showrunner-agent-staging 0.5.135-staging.2016 → 0.5.135-staging.2017

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package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ The server fixes `trust.runType` to `owner`, `trusted`, or `untrusted` when a ru
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  Owner and trusted runs pass through the provider's native configuration and permission prompts, including Full access. A trusted teammate cannot use the owner's connected accounts (Claude's claude.ai connectors, Codex's apps). Untrusted runs use a verified provider sandbox: project work and Showrunner's own tools in the chat need no card, while files outside the project folder, each new site, the owner's accounts, and email sends ask the owner. On any run, Showrunner's own tools ask only before sending to people and moving money. The server limits teammate reads to content the teammate can see, and the connector starts a fresh provider session when retained context may contain private content. ACP accepts owner and trusted runs. See [docs/native-sandbox-approvals.md](docs/native-sandbox-approvals.md).
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- Cards carry an origin describing why they appeared: `provider_ask` relays a provider permission request; `sandbox_escape`, `network`, `outside_project`, and `owner_account` identify untrusted requests beyond the sandbox or into the installer's accounts. A run reads the chats everyone in the room it was asked in can see; in an owner's private chat with the agent that is all the owner's chats, and a teammate's run stays within what its starter can see. Provider permission memory stays with the provider. Allow on an untrusted run's non-folder card covers that exact effect for the rest of the request; a decline is final for that request. Allow on an outside-folder card grants the folder for the rest of the invocation. Outside-folder cards also offer **Always allow this folder**, which saves the exact directory from the provider's native permission request. Later untrusted runs can read saved folders; owner and trusted runs use the native filesystem instead. The filesystem root, `/Users`, a home folder, its `Library` and `.config`, and top-level system folders such as `/etc`, `/opt`, `/usr` and `/Volumes` can be granted for one invocation but can't be saved. Other untrusted cards offer **Always trust _name_**.
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+ Cards carry an origin describing why they appeared: `provider_ask` relays a provider permission request; `sandbox_escape`, `network`, `outside_project`, and `owner_account` identify untrusted requests beyond the sandbox or into the installer's accounts. A run reads the chats everyone in the room it was asked in can see; in an owner's private chat with the agent that is all the owner's chats, and a teammate's run stays within what its starter can see. Provider permission memory stays with the provider. Allow on an untrusted run's non-folder card covers that exact effect for the rest of the request; a decline is final for that request. Allow on an outside-folder card grants the folder for the rest of the invocation. Outside-folder cards also offer **Always allow this folder**, which saves the exact directory from the provider's native permission request. Later untrusted runs can read saved folders; owner and trusted runs use the native filesystem instead. The filesystem root, `/Users`, a home folder, its `Library` and `.config`, and top-level system folders such as `/etc`, `/opt`, `/usr` and `/Volumes` can be granted for one invocation but can't be saved. Other untrusted cards offer **Always trust _name_**, which ends that teammate's untrusted runs on the agent (helpers included) without doing the card's action, and starts each request again from its message as a new trusted run, with a line in the chat saying so.
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  Claude and Codex keep a run open while the provider reports background jobs. Claude's `background_tasks_changed` snapshot (excluding tasks the SDK marks `ambient`, plus terminal `task_updated` patches) and Codex's background-terminal inventory decide which jobs are running. When the provider's turn ends, the connector marks the foreground ended: the card shows its finished steps and one quiet background-jobs line, each job with its own Stop (Claude `stopTask`, Codex `thread/backgroundTerminals/terminate`). The run's Stop stays while any job runs and ends the run and every job. A person's message during this time steers into the run, as it does while the foreground works. Codex isn't woken when a job ends, so the connector posts one line saying how it went. Once the CLI is idle with only ambient tasks, the invocation ends while the CLI stays available for that chat. The next message uses the same input queue. Ending the CLI ends its background tasks.
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@@ -257,8 +257,13 @@ export function writeTeammateLaunchers(scratch, executables = {
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  write(name, `profile=$(mktemp -d ${quote(path.join(scratch, "chrome-profile.XXXXXX"))}) || exit 1\nexec ${quote(executables.chrome)} --no-sandbox --user-data-dir="$profile" --disk-cache-dir=${quote(path.join(scratch, "chrome-cache"))} --crash-dumps-dir=${quote(path.join(scratch, "chrome-crashes"))} "$@"`);
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  return directory;
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  }
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+ /** Why an untrusted run can't reach what the owner's own runs can, so the agent explains that instead of asking for access the agent already has. */
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+ const untrustedRunSetup = "You are running a teammate's request with a limited setup, because the owner hasn't trusted this teammate on this agent. " +
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+ "The owner's sign-ins aren't here (git and GitHub logins, gh and other command-line logins), and files outside this project need the owner's OK. " +
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+ "When the request needs something this setup lacks, say so plainly: the owner can trust the teammate, and the request then runs with the owner's files, tools and sign-ins. " +
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+ "Never tell the owner to give this agent GitHub or other access: the owner's own requests already run with the owner's setup.";
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  export function teammateEscapeInstruction(provider) {
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- const need = "Your sandbox covers this project. When the teammate's request needs a file, folder or network access outside it, do not refuse and do not ask the teammate to move the file: ";
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+ const need = `${untrustedRunSetup} Your sandbox covers this project. When the teammate's request needs a file, folder or network access outside it, do not refuse and do not ask the teammate to move the file: `;
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  const asks = "That asks the owner, who can allow it with one tap. If the sandbox blocks a command the request needs, retry it once that way";
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  const tell = "Tell the teammate you asked the owner; if the owner declines, say so and stop. Only ask for access the request needs, never to look around outside the project.";
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  if (provider === "claude")
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "showrunner-agent-staging",
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- "version": "0.5.135-staging.2016",
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+ "version": "0.5.135-staging.2017",
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  "description": "Provider-neutral connector SDK for Showrunner agents",
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  "type": "module",
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  "main": "dist/src/index.js",