ship-safe 6.1.1 → 6.2.0

package/cli/agents/supply-chain-agent.js

@@ -1,507 +1,650 @@
-/**
- * SupplyChainAudit Agent
- * =======================
- *
- * Comprehensive supply chain security analysis.
- * Goes beyond npm audit: checks for dependency confusion,
- * typosquatting, malicious install scripts, lockfile integrity,
- * EPSS scoring, and KEV flagging.
- */
-
-import fs from 'fs';
-import path from 'path';
-import { BaseAgent, createFinding } from './base-agent.js';
-
-// Common packages that are often typosquatted
-const POPULAR_PACKAGES = [
-  'lodash', 'express', 'react', 'axios', 'moment', 'request',
-  'chalk', 'commander', 'debug', 'uuid', 'dotenv', 'cors',
-  'body-parser', 'jsonwebtoken', 'bcrypt', 'mongoose', 'sequelize',
-  'webpack', 'babel', 'eslint', 'prettier', 'typescript',
-  'next', 'nuxt', 'svelte', 'vue', 'angular',
-];
-
-// Well-known packages that happen to be close to other popular names
-// (not typosquats — verified legitimate packages)
-const KNOWN_SAFE = new Set([
-  'ora', 'got', 'ink', 'yup', 'joi', 'ava', 'tap', 'npm', 'nwb',
-  'pug', 'koa', 'hap', 'ejs', 'csv', 'ws', 'pg', 'ms',
-]);
-
-// Known malicious package name patterns
-const SUSPICIOUS_NAME_PATTERNS = [
-  /^@[^/]+\/[^/]+-[0-9]+$/,       // @scope/package-123 (random suffix)
-  /^[a-z]+-[a-z]+-[a-z]+-[a-z]+$/, // overly-generic multi-word names
-];
-
-export class SupplyChainAudit extends BaseAgent {
-  constructor() {
-    super('SupplyChainAudit', 'Comprehensive supply chain security audit', 'supply-chain');
-  }
-
-  async analyze(context) {
-    const { rootPath } = context;
-    const findings = [];
-
-    // ── 1. Check package.json ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
-    const pkgPath = path.join(rootPath, 'package.json');
-    if (fs.existsSync(pkgPath)) {
-      try {
-        const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf-8'));
-        const allDeps = {
-          ...(pkg.dependencies || {}),
-          ...(pkg.devDependencies || {}),
-          ...(pkg.optionalDependencies || {}),
-        };
-
-        // ── Typosquatting detection ───────────────────────────────────────────
-        for (const depName of Object.keys(allDeps)) {
-          if (KNOWN_SAFE.has(depName)) continue;
-          for (const popular of POPULAR_PACKAGES) {
-            const distance = this.levenshtein(depName, popular);
-            if (distance > 0 && distance <= 2 && depName !== popular) {
-              findings.push(createFinding({
-                file: pkgPath,
-                line: 0,
-                severity: 'high',
-                category: 'supply-chain',
-                rule: 'TYPOSQUAT_SUSPECT',
-                title: `Possible Typosquat: "${depName}" (similar to "${popular}")`,
-                description: `Package "${depName}" is ${distance} character(s) away from popular package "${popular}". This could be a typosquatting attempt.`,
-                matched: depName,
-                fix: `Verify this is the intended package. Did you mean "${popular}"?`,
-              }));
-            }
-          }
-        }
-
-        // ── Deprecated/suspicious version pins ───────────────────────────────
-        for (const [name, version] of Object.entries(allDeps)) {
-          if (typeof version === 'string' && version.startsWith('git+')) {
-            findings.push(createFinding({
-              file: pkgPath,
-              line: 0,
-              severity: 'high',
-              category: 'supply-chain',
-              rule: 'GIT_DEPENDENCY',
-              title: `Git Dependency: ${name}`,
-              description: `"${name}" is installed from a git URL. Git dependencies bypass registry integrity checks.`,
-              matched: `${name}: ${version}`,
-              fix: 'Pin to a specific commit hash or use a published npm package version',
-            }));
-          }
-
-          if (typeof version === 'string' && version.startsWith('http')) {
-            findings.push(createFinding({
-              file: pkgPath,
-              line: 0,
-              severity: 'critical',
-              category: 'supply-chain',
-              rule: 'URL_DEPENDENCY',
-              title: `URL Dependency: ${name}`,
-              description: `"${name}" is installed from a URL. This bypasses npm registry and integrity checks.`,
-              matched: `${name}: ${version}`,
-              fix: 'Publish the package to npm or use a private registry',
-            }));
-          }
-
-          if (typeof version === 'string' && version === '*') {
-            findings.push(createFinding({
-              file: pkgPath,
-              line: 0,
-              severity: 'high',
-              category: 'supply-chain',
-              rule: 'WILDCARD_VERSION',
-              title: `Wildcard Version: ${name}`,
-              description: `"${name}" uses "*" version which accepts any version including malicious updates.`,
-              matched: `${name}: *`,
-              fix: 'Pin to a specific version or use a caret range: "^x.y.z"',
-            }));
-          }
-        }
-
-        // ── Install scripts ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
-        if (pkg.scripts) {
-          const dangerousScripts = ['preinstall', 'postinstall', 'preuninstall', 'postuninstall'];
-          for (const script of dangerousScripts) {
-            if (pkg.scripts[script]) {
-              const cmd = pkg.scripts[script];
-              const suspicious = /curl|wget|bash|sh\s|powershell|eval|base64|nc\s|ncat/i.test(cmd);
-              if (suspicious) {
-                findings.push(createFinding({
-                  file: pkgPath,
-                  line: 0,
-                  severity: 'critical',
-                  category: 'supply-chain',
-                  rule: 'SUSPICIOUS_INSTALL_SCRIPT',
-                  title: `Suspicious ${script} Script`,
-                  description: `The ${script} script contains potentially dangerous commands: ${cmd.slice(0, 100)}`,
-                  matched: cmd,
-                  fix: 'Review and remove suspicious install scripts',
-                }));
-              }
-            }
-          }
-        }
-
-      } catch { /* skip parse errors */ }
-    }
-
-    // ── 2. Dependency confusion detection ─────────────────────────────────────
-    if (fs.existsSync(pkgPath)) {
-      try {
-        const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf-8'));
-        const allDeps = {
-          ...(pkg.dependencies || {}),
-          ...(pkg.devDependencies || {}),
-        };
-
-        // Check for scoped packages without registry pinning
-        const scopedPkgs = Object.keys(allDeps).filter(n => n.startsWith('@'));
-        if (scopedPkgs.length > 0) {
-          const npmrcPath = path.join(rootPath, '.npmrc');
-          const yarnrcPath = path.join(rootPath, '.yarnrc');
-          const yarnrcYmlPath = path.join(rootPath, '.yarnrc.yml');
-          const hasRegistryConfig = [npmrcPath, yarnrcPath, yarnrcYmlPath].some(p => {
-            if (!fs.existsSync(p)) return false;
-            const content = this.readFile(p) || '';
-            // Check if any scope is pinned to a registry
-            return /@[^:]+:registry/i.test(content) || /npmRegistryServer/i.test(content);
-          });
-
-          // Extract unique scopes
-          const scopes = [...new Set(scopedPkgs.map(n => n.split('/')[0]))];
-          // Check if this looks like an internal scope (not well-known public ones)
-          const publicScopes = new Set([
-            '@types', '@babel', '@eslint', '@jest', '@testing-library',
-            '@react-native', '@angular', '@vue', '@nuxt', '@next',
-            '@emotion', '@mui', '@radix-ui', '@tanstack', '@trpc',
-            '@prisma', '@supabase', '@aws-sdk', '@azure', '@google-cloud',
-            '@octokit', '@sentry', '@stripe', '@anthropic-ai', '@openai',
-          ]);
-          const internalScopes = scopes.filter(s => !publicScopes.has(s));
-
-          if (internalScopes.length > 0 && !hasRegistryConfig) {
-            findings.push(createFinding({
-              file: pkgPath,
-              line: 0,
-              severity: 'high',
-              category: 'supply-chain',
-              rule: 'DEPCONF_NO_SCOPE_REGISTRY',
-              title: `Scoped Packages Without Registry Pin: ${internalScopes.join(', ')}`,
-              description: `Scoped packages (${internalScopes.join(', ')}) found without a .npmrc pinning the scope to a private registry. An attacker could claim the scope on the public npm registry.`,
-              matched: internalScopes.join(', '),
-              confidence: 'medium',
-              fix: 'Add to .npmrc: @yourscope:registry=https://your-private-registry.com/',
-            }));
-          }
-        }
-
-        // Check for suspicious install scripts in dependencies
-        const nodeModulesPath = path.join(rootPath, 'node_modules');
-        if (fs.existsSync(nodeModulesPath)) {
-          for (const depName of Object.keys(allDeps).slice(0, 50)) {
-            const depPkgPath = path.join(nodeModulesPath, depName, 'package.json');
-            if (!fs.existsSync(depPkgPath)) continue;
-            try {
-              const depPkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(depPkgPath, 'utf-8'));
-              const scripts = depPkg.scripts || {};
-              for (const hook of ['preinstall', 'install', 'postinstall']) {
-                const cmd = scripts[hook];
-                if (!cmd) continue;
-                if (/(?:curl|wget|powershell|base64\s|eval\s|nc\s|ncat|\.sh\b)/i.test(cmd)) {
-                  findings.push(createFinding({
-                    file: depPkgPath,
-                    line: 0,
-                    severity: 'critical',
-                    category: 'supply-chain',
-                    rule: 'DEPCONF_SUSPICIOUS_INSTALL_SCRIPT',
-                    title: `Suspicious ${hook} in ${depName}`,
-                    description: `Dependency "${depName}" has a suspicious ${hook} script: ${cmd.slice(0, 120)}`,
-                    matched: cmd.slice(0, 200),
-                    fix: 'Review the script. If untrusted, remove the dependency or use npm with --ignore-scripts',
-                  }));
-                }
-              }
-            } catch { /* skip */ }
-          }
-        }
-      } catch { /* skip */ }
-    }
-
-    // ── 3. Check lockfile integrity ── ───────────────────────────────────────────
-    const lockFiles = [
-      { file: 'package-lock.json', manager: 'npm' },
-      { file: 'yarn.lock', manager: 'yarn' },
-      { file: 'pnpm-lock.yaml', manager: 'pnpm' },
-      { file: 'bun.lockb', manager: 'bun' },
-    ];
-
-    const hasPackageJson = fs.existsSync(pkgPath);
-    let hasLockfile = false;
-
-    for (const { file, manager } of lockFiles) {
-      if (fs.existsSync(path.join(rootPath, file))) {
-        hasLockfile = true;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (hasPackageJson && !hasLockfile) {
-      findings.push(createFinding({
-        file: pkgPath,
-        line: 0,
-        severity: 'high',
-        category: 'supply-chain',
-        rule: 'MISSING_LOCKFILE',
-        title: 'No Lock File Found',
-        description: 'No package-lock.json, yarn.lock, or pnpm-lock.yaml found. Without a lockfile, installs are non-deterministic and vulnerable to dependency confusion.',
-        matched: 'package.json without lockfile',
-        fix: 'Run npm install, yarn install, or pnpm install to generate a lockfile, then commit it',
-      }));
-    }
-
-    // ── 4. Check .npmrc for security settings ─────────────────────────────────
-    const npmrcPath = path.join(rootPath, '.npmrc');
-    if (fs.existsSync(npmrcPath)) {
-      const content = this.readFile(npmrcPath) || '';
-      if (content.includes('ignore-scripts=true')) {
-        // Good — scripts are disabled
-      }
-      if (content.includes('registry=') && !content.includes('registry=https://registry.npmjs.org')) {
-        findings.push(createFinding({
-          file: npmrcPath,
-          line: 0,
-          severity: 'medium',
-          category: 'supply-chain',
-          rule: 'CUSTOM_REGISTRY',
-          title: 'Custom NPM Registry Configured',
-          description: 'A custom npm registry is configured. Verify it is trusted and uses HTTPS.',
-          matched: content.match(/registry=.*/)?.[0] || '',
-          confidence: 'medium',
-          fix: 'Verify the registry URL is trusted and uses HTTPS',
-        }));
-      }
-    }
-
-    // ── 5. Package behavioral signals (Socket-style) ─────────────────────────
-    if (fs.existsSync(pkgPath)) {
-      try {
-        const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf-8'));
-        const allDeps = {
-          ...(pkg.dependencies || {}),
-          ...(pkg.devDependencies || {}),
-        };
-
-        // Scan node_modules for behavioral red flags
-        const nodeModulesPath = path.join(rootPath, 'node_modules');
-        if (fs.existsSync(nodeModulesPath)) {
-          for (const depName of Object.keys(allDeps).slice(0, 50)) {
-            const depDir = path.join(nodeModulesPath, depName);
-            const depPkgPath = path.join(depDir, 'package.json');
-            if (!fs.existsSync(depPkgPath)) continue;
-            try {
-              const depPkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(depPkgPath, 'utf-8'));
-
-              // Check for postinstall scripts with network/eval calls
-              const scripts = depPkg.scripts || {};
-              for (const hook of ['preinstall', 'install', 'postinstall']) {
-                const cmd = scripts[hook];
-                if (!cmd) continue;
-                if (/node\s+-e|node\s+--eval/.test(cmd)) {
-                  findings.push(createFinding({
-                    file: depPkgPath,
-                    line: 0,
-                    severity: 'high',
-                    category: 'supply-chain',
-                    rule: 'BEHAVIORAL_INLINE_EVAL',
-                    title: `Inline Code Execution in ${hook}: ${depName}`,
-                    description: `Dependency "${depName}" runs inline Node.js code during ${hook}. This is a common pattern in malicious packages.`,
-                    matched: cmd.slice(0, 200),
-                    fix: 'Review the inline code. Consider using --ignore-scripts or removing the dependency.',
-                  }));
-                }
-              }
-            } catch { /* skip */ }
-          }
-        }
-
-        // Detect obfuscated code patterns in dependencies
-        const codeFiles = (context.files || []).filter(f =>
-          f.includes('node_modules') &&
-          !f.includes('node_modules/.cache') &&
-          path.extname(f).toLowerCase() === '.js' &&
-          !path.basename(f).endsWith('.min.js')
-        ).slice(0, 30); // Sample up to 30 files
-
-        for (const file of codeFiles) {
-          const content = this.readFile(file);
-          if (!content || content.length < 100) continue;
-
-          // Excessive hex encoding
-          const hexMatches = (content.match(/\\x[0-9a-fA-F]{2}/g) || []).length;
-          if (hexMatches > 20) {
-            findings.push(createFinding({
-              file,
-              line: 1,
-              severity: 'high',
-              category: 'supply-chain',
-              rule: 'BEHAVIORAL_HEX_OBFUSCATION',
-              title: 'Obfuscated Code: Excessive Hex Encoding',
-              description: `File contains ${hexMatches} hex-encoded sequences. Common in malicious packages trying to hide payload.`,
-              matched: `${hexMatches} hex sequences detected`,
-              fix: 'Inspect the deobfuscated code. Consider removing this dependency.',
-            }));
-          }
-
-          // Excessive String.fromCharCode
-          const charCodeMatches = (content.match(/String\.fromCharCode/g) || []).length;
-          if (charCodeMatches > 5) {
-            findings.push(createFinding({
-              file,
-              line: 1,
-              severity: 'high',
-              category: 'supply-chain',
-              rule: 'BEHAVIORAL_CHARCODE_OBFUSCATION',
-              title: 'Obfuscated Code: Excessive String.fromCharCode',
-              description: `File contains ${charCodeMatches} String.fromCharCode calls. Common obfuscation technique in malicious packages.`,
-              matched: `${charCodeMatches} String.fromCharCode calls`,
-              fix: 'Inspect the deobfuscated code. Consider removing this dependency.',
-            }));
-          }
-
-          // Base64 decode chains
-          const base64Matches = (content.match(/Buffer\.from\s*\([^,]+,\s*['"]base64['"]\)/g) || []).length;
-          if (base64Matches > 3) {
-            findings.push(createFinding({
-              file,
-              line: 1,
-              severity: 'medium',
-              category: 'supply-chain',
-              rule: 'BEHAVIORAL_BASE64_DECODE',
-              title: 'Suspicious: Multiple Base64 Decode Operations',
-              description: `File contains ${base64Matches} base64 decode operations. May indicate hidden payload.`,
-              matched: `${base64Matches} base64 decode operations`,
-              confidence: 'medium',
-              fix: 'Review what data is being decoded. Legitimate use is possible but warrants inspection.',
-            }));
-          }
-        }
-
-        // Detect unused dependencies (in package.json but never imported)
-        const projectFiles = (context.files || []).filter(f =>
-          !f.includes('node_modules') &&
-          ['.js', '.jsx', '.ts', '.tsx', '.mjs', '.cjs'].includes(path.extname(f).toLowerCase())
-        );
-
-        if (projectFiles.length > 0 && projectFiles.length < 500) {
-          const allImports = new Set();
-          for (const file of projectFiles) {
-            const content = this.readFile(file);
-            if (!content) continue;
-            // Capture import/require module names
-            const importMatches = content.matchAll(/(?:from\s+['"]([^'"]+)['"]|require\s*\(\s*['"]([^'"]+)['"]\s*\))/g);
-            for (const m of importMatches) {
-              const mod = (m[1] || m[2] || '').split('/')[0]; // Get package name (not subpath)
-              if (mod && !mod.startsWith('.')) allImports.add(mod);
-              // Handle scoped packages
-              const fullMod = m[1] || m[2] || '';
-              if (fullMod.startsWith('@')) {
-                const scopedPkg = fullMod.split('/').slice(0, 2).join('/');
-                allImports.add(scopedPkg);
-              }
-            }
-          }
-
-          const prodDeps = Object.keys(pkg.dependencies || {});
-          for (const dep of prodDeps) {
-            if (!allImports.has(dep) && !dep.startsWith('@types/')) {
-              findings.push(createFinding({
-                file: pkgPath,
-                line: 0,
-                severity: 'low',
-                category: 'supply-chain',
-                rule: 'UNUSED_DEPENDENCY',
-                title: `Unused Dependency: ${dep}`,
-                description: `"${dep}" is in dependencies but never imported in project code. Unused dependencies increase attack surface.`,
-                matched: dep,
-                confidence: 'low',
-                fix: `Remove if unused: npm uninstall ${dep}`,
-              }));
-            }
-          }
-        }
-
-      } catch { /* skip */ }
-    }
-
-    // ── 6. Check Python requirements ──────────────────────────────────────────
-    const reqPath = path.join(rootPath, 'requirements.txt');
-    if (fs.existsSync(reqPath)) {
-      const content = this.readFile(reqPath) || '';
-      const lines = content.split('\n');
-      for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
-        const line = lines[i].trim();
-        if (!line || line.startsWith('#')) continue;
-
-        // Unpinned versions
-        if (!line.includes('==') && !line.includes('>=') && !line.includes('~=') && !line.includes('@')) {
-          findings.push(createFinding({
-            file: reqPath,
-            line: i + 1,
-            severity: 'medium',
-            category: 'supply-chain',
-            rule: 'UNPINNED_PYTHON_DEP',
-            title: `Unpinned Python Dependency: ${line}`,
-            description: 'Python dependency without version pin. Pin to a specific version for reproducible builds.',
-            matched: line,
-            fix: `Pin version: ${line}==x.y.z`,
-          }));
-        }
-
-        // Git/URL dependencies
-        if (line.includes('git+') || line.startsWith('http')) {
-          findings.push(createFinding({
-            file: reqPath,
-            line: i + 1,
-            severity: 'high',
-            category: 'supply-chain',
-            rule: 'GIT_PYTHON_DEP',
-            title: `Git/URL Python Dependency: ${line.slice(0, 60)}`,
-            description: 'Installing from git/URL bypasses PyPI integrity checks.',
-            matched: line,
-            fix: 'Publish to PyPI or pin to a specific commit hash',
-          }));
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-    return findings;
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Simple Levenshtein distance for typosquatting detection.
-   */
-  levenshtein(a, b) {
-    if (a.length === 0) return b.length;
-    if (b.length === 0) return a.length;
-
-    const matrix = [];
-    for (let i = 0; i <= b.length; i++) matrix[i] = [i];
-    for (let j = 0; j <= a.length; j++) matrix[0][j] = j;
-
-    for (let i = 1; i <= b.length; i++) {
-      for (let j = 1; j <= a.length; j++) {
-        const cost = b[i - 1] === a[j - 1] ? 0 : 1;
-        matrix[i][j] = Math.min(
-          matrix[i - 1][j] + 1,
-          matrix[i][j - 1] + 1,
-          matrix[i - 1][j - 1] + cost
-        );
-      }
-    }
-
-    return matrix[b.length][a.length];
-  }
-}
-
-export default SupplyChainAudit;
+/**
+ * SupplyChainAudit Agent
+ * =======================
+ *
+ * Comprehensive supply chain security analysis.
+ * Goes beyond npm audit: checks for dependency confusion,
+ * typosquatting, malicious install scripts, lockfile integrity,
+ * EPSS scoring, and KEV flagging.
+ */
+
+import fs from 'fs';
+import path from 'path';
+import { BaseAgent, createFinding } from './base-agent.js';
+
+// =============================================================================
+// KNOWN-COMPROMISED PACKAGE IOC LIST
+// Source: TeamPCP/CanisterWorm campaign (March 2026) + prior incidents
+// Format: { name, badVersions: [exact], note }
+// =============================================================================
+const COMPROMISED_PACKAGES = [
+  {
+    name: 'litellm',
+    badVersions: ['1.82.7', '1.82.8'],
+    note: 'TeamPCP supply chain attack (Mar 24 2026). Multi-stage credential stealer targeting SSH keys, cloud tokens, and AI API keys.',
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'axios',
+    badVersions: ['1.8.2'],
+    note: 'TeamPCP/CanisterWorm campaign (Mar 31 2026). Malicious publish delivered a Remote Access Trojan with persistence.',
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'telnyx',
+    badVersions: ['2.1.5'],
+    note: 'TeamPCP campaign (Mar 27 2026). Compromised PyPI release exfiltrated credentials.',
+  },
+];
+
+// Packages that have no reason to depend on ICP/Internet Computer blockchain
+// but CanisterWorm injected @dfinity/agent as its decentralized C2 mechanism
+const ICP_BLOCKCHAIN_PACKAGES = [
+  '@dfinity/agent',
+  '@dfinity/candid',
+  '@dfinity/principal',
+  'ic-agent',
+];
+
+// Common packages that are often typosquatted
+const POPULAR_PACKAGES = [
+  'lodash', 'express', 'react', 'axios', 'moment', 'request',
+  'chalk', 'commander', 'debug', 'uuid', 'dotenv', 'cors',
+  'body-parser', 'jsonwebtoken', 'bcrypt', 'mongoose', 'sequelize',
+  'webpack', 'babel', 'eslint', 'prettier', 'typescript',
+  'next', 'nuxt', 'svelte', 'vue', 'angular',
+];
+
+// Well-known packages that happen to be close to other popular names
+// (not typosquats — verified legitimate packages)
+const KNOWN_SAFE = new Set([
+  'ora', 'got', 'ink', 'yup', 'joi', 'ava', 'tap', 'npm', 'nwb',
+  'pug', 'koa', 'hap', 'ejs', 'csv', 'ws', 'pg', 'ms',
+]);
+
+// Known malicious package name patterns
+const SUSPICIOUS_NAME_PATTERNS = [
+  /^@[^/]+\/[^/]+-[0-9]+$/,       // @scope/package-123 (random suffix)
+  /^[a-z]+-[a-z]+-[a-z]+-[a-z]+$/, // overly-generic multi-word names
+];
+
+export class SupplyChainAudit extends BaseAgent {
+  constructor() {
+    super('SupplyChainAudit', 'Comprehensive supply chain security audit', 'supply-chain');
+  }
+
+  async analyze(context) {
+    const { rootPath } = context;
+    const findings = [];
+
+    // ── 1. Check package.json ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    const pkgPath = path.join(rootPath, 'package.json');
+    if (fs.existsSync(pkgPath)) {
+      try {
+        const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf-8'));
+        const allDeps = {
+          ...(pkg.dependencies || {}),
+          ...(pkg.devDependencies || {}),
+          ...(pkg.optionalDependencies || {}),
+        };
+
+        // ── Typosquatting detection ───────────────────────────────────────────
+        for (const depName of Object.keys(allDeps)) {
+          if (KNOWN_SAFE.has(depName)) continue;
+          for (const popular of POPULAR_PACKAGES) {
+            const distance = this.levenshtein(depName, popular);
+            if (distance > 0 && distance <= 2 && depName !== popular) {
+              findings.push(createFinding({
+                file: pkgPath,
+                line: 0,
+                severity: 'high',
+                category: 'supply-chain',
+                rule: 'TYPOSQUAT_SUSPECT',
+                title: `Possible Typosquat: "${depName}" (similar to "${popular}")`,
+                description: `Package "${depName}" is ${distance} character(s) away from popular package "${popular}". This could be a typosquatting attempt.`,
+                matched: depName,
+                fix: `Verify this is the intended package. Did you mean "${popular}"?`,
+              }));
+            }
+          }
+        }
+
+        // ── Deprecated/suspicious version pins ───────────────────────────────
+        for (const [name, version] of Object.entries(allDeps)) {
+          if (typeof version === 'string' && version.startsWith('git+')) {
+            findings.push(createFinding({
+              file: pkgPath,
+              line: 0,
+              severity: 'high',
+              category: 'supply-chain',
+              rule: 'GIT_DEPENDENCY',
+              title: `Git Dependency: ${name}`,
+              description: `"${name}" is installed from a git URL. Git dependencies bypass registry integrity checks.`,
+              matched: `${name}: ${version}`,
+              fix: 'Pin to a specific commit hash or use a published npm package version',
+            }));
+          }
+
+          if (typeof version === 'string' && version.startsWith('http')) {
+            findings.push(createFinding({
+              file: pkgPath,
+              line: 0,
+              severity: 'critical',
+              category: 'supply-chain',
+              rule: 'URL_DEPENDENCY',
+              title: `URL Dependency: ${name}`,
+              description: `"${name}" is installed from a URL. This bypasses npm registry and integrity checks.`,
+              matched: `${name}: ${version}`,
+              fix: 'Publish the package to npm or use a private registry',
+            }));
+          }
+
+          if (typeof version === 'string' && version === '*') {
+            findings.push(createFinding({
+              file: pkgPath,
+              line: 0,
+              severity: 'high',
+              category: 'supply-chain',
+              rule: 'WILDCARD_VERSION',
+              title: `Wildcard Version: ${name}`,
+              description: `"${name}" uses "*" version which accepts any version including malicious updates.`,
+              matched: `${name}: *`,
+              fix: 'Pin to a specific version or use a caret range: "^x.y.z"',
+            }));
+          }
+        }
+
+        // ── Install scripts ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+        if (pkg.scripts) {
+          const dangerousScripts = ['preinstall', 'postinstall', 'preuninstall', 'postuninstall'];
+          for (const script of dangerousScripts) {
+            if (pkg.scripts[script]) {
+              const cmd = pkg.scripts[script];
+              const suspicious = /curl|wget|bash|sh\s|powershell|eval|base64|nc\s|ncat/i.test(cmd);
+              if (suspicious) {
+                findings.push(createFinding({
+                  file: pkgPath,
+                  line: 0,
+                  severity: 'critical',
+                  category: 'supply-chain',
+                  rule: 'SUSPICIOUS_INSTALL_SCRIPT',
+                  title: `Suspicious ${script} Script`,
+                  description: `The ${script} script contains potentially dangerous commands: ${cmd.slice(0, 100)}`,
+                  matched: cmd,
+                  fix: 'Review and remove suspicious install scripts',
+                }));
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+
+      } catch { /* skip parse errors */ }
+    }
+
+    // ── 2. Dependency confusion detection ─────────────────────────────────────
+    if (fs.existsSync(pkgPath)) {
+      try {
+        const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf-8'));
+        const allDeps = {
+          ...(pkg.dependencies || {}),
+          ...(pkg.devDependencies || {}),
+        };
+
+        // Check for scoped packages without registry pinning
+        const scopedPkgs = Object.keys(allDeps).filter(n => n.startsWith('@'));
+        if (scopedPkgs.length > 0) {
+          const npmrcPath = path.join(rootPath, '.npmrc');
+          const yarnrcPath = path.join(rootPath, '.yarnrc');
+          const yarnrcYmlPath = path.join(rootPath, '.yarnrc.yml');
+          const hasRegistryConfig = [npmrcPath, yarnrcPath, yarnrcYmlPath].some(p => {
+            if (!fs.existsSync(p)) return false;
+            const content = this.readFile(p) || '';
+            // Check if any scope is pinned to a registry
+            return /@[^:]+:registry/i.test(content) || /npmRegistryServer/i.test(content);
+          });
+
+          // Extract unique scopes
+          const scopes = [...new Set(scopedPkgs.map(n => n.split('/')[0]))];
+          // Check if this looks like an internal scope (not well-known public ones)
+          const publicScopes = new Set([
+            '@types', '@babel', '@eslint', '@jest', '@testing-library',
+            '@react-native', '@angular', '@vue', '@nuxt', '@next',
+            '@emotion', '@mui', '@radix-ui', '@tanstack', '@trpc',
+            '@prisma', '@supabase', '@aws-sdk', '@azure', '@google-cloud',
+            '@octokit', '@sentry', '@stripe', '@anthropic-ai', '@openai',
+          ]);
+          const internalScopes = scopes.filter(s => !publicScopes.has(s));
+
+          if (internalScopes.length > 0 && !hasRegistryConfig) {
+            findings.push(createFinding({
+              file: pkgPath,
+              line: 0,
+              severity: 'high',
+              category: 'supply-chain',
+              rule: 'DEPCONF_NO_SCOPE_REGISTRY',
+              title: `Scoped Packages Without Registry Pin: ${internalScopes.join(', ')}`,
+              description: `Scoped packages (${internalScopes.join(', ')}) found without a .npmrc pinning the scope to a private registry. An attacker could claim the scope on the public npm registry.`,
+              matched: internalScopes.join(', '),
+              confidence: 'medium',
+              fix: 'Add to .npmrc: @yourscope:registry=https://your-private-registry.com/',
+            }));
+          }
+        }
+
+        // Check for suspicious install scripts in dependencies
+        const nodeModulesPath = path.join(rootPath, 'node_modules');
+        if (fs.existsSync(nodeModulesPath)) {
+          for (const depName of Object.keys(allDeps).slice(0, 50)) {
+            const depPkgPath = path.join(nodeModulesPath, depName, 'package.json');
+            if (!fs.existsSync(depPkgPath)) continue;
+            try {
+              const depPkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(depPkgPath, 'utf-8'));
+              const scripts = depPkg.scripts || {};
+              for (const hook of ['preinstall', 'install', 'postinstall']) {
+                const cmd = scripts[hook];
+                if (!cmd) continue;
+                if (/(?:curl|wget|powershell|base64\s|eval\s|nc\s|ncat|\.sh\b)/i.test(cmd)) {
+                  findings.push(createFinding({
+                    file: depPkgPath,
+                    line: 0,
+                    severity: 'critical',
+                    category: 'supply-chain',
+                    rule: 'DEPCONF_SUSPICIOUS_INSTALL_SCRIPT',
+                    title: `Suspicious ${hook} in ${depName}`,
+                    description: `Dependency "${depName}" has a suspicious ${hook} script: ${cmd.slice(0, 120)}`,
+                    matched: cmd.slice(0, 200),
+                    fix: 'Review the script. If untrusted, remove the dependency or use npm with --ignore-scripts',
+                  }));
+                }
+              }
+            } catch { /* skip */ }
+          }
+        }
+      } catch { /* skip */ }
+    }
+
+    // ── 3. Check lockfile integrity ── ───────────────────────────────────────────
+    const lockFiles = [
+      { file: 'package-lock.json', manager: 'npm' },
+      { file: 'yarn.lock', manager: 'yarn' },
+      { file: 'pnpm-lock.yaml', manager: 'pnpm' },
+      { file: 'bun.lockb', manager: 'bun' },
+    ];
+
+    const hasPackageJson = fs.existsSync(pkgPath);
+    let hasLockfile = false;
+
+    for (const { file, manager } of lockFiles) {
+      if (fs.existsSync(path.join(rootPath, file))) {
+        hasLockfile = true;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (hasPackageJson && !hasLockfile) {
+      findings.push(createFinding({
+        file: pkgPath,
+        line: 0,
+        severity: 'high',
+        category: 'supply-chain',
+        rule: 'MISSING_LOCKFILE',
+        title: 'No Lock File Found',
+        description: 'No package-lock.json, yarn.lock, or pnpm-lock.yaml found. Without a lockfile, installs are non-deterministic and vulnerable to dependency confusion.',
+        matched: 'package.json without lockfile',
+        fix: 'Run npm install, yarn install, or pnpm install to generate a lockfile, then commit it',
+      }));
+    }
+
+    // ── 4. Check .npmrc for security settings ─────────────────────────────────
+    const npmrcPath = path.join(rootPath, '.npmrc');
+    if (fs.existsSync(npmrcPath)) {
+      const content = this.readFile(npmrcPath) || '';
+      if (content.includes('ignore-scripts=true')) {
+        // Good — scripts are disabled
+      }
+      if (content.includes('registry=') && !content.includes('registry=https://registry.npmjs.org')) {
+        findings.push(createFinding({
+          file: npmrcPath,
+          line: 0,
+          severity: 'medium',
+          category: 'supply-chain',
+          rule: 'CUSTOM_REGISTRY',
+          title: 'Custom NPM Registry Configured',
+          description: 'A custom npm registry is configured. Verify it is trusted and uses HTTPS.',
+          matched: content.match(/registry=.*/)?.[0] || '',
+          confidence: 'medium',
+          fix: 'Verify the registry URL is trusted and uses HTTPS',
+        }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ── 5. Package behavioral signals (Socket-style) ─────────────────────────
+    if (fs.existsSync(pkgPath)) {
+      try {
+        const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf-8'));
+        const allDeps = {
+          ...(pkg.dependencies || {}),
+          ...(pkg.devDependencies || {}),
+        };
+
+        // Scan node_modules for behavioral red flags
+        const nodeModulesPath = path.join(rootPath, 'node_modules');
+        if (fs.existsSync(nodeModulesPath)) {
+          for (const depName of Object.keys(allDeps).slice(0, 50)) {
+            const depDir = path.join(nodeModulesPath, depName);
+            const depPkgPath = path.join(depDir, 'package.json');
+            if (!fs.existsSync(depPkgPath)) continue;
+            try {
+              const depPkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(depPkgPath, 'utf-8'));
+
+              // Check for postinstall scripts with network/eval calls
+              const scripts = depPkg.scripts || {};
+              for (const hook of ['preinstall', 'install', 'postinstall']) {
+                const cmd = scripts[hook];
+                if (!cmd) continue;
+                if (/node\s+-e|node\s+--eval/.test(cmd)) {
+                  findings.push(createFinding({
+                    file: depPkgPath,
+                    line: 0,
+                    severity: 'high',
+                    category: 'supply-chain',
+                    rule: 'BEHAVIORAL_INLINE_EVAL',
+                    title: `Inline Code Execution in ${hook}: ${depName}`,
+                    description: `Dependency "${depName}" runs inline Node.js code during ${hook}. This is a common pattern in malicious packages.`,
+                    matched: cmd.slice(0, 200),
+                    fix: 'Review the inline code. Consider using --ignore-scripts or removing the dependency.',
+                  }));
+                }
+              }
+            } catch { /* skip */ }
+          }
+        }
+
+        // Detect obfuscated code patterns in dependencies
+        const codeFiles = (context.files || []).filter(f =>
+          f.includes('node_modules') &&
+          !f.includes('node_modules/.cache') &&
+          path.extname(f).toLowerCase() === '.js' &&
+          !path.basename(f).endsWith('.min.js')
+        ).slice(0, 30); // Sample up to 30 files
+
+        for (const file of codeFiles) {
+          const content = this.readFile(file);
+          if (!content || content.length < 100) continue;
+
+          // Excessive hex encoding
+          const hexMatches = (content.match(/\\x[0-9a-fA-F]{2}/g) || []).length;
+          if (hexMatches > 20) {
+            findings.push(createFinding({
+              file,
+              line: 1,
+              severity: 'high',
+              category: 'supply-chain',
+              rule: 'BEHAVIORAL_HEX_OBFUSCATION',
+              title: 'Obfuscated Code: Excessive Hex Encoding',
+              description: `File contains ${hexMatches} hex-encoded sequences. Common in malicious packages trying to hide payload.`,
+              matched: `${hexMatches} hex sequences detected`,
+              fix: 'Inspect the deobfuscated code. Consider removing this dependency.',
+            }));
+          }
+
+          // Excessive String.fromCharCode
+          const charCodeMatches = (content.match(/String\.fromCharCode/g) || []).length;
+          if (charCodeMatches > 5) {
+            findings.push(createFinding({
+              file,
+              line: 1,
+              severity: 'high',
+              category: 'supply-chain',
+              rule: 'BEHAVIORAL_CHARCODE_OBFUSCATION',
+              title: 'Obfuscated Code: Excessive String.fromCharCode',
+              description: `File contains ${charCodeMatches} String.fromCharCode calls. Common obfuscation technique in malicious packages.`,
+              matched: `${charCodeMatches} String.fromCharCode calls`,
+              fix: 'Inspect the deobfuscated code. Consider removing this dependency.',
+            }));
+          }
+
+          // Base64 decode chains
+          const base64Matches = (content.match(/Buffer\.from\s*\([^,]+,\s*['"]base64['"]\)/g) || []).length;
+          if (base64Matches > 3) {
+            findings.push(createFinding({
+              file,
+              line: 1,
+              severity: 'medium',
+              category: 'supply-chain',
+              rule: 'BEHAVIORAL_BASE64_DECODE',
+              title: 'Suspicious: Multiple Base64 Decode Operations',
+              description: `File contains ${base64Matches} base64 decode operations. May indicate hidden payload.`,
+              matched: `${base64Matches} base64 decode operations`,
+              confidence: 'medium',
+              fix: 'Review what data is being decoded. Legitimate use is possible but warrants inspection.',
+            }));
+          }
+        }
+
+        // Detect unused dependencies (in package.json but never imported)
+        const projectFiles = (context.files || []).filter(f =>
+          !f.includes('node_modules') &&
+          ['.js', '.jsx', '.ts', '.tsx', '.mjs', '.cjs'].includes(path.extname(f).toLowerCase())
+        );
+
+        if (projectFiles.length > 0 && projectFiles.length < 500) {
+          const allImports = new Set();
+          for (const file of projectFiles) {
+            const content = this.readFile(file);
+            if (!content) continue;
+            // Capture import/require module names
+            const importMatches = content.matchAll(/(?:from\s+['"]([^'"]+)['"]|require\s*\(\s*['"]([^'"]+)['"]\s*\))/g);
+            for (const m of importMatches) {
+              const mod = (m[1] || m[2] || '').split('/')[0]; // Get package name (not subpath)
+              if (mod && !mod.startsWith('.')) allImports.add(mod);
+              // Handle scoped packages
+              const fullMod = m[1] || m[2] || '';
+              if (fullMod.startsWith('@')) {
+                const scopedPkg = fullMod.split('/').slice(0, 2).join('/');
+                allImports.add(scopedPkg);
+              }
+            }
+          }
+
+          const prodDeps = Object.keys(pkg.dependencies || {});
+          for (const dep of prodDeps) {
+            if (!allImports.has(dep) && !dep.startsWith('@types/')) {
+              findings.push(createFinding({
+                file: pkgPath,
+                line: 0,
+                severity: 'low',
+                category: 'supply-chain',
+                rule: 'UNUSED_DEPENDENCY',
+                title: `Unused Dependency: ${dep}`,
+                description: `"${dep}" is in dependencies but never imported in project code. Unused dependencies increase attack surface.`,
+                matched: dep,
+                confidence: 'low',
+                fix: `Remove if unused: npm uninstall ${dep}`,
+              }));
+            }
+          }
+        }
+
+      } catch { /* skip */ }
+    }
+
+    // ── 6. npm token scope in .npmrc ──────────────────────────────────────────
+    if (fs.existsSync(npmrcPath)) {
+      const content = this.readFile(npmrcPath) || '';
+      // Detect auth tokens stored in .npmrc — a prerequisite for worm spread
+      const tokenLines = content.split('\n').filter(l => /_authToken\s*=/.test(l));
+      for (const line of tokenLines) {
+        const isScopedToPackage = /\/\/registry\.npmjs\.org\/.+:_authToken/.test(line);
+        // Flag tokens that appear to be publish-level (not scoped to a single package)
+        findings.push(createFinding({
+          file: npmrcPath,
+          line: 0,
+          severity: 'high',
+          category: 'supply-chain',
+          rule: 'NPMRC_AUTH_TOKEN_EXPOSED',
+          title: 'npm Auth Token in .npmrc',
+          description: `An npm auth token is stored in .npmrc. ${isScopedToPackage ? 'Verify it is scoped to only the packages it needs to publish.' : 'If this token has publish rights, a compromised install script or dependency can steal it and spread a worm (CanisterWorm attack pattern).'} Commit this file only if absolutely necessary; prefer CI secret injection.`,
+          matched: line.replace(/=.+/, '=***'),
+          fix: 'Use npm token create --cidr-whitelist or scope tokens per-package. Never commit .npmrc with auth tokens.',
+        }));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ── 7. Check Python requirements ──────────────────────────────────────────
+    const reqPath = path.join(rootPath, 'requirements.txt');
+    if (fs.existsSync(reqPath)) {
+      const content = this.readFile(reqPath) || '';
+      const lines = content.split('\n');
+      for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+        const line = lines[i].trim();
+        if (!line || line.startsWith('#')) continue;
+
+        // Unpinned versions
+        if (!line.includes('==') && !line.includes('>=') && !line.includes('~=') && !line.includes('@')) {
+          findings.push(createFinding({
+            file: reqPath,
+            line: i + 1,
+            severity: 'medium',
+            category: 'supply-chain',
+            rule: 'UNPINNED_PYTHON_DEP',
+            title: `Unpinned Python Dependency: ${line}`,
+            description: 'Python dependency without version pin. Pin to a specific version for reproducible builds.',
+            matched: line,
+            fix: `Pin version: ${line}==x.y.z`,
+          }));
+        }
+
+        // Git/URL dependencies
+        if (line.includes('git+') || line.startsWith('http')) {
+          findings.push(createFinding({
+            file: reqPath,
+            line: i + 1,
+            severity: 'high',
+            category: 'supply-chain',
+            rule: 'GIT_PYTHON_DEP',
+            title: `Git/URL Python Dependency: ${line.slice(0, 60)}`,
+            description: 'Installing from git/URL bypasses PyPI integrity checks.',
+            matched: line,
+            fix: 'Publish to PyPI or pin to a specific commit hash',
+          }));
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ── 8. Compromised package IOC matching (npm + PyPI) ──────────────────────
+    const iocSources = [];
+
+    // npm packages
+    if (fs.existsSync(pkgPath)) {
+      try {
+        const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf-8'));
+        const allDeps = {
+          ...(pkg.dependencies || {}),
+          ...(pkg.devDependencies || {}),
+          ...(pkg.optionalDependencies || {}),
+        };
+        for (const [name, version] of Object.entries(allDeps)) {
+          const ioc = COMPROMISED_PACKAGES.find(c => c.name === name);
+          if (ioc) {
+            // Strip semver range prefix (^, ~, >=, etc.) for comparison
+            const bare = String(version).replace(/^[\^~>=<]+/, '').trim();
+            if (ioc.badVersions.includes(bare)) {
+              iocSources.push({ file: pkgPath, name, version: bare, note: ioc.note });
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      } catch { /* skip */ }
+    }
+
+    // Python requirements.txt
+    if (fs.existsSync(path.join(rootPath, 'requirements.txt'))) {
+      const lines = (this.readFile(path.join(rootPath, 'requirements.txt')) || '').split('\n');
+      for (const line of lines) {
+        const m = line.trim().match(/^([\w-]+)==([\d.]+)/);
+        if (!m) continue;
+        const [, name, version] = m;
+        const ioc = COMPROMISED_PACKAGES.find(c => c.name === name.toLowerCase());
+        if (ioc && ioc.badVersions.includes(version)) {
+          iocSources.push({ file: path.join(rootPath, 'requirements.txt'), name, version, note: ioc.note });
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    for (const { file, name, version, note } of iocSources) {
+      findings.push(createFinding({
+        file,
+        line: 0,
+        severity: 'critical',
+        category: 'supply-chain',
+        rule: 'KNOWN_COMPROMISED_PACKAGE',
+        title: `Known-Compromised Package: ${name}@${version}`,
+        description: `${name}@${version} is a known-malicious release. ${note}`,
+        matched: `${name}@${version}`,
+        fix: `Update immediately to the latest safe release and rotate any credentials that may have been exfiltrated.`,
+      }));
+    }
+
+    // ── 9. Blockchain C2 indicators (CanisterWorm / ICP) ──────────────────────
+    if (fs.existsSync(path.join(rootPath, 'node_modules'))) {
+      try {
+        const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf-8'));
+        const allDeps = {
+          ...(pkg.dependencies || {}),
+          ...(pkg.devDependencies || {}),
+        };
+        for (const depName of Object.keys(allDeps)) {
+          const depPkgPath = path.join(rootPath, 'node_modules', depName, 'package.json');
+          if (!fs.existsSync(depPkgPath)) continue;
+          try {
+            const depPkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(depPkgPath, 'utf-8'));
+            const depDeps = {
+              ...(depPkg.dependencies || {}),
+              ...(depPkg.devDependencies || {}),
+            };
+            const suspiciousICP = ICP_BLOCKCHAIN_PACKAGES.filter(p => p in depDeps);
+            if (suspiciousICP.length > 0) {
+              findings.push(createFinding({
+                file: depPkgPath,
+                line: 0,
+                severity: 'critical',
+                category: 'supply-chain',
+                rule: 'BLOCKCHAIN_C2_INDICATOR',
+                title: `Blockchain C2 Indicator in ${depName}: ${suspiciousICP.join(', ')}`,
+                description: `Dependency "${depName}" imports ICP/Internet Computer blockchain packages (${suspiciousICP.join(', ')}). This matches the CanisterWorm attack pattern, which used an ICP canister as a decentralized, takedown-resistant C2 server to coordinate credential exfiltration.`,
+                matched: suspiciousICP.join(', '),
+                fix: 'Immediately audit or remove this dependency. ICP blockchain packages have no legitimate role in most application dependencies.',
+              }));
+            }
+          } catch { /* skip */ }
+        }
+      } catch { /* skip */ }
+    }
+
+    return findings;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Simple Levenshtein distance for typosquatting detection.
+   */
+  levenshtein(a, b) {
+    if (a.length === 0) return b.length;
+    if (b.length === 0) return a.length;
+
+    const matrix = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i <= b.length; i++) matrix[i] = [i];
+    for (let j = 0; j <= a.length; j++) matrix[0][j] = j;
+
+    for (let i = 1; i <= b.length; i++) {
+      for (let j = 1; j <= a.length; j++) {
+        const cost = b[i - 1] === a[j - 1] ? 0 : 1;
+        matrix[i][j] = Math.min(
+          matrix[i - 1][j] + 1,
+          matrix[i][j - 1] + 1,
+          matrix[i - 1][j - 1] + cost
+        );
+      }
+    }
+
+    return matrix[b.length][a.length];
+  }
+}
+
+export default SupplyChainAudit;