sigild 0.0.4 → 0.0.5

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (2) hide show
  1. package/README.md +10 -2
  2. package/package.json +1 -1
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -154,11 +154,11 @@ Key-management libraries die from supply chain compromise, not from clever attac
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  - **No MCP SDK.** The official `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` pulls 92 transitive deps (ajv, hono, cors, cross-spawn, etc) — unacceptable surface. We implement the MCP wire protocol directly in ~200 lines.
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  - **No Bun.** Plain Node only. Bun is currently being weaponized by Mini Shai-Hulud as an evasion layer; we will not give that pattern any cover.
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  - **Provenance attestations on every npm publish.** Starting v0.0.4, releases are built by [a GitHub Actions workflow](./.github/workflows/release.yml) under OIDC trusted-publisher auth, signed with a Sigstore attestation. No long-lived npm token; tampered or out-of-band publishes fail signature verification.
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+ - **CycloneDX SBOM attached to every GitHub Release.** Full transitive dep tree enumerated at release time.
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+ - **Install-scripts CI guard.** Every PR fails if any package in the resolved tree declares `preinstall` / `install` / `postinstall`. `.npmrc` already has `ignore-scripts=true` so these never actually run for us; the guard catches new transitive deps that might run for a user without our `.npmrc`.
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  - **Still planned for v0.1.0:**
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- - SBOM (CycloneDX) attached to every release
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  - Signed standalone binaries from GitHub Releases for users who'd rather not touch npm
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  - Action SHA pinning rotation via Dependabot
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- - CI guard that fails the build if any dep in the resolved tree declares `postinstall` / `preinstall` / `prepare`
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  ## Verifying a release
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@@ -175,6 +175,14 @@ npm view sigild@<version> dist.attestations
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  What the attestation tells you: this tarball was built by `cdrn/sigil`'s `.github/workflows/release.yml`, at a specific commit on `main`, at a specific time. It does *not* tell you that commit is non-malicious — for that, read the diff between the version you trust and the version you're upgrading to. But it does mean an attacker who steals an npm token can't publish a malicious `sigild` under our name; they'd need to compromise the GitHub repo + push a tag, which leaves an audit trail.
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+ Every release also publishes a [CycloneDX SBOM](https://cyclonedx.org/) as a GitHub Release asset, enumerating every package (direct + transitive) in the install tree at the version pinned by `package-lock.json`:
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+ ```sh
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+ # Download + inspect the SBOM for a specific release:
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+ gh release download v0.0.4 --repo cdrn/sigil --pattern '*.cdx.json'
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+ # → produces sigild-v0.0.4.cdx.json — feed to syft/grype/etc. for vuln scan
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+ ```
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+
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  ## Threat model
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  See [THREAT_MODEL.md](./THREAT_MODEL.md). Read it before trusting this with anything.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "sigild",
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- "version": "0.0.4",
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+ "version": "0.0.5",
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  "mcpName": "io.github.cdrn/sigil",
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  "description": "Claude can sign, but never see. MCP server + CLI that keeps private keys out of the LLM's context window.",
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  "license": "Apache-2.0",