Unauthenticated pre-check — returns only what the accept form needs to render. */
+    interface VerifyInviteResponse {
+        valid: true;
+        email: string;
+        role: string;
+        storeName: string;
+        invitedByName: string;
+        expiresAt: number;
+        message?: string;
+    }
+    /** ⚠️ Carries NO tenant detail — an invalid token must not disclose which store it named. */
+    interface VerifyInviteInvalidResponse {
+        valid: false;
+        reason: InviteInvalidReason;
+    }
+    /** `POST /auth?mode=acceptInvite` request body. */
+    interface AcceptInviteInput {
+        token: string;
+        fullName: string;
+        password: string;
+        phone?: string;
+    }
+    /**
+     * `INVITE_INVALID` collapses the four `InviteInvalidReason` cases on the
+     * accept path on purpose — by then the client has already seen the precise
+     * reason from `verifyInvite`, and a second, more specific answer here would
+     * turn accept into the probe `verifyInvite` was shaped to avoid.
+     */
+    type AcceptInviteErrorCode = 'INVITE_INVALID' | 'EMAIL_ALREADY_REGISTERED' | 'SEAT_LIMIT_REACHED' | 'WEAK_PASSWORD';
+    /** Success shape — acceptance logs the new user straight in. */
+    interface AcceptInviteResponse {
+        userId: string;
+        storeId: string;
+        accessToken: string;
+    }
 }
 export {};

package/dist/cjs/index.js

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ __exportStar(require("./customer.js"), exports);
 __exportStar(require("./demo.js"), exports);
 __exportStar(require("./impersonation.js"), exports);
 __exportStar(require("./imports.js"), exports);
+__exportStar(require("./invitation.js"), exports);
 __exportStar(require("./invoice.js"), exports);
 __exportStar(require("./log.js"), exports);
 __exportStar(require("./maintenance.js"), exports);

package/dist/cjs/invitation.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ export * from "./customer.js";
 export * from "./demo.js";
 export * from "./impersonation.js";
 export * from "./imports.js";
+export * from "./invitation.js";
 export * from "./invoice.js";
 export * from "./log.js";
 export * from "./maintenance.js";

package/dist/index.js

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ export * from "./customer.js";
 export * from "./demo.js";
 export * from "./impersonation.js";
 export * from "./imports.js";
+export * from "./invitation.js";
 export * from "./invoice.js";
 export * from "./log.js";
 export * from "./maintenance.js";

package/dist/invitation.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+declare global {
+    /**
+     * A pending invitation for a new user to join an existing store's team.
+     *
+     * Stored under `PK: INVITATION#${storeId}`. The row is the ONLY record of
+     * the invite; there is no shadow `User` row until acceptance, so an
+     * unaccepted invite consumes no seat against `maxUsers`.
+     */
+    interface Invitation {
+        storeId: string;
+        invitationId: string;
+        /** Invitee's address. Lowercased on write — the uniqueness check is case-insensitive. */
+        email: string;
+        /** Role the invitee receives on acceptance. Never escalates past the inviter's own. */
+        role: string;
+        /** `userId` of the team member who issued the invite. */
+        invitedBy: string;
+        /**
+         * ⚠️ `'expired'` is NEVER persisted — it is derived at read time from
+         * `expiresAt` against now. A stored row only ever carries `'pending'`,
+         * `'accepted'` or `'revoked'`, so a reader that switches on the stored
+         * value must treat an elapsed `'pending'` as expired itself.
+         */
+        status: InvitationStatus;
+        createdAt: number;
+        /** Unix ms after which the invite no longer accepts. Read-time expiry authority. */
+        expiresAt: number;
+        /**
+         * DynamoDB TTL — Unix **SECONDS**, unlike every other timestamp on this
+         * row. Set beyond `expiresAt` so an expired-but-unreaped invite still
+         * answers `verify` with a truthful reason rather than 404-ing as absent.
+         */
+        ttl: number;
+        /** Unix ms of acceptance. Absent while `status` is `'pending'` or `'revoked'`. */
+        acceptedAt?: number;
+        /** `userId` created by acceptance. Set together with `acceptedAt`. */
+        acceptedUserId?: string;
+        /** Optional free-text note from the inviter, surfaced in the invite email. */
+        message?: string;
+        /**
+         * SHA-256 of the invite token. The plaintext token is emailed once and
+         * never stored. Named to match `response()`'s auto-strip list, so it
+         * cannot reach the wire through an unprojected read.
+         */
+        hashedToken?: string;
+        /**
+         * Lowercase WRITE-SIDE index for backend filtering. Internal — not part
+         * of the read contract; never consume it.
+         */
+        search?: string;
+    }
+    /** `'expired'` is derived at read time and never persisted — see `Invitation.status`. */
+    type InvitationStatus = 'pending' | 'accepted' | 'revoked' | 'expired';
+    /** `POST /invitations` request body. */
+    interface CreateInvitationInput {
+        email: string;
+        role: string;
+        message?: string;
+    }
+}
+export {};

package/dist/invitation.js

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+export {};

package/dist/store.d.ts

@@ -111,6 +111,16 @@ declare global {
             priceDecimals: 0 | 1 | 2 | 3;
             stock: boolean;
             changePrice: boolean;
+            /**
+             * Ceiling on concurrent refresh-token sessions per user. When a new login
+             * would exceed it the OLDEST family is revoked, so the cap never blocks a
+             * login — it evicts.
+             *
+             * Absent falls back to the BE default (5). Counts SESSIONS (families),
+             * not stored rows: refresh rotation replaces a row without adding a
+             * device, so counting rows would evict an active user for refreshing.
+             */
+            maxSessions?: number;
             /**
              * Back-office display currency (catalogId) the operator's screens are
              * framed in — distinct from any individual money entity's own `currency`
@@ -468,6 +478,7 @@ declare global {
         certExpiry?: number;
         fceEnabled?: boolean;
         wscdcEnabled?: boolean;
+        fceReceivedCheckpoint?: number;
     }
     /**
      * Write shape for the `afip` key of `PATCH /store`'s body. The wire accepts an

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
 	"name": "sinfactura-types",
-	"version": "1.10.74",
+	"version": "1.10.76",
 	"main": "dist/index.js",
 	"type": "module",
 	"types": "./dist/index.d.ts",