silentlake 2026.3.24

package/dist/audit-extra.async-DY8v7LXH.js

@@ -0,0 +1,817 @@
+import { h as resolveOAuthDir } from "./paths-GHJ97ebE.js";
+import { c as normalizeAgentId } from "./session-key-gFFk3uv9.js";
+import { m as resolveDefaultAgentId } from "./agent-scope-DPP4Z_UU.js";
+import { a as hasConfiguredSecretInput } from "./types.secrets-BWSeXrF4.js";
+import { n as isPathInside, t as extensionUsesSkippedScannerPath } from "./scan-paths-BJmvUZ1E.js";
+import { i as normalizePluginsConfig } from "./config-state-CE0CGjey.js";
+import { n as MANIFEST_KEY } from "./legacy-names-CUNZ4vHN.js";
+import { i as safeStat, n as formatPermissionRemediation, r as inspectPathPermissions, t as formatPermissionDetail } from "./audit-fs-oDMUa5N_.js";
+import { t as formatCliCommand } from "./command-format-CYK9XiUC.js";
+import { a as resolveNativeSkillsEnabled } from "./commands-Bb9xUwz9.js";
+import { E as resolveSandboxConfigForAgent, G as resolveToolProfilePolicy, I as SANDBOX_BROWSER_SECURITY_HASH_EPOCH, a as execDockerRaw, k as resolveSandboxToolPolicyForAgent } from "./docker-XFNiArwM.js";
+import { t as listAgentWorkspaceDirs } from "./workspace-dirs-_O4V3xCR.js";
+import { r as pickSandboxToolPolicy, t as isToolAllowedByPolicies } from "./tool-policy-match-CHqTCSdK.js";
+import { t as scanDirectoryWithSummary } from "./skill-scanner-DG7MT7pu.js";
+import { t as collectIncludePathsRecursive } from "./includes-scan-y-rS6tTw.js";
+import path from "node:path";
+import fs from "node:fs/promises";
+//#region src/security/audit-extra.async.ts
+/**
+* Asynchronous security audit collector functions.
+*
+* These functions perform I/O (filesystem, config reads) to detect security issues.
+*/
+const MAX_WORKSPACE_SKILL_SCAN_FILES_PER_WORKSPACE = 2e3;
+const MAX_WORKSPACE_SKILL_ESCAPE_DETAIL_ROWS = 12;
+let skillsModulePromise;
+let configModulePromise;
+function loadSkillsModule() {
+	skillsModulePromise ??= import("./skills-BC8GJ9Rp.js");
+	return skillsModulePromise;
+}
+function loadConfigModule() {
+	configModulePromise ??= import("./config-B7tPwoHZ.js");
+	return configModulePromise;
+}
+function expandTilde(p, env) {
+	if (!p.startsWith("~")) return p;
+	const home = typeof env.HOME === "string" && env.HOME.trim() ? env.HOME.trim() : null;
+	if (!home) return null;
+	if (p === "~") return home;
+	if (p.startsWith("~/") || p.startsWith("~\\")) return path.join(home, p.slice(2));
+	return null;
+}
+async function readPluginManifestExtensions(pluginPath) {
+	const manifestPath = path.join(pluginPath, "package.json");
+	const raw = await fs.readFile(manifestPath, "utf-8").catch(() => "");
+	if (!raw.trim()) return [];
+	const extensions = JSON.parse(raw)?.[MANIFEST_KEY]?.extensions;
+	if (!Array.isArray(extensions)) return [];
+	return extensions.map((entry) => typeof entry === "string" ? entry.trim() : "").filter(Boolean);
+}
+function formatCodeSafetyDetails(findings, rootDir) {
+	return findings.map((finding) => {
+		const relPath = path.relative(rootDir, finding.file);
+		const normalizedPath = (relPath && relPath !== "." && !relPath.startsWith("..") ? relPath : path.basename(finding.file)).replaceAll("\\", "/");
+		return `  - [${finding.ruleId}] ${finding.message} (${normalizedPath}:${finding.line})`;
+	}).join("\n");
+}
+async function listInstalledPluginDirs(params) {
+	const extensionsDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "extensions");
+	const st = await safeStat(extensionsDir);
+	if (!st.ok || !st.isDir) return {
+		extensionsDir,
+		pluginDirs: []
+	};
+	return {
+		extensionsDir,
+		pluginDirs: (await fs.readdir(extensionsDir, { withFileTypes: true }).catch((err) => {
+			params.onReadError?.(err);
+			return [];
+		})).filter((entry) => entry.isDirectory()).map((entry) => entry.name).filter(Boolean)
+	};
+}
+function resolveToolPolicies(params) {
+	const policies = [
+		resolveToolProfilePolicy(params.agentTools?.profile ?? params.cfg.tools?.profile),
+		pickSandboxToolPolicy(params.cfg.tools ?? void 0),
+		pickSandboxToolPolicy(params.agentTools)
+	];
+	if (params.sandboxMode === "all") policies.push(resolveSandboxToolPolicyForAgent(params.cfg, params.agentId ?? void 0));
+	return policies;
+}
+function normalizePluginIdSet(entries) {
+	return new Set(entries.map((entry) => entry.trim().toLowerCase()).filter(Boolean));
+}
+function resolveEnabledExtensionPluginIds(params) {
+	const normalized = normalizePluginsConfig(params.cfg.plugins);
+	if (!normalized.enabled) return [];
+	const allowSet = normalizePluginIdSet(normalized.allow);
+	const denySet = normalizePluginIdSet(normalized.deny);
+	const entryById = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	for (const [id, entry] of Object.entries(normalized.entries)) entryById.set(id.trim().toLowerCase(), entry);
+	const enabled = [];
+	for (const id of params.pluginDirs) {
+		const normalizedId = id.trim().toLowerCase();
+		if (!normalizedId) continue;
+		if (denySet.has(normalizedId)) continue;
+		if (allowSet.size > 0 && !allowSet.has(normalizedId)) continue;
+		if (entryById.get(normalizedId)?.enabled === false) continue;
+		enabled.push(normalizedId);
+	}
+	return enabled;
+}
+function collectAllowEntries(config) {
+	const out = [];
+	if (Array.isArray(config?.allow)) out.push(...config.allow);
+	if (Array.isArray(config?.alsoAllow)) out.push(...config.alsoAllow);
+	return out.map((entry) => entry.trim().toLowerCase()).filter(Boolean);
+}
+function hasExplicitPluginAllow(params) {
+	return params.allowEntries.some((entry) => entry === "group:plugins" || params.enabledPluginIds.has(entry));
+}
+function hasProviderPluginAllow(params) {
+	if (!params.byProvider) return false;
+	for (const policy of Object.values(params.byProvider)) if (hasExplicitPluginAllow({
+		allowEntries: collectAllowEntries(policy),
+		enabledPluginIds: params.enabledPluginIds
+	})) return true;
+	return false;
+}
+function isPinnedRegistrySpec(spec) {
+	const value = spec.trim();
+	if (!value) return false;
+	const at = value.lastIndexOf("@");
+	if (at <= 0 || at >= value.length - 1) return false;
+	const version = value.slice(at + 1).trim();
+	return /^v?\d+\.\d+\.\d+(?:-[0-9A-Za-z.-]+)?(?:\+[0-9A-Za-z.-]+)?$/.test(version);
+}
+async function readInstalledPackageVersion(dir) {
+	try {
+		const raw = await fs.readFile(path.join(dir, "package.json"), "utf-8");
+		const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+		return typeof parsed.version === "string" ? parsed.version : void 0;
+	} catch {
+		return;
+	}
+}
+function buildCodeSafetySummaryCacheKey(params) {
+	const includeFiles = (params.includeFiles ?? []).map((entry) => entry.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+	const includeKey = includeFiles.length > 0 ? includeFiles.toSorted().join("\0") : "";
+	return `${params.dirPath}\u0000${includeKey}`;
+}
+async function getCodeSafetySummary(params) {
+	const cacheKey = buildCodeSafetySummaryCacheKey({
+		dirPath: params.dirPath,
+		includeFiles: params.includeFiles
+	});
+	const cache = params.summaryCache;
+	if (cache) {
+		const hit = cache.get(cacheKey);
+		if (hit) return await hit;
+		const pending = scanDirectoryWithSummary(params.dirPath, { includeFiles: params.includeFiles });
+		cache.set(cacheKey, pending);
+		return await pending;
+	}
+	return await scanDirectoryWithSummary(params.dirPath, { includeFiles: params.includeFiles });
+}
+async function listWorkspaceSkillMarkdownFiles(workspaceDir) {
+	const skillsRoot = path.join(workspaceDir, "skills");
+	const rootStat = await safeStat(skillsRoot);
+	if (!rootStat.ok || !rootStat.isDir) return [];
+	const skillFiles = [];
+	const queue = [skillsRoot];
+	const visitedDirs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+	while (queue.length > 0 && skillFiles.length < MAX_WORKSPACE_SKILL_SCAN_FILES_PER_WORKSPACE) {
+		const dir = queue.shift();
+		const dirRealPath = await fs.realpath(dir).catch(() => path.resolve(dir));
+		if (visitedDirs.has(dirRealPath)) continue;
+		visitedDirs.add(dirRealPath);
+		const entries = await fs.readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true }).catch(() => []);
+		for (const entry of entries) {
+			if (entry.name.startsWith(".") || entry.name === "node_modules") continue;
+			const fullPath = path.join(dir, entry.name);
+			if (entry.isDirectory()) {
+				queue.push(fullPath);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) {
+				const stat = await fs.stat(fullPath).catch(() => null);
+				if (!stat) continue;
+				if (stat.isDirectory()) {
+					queue.push(fullPath);
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (stat.isFile() && entry.name === "SKILL.md") skillFiles.push(fullPath);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (entry.isFile() && entry.name === "SKILL.md") skillFiles.push(fullPath);
+		}
+	}
+	return skillFiles;
+}
+function normalizeDockerLabelValue(raw) {
+	const trimmed = raw?.trim() ?? "";
+	if (!trimmed || trimmed === "<no value>") return null;
+	return trimmed;
+}
+async function listSandboxBrowserContainers(execDockerRawFn) {
+	try {
+		const result = await execDockerRawFn([
+			"ps",
+			"-a",
+			"--filter",
+			"label=openclaw.sandboxBrowser=1",
+			"--format",
+			"{{.Names}}"
+		], { allowFailure: true });
+		if (result.code !== 0) return null;
+		return result.stdout.toString("utf8").split(/\r?\n/).map((entry) => entry.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+	} catch {
+		return null;
+	}
+}
+async function readSandboxBrowserHashLabels(params) {
+	try {
+		const result = await params.execDockerRawFn([
+			"inspect",
+			"-f",
+			"{{ index .Config.Labels \"openclaw.configHash\" }}	{{ index .Config.Labels \"openclaw.browserConfigEpoch\" }}",
+			params.containerName
+		], { allowFailure: true });
+		if (result.code !== 0) return null;
+		const [hashRaw, epochRaw] = result.stdout.toString("utf8").split("	");
+		return {
+			configHash: normalizeDockerLabelValue(hashRaw),
+			epoch: normalizeDockerLabelValue(epochRaw)
+		};
+	} catch {
+		return null;
+	}
+}
+function parsePublishedHostFromDockerPortLine(line) {
+	const trimmed = line.trim();
+	const rhs = trimmed.includes("->") ? trimmed.split("->").at(-1)?.trim() ?? "" : trimmed;
+	if (!rhs) return null;
+	const bracketHost = rhs.match(/^\[([^\]]+)\]:\d+$/);
+	if (bracketHost?.[1]) return bracketHost[1];
+	const hostPort = rhs.match(/^([^:]+):\d+$/);
+	if (hostPort?.[1]) return hostPort[1];
+	return null;
+}
+function isLoopbackPublishHost(host) {
+	const normalized = host.trim().toLowerCase();
+	return normalized === "127.0.0.1" || normalized === "::1" || normalized === "localhost";
+}
+async function readSandboxBrowserPortMappings(params) {
+	try {
+		const result = await params.execDockerRawFn(["port", params.containerName], { allowFailure: true });
+		if (result.code !== 0) return null;
+		return result.stdout.toString("utf8").split(/\r?\n/).map((entry) => entry.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+	} catch {
+		return null;
+	}
+}
+async function collectSandboxBrowserHashLabelFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const execFn = params?.execDockerRawFn ?? execDockerRaw;
+	const containers = await listSandboxBrowserContainers(execFn);
+	if (!containers || containers.length === 0) return findings;
+	const missingHash = [];
+	const staleEpoch = [];
+	const nonLoopbackPublished = [];
+	for (const containerName of containers) {
+		const labels = await readSandboxBrowserHashLabels({
+			containerName,
+			execDockerRawFn: execFn
+		});
+		if (!labels) continue;
+		if (!labels.configHash) missingHash.push(containerName);
+		if (labels.epoch !== "2026-02-28-no-sandbox-env") staleEpoch.push(containerName);
+		const portMappings = await readSandboxBrowserPortMappings({
+			containerName,
+			execDockerRawFn: execFn
+		});
+		if (!portMappings?.length) continue;
+		const exposedMappings = portMappings.filter((line) => {
+			const host = parsePublishedHostFromDockerPortLine(line);
+			return Boolean(host && !isLoopbackPublishHost(host));
+		});
+		if (exposedMappings.length > 0) nonLoopbackPublished.push(`${containerName} (${exposedMappings.join("; ")})`);
+	}
+	if (missingHash.length > 0) findings.push({
+		checkId: "sandbox.browser_container.hash_label_missing",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Sandbox browser container missing config hash label",
+		detail: `Containers: ${missingHash.join(", ")}. These browser containers predate hash-based drift checks and may miss security remediations until recreated.`,
+		remediation: `${formatCliCommand("openclaw sandbox recreate --browser --all")} (add --force to skip prompt).`
+	});
+	if (staleEpoch.length > 0) findings.push({
+		checkId: "sandbox.browser_container.hash_epoch_stale",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Sandbox browser container hash epoch is stale",
+		detail: `Containers: ${staleEpoch.join(", ")}. Expected openclaw.browserConfigEpoch=${SANDBOX_BROWSER_SECURITY_HASH_EPOCH}.`,
+		remediation: `${formatCliCommand("openclaw sandbox recreate --browser --all")} (add --force to skip prompt).`
+	});
+	if (nonLoopbackPublished.length > 0) findings.push({
+		checkId: "sandbox.browser_container.non_loopback_publish",
+		severity: "critical",
+		title: "Sandbox browser container publishes ports on non-loopback interfaces",
+		detail: `Containers: ${nonLoopbackPublished.join(", ")}. Sandbox browser observer/control ports should stay loopback-only to avoid unintended remote access.`,
+		remediation: `${formatCliCommand("openclaw sandbox recreate --browser --all")} (add --force to skip prompt), then verify published ports are bound to 127.0.0.1.`
+	});
+	return findings;
+}
+async function collectPluginsTrustFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const { extensionsDir, pluginDirs } = await listInstalledPluginDirs({ stateDir: params.stateDir });
+	if (pluginDirs.length > 0) {
+		const allow = params.cfg.plugins?.allow;
+		if (!(Array.isArray(allow) && allow.length > 0)) {
+			const hasString = (value) => typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0;
+			const hasSecretInput = (value) => hasConfiguredSecretInput(value, params.cfg.secrets?.defaults);
+			const hasAccountStringKey = (account, key) => Boolean(account && typeof account === "object" && hasString(account[key]));
+			const hasAccountSecretInputKey = (account, key) => Boolean(account && typeof account === "object" && hasSecretInput(account[key]));
+			const discordConfigured = hasSecretInput(params.cfg.channels?.discord?.token) || Boolean(params.cfg.channels?.discord?.accounts && Object.values(params.cfg.channels.discord.accounts).some((a) => hasAccountSecretInputKey(a, "token"))) || hasString(process.env.DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN);
+			const telegramConfigured = hasSecretInput(params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.botToken) || hasString(params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.tokenFile) || Boolean(params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.accounts && Object.values(params.cfg.channels.telegram.accounts).some((a) => hasAccountSecretInputKey(a, "botToken") || hasAccountStringKey(a, "tokenFile"))) || hasString(process.env.TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN);
+			const slackConfigured = hasSecretInput(params.cfg.channels?.slack?.botToken) || hasSecretInput(params.cfg.channels?.slack?.appToken) || Boolean(params.cfg.channels?.slack?.accounts && Object.values(params.cfg.channels.slack.accounts).some((a) => hasAccountSecretInputKey(a, "botToken") || hasAccountSecretInputKey(a, "appToken"))) || hasString(process.env.SLACK_BOT_TOKEN) || hasString(process.env.SLACK_APP_TOKEN);
+			const skillCommandsLikelyExposed = discordConfigured && resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
+				providerId: "discord",
+				providerSetting: params.cfg.channels?.discord?.commands?.nativeSkills,
+				globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills
+			}) || telegramConfigured && resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
+				providerId: "telegram",
+				providerSetting: params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.commands?.nativeSkills,
+				globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills
+			}) || slackConfigured && resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
+				providerId: "slack",
+				providerSetting: params.cfg.channels?.slack?.commands?.nativeSkills,
+				globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills
+			});
+			findings.push({
+				checkId: "plugins.extensions_no_allowlist",
+				severity: skillCommandsLikelyExposed ? "critical" : "warn",
+				title: "Extensions exist but plugins.allow is not set",
+				detail: `Found ${pluginDirs.length} extension(s) under ${extensionsDir}. Without plugins.allow, any discovered plugin id may load (depending on config and plugin behavior).` + (skillCommandsLikelyExposed ? "\nNative skill commands are enabled on at least one configured chat surface; treat unpinned/unallowlisted extensions as high risk." : ""),
+				remediation: "Set plugins.allow to an explicit list of plugin ids you trust."
+			});
+		}
+		const enabledExtensionPluginIds = resolveEnabledExtensionPluginIds({
+			cfg: params.cfg,
+			pluginDirs
+		});
+		if (enabledExtensionPluginIds.length > 0) {
+			const enabledPluginSet = new Set(enabledExtensionPluginIds);
+			const contexts = [{ label: "default" }];
+			for (const entry of params.cfg.agents?.list ?? []) {
+				if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object" || typeof entry.id !== "string") continue;
+				contexts.push({
+					label: `agents.list.${entry.id}`,
+					agentId: entry.id,
+					tools: entry.tools
+				});
+			}
+			const permissiveContexts = [];
+			for (const context of contexts) {
+				const profile = context.tools?.profile ?? params.cfg.tools?.profile;
+				const restrictiveProfile = Boolean(resolveToolProfilePolicy(profile));
+				const sandboxMode = resolveSandboxConfigForAgent(params.cfg, context.agentId).mode;
+				const broadPolicy = isToolAllowedByPolicies("__openclaw_plugin_probe__", resolveToolPolicies({
+					cfg: params.cfg,
+					agentTools: context.tools,
+					sandboxMode,
+					agentId: context.agentId
+				}));
+				const explicitPluginAllow = !restrictiveProfile && (hasExplicitPluginAllow({
+					allowEntries: collectAllowEntries(params.cfg.tools),
+					enabledPluginIds: enabledPluginSet
+				}) || hasProviderPluginAllow({
+					byProvider: params.cfg.tools?.byProvider,
+					enabledPluginIds: enabledPluginSet
+				}) || hasExplicitPluginAllow({
+					allowEntries: collectAllowEntries(context.tools),
+					enabledPluginIds: enabledPluginSet
+				}) || hasProviderPluginAllow({
+					byProvider: context.tools?.byProvider,
+					enabledPluginIds: enabledPluginSet
+				}));
+				if (broadPolicy || explicitPluginAllow) permissiveContexts.push(context.label);
+			}
+			if (permissiveContexts.length > 0) findings.push({
+				checkId: "plugins.tools_reachable_permissive_policy",
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: "Extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy",
+				detail: `Enabled extension plugins: ${enabledExtensionPluginIds.join(", ")}.\nPermissive tool policy contexts:\n${permissiveContexts.map((entry) => `- ${entry}`).join("\n")}`,
+				remediation: "Use restrictive profiles (`minimal`/`coding`) or explicit tool allowlists that exclude plugin tools for agents handling untrusted input."
+			});
+		}
+	}
+	const pluginInstalls = params.cfg.plugins?.installs ?? {};
+	const npmPluginInstalls = Object.entries(pluginInstalls).filter(([, record]) => record?.source === "npm");
+	if (npmPluginInstalls.length > 0) {
+		const unpinned = npmPluginInstalls.filter(([, record]) => typeof record.spec === "string" && !isPinnedRegistrySpec(record.spec)).map(([pluginId, record]) => `${pluginId} (${record.spec})`);
+		if (unpinned.length > 0) findings.push({
+			checkId: "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Plugin installs include unpinned npm specs",
+			detail: `Unpinned plugin install records:\n${unpinned.map((entry) => `- ${entry}`).join("\n")}`,
+			remediation: "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, `@scope/pkg@1.2.3`) for higher supply-chain stability."
+		});
+		const missingIntegrity = npmPluginInstalls.filter(([, record]) => typeof record.integrity !== "string" || record.integrity.trim() === "").map(([pluginId]) => pluginId);
+		if (missingIntegrity.length > 0) findings.push({
+			checkId: "plugins.installs_missing_integrity",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Plugin installs are missing integrity metadata",
+			detail: `Plugin install records missing integrity:\n${missingIntegrity.map((entry) => `- ${entry}`).join("\n")}`,
+			remediation: "Reinstall or update plugins to refresh install metadata with resolved integrity hashes."
+		});
+		const pluginVersionDrift = [];
+		for (const [pluginId, record] of npmPluginInstalls) {
+			const recordedVersion = record.resolvedVersion ?? record.version;
+			if (!recordedVersion) continue;
+			const installedVersion = await readInstalledPackageVersion(record.installPath ?? path.join(params.stateDir, "extensions", pluginId));
+			if (!installedVersion || installedVersion === recordedVersion) continue;
+			pluginVersionDrift.push(`${pluginId} (recorded ${recordedVersion}, installed ${installedVersion})`);
+		}
+		if (pluginVersionDrift.length > 0) findings.push({
+			checkId: "plugins.installs_version_drift",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Plugin install records drift from installed package versions",
+			detail: `Detected plugin install metadata drift:\n${pluginVersionDrift.map((entry) => `- ${entry}`).join("\n")}`,
+			remediation: "Run `openclaw plugins update --all` (or reinstall affected plugins) to refresh install metadata."
+		});
+	}
+	const hookInstalls = params.cfg.hooks?.internal?.installs ?? {};
+	const npmHookInstalls = Object.entries(hookInstalls).filter(([, record]) => record?.source === "npm");
+	if (npmHookInstalls.length > 0) {
+		const unpinned = npmHookInstalls.filter(([, record]) => typeof record.spec === "string" && !isPinnedRegistrySpec(record.spec)).map(([hookId, record]) => `${hookId} (${record.spec})`);
+		if (unpinned.length > 0) findings.push({
+			checkId: "hooks.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Hook installs include unpinned npm specs",
+			detail: `Unpinned hook install records:\n${unpinned.map((entry) => `- ${entry}`).join("\n")}`,
+			remediation: "Pin hook install specs to exact versions (for example, `@scope/pkg@1.2.3`) for higher supply-chain stability."
+		});
+		const missingIntegrity = npmHookInstalls.filter(([, record]) => typeof record.integrity !== "string" || record.integrity.trim() === "").map(([hookId]) => hookId);
+		if (missingIntegrity.length > 0) findings.push({
+			checkId: "hooks.installs_missing_integrity",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Hook installs are missing integrity metadata",
+			detail: `Hook install records missing integrity:\n${missingIntegrity.map((entry) => `- ${entry}`).join("\n")}`,
+			remediation: "Reinstall or update hooks to refresh install metadata with resolved integrity hashes."
+		});
+		const hookVersionDrift = [];
+		for (const [hookId, record] of npmHookInstalls) {
+			const recordedVersion = record.resolvedVersion ?? record.version;
+			if (!recordedVersion) continue;
+			const installedVersion = await readInstalledPackageVersion(record.installPath ?? path.join(params.stateDir, "hooks", hookId));
+			if (!installedVersion || installedVersion === recordedVersion) continue;
+			hookVersionDrift.push(`${hookId} (recorded ${recordedVersion}, installed ${installedVersion})`);
+		}
+		if (hookVersionDrift.length > 0) findings.push({
+			checkId: "hooks.installs_version_drift",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Hook install records drift from installed package versions",
+			detail: `Detected hook install metadata drift:\n${hookVersionDrift.map((entry) => `- ${entry}`).join("\n")}`,
+			remediation: "Run `openclaw hooks update --all` (or reinstall affected hooks) to refresh install metadata."
+		});
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+async function collectWorkspaceSkillSymlinkEscapeFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const workspaceDirs = listAgentWorkspaceDirs(params.cfg);
+	if (workspaceDirs.length === 0) return findings;
+	const escapedSkillFiles = [];
+	const seenSkillPaths = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+	for (const workspaceDir of workspaceDirs) {
+		const workspacePath = path.resolve(workspaceDir);
+		const workspaceRealPath = await fs.realpath(workspacePath).catch(() => workspacePath);
+		const skillFilePaths = await listWorkspaceSkillMarkdownFiles(workspacePath);
+		for (const skillFilePath of skillFilePaths) {
+			const canonicalSkillPath = path.resolve(skillFilePath);
+			if (seenSkillPaths.has(canonicalSkillPath)) continue;
+			seenSkillPaths.add(canonicalSkillPath);
+			const skillRealPath = await fs.realpath(canonicalSkillPath).catch(() => null);
+			if (!skillRealPath) continue;
+			if (isPathInside(workspaceRealPath, skillRealPath)) continue;
+			escapedSkillFiles.push({
+				workspaceDir: workspacePath,
+				skillFilePath: canonicalSkillPath,
+				skillRealPath
+			});
+		}
+	}
+	if (escapedSkillFiles.length === 0) return findings;
+	findings.push({
+		checkId: "skills.workspace.symlink_escape",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Workspace skill files resolve outside the workspace root",
+		detail: "Detected workspace `skills/**/SKILL.md` paths whose realpath escapes their workspace root:\n" + escapedSkillFiles.slice(0, MAX_WORKSPACE_SKILL_ESCAPE_DETAIL_ROWS).map((entry) => `- workspace=${entry.workspaceDir}\n  skill=${entry.skillFilePath}\n  realpath=${entry.skillRealPath}`).join("\n") + (escapedSkillFiles.length > MAX_WORKSPACE_SKILL_ESCAPE_DETAIL_ROWS ? `\n- +${escapedSkillFiles.length - MAX_WORKSPACE_SKILL_ESCAPE_DETAIL_ROWS} more` : ""),
+		remediation: "Keep workspace skills inside the workspace root (replace symlinked escapes with real in-workspace files), or move trusted shared skills to managed/bundled skill locations."
+	});
+	return findings;
+}
+async function collectIncludeFilePermFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	if (!params.configSnapshot.exists) return findings;
+	const configPath = params.configSnapshot.path;
+	const includePaths = await collectIncludePathsRecursive({
+		configPath,
+		parsed: params.configSnapshot.parsed
+	});
+	if (includePaths.length === 0) return findings;
+	for (const p of includePaths) {
+		const perms = await inspectPathPermissions(p, {
+			env: params.env,
+			platform: params.platform,
+			exec: params.execIcacls
+		});
+		if (!perms.ok) continue;
+		if (perms.worldWritable || perms.groupWritable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.config_include.perms_writable",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "Config include file is writable by others",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(p, perms)}; another user could influence your effective config.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: p,
+				perms,
+				isDir: false,
+				posixMode: 384,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+		else if (perms.worldReadable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.config_include.perms_world_readable",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "Config include file is world-readable",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(p, perms)}; include files can contain tokens and private settings.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: p,
+				perms,
+				isDir: false,
+				posixMode: 384,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+		else if (perms.groupReadable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.config_include.perms_group_readable",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Config include file is group-readable",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(p, perms)}; include files can contain tokens and private settings.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: p,
+				perms,
+				isDir: false,
+				posixMode: 384,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+async function collectStateDeepFilesystemFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const oauthDir = resolveOAuthDir(params.env, params.stateDir);
+	const oauthPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(oauthDir, {
+		env: params.env,
+		platform: params.platform,
+		exec: params.execIcacls
+	});
+	if (oauthPerms.ok && oauthPerms.isDir) {
+		if (oauthPerms.worldWritable || oauthPerms.groupWritable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.credentials_dir.perms_writable",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "Credentials dir is writable by others",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(oauthDir, oauthPerms)}; another user could drop/modify credential files.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: oauthDir,
+				perms: oauthPerms,
+				isDir: true,
+				posixMode: 448,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+		else if (oauthPerms.groupReadable || oauthPerms.worldReadable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.credentials_dir.perms_readable",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Credentials dir is readable by others",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(oauthDir, oauthPerms)}; credentials and allowlists can be sensitive.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: oauthDir,
+				perms: oauthPerms,
+				isDir: true,
+				posixMode: 448,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+	}
+	const agentIds = Array.isArray(params.cfg.agents?.list) ? params.cfg.agents?.list.map((a) => a && typeof a === "object" && typeof a.id === "string" ? a.id.trim() : "").filter(Boolean) : [];
+	const defaultAgentId = resolveDefaultAgentId(params.cfg);
+	const ids = Array.from(new Set([defaultAgentId, ...agentIds])).map((id) => normalizeAgentId(id));
+	for (const agentId of ids) {
+		const agentDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "agents", agentId, "agent");
+		const authPath = path.join(agentDir, "auth-profiles.json");
+		const authPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(authPath, {
+			env: params.env,
+			platform: params.platform,
+			exec: params.execIcacls
+		});
+		if (authPerms.ok) {
+			if (authPerms.worldWritable || authPerms.groupWritable) findings.push({
+				checkId: "fs.auth_profiles.perms_writable",
+				severity: "critical",
+				title: "auth-profiles.json is writable by others",
+				detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(authPath, authPerms)}; another user could inject credentials.`,
+				remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+					targetPath: authPath,
+					perms: authPerms,
+					isDir: false,
+					posixMode: 384,
+					env: params.env
+				})
+			});
+			else if (authPerms.worldReadable || authPerms.groupReadable) findings.push({
+				checkId: "fs.auth_profiles.perms_readable",
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: "auth-profiles.json is readable by others",
+				detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(authPath, authPerms)}; auth-profiles.json contains API keys and OAuth tokens.`,
+				remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+					targetPath: authPath,
+					perms: authPerms,
+					isDir: false,
+					posixMode: 384,
+					env: params.env
+				})
+			});
+		}
+		const storePath = path.join(params.stateDir, "agents", agentId, "sessions", "sessions.json");
+		const storePerms = await inspectPathPermissions(storePath, {
+			env: params.env,
+			platform: params.platform,
+			exec: params.execIcacls
+		});
+		if (storePerms.ok) {
+			if (storePerms.worldReadable || storePerms.groupReadable) findings.push({
+				checkId: "fs.sessions_store.perms_readable",
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: "sessions.json is readable by others",
+				detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(storePath, storePerms)}; routing and transcript metadata can be sensitive.`,
+				remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+					targetPath: storePath,
+					perms: storePerms,
+					isDir: false,
+					posixMode: 384,
+					env: params.env
+				})
+			});
+		}
+	}
+	const logFile = typeof params.cfg.logging?.file === "string" ? params.cfg.logging.file.trim() : "";
+	if (logFile) {
+		const expanded = logFile.startsWith("~") ? expandTilde(logFile, params.env) : logFile;
+		if (expanded) {
+			const logPath = path.resolve(expanded);
+			const logPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(logPath, {
+				env: params.env,
+				platform: params.platform,
+				exec: params.execIcacls
+			});
+			if (logPerms.ok) {
+				if (logPerms.worldReadable || logPerms.groupReadable) findings.push({
+					checkId: "fs.log_file.perms_readable",
+					severity: "warn",
+					title: "Log file is readable by others",
+					detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(logPath, logPerms)}; logs can contain private messages and tool output.`,
+					remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+						targetPath: logPath,
+						perms: logPerms,
+						isDir: false,
+						posixMode: 384,
+						env: params.env
+					})
+				});
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+async function readConfigSnapshotForAudit(params) {
+	const { createConfigIO } = await loadConfigModule();
+	return await createConfigIO({
+		env: params.env,
+		configPath: params.configPath
+	}).readConfigFileSnapshot();
+}
+async function collectPluginsCodeSafetyFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const { extensionsDir, pluginDirs } = await listInstalledPluginDirs({
+		stateDir: params.stateDir,
+		onReadError: (err) => {
+			findings.push({
+				checkId: "plugins.code_safety.scan_failed",
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: "Plugin extensions directory scan failed",
+				detail: `Static code scan could not list extensions directory: ${String(err)}`,
+				remediation: "Check file permissions and plugin layout, then rerun `openclaw security audit --deep`."
+			});
+		}
+	});
+	for (const pluginName of pluginDirs) {
+		const pluginPath = path.join(extensionsDir, pluginName);
+		const extensionEntries = await readPluginManifestExtensions(pluginPath).catch(() => []);
+		const forcedScanEntries = [];
+		const escapedEntries = [];
+		for (const entry of extensionEntries) {
+			const resolvedEntry = path.resolve(pluginPath, entry);
+			if (!isPathInside(pluginPath, resolvedEntry)) {
+				escapedEntries.push(entry);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (extensionUsesSkippedScannerPath(entry)) findings.push({
+				checkId: "plugins.code_safety.entry_path",
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" entry path is hidden or node_modules`,
+				detail: `Extension entry "${entry}" points to a hidden or node_modules path. Deep code scan will cover this entry explicitly, but review this path choice carefully.`,
+				remediation: "Prefer extension entrypoints under normal source paths like dist/ or src/."
+			});
+			forcedScanEntries.push(resolvedEntry);
+		}
+		if (escapedEntries.length > 0) findings.push({
+			checkId: "plugins.code_safety.entry_escape",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" has extension entry path traversal`,
+			detail: `Found extension entries that escape the plugin directory:\n${escapedEntries.map((entry) => `  - ${entry}`).join("\n")}`,
+			remediation: "Update the plugin manifest so all openclaw.extensions entries stay inside the plugin directory."
+		});
+		const summary = await getCodeSafetySummary({
+			dirPath: pluginPath,
+			includeFiles: forcedScanEntries,
+			summaryCache: params.summaryCache
+		}).catch((err) => {
+			findings.push({
+				checkId: "plugins.code_safety.scan_failed",
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" code scan failed`,
+				detail: `Static code scan could not complete: ${String(err)}`,
+				remediation: "Check file permissions and plugin layout, then rerun `openclaw security audit --deep`."
+			});
+			return null;
+		});
+		if (!summary) continue;
+		if (summary.critical > 0) {
+			const details = formatCodeSafetyDetails(summary.findings.filter((f) => f.severity === "critical"), pluginPath);
+			findings.push({
+				checkId: "plugins.code_safety",
+				severity: "critical",
+				title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" contains dangerous code patterns`,
+				detail: `Found ${summary.critical} critical issue(s) in ${summary.scannedFiles} scanned file(s):\n${details}`,
+				remediation: "Review the plugin source code carefully before use. If untrusted, remove the plugin from your OpenClaw extensions state directory."
+			});
+		} else if (summary.warn > 0) {
+			const details = formatCodeSafetyDetails(summary.findings.filter((f) => f.severity === "warn"), pluginPath);
+			findings.push({
+				checkId: "plugins.code_safety",
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" contains suspicious code patterns`,
+				detail: `Found ${summary.warn} warning(s) in ${summary.scannedFiles} scanned file(s):\n${details}`,
+				remediation: `Review the flagged code to ensure it is intentional and safe.`
+			});
+		}
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+async function collectInstalledSkillsCodeSafetyFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const pluginExtensionsDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "extensions");
+	const scannedSkillDirs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+	const workspaceDirs = listAgentWorkspaceDirs(params.cfg);
+	const { loadWorkspaceSkillEntries } = await loadSkillsModule();
+	for (const workspaceDir of workspaceDirs) {
+		const entries = loadWorkspaceSkillEntries(workspaceDir, { config: params.cfg });
+		for (const entry of entries) {
+			if (entry.skill.source === "openclaw-bundled") continue;
+			const skillDir = path.resolve(entry.skill.baseDir);
+			if (isPathInside(pluginExtensionsDir, skillDir)) continue;
+			if (scannedSkillDirs.has(skillDir)) continue;
+			scannedSkillDirs.add(skillDir);
+			const skillName = entry.skill.name;
+			const summary = await getCodeSafetySummary({
+				dirPath: skillDir,
+				summaryCache: params.summaryCache
+			}).catch((err) => {
+				findings.push({
+					checkId: "skills.code_safety.scan_failed",
+					severity: "warn",
+					title: `Skill "${skillName}" code scan failed`,
+					detail: `Static code scan could not complete for ${skillDir}: ${String(err)}`,
+					remediation: "Check file permissions and skill layout, then rerun `openclaw security audit --deep`."
+				});
+				return null;
+			});
+			if (!summary) continue;
+			if (summary.critical > 0) {
+				const details = formatCodeSafetyDetails(summary.findings.filter((finding) => finding.severity === "critical"), skillDir);
+				findings.push({
+					checkId: "skills.code_safety",
+					severity: "critical",
+					title: `Skill "${skillName}" contains dangerous code patterns`,
+					detail: `Found ${summary.critical} critical issue(s) in ${summary.scannedFiles} scanned file(s) under ${skillDir}:\n${details}`,
+					remediation: `Review the skill source code before use. If untrusted, remove "${skillDir}".`
+				});
+			} else if (summary.warn > 0) {
+				const details = formatCodeSafetyDetails(summary.findings.filter((finding) => finding.severity === "warn"), skillDir);
+				findings.push({
+					checkId: "skills.code_safety",
+					severity: "warn",
+					title: `Skill "${skillName}" contains suspicious code patterns`,
+					detail: `Found ${summary.warn} warning(s) in ${summary.scannedFiles} scanned file(s) under ${skillDir}:\n${details}`,
+					remediation: "Review flagged lines to ensure the behavior is intentional and safe."
+				});
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+//#endregion
+export { collectSandboxBrowserHashLabelFindings as a, readConfigSnapshotForAudit as c, collectPluginsTrustFindings as i, collectInstalledSkillsCodeSafetyFindings as n, collectStateDeepFilesystemFindings as o, collectPluginsCodeSafetyFindings as r, collectWorkspaceSkillSymlinkEscapeFindings as s, collectIncludeFilePermFindings as t };