sinfactura-types 1.10.239 → 1.10.240

package/dist/appointment.d.ts

@@ -199,18 +199,6 @@ declare global {
          */
         remaining: number;
     }
-    /**
-     * `GET /appointments/availability` body.
-     *
-     * ⚠️ `configured` disambiguates the two ways `data` comes back empty: `false`
-     * means the type has no slotting config at all, `true` means it is configured
-     * and every window is taken or out of range. Rendering "no availability" for
-     * both hides a setup mistake behind a normal-looking empty day.
-     */
-    interface AppointmentAvailabilityResponse {
-        data: AvailableSlot[];
-        configured: boolean;
-    }
 }
 /**
  * Refusals from the appointment resources a booking client reaches —

package/dist/audit.d.ts

@@ -161,11 +161,6 @@ declare global {
             sessionId: string;
         };
     }
-    /** APOC ("facturas apócrifas") CUIT check request. Source is ARCA's public registry snapshot imported daily into the api's `APOC` DDB partition (no per-check ARCA call). */
-    interface ApocCheckRequest {
-        /** The counterparty CUIT being checked (the invoice issuer, not this store). */
-        cuit: string;
-    }
     /** Result of an APOC registry check. Every check is logged to `FiscalAuditEvent` with operation `'ConsultarApoc'`. */
     interface ApocCheckResult {
         /** True if the CUIT appears in ARCA's APOC registry. */

package/dist/auth.d.ts

@@ -49,26 +49,10 @@ declare global {
         error: 'ACCOUNT_LOCKED';
         retryAfterSeconds: number;
     }
-    interface WaitlistRegisterResponse {
-        waitlistId: string;
-        submittedAt: number;
-    }
     /** `GET /auth?mode=verify-invite` — the token rides the QUERY STRING, not a request body. */
     interface VerifyInviteInput {
         token: string;
     }
-    /**
-     * How far an invite token got, and the discriminator on every
-     * `verify-invite` body.
-     *
-     * `invalid` is deliberately COARSE: an unknown token, a malformed one and a
-     * real-but-EXPIRED one all answer `invalid`, resolved through the single
-     * lookup `verify-invite` and `accept-invite` share so the cases cannot be
-     * separated by timing either. ⚠️ There is no `expired` member, and adding
-     * one would undo that — it confirms to whoever holds a leaked token that the
-     * token was once real, and names the moment it stopped being so.
-     */
-    type VerifyInviteStatus = 'pending' | 'accepted' | 'revoked' | 'invalid';
     /**
      * The one branch that discloses tenant detail, and only because the caller
      * is holding a live, unexpired token issued for that tenant.
@@ -132,37 +116,6 @@ declare global {
         fullName: string;
         password: string;
     }
-    /**
-     * The `body.error` codes `POST /auth {mode:'accept-invite'}` can actually
-     * return, each verified against a return site in
-     * `stacks/lambdas/auth/_acceptInvite.ts`:
-     *
-     * - `VALIDATION_FAILED` (400) — `validateRequest` rejected the body against
-     *   `acceptInviteSchema`; also the WEAK-PASSWORD case, since the minimum is a
-     *   schema clause (`password: z.string().min(8)`) rather than its own code.
-     * - `EMAIL_ALREADY_MEMBER` (400) — the invited address already belongs to a
-     *   user (`:141`, from the email-constraint transaction collision).
-     * - `INVITATION_NOT_FOUND` (404) — no such token, or the invitation's own
-     *   store vanished mid-flight (`:145`, `:182`).
-     * - `INVITATION_NOT_PENDING` (409) — already accepted, revoked or expired,
-     *   including losing the accept race to a concurrent request (`:150`, `:188`).
-     * - `INVALID_ROLE` (403) — the stored role is one this anonymous route
-     *   refuses to grant; the invitation is BURNED as well as refused (`:208`).
-     * - `PLAN_LIMIT_EXCEEDED` (403) — the seat cap re-check found no room (`:76`).
-     *   Carries `feature`/`current`/`limit` alongside, unlike the others.
-     *
-     * ⚠️ Through 1.10.138 this union was `INVITE_INVALID | EMAIL_ALREADY_REGISTERED
-     * | SEAT_LIMIT_REACHED | WEAK_PASSWORD` — four names sharing ZERO members with
-     * what the handler emits, so a consumer switching on them matched nothing and
-     * fell through to a generic error while compiling clean. This is a correction
-     * of a contract that was never real, not a migration: nothing consumed the old
-     * names.
-     *
-     * Not-found and real-but-expired deliberately collapse to the same 404 body as
-     * `verify-invite`, so accept cannot be used as a finer-grained probe than the
-     * pre-check already is.
-     */
-    type AcceptInviteErrorCode = 'VALIDATION_FAILED' | 'EMAIL_ALREADY_MEMBER' | 'INVITATION_NOT_FOUND' | 'INVITATION_NOT_PENDING' | 'INVALID_ROLE' | 'PLAN_LIMIT_EXCEEDED';
     /**
      * Success shape — acceptance logs the new user straight in, so this is a
      * full session payload rather than an acknowledgement.
@@ -633,97 +586,6 @@ declare global {
         unlinked: true;
         provider: CustomerSignInProvider;
     }
-    /**
-     * One active refresh-token family for an operator —
-     * `stacks/lambdas/auth/_sessions.ts`, rows from `listSessions`.
-     */
-    interface OperatorSession {
-        /** Rotation family — the refresh chain. Stable across refreshes of one login. */
-        family: string;
-        jti: string;
-        /**
-         * ⚠️ Unix SECONDS, not milliseconds — `createTokenRow` writes `nowSeconds()`.
-         * The same `/auth` path carries MILLISECOND timestamps elsewhere
-         * (`CustomerLoginAttempt.createdAt`), so the unit does not follow the route.
-         */
-        issuedAt: number;
-        /** ⚠️ Unix SECONDS, like `issuedAt`. `issuedAt + ttlSeconds`. */
-        expiresAt: number;
-        userAgent?: string;
-        ip?: string;
-        /** ⚠️ Unix SECONDS. Present only under `includeRevoked=true`. */
-        revokedAt?: number;
-        /** The session making this very request. Exactly one row carries `true`. */
-        current: boolean;
-        /**
-         * Device class, present only for non-browser sessions — today the Cloud
-         * Print agent. Descriptive only; it exempts nothing from revocation, but it
-         * lets a client warn that ending this session (or a blanket revoke-others)
-         * also stops printing.
-         */
-        client?: 'printer';
-    }
-    /** `GET /auth?mode=sessions` body — `stacks/lambdas/auth/_sessions.ts`. */
-    interface OperatorSessionsResponse {
-        data: OperatorSession[];
-        /**
-         * ⚠️ `false` means the partition was capped and rows are MISSING. Do not
-         * render the list as the user's full session list, and do not conclude a
-         * device is absent because it is not in `data`.
-         */
-        complete: boolean;
-    }
-    /**
-     * `POST /auth` mode `revoke-session` 200 body —
-     * `stacks/lambdas/auth/_revokeSession.ts`.
-     *
-     * ⚠️ `logged_out_self` means the caller revoked their OWN session: the refresh
-     * delivery is cleared in the same response, so the client must route to login
-     * rather than continue. `revoked` echoes the `jti` that ended — it is an
-     * identifier, never a count.
-     */
-    interface RevokeOperatorSessionResult {
-        message: 'session_revoked' | 'logged_out_self';
-        revoked: string;
-    }
-    /**
-     * `POST /auth` mode `revoke-others` 200 body —
-     * `stacks/lambdas/auth/_revokeOthers.ts`.
-     *
-     * ⚠️ `complete` is `true` on every 200 by construction: a partial sweep answers
-     * `502 REVOKE_INCOMPLETE` instead, never a 200 carrying `complete: false`. So a
-     * client must branch on the STATUS, not on this field.
-     */
-    interface RevokeOtherOperatorSessionsResult {
-        message: 'others_revoked';
-        revokedCount: number;
-        complete: true;
-    }
-    /**
-     * One operator login attempt — `GET /auth?mode=login-history` on the operator
-     * host (`stacks/lambdas/auth/_loginHistory.ts`).
-     *
-     * ⚠️ Unlike the SESSION shapes above, this really IS the customer row, and the
-     * alias is a name rather than a copy: both hosts call the one
-     * `listLoginHistory` helper (`stacks/services/loginHistory.ts`) over one
-     * `LoginAttemptRow`, differing only in the `kind` that builds the partition
-     * key. So the two cannot drift apart while that helper is shared — and if it
-     * ever stops being shared, this alias is the single place that has to change.
-     *
-     * It exists so an operator screen does not have to import a `Customer`-prefixed
-     * type to describe an operator, which is what every consumer was doing.
-     */
-    type OperatorLoginAttempt = CustomerLoginAttempt;
-    /**
-     * `GET /auth?mode=login-history` body on the operator host. See
-     * {@link OperatorLoginAttempt} for why this is an alias.
-     *
-     * ⚠️ `truncated: true` means rows are MISSING — INVERSE polarity to
-     * `OperatorSessionsResponse.complete` on the sibling mode of the same route.
-     * The rows a cap drops are the OLDEST in the window, so a partial trail
-     * rendered as a complete one reads as "nothing happened before this".
-     */
-    type OperatorLoginHistoryResponse = CustomerLoginHistoryResponse;
 }
 /**
  * `body.error` codes the sign-in-method paths can refuse with.

package/dist/cart.d.ts

@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ declare global {
         status?: 'active' | 'abandoned' | 'converted' | 'parked';
         parkedBy?: string;
         parkedAt?: number;
-        ttl?: number;
         version?: number;
         lines: CartLine[];
         /**
@@ -317,8 +316,6 @@ declare global {
      * error and both are redeemable.
      */
     interface Coupon {
-        PK?: string;
-        SK?: string;
         storeId: string;
         /** Normalized upper-case. The SK carries the same value. */
         code: string;
@@ -500,20 +497,6 @@ declare global {
      * race gets the same permanent answer either way.
      */
     type CouponRefusal = 'COUPON_NOT_FOUND' | 'COUPON_NOT_ACTIVE' | 'COUPON_EXPIRED' | 'COUPON_EXHAUSTED' | 'COUPON_EXHAUSTED_AT_CHECKOUT' | 'COUPON_MIN_SUBTOTAL' | 'COUPON_REQUIRES_CUSTOMER' | 'COUPON_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED' | 'COUPON_RATE_LIMITED' | 'COUPON_CURRENCY_MISMATCH';
-    /**
-     * The PHYSICAL key a cart was read from.
-     *
-     * ⚠️ Exists because a re-key makes a re-derived key silently wrong rather than
-     * loudly wrong: DynamoDB's `Delete` on a key that does not exist SUCCEEDS, so a
-     * writer that rebuilds `{ PK: BASKET#{storeId}, SK: customerId }` against a row
-     * now living at `CART#{storeId}` / `{cartId}` completes, reports success, and
-     * empties nothing. Carry this from the read and use it — never re-derive.
-     */
-    interface CartRef {
-        PK: string;
-        SK: string;
-        legacy: boolean;
-    }
     /**
      * The request body for every cart mutation, discriminated on `mode`.
      *
@@ -536,47 +519,6 @@ declare global {
      * - `merge.items` is `min(1).max(50)`.
      */
     type CartActionRequest = CartActionAddLine | CartActionChangeQuantity | CartActionRemoveLine | CartActionClear | CartActionMerge | CartActionSaveLine | CartActionRestoreLine | CartActionRemoveSavedLine | CartActionApplyCoupon | CartActionRemoveCoupon | CartActionSetLineDiscount;
-    /**
-     * WHICH cart an OPERATOR action acts on — the half of the operator request
-     * that `CartActionRequest` cannot carry.
-     *
-     * The storefront takes the cart from the authenticated identity, so a
-     * shopper's body names no target and `CartActionRequest` alone is complete
-     * there. The operator surface acts on someone else's cart and must say which,
-     * so `POST /baskets` refuses a body naming none of the three with
-     * `400 CART_TARGET_REQUIRED`. A client typing an operator body as the bare
-     * `CartActionRequest` therefore compiles and 400s on every write, which is
-     * exactly what this type exists to stop.
-     *
-     * Modelled as a UNION rather than three optional fields so "at least one" is
-     * enforced by `tsc` rather than discovered at runtime. Supplying more than one
-     * is legal; the server resolves them in the order below.
-     *
-     * ⚠️ `cartId` is the ONLY one that reaches a WALK-IN ticket. Such a cart has
-     * no `customerId` at all and the `PK-customerId` GSI is sparse, so no customer
-     * lookup can find it by any route.
-     */
-    type OperatorCartTarget = 
-    /** That customer's own cart. */
-    {
-        customerId: string;
-        cartId?: string;
-        terminalId?: string;
-    }
-    /** One specific ticket, walk-ins included. */
-     | {
-        cartId: string;
-        customerId?: string;
-        terminalId?: string;
-    }
-    /** The till's currently OPEN ticket, minted if it has none. */
-     | {
-        terminalId: string;
-        customerId?: string;
-        cartId?: string;
-    };
-    /** The body `POST /baskets` accepts: any named action, plus a target. */
-    type OperatorCartActionRequest = CartActionRequest & OperatorCartTarget;
     /**
      * Fields common to every action.
      *

package/dist/cjs/index.js

@@ -83,5 +83,6 @@ __exportStar(require("./user.js"), exports);
 __exportStar(require("./userActivity.js"), exports);
 __exportStar(require("./valuation.js"), exports);
 __exportStar(require("./webhook.js"), exports);
+__exportStar(require("./wire.js"), exports);
 __exportStar(require("./whatsapp.js"), exports);
 __exportStar(require("./provinces.js"), exports);

package/dist/cjs/wire.js

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * The strip catalogues every wire boundary in the api runs on, published as
+ * runtime tuples.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ **The direction of the single-sourcing is forced, not chosen.** The
+ * obvious arrangement — declare each tuple next to the `delete` calls in
+ * `stacks/helpers/*.ts` and `import type` it from here — cannot compile: the
+ * published build (`contracts/tsconfig.build.json`) sets `rootDir: "./src"`,
+ * so any file this tree reaches outside `src` is a hard `TS6059`, and a build
+ * that did somehow reach it would emit api source into the npm package that
+ * `files: ["dist"]` exists to keep out. So the list lives HERE, where both
+ * sides can reach it, and the sanitisers build their `Set`s from it.
+ *
+ * The sanitisers keep their `ReadonlySet` shape at runtime — membership tests
+ * on a 9-key list run per row on hot read paths — but the MEMBERS come from
+ * these tuples, so a key added for the runtime strip is added to the type that
+ * describes the result in the same edit.
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.ROW_TTL_KEYS = exports.USER_TOTP_INTERNAL_KEYS = exports.STORE_WHATSAPP_SECRET_KEYS = exports.STORE_MERCADOLIBRE_SECRET_KEYS = exports.STORE_GMAIL_SECRET_KEYS = exports.STORE_MP_SECRET_KEYS = exports.STORE_AFIP_SECRET_KEYS = exports.RESPONSE_STRIPPED_KEYS = void 0;
+/**
+ * The seven keys `response()` deletes from `body.data`.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ Two levels, and NOT into arrays. `response()` strips the top-level object
+ * and each of its direct object-valued properties, so `data.totp.secretRef` is
+ * removed and `data.items[].hash` is NOT. {@link Wire} models exactly that,
+ * including the array hole — widening the runtime to descend into arrays is a
+ * behaviour change and would need its own change; a type that claimed the hole
+ * was closed would be strictly worse than one that documents it.
+ */
+exports.RESPONSE_STRIPPED_KEYS = [
+    'PK',
+    'SK',
+    'salt',
+    'hash',
+    'hashedToken',
+    'secretRef',
+    'pendingSecretRef',
+];
+/**
+ * AFIP credentials on `Store.afip` / `Store.integrations.afip`. The cert and
+ * key PEMs plus every per-service WSAA ticket.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ The runtime strip also carries a PREFIX guard on `accessTicket*`, which no
+ * tuple can express — a ticket field added later is stripped at runtime but
+ * would still be declared on the type until it is listed here.
+ */
+exports.STORE_AFIP_SECRET_KEYS = [
+    'cert',
+    'key',
+    'accessTicket_EB',
+    'accessTicket_RSF',
+    'accessTicket_FEX',
+    'accessTicket_FECRED',
+    'accessTicket_CDC',
+];
+/** MercadoPago OAuth credentials on `Store.mercadopago` / `Store.integrations.mercadopago`. */
+exports.STORE_MP_SECRET_KEYS = ['accessToken', 'code', 'refreshToken'];
+/** KMS-ciphertext Gmail OAuth credentials on `Store.integrations.gmail`. */
+exports.STORE_GMAIL_SECRET_KEYS = ['refreshTokenEncrypted', 'accessTokenEncrypted'];
+/** KMS-ciphertext Mercadolibre OAuth credentials + the single-flight refresh marker. */
+exports.STORE_MERCADOLIBRE_SECRET_KEYS = [
+    'accessTokenEncrypted',
+    'refreshTokenEncrypted',
+    'refreshAttemptAt',
+];
+/** WhatsApp's only secret field on `Store.integrations.whatsapp`. */
+exports.STORE_WHATSAPP_SECRET_KEYS = ['accessToken'];
+/**
+ * The TOTP sub-keys `sanitizeUserRow` drops from `User.totp` before a USER row
+ * crosses any wire.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ `recoveryCodes` is on this list and `response()` structurally cannot cover
+ * it: the stored form is an ARRAY of `{ hash, usedAt }`, and `response()`'s
+ * nested sweep skips arrays. The strip has to happen at the row source.
+ */
+exports.USER_TOTP_INTERNAL_KEYS = [
+    'secretRef',
+    'pendingSecretRef',
+    'recoveryCodes',
+    'recoveryCodesGeneratedAt',
+    'lastCounter',
+    'lastUsedAt',
+    'pendingAt',
+    'failedAttempts',
+    'lockedUntil',
+];
+/**
+ * The DynamoDB housekeeping attribute that is stored on a row and must not be
+ * echoed back on a read of it.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ **"Storage-only" is a property of (entity, field), never of the bare
+ * name.** `CustomerLoginAttempt.ttl` is deliberately wire-visible — the login
+ * history renders it — so this list is applied PER ENTITY at the handlers that
+ * project a stored row, and is never folded into {@link RESPONSE_STRIPPED_KEYS},
+ * which would un-publish a field a consumer already reads.
+ */
+exports.ROW_TTL_KEYS = ['ttl'];

package/dist/customer.d.ts

@@ -171,8 +171,6 @@ declare global {
         appleRelayEmail?: string;
         favorites?: Partial<Product>[];
         fullName: string;
-        /** Storage-only credential hash — stripped from every response by the api's central sanitizer; never present on reads. */
-        hash?: string;
         lastBuy?: number;
         lastLog?: number;
         /**
@@ -258,8 +256,6 @@ declare global {
          */
         priceList: number;
         province: string;
-        /** Storage-only credential salt — stripped from every response by the api's central sanitizer; never present on reads. */
-        salt?: string;
         /**
          * @deprecated Lowercase WRITE-SIDE index for backend `contains` filtering.
          * Internal — not part of the read contract, even where legacy responses

package/dist/cycleCount.d.ts

@@ -18,103 +18,5 @@ declare global {
      * cannot do.
      */
     type CycleCountStatus = 'open' | 'finalized' | 'cancelled';
-    /**
-     * A physical count session that the SERVER owns — an id, a stored line set,
-     * and a read path. It exists because a stocktake has been a purely
-     * client-side construct: the count lived in one browser, no id was minted,
-     * nothing indexed it, and a session lost mid-count was simply gone.
-     *
-     * ⚠️ **`cycleCountId` IS the value written into `stocktakeId` on the movement
-     * rows** this session emits when it finalises. That field was published ahead
-     * of this entity precisely so the two would meet without a backfill, and it
-     * constrains what a legal id looks like: 1–64 characters of `[A-Za-z0-9_-]`.
-     * Minting an id outside that charset silently orphans every adjustment the
-     * session produces, because the grouping field will not accept it and this
-     * platform is forward-only.
-     *
-     * ⚠️ **A count is not a lock.** Nothing freezes stock while the session is
-     * open: sales keep depleting and receipts keep adding, so a variance computed
-     * from a `systemQuantity` captured minutes earlier attributes real trade to
-     * miscounting. The longer a session stays `open`, the more of its variance is
-     * legitimate movement. That is inherent, not a defect to design around here —
-     * but a consumer must not present the variance as shrinkage.
-     */
-    interface CycleCount {
-        storeId: string;
-        /** Server-minted. ⚠️ Must satisfy the `stocktakeId` charset — see the interface note. */
-        cycleCountId: string;
-        /** Unix ms the session was opened. */
-        createdAt: number;
-        updatedAt?: number;
-        /** The operator who opened it. */
-        userId: string;
-        status: CycleCountStatus;
-        /** The `YYYYMMDD` day the count was taken. */
-        dated: number;
-        /**
-         * Operator-facing label for the session ("Depósito, estante 3"). Prose, for
-         * a human reading a list of past counts; nothing derives from it.
-         */
-        name?: string;
-        /**
-         * The `Product.zone` this session was scoped to, when it was scoped at all.
-         *
-         * ⚠️ Descriptive, not a guarantee. It records what the operator SAID they
-         * were counting; nothing forces every line to belong to that zone, and
-         * nothing forces every product in that zone to appear. A zoned session is
-         * not evidence that the zone was counted completely.
-         */
-        zone?: string;
-        items: CycleCountItem[];
-        /** Unix ms the variances were applied. Present only on a `finalized` session. */
-        finalizedAt?: number;
-        /** The operator who applied them — not necessarily the one who opened the session. */
-        finalizedBy?: string;
-        /** Operator note. ⚠️ Never personal data — this row is not scrubbed and has no TTL. */
-        notes?: string;
-        /** Lowercase '#'-joined write-side index. Internal; not part of the read contract. */
-        search?: string;
-        disabled?: boolean;
-    }
-    /**
-     * One counted product.
-     *
-     * A line whose `countedQuantity` equals its `systemQuantity` still belongs in
-     * the session: "we looked and it was right" is the evidence a count exists to
-     * produce, and dropping matching lines makes a completed count
-     * indistinguishable from an abandoned one.
-     */
-    interface CycleCountItem {
-        productId: string;
-        /** Name and SKU DENORMALIZED at count time, so a later catalogue rename does not rewrite history. */
-        name?: string;
-        sku?: string;
-        /**
-         * On-hand as the SYSTEM believed it at the moment this line was captured —
-         * a snapshot, stored rather than recomputed at finalise.
-         *
-         * ⚠️ It is stored precisely so the variance stays reproducible. Recomputing
-         * it at finalise would make the applied adjustment disagree with the number
-         * the operator was shown while counting, and the operator's number is the
-         * one they signed off.
-         */
-        systemQuantity: number;
-        /** What the operator physically counted. */
-        countedQuantity: number;
-        /**
-         * The batch counted, when the product is lot-tracked.
-         *
-         * ⚠️ Optional even on a lot-tracked product, because a real count often
-         * cannot attribute units to a batch — mixed shelf stock, a rubbed-off
-         * carton code. Absence means "counted, batch unknown", never "not
-         * lot-tracked", so an adjustment from such a line depletes the product
-         * without depleting any lot.
-         */
-        lotId?: string;
-        /** Why the line differs. ⚠️ Never personal data — it rides into an un-scrubbed, TTL-less row. */
-        note?: string;
-        /** Unix ms this line was captured. Its distance from `finalizedAt` is how stale `systemQuantity` is. */
-        countedAt?: number;
-    }
 }
 export {};

package/dist/delivery.d.ts

@@ -109,22 +109,5 @@ declare global {
         /** Set only on a `'failed'` event. */
         failureReason?: DeliveryFailureReason;
     }
-    /**
-     * A `DeliveryProofAsset` carrying the read-time-only `downloadUrl` minted by
-     * `withDeliveryProofDownloadUrls` (`stacks/services/deliveryAttachments.ts`)
-     * and served by `stacks/lambdas/deliveries/_get.ts`.
-     *
-     * ⚠️ Ephemeral and never persisted — a presigned S3 GET, minted fresh on every
-     * read. A client that caches it past its TTL gets a 403 from S3, not from the
-     * api, so the failure does not look like an api error. Never send it back on a
-     * write.
-     */
-    type DeliveryProofAssetWithUrl = DeliveryProofAsset & {
-        downloadUrl: string;
-    };
-    /** `DeliveryEvent` with a resolved `proof[]` — see {@link DeliveryProofAssetWithUrl}. */
-    type DeliveryEventWithProofUrls = Omit<DeliveryEvent, 'proof'> & {
-        proof?: DeliveryProofAssetWithUrl[];
-    };
 }
 export {};

package/dist/demo.d.ts

@@ -6,16 +6,5 @@
  * enforced server-side via the `requireWritable` gate (ADR-0010);
  * see also `Store.type === 'demo'` in store.ts.
  */
-declare global {
-    /**
-     * Firebase custom claims attached to a demo session token; `demo: true`
-     * marks the session as a demo tenant.
-     */
-    interface DemoClaims {
-        demo: true;
-        storeId: string;
-        /** When true, all writes are blocked (view-only demo). */
-        readOnly: boolean;
-    }
-}
+declare global { }
 export {};

package/dist/imports.d.ts

@@ -1,22 +1,4 @@
 declare global {
-    interface ProductSale {
-        pk: string;
-        sk: string;
-        orderId: string;
-        customerId: string;
-        fullName: string;
-        quantity: number;
-        price: number;
-    }
-    interface ProductIncome {
-        pk: string;
-        sk: string;
-        orderId?: string;
-        supplierId: string;
-        supplierName?: string;
-        quantity: number;
-        cost: number;
-    }
     /**
      * Envelope returned by the bulk CSV import endpoints — `POST /products` and
      * `POST /customers` with `mode: 'import'`.

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -59,5 +59,6 @@ export * from './user.ts';
 export * from './userActivity.ts';
 export * from './valuation.ts';
 export * from './webhook.ts';
+export * from './wire.ts';
 export * from './whatsapp.ts';
 export * from './provinces.ts';

package/dist/index.js

@@ -67,5 +67,6 @@ export * from "./user.js";
 export * from "./userActivity.js";
 export * from "./valuation.js";
 export * from "./webhook.js";
+export * from "./wire.js";
 export * from "./whatsapp.js";
 export * from "./provinces.js";