showrunner-agent-staging 0.5.135-staging.2000 → 0.5.135-staging.2012

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Files changed (39) hide show
  1. package/README.md +2 -2
  2. package/dist/src/adapter-runner.js +3 -4
  3. package/dist/src/adapter.d.ts +3 -3
  4. package/dist/src/adapter.js +22 -20
  5. package/dist/src/adapters/acp/acp-adapter.js +2 -2
  6. package/dist/src/adapters/claude/claude-adapter.d.ts +3 -2
  7. package/dist/src/adapters/claude/claude-adapter.js +35 -28
  8. package/dist/src/adapters/claude/claude-permission-mapper.js +3 -3
  9. package/dist/src/adapters/claude/claude-sandbox.d.ts +3 -7
  10. package/dist/src/adapters/claude/claude-sandbox.js +8 -12
  11. package/dist/src/adapters/codex/codex-adapter.d.ts +4 -11
  12. package/dist/src/adapters/codex/codex-adapter.js +35 -49
  13. package/dist/src/adapters/codex/codex-input-mapper.js +9 -10
  14. package/dist/src/adapters/codex/codex-sandbox.d.ts +3 -4
  15. package/dist/src/adapters/codex/codex-sandbox.js +4 -7
  16. package/dist/src/agent-tools.js +2 -2
  17. package/dist/src/approval-policy.d.ts +2 -2
  18. package/dist/src/approval-policy.js +7 -15
  19. package/dist/src/cloud/cloud-server.js +23 -4
  20. package/dist/src/cloud/cloud-tool-server.d.ts +18 -0
  21. package/dist/src/cloud/cloud-tool-server.js +50 -32
  22. package/dist/src/cloud/user-api.d.ts +27 -0
  23. package/dist/src/cloud/user-api.js +79 -0
  24. package/dist/src/cloud/user-tool-server.d.ts +17 -0
  25. package/dist/src/cloud/user-tool-server.js +60 -0
  26. package/dist/src/file-tools.js +3 -3
  27. package/dist/src/run-type.d.ts +3 -0
  28. package/dist/src/run-type.js +1 -0
  29. package/dist/src/step-names.d.ts +5 -0
  30. package/dist/src/step-names.js +20 -1
  31. package/dist/src/teammate-sandbox.d.ts +3 -4
  32. package/dist/src/teammate-sandbox.js +4 -7
  33. package/dist/src/user-tools.d.ts +21 -0
  34. package/dist/src/user-tools.js +173 -0
  35. package/node_modules/@showrunner/agent-contracts/dist/stream-type.d.ts +13 -0
  36. package/node_modules/@showrunner/agent-contracts/dist/stream-type.js +11 -0
  37. package/node_modules/@showrunner/agent-contracts/dist/workspace-type.d.ts +9 -0
  38. package/node_modules/@showrunner/agent-contracts/dist/workspace-type.js +8 -0
  39. package/package.json +1 -1
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -71,9 +71,9 @@ Run each connector under a dedicated OS account/container with access only to it
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  The server fixes `trust.runType` to `owner`, `trusted`, or `untrusted` when a run starts. Reading messages, files, web pages, or tool output never changes it. `trust.ownerProfileId` identifies whose Showrunner content the run works with; for a team agent that is the initiating member. Only the installer's runs get `owner` authority.
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- Owner runs pass through the provider's native configuration and permission prompts, including the owner's Full access. Teammate runs require a verified provider sandbox and work like the owner's inside it: project work and Showrunner's own tools in the chat need no card. The owner is asked when an untrusted teammate's request reaches past what the teammate can see: files outside the project folder, each new site, the owner's accounts, or sending an email. A trusted teammate uses the owner's mode inside the agent's project and additional allowed folders and on the web; files outside those folders and email sends always ask. On any run, Showrunner's own tools ask only before sending to people and moving money. The server limits teammate reads to content the teammate can see, and the connector starts a fresh provider session when retained context may contain private content. ACP currently accepts only owner runs. See [docs/native-sandbox-approvals.md](docs/native-sandbox-approvals.md).
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+ Owner and trusted runs pass through the provider's native configuration and permission prompts, including Full access. A trusted teammate cannot use the owner's connected accounts (Claude's claude.ai connectors, Codex's apps). Untrusted runs use a verified provider sandbox: project work and Showrunner's own tools in the chat need no card, while files outside the project folder, each new site, the owner's accounts, and email sends ask the owner. On any run, Showrunner's own tools ask only before sending to people and moving money. The server limits teammate reads to content the teammate can see, and the connector starts a fresh provider session when retained context may contain private content. ACP accepts owner and trusted runs. See [docs/native-sandbox-approvals.md](docs/native-sandbox-approvals.md).
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- Cards carry an origin describing why they appeared: `provider_ask` relays a provider permission request; `sandbox_escape`, `network`, `outside_project`, and `owner_account` identify teammate requests beyond the sandbox or into the installer's accounts. A run reads the chats everyone in the room it was asked in can see; in an owner's private chat with the agent that is all the owner's chats, and a teammate's run stays within what its starter can see. Provider permission memory stays with the provider and only the owner's own cards offer it. Allow on a teammate's non-folder card covers that exact effect for the rest of the request; a decline is final for that request. Allow on an outside-folder card grants reads and changes in that folder for the rest of the invocation. Outside-folder cards also offer **Always allow this folder**, which saves the exact directory from the provider's native permission request for all teammates, with the card's access: read for a read card, write for a change or a command. All teammates’ later runs receive the saved grant, and the owner's own runs remain native. A trusted teammate's Auto run can change files in a saved write folder; other saved-folder runs can only read it. The filesystem root, `/Users`, a home folder, its `Library` and `.config`, and top-level system folders such as `/etc`, `/opt`, `/usr` and `/Volumes` can be granted for one invocation but can't be saved. Other teammate cards offer **Always trust _name_**.
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+ Cards carry an origin describing why they appeared: `provider_ask` relays a provider permission request; `sandbox_escape`, `network`, `outside_project`, and `owner_account` identify untrusted requests beyond the sandbox or into the installer's accounts. A run reads the chats everyone in the room it was asked in can see; in an owner's private chat with the agent that is all the owner's chats, and a teammate's run stays within what its starter can see. Provider permission memory stays with the provider. Allow on an untrusted run's non-folder card covers that exact effect for the rest of the request; a decline is final for that request. Allow on an outside-folder card grants the folder for the rest of the invocation. Outside-folder cards also offer **Always allow this folder**, which saves the exact directory from the provider's native permission request. Later untrusted runs can read saved folders; owner and trusted runs use the native filesystem instead. The filesystem root, `/Users`, a home folder, its `Library` and `.config`, and top-level system folders such as `/etc`, `/opt`, `/usr` and `/Volumes` can be granted for one invocation but can't be saved. Other untrusted cards offer **Always trust _name_**.
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  Claude and Codex keep a run open while the provider reports background jobs. Claude's `background_tasks_changed` snapshot (excluding tasks the SDK marks `ambient`, plus terminal `task_updated` patches) and Codex's background-terminal inventory decide which jobs are running. When the provider's turn ends, the connector marks the foreground ended: the card shows its finished steps and one quiet background-jobs line, each job with its own Stop (Claude `stopTask`, Codex `thread/backgroundTerminals/terminate`). The run's Stop stays while any job runs and ends the run and every job. A person's message during this time steers into the run, as it does while the foreground works. Codex isn't woken when a job ends, so the connector posts one line saying how it went. Once the CLI is idle with only ambient tasks, the invocation ends while the CLI stays available for that chat. The next message uses the same input queue. Ending the CLI ends its background tasks.
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@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ export function createAdapterProcessor(input) {
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  const installationState = new NamespacedAdapterStateStore(input.state, input.adapter.kind, event.installation.id);
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  const state = new NamespacedAdapterStateStore(installationState, ...(generation === undefined ? [] : [generation]), event.session.id);
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  const previousSessionId = accountChanged ? null : handlerContext.session.externalSessionId;
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- const isOwner = trust.runType === "owner";
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  const previousWasTeammateBox = previousSessionId !== null &&
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  await state.get("provider-teammate-box", previousSessionId) === true;
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  const previousRunType = previousSessionId === null ? undefined :
@@ -46,7 +45,7 @@ export function createAdapterProcessor(input) {
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  // currently visible history, never from a transcript that may contain revoked private content.
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  const reason = accountChanged ? "account_change"
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  : previousSessionId === null ? "no_session"
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- : !isOwner ? "teammate_authority"
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+ : trust.runType !== "owner" ? "teammate_authority"
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  : previousRunType !== "owner" ? "provider_box_change"
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  : "reuse";
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  const freshProviderSession = reason !== "reuse" && reason !== "no_session";
@@ -247,12 +246,12 @@ export function createAdapterProcessor(input) {
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  get reasoningEffort() { return currentSettings().reasoningEffort; },
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  get mode() { return currentSettings().mode ?? null; },
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  get allowedFolders() {
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- if (isOwner)
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+ if (trust.runType !== "untrusted")
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  return [];
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  return currentSettings().allowedFolders ?? [];
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  },
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  get approvalMode() { return input.adapter.supportsAutoApproval ? currentPermissions().approvalMode : "ask"; },
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- get ownerFullAccess() { return input.adapter.supportsAutoApproval === true && isOwner && currentPermissions().fullAccess === true; },
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+ get ownerFullAccess() { return input.adapter.supportsAutoApproval === true && trust.runType !== "untrusted" && currentPermissions().fullAccess === true; },
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  client: commands,
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  finishRun: finish,
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  installationState,
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ export interface AgentInvocationContext {
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  reasoningEffort: string | null;
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  mode: string | null;
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  approvalMode?: "ask" | "auto";
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- /** Full access is on: the owner's own runs use the provider's no-approvals mode. Never set on teammate runs. */
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+ /** Full access is on: owner-path runs use the provider's no-approvals mode. */
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  ownerFullAccess?: boolean;
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  client: AdapterClient;
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  /** Durable state shared by every chat and provider session for this agent installation. */
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ export interface AgentInvocationContext {
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  ownerProfileId: string;
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  /** The profile that started the run. */
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  initiatingProfileId?: string;
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- /** That person's name, for the owner's card when their run reaches beyond the agent's folders. */
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+ /** That person's name, for owner-only cards such as untrusted sandbox escapes, sends and payments. */
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  initiatingDisplayName?: string;
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  };
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  scope: AgentStreamScope;
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ export declare function messageReferences(event: AgentEvent): string;
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  /** The body and its references as one turn, for a provider with no model-only channel. */
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  export declare function messageText(event: AgentEvent): string;
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  export declare function providerResourceId(namespace: string, value: string): string;
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- /** Native provider questions in a teammate run belong to the installation owner. */
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+ /** Untrusted and owner-account questions belong to the installation owner. */
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  export declare function teammateQuestion(context: AgentInvocationContext, body: string, origin?: ApprovalOrigin): {
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  body: string;
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  authorizedResponderProfileId?: string;
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { readdir } from "node:fs/promises";
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  import path from "node:path";
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  import { nativeCanonicalPath, runScope } from "./run-folders.js";
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  import { isWithin } from "./command-boundaries.js";
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- import { runStartedByOwner } from "./run-type.js";
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+ import { runStartedByOwner, runUsesOwnerPath } from "./run-type.js";
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  import { invocationDownloadDirectory } from "./file-tools.js";
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  import { redactKnownSecrets } from "./known-secrets.js";
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  const redacted = "[REDACTED]";
@@ -324,25 +324,26 @@ export function consequenceFor(request) {
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  */
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  export function invocationRunScope(context, workspaceRoot, sessionFolder, purpose = "read", projectAccess = "write") {
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  const project = [workspaceRoot, context.workingDirectory].map(folder => ({ path: folder, access: projectAccess }));
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- const saved = teammateAllowedFolders(context.allowedFolders ?? [], context.trust.runType, context.approvalMode);
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+ const saved = context.trust.runType === "untrusted" ? teammateAllowedFolders(context.allowedFolders ?? []) : [];
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  const approved = [...context.ownerApprovedFolders ?? []].map(([folder, access]) => ({ path: folder, access }));
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  const folders = [...project, ...saved, ...approved].filter(folder => purpose === "read" || folder.access === "write").map(folder => folder.path);
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  const folderScope = runScope([...folders, invocationDownloadDirectory(context), context.outputDirectory?.path, nativeTemporaryDirectory()]);
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- const credentials = runStartedByOwner(context.trust) ? [] : context.credentialPaths ?? [];
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+ const credentials = runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust) ? [] : context.credentialPaths ?? [];
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  return target => (folderScope(target) && !credentials.some(credential => isWithin(credential, target))) || sessionFolder?.(target) === true;
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  }
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  export async function requestHostToolApproval(context, request, input, signal) {
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- const owner = runStartedByOwner(context.trust);
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+ const ownerPath = runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust);
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+ // A trusted teammate answers its own provider prompts, as the owner does; sends and payments still ask the owner.
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+ const asksInstallationOwner = !runStartedByOwner(context.trust) && (!ownerPath || input.asksOwner === true);
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  const providerAsked = input.providerAsked === true;
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  const folderScope = request.origin === "outside_project" || request.origin === "sandbox_escape" ? "outside" : "inside";
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- const reportedFolder = owner || folderScope !== "outside" || request.allowedFolder === undefined ? undefined
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+ const reportedFolder = ownerPath || folderScope !== "outside" || request.allowedFolder === undefined ? undefined
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  : nativeCanonicalPath(request.allowedFolder, request.cwd ?? request.workspaceRoot ?? context.workingDirectory ?? "/");
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  const allowedFolder = reportedFolder;
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- const reach = input.reach ?? (!owner && folderScope === "outside" && reportedFolder !== undefined
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+ const reach = input.reach ?? (!ownerPath && folderScope === "outside" && reportedFolder !== undefined
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  ? "outside_folder" : undefined);
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- // Trusted Auto uses the owner's policy inside the agent's folders and on the web. Native provider
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- // prompts, outside-folder requests, sends, payments and server-owned decisions still ask.
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- if (usesOwnerApprovalPolicy(context.trust.runType, context.approvalMode, folderScope) &&
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+ // Provider prompts, sends, payments and server-owned decisions still ask.
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+ if (usesOwnerApprovalPolicy(context.trust.runType) &&
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  !providerAsked && input.asksOwner !== true) {
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  return { allowed: true, outcome: "allowed", cardless: true };
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  }
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ export async function requestHostToolApproval(context, request, input, signal) {
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  }
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  // The server spends an Allow for a send (an email, or a connected-app write) once, so a teammate's
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  // run never reuses one: sending the same again shows a new card.
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- const remembersAllow = !owner && request.emailAction === undefined && request.appAction === undefined;
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+ const remembersAllow = !ownerPath && request.emailAction === undefined && request.appAction === undefined;
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  const approvedEffect = approvedEffectKey(request);
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  if (remembersAllow && context.approvedHostToolEffects?.has(approvedEffect)) {
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  return { allowed: true, outcome: "allowed", cardless: true };
@@ -366,14 +367,15 @@ export async function requestHostToolApproval(context, request, input, signal) {
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  answer = await waitForApproval(context.client.requestApproval({
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  origin: request.origin ?? "provider_ask",
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  effectIdentity: request.effectIdentity, activityId: request.activityId,
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- title: input.title, body: owner ? input.body : `${context.trust.initiatingDisplayName?.trim() || "A teammate"} asked: ${input.body}`.slice(0, 2_000),
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+ title: input.title, body: asksInstallationOwner
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+ ? `${context.trust.initiatingDisplayName?.trim() || "A teammate"} asked: ${input.body}`.slice(0, 2_000) : input.body,
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  toolName: request.toolName, capability: request.capability,
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  effectDetail: sanitizeApprovalText(fullEffect.value, 500), effectFull: fullEffect.value,
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  effectFullTruncated: fullEffect.truncated,
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  ...(command === undefined ? {} : { command }),
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  ...(editSupported ? { canEditCommand: true } : {}),
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  riskLevel: request.origin === "sandbox_escape" || request.origin === "owner_account" ? "high" : request.origin === "network" ? "medium" : "low", availableDecisions: ["approve", "decline", "cancel"],
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- expiresInSeconds: inputRequestLifetimeSeconds, requiresOwnerApproval: !owner,
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+ expiresInSeconds: inputRequestLifetimeSeconds, requiresOwnerApproval: asksInstallationOwner,
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  ...(reach === undefined ? {} : { reachType: reach }),
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  ...(allowedFolder === undefined ? {} : { allowedFolder }),
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  ...(request.appAction === undefined ? {} : { appAction: request.appAction }),
@@ -404,18 +406,18 @@ export async function requestHostToolApproval(context, request, input, signal) {
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  if (answer.decision === "decline") {
405
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  (context.declinedHostToolEffects ??= new Set()).add(declinedEffect);
406
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  }
407
- // A teammate's card offers no provider "don't ask again". A response that asks for the folder (allowFolderForRunRequested,
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+ // An untrusted card offers no provider "don't ask again". A response that asks for the folder (allowFolderForRunRequested,
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  // sent only by a surface that said so) grants it for this invocation, and nothing else is remembered; any other
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  // approval covers only that exact effect.
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- const remember = owner && answer.rememberRequested;
412
+ const remember = ownerPath && answer.rememberRequested;
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  const alwaysAllowFolder = answer.alwaysAllowFolderRequested === true && allowedFolder !== undefined &&
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  canPersistTeammateFolder(allowedFolder);
413
- const folderAllowed = allowed && editedCommand === undefined && !owner && allowedFolder !== undefined &&
415
+ const folderAllowed = allowed && editedCommand === undefined && !ownerPath && allowedFolder !== undefined &&
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  (alwaysAllowFolder || answer.allowFolderForRunRequested === true);
415
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  if (folderAllowed) {
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  const requestedAccess = alwaysAllowFolder ? allowedFolderAccess(request.capability) : "write";
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  const access = alwaysAllowFolder
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- ? teammateAllowedFolders([{ path: allowedFolder, access: requestedAccess }], context.trust.runType, context.approvalMode)[0]?.access ?? requestedAccess
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+ ? teammateAllowedFolders([{ path: allowedFolder, access: requestedAccess }])[0]?.access ?? requestedAccess
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  : requestedAccess;
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  const approved = context.ownerApprovedFolders ??= new Map();
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  if (approved.get(allowedFolder) !== "write")
@@ -435,7 +437,7 @@ export async function requestHostToolApproval(context, request, input, signal) {
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  }
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  /** A teammate's Allow covers that one thing for the rest of the run, so the provider asking again shows no second card. */
437
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  export function rememberTeammateApproval(context, request) {
438
- if (!runStartedByOwner(context.trust))
440
+ if (!runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust))
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  (context.approvedHostToolEffects ??= new Set()).add(approvedEffectKey(request));
440
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  }
441
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  export function declinedEffectKey(request) {
@@ -838,9 +840,9 @@ export function providerResourceId(namespace, value) {
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  const hex = bytes.toString("hex");
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  return `${hex.slice(0, 8)}-${hex.slice(8, 12)}-${hex.slice(12, 16)}-${hex.slice(16, 20)}-${hex.slice(20)}`;
840
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  }
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- /** Native provider questions in a teammate run belong to the installation owner. */
843
+ /** Untrusted and owner-account questions belong to the installation owner. */
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844
  export function teammateQuestion(context, body, origin = "provider_ask") {
843
- return runStartedByOwner(context.trust) ? { body } : {
845
+ return runStartedByOwner(context.trust) || runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust) && origin !== "owner_account" ? { body } : {
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846
  body: `${context.trust.initiatingDisplayName?.trim() || "A teammate"} asked: ${body}`.slice(0, 2_000),
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  authorizedResponderProfileId: context.trust.ownerProfileId,
846
848
  origin,
@@ -857,7 +859,7 @@ const workingFolderListingLimit = 30;
857
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  export async function workingFolderGuidance(event, context, folder) {
858
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  if (folder === undefined || event.event.type !== "message.created" || event.event.scheduledToDoId !== undefined)
859
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  return "";
860
- if (event.stream.isAgentChat && runStartedByOwner(context.trust))
862
+ if (event.stream.isAgentChat && runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust))
861
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  return "";
862
864
  let entries;
863
865
  try {
@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ export class AcpAdapter {
78
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  if (signal.aborted) {
79
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  return { status: "aborted" };
80
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  }
81
- if (context.trust.runType !== "owner")
82
- return { status: "failed", error: { code: "teammate_sandbox_unavailable", message: "This agent only takes requests from its owner." } };
81
+ if (context.trust.runType === "untrusted")
82
+ return { status: "failed", error: { code: "teammate_sandbox_unavailable", message: "This agent can only take requests from people you trust." } };
83
83
  const cwd = context.workingDirectory ?? this.#cwd;
84
84
  const runtime = this.#runtime ?? new AcpStdioRuntime({ config: this.#config, cwd });
85
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  let bridge;
@@ -65,9 +65,10 @@ export type ClaudeQueryInput = {
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  pathToClaudeCodeExecutable?: string;
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  nativeOwnerRun?: () => boolean;
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67
  teammateOptions?: ReturnType<typeof claudeTeammateOptions>;
68
+ blockOwnerAccounts?: boolean;
68
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  };
69
70
  export declare const claudeConnectorManagedSettings: Settings;
70
- export declare const claudeTeammateManagedPolicyReason = "A managed Claude policy blocks teammate runs.";
71
+ export declare const claudeTeammateManagedPolicyReason = "A managed Claude policy blocks requests from people you haven't trusted yet.";
71
72
  export declare const claudeTeammateManagedPolicyCode = "claude_teammate_managed_policy";
72
73
  export declare const claudeTeammateSettingsUnavailableCode = "claude_teammate_settings_unavailable";
73
74
  /**
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ export type ClaudeModelListerInput = {
109
110
  cwd: string;
110
111
  pathToClaudeCodeExecutable?: string;
111
112
  signal: AbortSignal;
112
- /** A probe started while serving a teammate must not load project MCP servers. */
113
+ /** A probe started while serving an untrusted run must not load project MCP servers. */
113
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  teammateMcpIsolation?: true;
114
115
  };
115
116
  export type ClaudeModelLister = (input: ClaudeModelListerInput) => Promise<ModelInfo[]>;
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
1
- import { shortStepName } from "../../step-names.js";
1
+ import { backgroundJobName, shortStepName } from "../../step-names.js";
2
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  import { isWithin } from "../../command-boundaries.js";
3
3
  import { nativeCanonicalPath } from "../../run-folders.js";
4
4
  import { resolveSettings } from "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk";
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { getTeammateToolchain, teammateCredentialPaths, teammateEscapeInstructio
9
9
  import { claudeTeammateStateDirectory } from "../../storage.js";
10
10
  import { createTeammateHome, removeTeammateHome } from "../../teammate-homes.js";
11
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  import { claudeOwnerSettings, claudeRulePath, claudeTeammateOptions } from "./claude-sandbox.js";
12
- import { runStartedByOwner } from "../../run-type.js";
12
+ import { runStartedByOwner, runUsesOwnerPath } from "../../run-type.js";
13
13
  import { runClaudeCloudSetup } from "./claude-cloud-setup.js";
14
14
  import { renameClaudeProfileSession, resolveClaudeProfileSettings } from "./claude-profile-api.js";
15
15
  import { claudeLimitName, claudePlanUsage, planLimitNotice } from "../../plan-usage.js";
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ export const claudeConnectorManagedSettings = {
49
49
  permissions: { allow: ["mcp__showrunner__*"] },
50
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  bashEditDiffEnabled: true,
51
51
  };
52
- export const claudeTeammateManagedPolicyReason = "A managed Claude policy blocks teammate runs.";
52
+ export const claudeTeammateManagedPolicyReason = "A managed Claude policy blocks requests from people you haven't trusted yet.";
53
53
  export const claudeTeammateManagedPolicyCode = "claude_teammate_managed_policy";
54
54
  export const claudeTeammateSettingsUnavailableCode = "claude_teammate_settings_unavailable";
55
55
  /**
@@ -275,10 +275,9 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
275
275
  if (signal.aborted)
276
276
  return { status: "aborted" };
277
277
  const cwd = context.workingDirectory ?? this.#cwd;
278
- let ownerDomains;
279
278
  let projectEnvironment;
280
279
  let restrictions;
281
- if (!runStartedByOwner(context.trust)) {
280
+ if (!runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust)) {
282
281
  const owner = await Promise.resolve().then(() => claudeOwnerSettings(cwd, this.#resolveSettings)).then(value => ({ type: "ready", value }), (error) => ({ type: "unavailable", reason: String(error) }));
283
282
  if (owner.type === "unavailable") {
284
283
  context.logger.warn("claude.teammate_settings_unavailable", { reason: owner.reason, source: "owner_settings" });
@@ -289,7 +288,6 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
289
288
  return { status: "failed", failureAsStatus: true, error: { code: claudeTeammateManagedPolicyCode,
290
289
  message: claudeTeammateManagedPolicyReason } };
291
290
  }
292
- ownerDomains = owner.value.domains;
293
291
  projectEnvironment = owner.value.projectEnvironment;
294
292
  restrictions = owner.value.restrictions;
295
293
  }
@@ -306,16 +304,16 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
306
304
  context.completionRequirements ??= new CompletionRequirements();
307
305
  context.client.completionRequirements = context.completionRequirements;
308
306
  const sessionKey = JSON.stringify([context.installationId, context.sessionId, cwd, context.allowedFolders ?? [],
309
- !runStartedByOwner(context.trust), runStartedByOwner(context.trust),
310
- ...(!runStartedByOwner(context.trust) ? [context.trust.runType, context.invocationId] : [])]);
311
- if ((context.freshProviderSession || !runStartedByOwner(context.trust)) && continuation === undefined)
307
+ !runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust), context.trust.runType,
308
+ ...(!runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust) ? [context.invocationId] : [])]);
309
+ if ((context.freshProviderSession || !runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust)) && continuation === undefined)
312
310
  await this.forceStop(event);
313
311
  let connection = this.#sessions.get(sessionKey);
314
312
  if (connection?.iterator.ended) {
315
313
  this.#sessions.delete(sessionKey);
316
314
  connection = undefined;
317
315
  }
318
- const expectedPermissionMode = claudePermissionMode(context.approvalMode, runStartedByOwner(context.trust) && context.ownerFullAccess === true);
316
+ const expectedPermissionMode = claudePermissionMode(context.approvalMode, runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust) && context.ownerFullAccess === true);
319
317
  if (connection !== undefined && connection.permissionMode !== expectedPermissionMode) {
320
318
  if (connection.session.setPermissionMode === undefined) {
321
319
  await this.forceStop(event);
@@ -338,7 +336,7 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
338
336
  controller,
339
337
  cli: () => connection?.iterator,
340
338
  session: () => activeSession,
341
- owner: runStartedByOwner(context.trust),
339
+ owner: runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust),
342
340
  logger: context.logger,
343
341
  approvalMode: context.approvalMode ?? "ask",
344
342
  permissionMode: () => permissionMode,
@@ -370,7 +368,7 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
370
368
  let sessionId = connection?.sessionId ?? context.externalSessionId ?? undefined;
371
369
  const resumed = sessionId !== undefined;
372
370
  let activeSession = connection?.session;
373
- const providerPermissionMode = () => claudePermissionMode(context.approvalMode, runStartedByOwner(context.trust) && context.ownerFullAccess === true);
371
+ const providerPermissionMode = () => claudePermissionMode(context.approvalMode, runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust) && context.ownerFullAccess === true);
374
372
  let permissionMode = providerPermissionMode();
375
373
  let shellCwd;
376
374
  const title = providerSessionTitle(event);
@@ -383,7 +381,7 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
383
381
  return;
384
382
  }
385
383
  modelFallbackChecked = true;
386
- const options = await this.#listModelsForRun(signal, !runStartedByOwner(context.trust)).catch(() => null);
384
+ const options = await this.#listModelsForRun(signal, !runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust)).catch(() => null);
387
385
  // A listed choice is one the CLI resolves itself, such as a plan-mode or long-context variant.
388
386
  if (options?.some(option => option.id.toLowerCase() === requested.toLowerCase())) {
389
387
  await context.client.reportModel(resolved);
@@ -405,6 +403,8 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
405
403
  const progressActivities = new Map();
406
404
  // Keyed by CLI task id; the CLI wakes the model in this same session when one finishes.
407
405
  const backgroundActivities = new Map();
406
+ // The CLI names a shell the agent didn't describe by its raw command, which is named like a command.
407
+ const undescribedBackgroundCommands = new Set();
408
408
  const settleBackgroundActivities = async (live, outcome) => {
409
409
  for (const [taskId, activityId] of backgroundActivities) {
410
410
  if (live.has(taskId))
@@ -420,7 +420,8 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
420
420
  continue;
421
421
  const activityId = providerResourceId("claude-background", `${context.invocationId}:${task.taskId}`);
422
422
  backgroundActivities.set(task.taskId, activityId);
423
- await context.client.startActivity({ activityId, label: shortStepName(task.description) || "Background job", type: "background" });
423
+ const name = undescribedBackgroundCommands.has(task.description.trim()) ? backgroundJobName(task.description) : shortStepName(task.description);
424
+ await context.client.startActivity({ activityId, label: name || "Background job", type: "background" });
424
425
  }
425
426
  };
426
427
  const unsubscribeBackgroundStop = context.onBackgroundJobStop?.(async (backgroundJobId) => {
@@ -567,7 +568,7 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
567
568
  context.logger.warn("claude.interrupt_settlement_failed", { error: String(error) });
568
569
  }
569
570
  };
570
- // A teammate run's own Claude config folder, removed when the run ends.
571
+ // An untrusted run's Claude config folder, removed when the run ends.
571
572
  let teammateHome;
572
573
  try {
573
574
  chatRuns.add(run);
@@ -576,9 +577,9 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
576
577
  if (connection === undefined)
577
578
  permissionMode = providerPermissionMode();
578
579
  const reasoningEffort = claudeReasoningEffort(context.reasoningEffort);
579
- const teammateOptions = context.trust.runType === "owner" ? undefined : claudeTeammateOptions({
580
- runType: context.trust.runType, configDirectory: teammateHome = createTeammateHome(claudeTeammateStateDirectory),
581
- get mode() { return context.approvalMode; }, cwd, ownerDomains, projectEnvironment, restrictions,
580
+ const teammateOptions = context.trust.runType !== "untrusted" ? undefined : claudeTeammateOptions({
581
+ runType: "untrusted", configDirectory: teammateHome = createTeammateHome(claudeTeammateStateDirectory),
582
+ get mode() { return context.approvalMode; }, cwd, projectEnvironment, restrictions,
582
583
  environment: this.#environment,
583
584
  credentialPaths: this.#teammateCredentialPaths,
584
585
  allowedFolders: context.allowedFolders,
@@ -587,7 +588,7 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
587
588
  },
588
589
  folders: [invocationDownloadDirectory(context), ...(context.outputDirectory === undefined ? [] : [context.outputDirectory.path])],
589
590
  });
590
- // A teammate's sessions and saved tool output live in its own config folder, not the connector's.
591
+ // An untrusted run's sessions and saved tool output live in its own config folder, not the connector's.
591
592
  const teammateConfigDir = teammateOptions?.env?.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR;
592
593
  const queryInput = {
593
594
  environment: this.#environment,
@@ -600,10 +601,11 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
600
601
  ...(context.model === null ? {} : { model: context.model }),
601
602
  ...(reasoningEffort === undefined ? {} : { reasoningEffort }),
602
603
  signal: controller.signal,
603
- nativeOwnerRun: () => runStartedByOwner(context.trust),
604
+ nativeOwnerRun: () => runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust),
605
+ blockOwnerAccounts: !runStartedByOwner(context.trust),
604
606
  permissionMode: providerPermissionMode(),
605
- appendSystemPrompt: `${describeVocabulary()}\n\n${claudeBackgroundWorkGuidance}${runStartedByOwner(context.trust) ? "" :
606
- `\n\n${teammateEscapeInstruction(context.trust.runType, "claude")}`}`,
607
+ appendSystemPrompt: `${describeVocabulary()}\n\n${claudeBackgroundWorkGuidance}${runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust) ? "" :
608
+ `\n\n${teammateEscapeInstruction("claude")}`}`,
607
609
  ...(teammateOptions === undefined ? {} : { teammateOptions }),
608
610
  ...(this.#pathToClaudeCodeExecutable === undefined ? {} : {
609
611
  pathToClaudeCodeExecutable: this.#pathToClaudeCodeExecutable,
@@ -631,7 +633,7 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
631
633
  // The owner started the run that saves the agent's own wake link, so that needs no approval.
632
634
  if (name !== undefined || toolName === claudeWakeLinkTool || isClaudeAgentSpawn(toolName))
633
635
  return true;
634
- const allowedFolder = runStartedByOwner(context.trust) ? undefined : claudeAllowedFolder(providerOptions, { toolName, input, workspaceRoot: cwd, cwd: shellCwd });
636
+ const allowedFolder = runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust) ? undefined : claudeAllowedFolder(providerOptions, { toolName, input, workspaceRoot: cwd, cwd: shellCwd });
635
637
  const result = await approve({ toolName, input, toolUseId, sessionId, providerAsked, providerRequestId: providerOptions?.requestId, providerReason: providerOptions?.decisionReason, workspaceRoot: cwd, ...(shellCwd === undefined ? {} : { cwd: shellCwd }),
636
638
  ...(teammateConfigDir === undefined ? {} : { configDir: teammateConfigDir }),
637
639
  ...(allowedFolder === undefined ? {} : { allowedFolder }),
@@ -717,7 +719,7 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
717
719
  setWakeLink: async (...args) => { await binding.ready; controller.signal.throwIfAborted(); return binding.current.setWakeLink(...args); },
718
720
  });
719
721
  connection = { session, iterator: new ClaudeSessionStream(session.events, () => session.endInput?.()), controller, binding, tasks: [],
720
- owner: runStartedByOwner(context.trust), logger: context.logger, permissionMode, requestedModel: context.model,
722
+ owner: runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust), logger: context.logger, permissionMode, requestedModel: context.model,
721
723
  ...(reasoningEffort === undefined ? {} : { requestedEffort: reasoningEffort }) };
722
724
  connection.iterator.observer = observeSessionEvent;
723
725
  }
@@ -842,6 +844,11 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
842
844
  else if (item.type === "file.edit.started") {
843
845
  if (item.name === "Bash")
844
846
  bashFileChanges.start(item.toolUseId);
847
+ // A foreground command can move to the background later, so every undescribed one is kept.
848
+ if (item.name === "Bash" && typeof item.input.command === "string" &&
849
+ (typeof item.input.description !== "string" || item.input.description.trim().length === 0)) {
850
+ undescribedBackgroundCommands.add(item.input.command.trim());
851
+ }
845
852
  changedFiles.startClaude(item.toolUseId, item.name, item.input);
846
853
  }
847
854
  else if (item.type === "file.edit.completed") {
@@ -1054,7 +1061,7 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
1054
1061
  // Renaming appends to the session's transcript, so it waits until the CLI has finished
1055
1062
  // this turn's writes, but the turn doesn't wait on it. A new session already started
1056
1063
  // under this title.
1057
- // The SDK renames only sessions in the connector's own config folder, so a teammate's session
1064
+ // The SDK renames only sessions in the connector's own config folder, so an untrusted session
1058
1065
  // keeps its first title.
1059
1066
  const renamedSessionId = sessionId;
1060
1067
  void applyProviderSessionTitle(context.state, context.logger, renamedSessionId, title, resumed && teammateConfigDir === undefined ? (next) => this.#renameSession(renamedSessionId, next, cwd) : () => Promise.resolve());
@@ -1113,8 +1120,8 @@ export class ClaudeAdapter {
1113
1120
  signal.removeEventListener("abort", stop);
1114
1121
  clearTimeout(stopTimer);
1115
1122
  if (connection !== undefined) {
1116
- // Each teammate query applies this invocation's box while resuming the saved conversation.
1117
- if (!runStartedByOwner(context.trust))
1123
+ // A run that started untrusted lives in its own config folder, removed below, so it is never kept.
1124
+ if (teammateHome !== undefined)
1118
1125
  retained = false;
1119
1126
  if (retained) {
1120
1127
  connection.permissionMode = permissionMode;
@@ -1641,7 +1648,7 @@ export const defaultClaudeQuery = (input, query = sdkQuery, now = Date.now, envi
1641
1648
  append: input.appendSystemPrompt,
1642
1649
  },
1643
1650
  managedSettings: claudeConnectorManagedSettings,
1644
- disallowedTools: [claudeHiddenConnectorTools, ...claudeSchedulingTools],
1651
+ disallowedTools: [claudeHiddenConnectorTools, ...claudeSchedulingTools, ...(input.blockOwnerAccounts === true ? ["mcp__claude_ai_*"] : [])],
1645
1652
  ...(input.teammateOptions === undefined ? {} : {
1646
1653
  ...input.teammateOptions,
1647
1654
  env: claudeSessionEnvironment(input.teammateOptions.env ?? {}),
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ import os from "node:os";
3
3
  import path from "node:path";
4
4
  import { providerResourceId, consequenceFor, hostToolEffectIdentity, invocationRunScope, rememberTeammateApproval, requestHostToolApproval } from "../../adapter.js";
5
5
  import { nativeCanonicalPath, pathLeavesRunScope } from "../../run-folders.js";
6
- import { isOwnerAccountMcpTool, runStartedByOwner } from "../../run-type.js";
6
+ import { isOwnerAccountMcpTool, runUsesOwnerPath } from "../../run-type.js";
7
7
  import { claudeArtifactApproval, claudeRoutineApproval } from "./claude-artifact-tools.js";
8
8
  import { claudeWakeLinkTool, showrunnerToolName } from "./claude-message-mapper.js";
9
9
  export async function handleClaudePermissionResult(request, context, signal) {
10
- const hostRequest = { ...claudeHostRequest(request), origin: runStartedByOwner(context.trust) ? "provider_ask"
10
+ const hostRequest = { ...claudeHostRequest(request), origin: runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust) ? "provider_ask"
11
11
  : isOwnerAccountMcpTool(request.toolName) ? "owner_account"
12
12
  : claudeCallLeavesRunScope(request, context) ? "outside_project"
13
13
  : request.toolName === "Bash" && request.input?.dangerouslyDisableSandbox === true ? "sandbox_escape"
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ const claudeReadTools = new Set(["read", "glob", "grep", "ls", "notebookread"]);
78
78
  * A tool from the owner's own account or MCP config (isOwnerAccountMcpTool) always reaches beyond them.
79
79
  */
80
80
  export function claudeCallLeavesRunScope(request, context) {
81
- if (runStartedByOwner(context.trust) || claudeInternalTools.has(request.toolName) ||
81
+ if (runUsesOwnerPath(context.trust) || claudeInternalTools.has(request.toolName) ||
82
82
  showrunnerToolName(request.toolName) !== undefined || request.toolName === claudeWakeLinkTool)
83
83
  return false;
84
84
  if (isOwnerAccountMcpTool(request.toolName))
@@ -1,17 +1,15 @@
1
1
  import { resolveSettings, type Options, type Settings } from "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk";
2
2
  import { type AllowedFolder, type TeammateToolchain } from "../../teammate-sandbox.js";
3
- import type { RunType } from "../../run-type.js";
4
3
  /** Preserve the connector's Claude provider and account selection without restoring its unrelated environment. */
5
4
  export declare function claudeIdentityEnvironment(environment: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): Record<string, string>;
6
5
  export declare function claudeTeammateOptions(input: {
7
- runType: Exclude<RunType, "owner">;
6
+ runType: "untrusted";
8
7
  configDirectory: string;
9
8
  mode?: "ask" | "auto";
10
9
  cwd: string;
11
10
  folders: string[];
12
11
  allowedFolders?: readonly AllowedFolder[];
13
12
  runAllowedFolders?: readonly AllowedFolder[];
14
- ownerDomains?: string[];
15
13
  toolchain?: TeammateToolchain;
16
14
  environment?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
17
15
  credentialPaths?: readonly string[];
@@ -30,12 +28,10 @@ export declare function claudeRulePath(file: string, behavior: "allow"): string
30
28
  /** Public operating-system and developer-tool files needed by commands inside a root-denied sandbox. */
31
29
  export declare function claudeRuntimeReadPaths(platform?: NodeJS.Platform): string[];
32
30
  /**
33
- * The owner's own allowed sites, the variables the project's and local settings put in Claude Code's environment, and
34
- * whether an admin settings tier is present: that tier can drop the sandbox and hook locks the connector passes, so a
35
- * teammate run cannot share a process with it.
31
+ * The variables the project's and local settings put in Claude Code's environment, and whether an admin settings tier
32
+ * is present: that tier can drop the sandbox and hook locks the connector passes, so an untrusted run cannot share a process with it.
36
33
  */
37
34
  export declare function claudeOwnerSettings(cwd: string, resolve?: typeof resolveSettings): Promise<{
38
- domains: string[] | undefined;
39
35
  projectEnvironment: string[];
40
36
  restrictions: Settings;
41
37
  managedPolicy: boolean;
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import { nativeTemporaryDirectory } from "../../native-sandbox-config.js";
4
4
  import { nativeCanonicalPath } from "../../run-folders.js";
5
5
  import { darwinBuildEntries, teammateCredentialPaths, teammateEnvironment, teammateAllowedFolders, getTeammateToolchain } from "../../teammate-sandbox.js";
6
6
  import { claudeTeammateEnvironment } from "./claude-teammate-home.js";
7
- const localHosts = ["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"];
8
7
  const claudeIdentityVariables = new Set([
9
8
  "CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR", "CLAUDE_SECURESTORAGE_CONFIG_DIR", "CLAUDE_SESSION_INGRESS_TOKEN_FILE",
10
9
  "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", "CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ACCESS_TOKEN",
@@ -38,10 +37,9 @@ export function claudeTeammateOptions(input) {
38
37
  const darwin = toolchain.darwinUserDirectories;
39
38
  const buildWrites = [...(toolchain.buildCaches ?? []), ...(toolchain.derivedData === undefined ? [] : [toolchain.derivedData]), ...(darwin === undefined ? [] : claudeDarwinWrites(darwin))];
40
39
  const credentialPaths = input.credentialPaths ?? teammateCredentialPaths(toolchain.home, environment, input.cwd);
41
- const effectiveFolders = [...teammateAllowedFolders(input.allowedFolders ?? [], input.runType, input.mode), ...input.runAllowedFolders ?? []];
40
+ const effectiveFolders = [...teammateAllowedFolders(input.allowedFolders ?? []), ...input.runAllowedFolders ?? []];
42
41
  const writableFolders = effectiveFolders.filter(folder => folder.access === "write").map(folder => folder.path);
43
42
  const readOnlyFolders = effectiveFolders.filter(folder => folder.access === "read").map(folder => folder.path);
44
- const trusted = input.runType === "trusted";
45
43
  const sandbox = {
46
44
  enabled: true, failIfUnavailable: true, autoAllowBashIfSandboxed: true, allowUnsandboxedCommands: false,
47
45
  filesystem: {
@@ -59,8 +57,8 @@ export function claudeTeammateOptions(input) {
59
57
  .map(name => ({ name, mode: "deny" })), ...input.restrictions?.sandbox?.credentials?.envVars ?? []],
60
58
  },
61
59
  // The provider cannot distinguish a port this run bound from an owner's existing loopback service.
62
- network: { allowedDomains: trusted && input.mode === "auto" ? [...new Set([...input.ownerDomains ?? ["*"], ...localHosts])] : trusted ? [...localHosts] : [],
63
- allowLocalBinding: trusted,
60
+ network: { allowedDomains: [],
61
+ allowLocalBinding: false,
64
62
  // Chrome's single-instance socket lives in the box scratch folder.
65
63
  allowUnixSockets: [scratch],
66
64
  ...(input.restrictions?.sandbox?.network?.deniedDomains === undefined ? {}
@@ -74,7 +72,7 @@ export function claudeTeammateOptions(input) {
74
72
  const nativeAllows = ["mcp__showrunner__*", ...readOnlyFolders.flatMap(folder => {
75
73
  const rulePath = claudeRulePath(folder, "allow");
76
74
  return rulePath === undefined ? [] : [`Read(${rulePath}/**)`];
77
- }), ...trusted && input.mode === "auto" ? ["WebFetch", "WebSearch"] : []];
75
+ })];
78
76
  const claudeMdExcludes = ["**/CLAUDE.local.md", ...claudeInstructionsAbove(input.cwd)];
79
77
  return {
80
78
  // Project instructions load natively. Project and local permission grants do not; their restrictions are copied
@@ -146,15 +144,13 @@ function claudeDarwinWrites(directories) {
146
144
  return [...entries.caches, `${entries.replacementItems}/${entries.replacementPrefix}**`, `${directories.temp}/${entries.scratchPrefix}**`];
147
145
  }
148
146
  /**
149
- * The owner's own allowed sites, the variables the project's and local settings put in Claude Code's environment, and
150
- * whether an admin settings tier is present: that tier can drop the sandbox and hook locks the connector passes, so a
151
- * teammate run cannot share a process with it.
147
+ * The variables the project's and local settings put in Claude Code's environment, and whether an admin settings tier
148
+ * is present: that tier can drop the sandbox and hook locks the connector passes, so an untrusted run cannot share a process with it.
152
149
  */
153
150
  export async function claudeOwnerSettings(cwd, resolve = resolveSettings) {
154
- const { effective, sources } = await resolve({ cwd, settingSources: ["user"] });
151
+ const { sources } = await resolve({ cwd, settingSources: ["user"] });
155
152
  const project = await resolve({ cwd, settingSources: ["project", "local"] });
156
- return { domains: effective.sandbox?.network?.allowedDomains,
157
- projectEnvironment: Object.keys(project.effective.env ?? {}),
153
+ return { projectEnvironment: Object.keys(project.effective.env ?? {}),
158
154
  restrictions: claudeRestrictions(project.effective),
159
155
  managedPolicy: sources.some(source => source.source === "managed" && Object.keys(source.settings).length > 0) };
160
156
  }