sigild 0.0.3 → 0.0.4

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/CONTRIBUTING.md CHANGED
@@ -37,3 +37,28 @@ Never commit:
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  The repo `.gitignore` covers these patterns. Double-check `git status` before committing.
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  For security issues in sigil itself, open a private GitHub Security Advisory rather than a public issue.
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+ ## Releasing (maintainer only)
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+ `sigild` publishes to npm via OIDC trusted-publisher auth — there is no long-lived `NPM_TOKEN`. The release workflow at [`.github/workflows/release.yml`](./.github/workflows/release.yml) is the only thing allowed to publish; it triggers on tags matching `v*`.
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+ To cut a new release:
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+ 1. Land a PR that bumps `package.json` `version` and `server.json` `version` + the inner `packages[0].version` (both must match). Get it into `main`.
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+ 2. Pull `main` locally so your working tree matches the merged commit.
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+ 3. Tag and push:
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+ ```sh
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+ git tag v0.0.4 && git push --tags
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+ ```
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+ 4. The workflow runs: installs, tests, verifies the tag matches `package.json`, then `npm publish --access public --provenance`. If anything fails, no publish happens.
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+ 5. Optionally: also publish to the MCP registry. `mcp-publisher login github` (if your local token expired) then `mcp-publisher publish`. There's no automated path for the MCP registry yet.
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+ One-time setup on `npmjs.com` (already done — listed here for documentation):
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+ - Package settings → Trusted publishers → Add → GitHub Actions
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+ - Organization or user: `cdrn`
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+ - Repository: `sigil`
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+ - Workflow filename: `release.yml`
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+ - Environment name: `release`
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+ If that config is ever lost or rotated, every step above will fail with an OIDC auth error until it's recreated. No fallback token by design.
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -153,11 +153,27 @@ Key-management libraries die from supply chain compromise, not from clever attac
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  All by paulmillr, audited, zero transitive deps.
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  - **No MCP SDK.** The official `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` pulls 92 transitive deps (ajv, hono, cors, cross-spawn, etc) — unacceptable surface. We implement the MCP wire protocol directly in ~200 lines.
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  - **No Bun.** Plain Node only. Bun is currently being weaponized by Mini Shai-Hulud as an evasion layer; we will not give that pattern any cover.
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- - **Planned for v0.1.0** (the real release, not this 0.0.1 placeholder):
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- - Provenance attestations on every npm publish via GitHub Actions trusted publishing (OIDC, no long-lived tokens)
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+ - **Provenance attestations on every npm publish.** Starting v0.0.4, releases are built by [a GitHub Actions workflow](./.github/workflows/release.yml) under OIDC trusted-publisher auth, signed with a Sigstore attestation. No long-lived npm token; tampered or out-of-band publishes fail signature verification.
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+ - **Still planned for v0.1.0:**
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  - SBOM (CycloneDX) attached to every release
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  - Signed standalone binaries from GitHub Releases for users who'd rather not touch npm
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  - Action SHA pinning rotation via Dependabot
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+ - CI guard that fails the build if any dep in the resolved tree declares `postinstall` / `preinstall` / `prepare`
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+ ## Verifying a release
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+ You can confirm a `sigild` tarball was built by the public workflow at the commit it claims to come from:
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+ ```sh
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+ # Validates every package in your install tree:
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+ npm audit signatures
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+ # Inspect the attestation for a specific sigild version:
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+ npm view sigild@<version> dist.attestations
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+ # → shows the workflow filename, the commit SHA, and the Sigstore signing cert
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+ ```
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+ What the attestation tells you: this tarball was built by `cdrn/sigil`'s `.github/workflows/release.yml`, at a specific commit on `main`, at a specific time. It does *not* tell you that commit is non-malicious — for that, read the diff between the version you trust and the version you're upgrading to. But it does mean an attacker who steals an npm token can't publish a malicious `sigild` under our name; they'd need to compromise the GitHub repo + push a tag, which leaves an audit trail.
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  ## Threat model
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package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "sigild",
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- "version": "0.0.3",
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+ "version": "0.0.4",
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  "mcpName": "io.github.cdrn/sigil",
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  "description": "Claude can sign, but never see. MCP server + CLI that keeps private keys out of the LLM's context window.",
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  "license": "Apache-2.0",