shieldcortex 4.31.2 → 4.32.0

package/dist/xray/file-scanner.js

@@ -246,9 +246,16 @@ export async function scanFile(filePath, deep) {
     if (!stat.isFile() || stat.size > MAX_FILE_SIZE) {
         return findings;
     }
+    // Read the file body AT MOST ONCE. Each branch records what it read so deep
+    // mode (below) can reuse it instead of re-reading from disk. Previously a
+    // deep scan read every file a second time (and on every other-text file,
+    // walked the same content twice) — pure wasted IO for large trees.
+    let fileBuffer = null;
+    let textContent = null;
     // Route by extension
     if (IMAGE_EXTENSIONS.has(ext)) {
         const buf = fs.readFileSync(filePath);
+        fileBuffer = buf;
         findings.push(...scanImage(filePath, buf));
         // Polyglot check
         const polyglot = checkPolyglot(buf);
@@ -259,6 +266,7 @@ export async function scanFile(filePath, deep) {
     }
     else if (JSON_EXTENSIONS.has(ext)) {
         const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');
+        textContent = content;
         findings.push(...scanJson(filePath, content));
         // Zero-width unicode check
         const zw = hasZeroWidthUnicode(content);
@@ -269,6 +277,7 @@ export async function scanFile(filePath, deep) {
     }
     else if (CODE_EXTENSIONS.has(ext)) {
         const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');
+        textContent = content;
         findings.push(...detectPatterns(content, filePath));
         // Zero-width unicode check
         const zw = hasZeroWidthUnicode(content);
@@ -281,6 +290,7 @@ export async function scanFile(filePath, deep) {
         // For any other text-like file, try reading as text
         try {
             const buf = fs.readFileSync(filePath);
+            fileBuffer = buf;
             // Check if it's mostly text
             let nonPrintable = 0;
             const sampleSize = Math.min(buf.length, 8192);
@@ -293,6 +303,7 @@ export async function scanFile(filePath, deep) {
             if (nonPrintable / sampleSize < 0.1) {
                 // Treat as text
                 const content = buf.toString('utf-8');
+                textContent = content;
                 findings.push(...detectPatterns(content, filePath));
                 const zw = hasZeroWidthUnicode(content);
                 if (zw) {
@@ -316,7 +327,11 @@ export async function scanFile(filePath, deep) {
     // Deep mode: additional analysis (Pro feature)
     if (deep && stat.size > 0) {
         try {
-            const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');
+            // Reuse the content already read above. Derive text from a buffer the
+            // image/binary branch read (no re-read); only hit disk if nothing was
+            // captured (a branch that didn't read, e.g. an early-skipped path).
+            const content = textContent ??
+                (fileBuffer ? fileBuffer.toString('utf-8') : fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8'));
             // Entropy analysis — detect packed/obfuscated code
             if (CODE_EXTENSIONS.has(ext) || ext === '.js' || ext === '.mjs') {
                 const entropy = shannonEntropy(content);

package/dist/xray/findings-store.js

@@ -43,7 +43,15 @@ export function createFindingsStore(basePath) {
         addFindings(sourceId, sourceKind, target, rawFindings) {
             const now = new Date().toISOString();
             const existing = readFindings();
-            const existingKeys = new Set(existing.filter((f) => f.status === 'new').map((f) => findingDedupeKey(f.target, f)));
+            // Dedupe against EVERY retained finding regardless of status (Phase 17
+            // B5). Previously only `status === 'new'` findings seeded the dedupe set,
+            // so a finding the user had already triaged — ignored, resolved,
+            // reviewed or quarantined — resurfaced as a brand-new duplicate on every
+            // re-scan, undoing their decision. Matching across all statuses respects
+            // the prior triage. (Findings aged past the 30-day cleanup window below
+            // are no longer retained, so they may legitimately reappear — that's the
+            // intended TTL behaviour, not a dedupe miss.)
+            const existingKeys = new Set(existing.map((f) => findingDedupeKey(f.target, f)));
             const newFindings = [];
             for (const f of rawFindings) {
                 const key = findingDedupeKey(target, f);

package/dist/xray/index.d.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ export { watchDirectory } from './watch.js';
 export { handlePreinstallCheck } from './preinstall.js';
 export { xrayMemoryContent } from './memory-guard.js';
 export type { MemoryGuardResult } from './memory-guard.js';
+export { toSarif } from './sarif.js';
+export type { SarifLog } from './sarif.js';
 /**
  * Handle the `shieldcortex xray` CLI command.
  */

package/dist/xray/index.js

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import { scanDirectory } from './dir-scanner.js';
 import { inspectNpmPackage } from './npm-inspector.js';
 import { calculateTrustScore } from './trust-score.js';
 import { formatXRayReport, formatXRayMarkdown } from './report.js';
+import { toSarif } from './sarif.js';
 import { watchDirectory } from './watch.js';
 import { appendActivity, appendHistory, createHistoryEntry } from './activity.js';
 export { calculateTrustScore } from './trust-score.js';
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ export { formatXRayReport, formatXRayMarkdown } from './report.js';
 export { watchDirectory } from './watch.js';
 export { handlePreinstallCheck } from './preinstall.js';
 export { xrayMemoryContent } from './memory-guard.js';
+export { toSarif } from './sarif.js';
 // ── Usage tracking ──────────────────────────────────────────
 const USAGE_FILE = path.join(os.homedir(), '.shieldcortex', 'xray-usage.json');
 const FREE_DAILY_LIMIT = 5;
@@ -84,6 +86,7 @@ export async function handleXRayCommand(args) {
     const deep = flags.has('--deep');
     const jsonOutput = flags.has('--json');
     const markdownOutput = flags.has('--markdown');
+    const sarifOutput = flags.has('--sarif') || args.includes('--format=sarif');
     const ciMode = flags.has('--ci');
     const watchMode = flags.has('--watch');
     const ciThreshold = (() => {
@@ -100,6 +103,7 @@ export async function handleXRayCommand(args) {
         console.error('  --deep      Deep scan with full analysis (Pro)');
         console.error('  --json      Output JSON result');
         console.error('  --markdown  Output markdown report');
+        console.error('  --sarif     Output SARIF 2.1.0 (GitHub Code Scanning)');
         console.error('  --ci        CI/CD mode: exit code 1 if risk >= threshold');
         console.error('  --threshold=LEVEL  Risk threshold for --ci (CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW, default: HIGH)');
         console.error('  --watch     Watch directory for changes and scan incrementally');
@@ -201,7 +205,12 @@ export async function handleXRayCommand(args) {
             : `${result.findings.length} findings across ${result.filesScanned} files`,
     });
     // Output
-    if (jsonOutput) {
+    if (sarifOutput) {
+        // Pure SARIF JSON on stdout — nothing else, so the file can be uploaded
+        // straight to GitHub Code Scanning.
+        console.log(JSON.stringify(toSarif(result.findings), null, 2));
+    }
+    else if (jsonOutput) {
         console.log(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2));
     }
     else if (markdownOutput) {

package/dist/xray/npm-inspector.d.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,37 @@
  * Uses only Node.js built-ins (https module) — no new dependencies.
  */
 import type { XRayResult } from './types.js';
+/**
+ * Decide whether another redirect hop may be followed. Returns the remaining
+ * budget for the next hop, or `null` when the cap is exhausted. Pure + exported
+ * so the redirect bound can be unit-tested without standing up a TLS server.
+ */
+export declare function nextRedirectBudget(redirectsLeft: number): number | null;
+/**
+ * Simple HTTPS GET returning the response body as a string.
+ *
+ * Bounds redirect following (max MAX_REDIRECTS hops) and applies a socket
+ * timeout so a hostile / mis-configured registry cannot loop or hang us.
+ */
+export declare function httpsGet(url: string, redirectsLeft?: number): Promise<string>;
+/**
+ * A minimal readable-stream shape: emits `data` (Buffer), then `end`, or
+ * `error`. Lets the decompressed-size guard be unit-tested against a tiny fake
+ * stream without producing a real 100 MB tarball.
+ */
+export interface DecompressStream {
+    on(event: 'data', listener: (chunk: Buffer) => void): unknown;
+    on(event: 'end', listener: () => void): unknown;
+    on(event: 'error', listener: (err: Error) => void): unknown;
+    destroy?(err?: Error): unknown;
+}
+/**
+ * Accumulate a decompressed stream into a single Buffer, aborting if the total
+ * exceeds `maxBytes`. This is the gzip-bomb guard: a hostile .tgz can be tiny
+ * on disk yet decompress to gigabytes, so we cap the INFLATED size, not just
+ * the download. Pure (no fs/network) so it can be tested with a fake stream.
+ */
+export declare function collectDecompressed(stream: DecompressStream, maxBytes?: number): Promise<Buffer>;
 /**
  * Inspect an npm package for hidden risk.
  *

package/dist/xray/npm-inspector.js

@@ -14,6 +14,22 @@ import { detectPatterns } from './patterns.js';
 import { calculateTrustScore } from './trust-score.js';
 import { scanFile } from './file-scanner.js';
 // ── Constants ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * DoS caps for the deep tarball scan. A hostile package can ship a tiny .tgz
+ * that decompresses to gigabytes (a zip/gzip "bomb"), redirect a fetch in an
+ * endless loop, or hang a socket open forever. These bounds keep the scanner
+ * from OOMing or stalling on adversarial input.
+ */
+/** Max bytes we will download for a tarball (compressed, on the wire). */
+const MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024; // 50 MB
+/** Max bytes a tarball may decompress to before we abort (gzip-bomb guard). */
+const MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES = 100 * 1024 * 1024; // 100 MB
+/** Max number of entries we will extract from a single tarball. */
+const MAX_TARBALL_ENTRIES = 10_000;
+/** Max HTTP redirect hops to follow before giving up. */
+const MAX_REDIRECTS = 5;
+/** Per-request network timeout (no response / stalled socket). */
+const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
 /** Popular npm packages for typosquat comparison. */
 const POPULAR_PACKAGES = [
     'react', 'express', 'lodash', 'axios', 'chalk', 'commander', 'debug',
@@ -26,14 +42,33 @@ const POPULAR_PACKAGES = [
     'redis', 'mongodb', 'sequelize', 'prisma', 'graphql', 'apollo',
 ];
 // ── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * Decide whether another redirect hop may be followed. Returns the remaining
+ * budget for the next hop, or `null` when the cap is exhausted. Pure + exported
+ * so the redirect bound can be unit-tested without standing up a TLS server.
+ */
+export function nextRedirectBudget(redirectsLeft) {
+    if (redirectsLeft <= 0)
+        return null;
+    return redirectsLeft - 1;
+}
 /**
  * Simple HTTPS GET returning the response body as a string.
+ *
+ * Bounds redirect following (max MAX_REDIRECTS hops) and applies a socket
+ * timeout so a hostile / mis-configured registry cannot loop or hang us.
  */
-function httpsGet(url) {
+export function httpsGet(url, redirectsLeft = MAX_REDIRECTS) {
     return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-        https.get(url, { headers: { 'Accept': 'application/json' } }, (res) => {
+        const req = https.get(url, { headers: { 'Accept': 'application/json' } }, (res) => {
             if (res.statusCode && res.statusCode >= 300 && res.statusCode < 400 && res.headers.location) {
-                httpsGet(res.headers.location).then(resolve, reject);
+                res.resume(); // drain the redirect response so the socket can be reused/freed
+                const budget = nextRedirectBudget(redirectsLeft);
+                if (budget === null) {
+                    reject(new Error(`Too many redirects (>${MAX_REDIRECTS}) for ${url}`));
+                    return;
+                }
+                httpsGet(res.headers.location, budget).then(resolve, reject);
                 return;
             }
             if (res.statusCode !== 200) {
@@ -45,75 +80,146 @@ function httpsGet(url) {
             res.on('data', (chunk) => chunks.push(chunk));
             res.on('end', () => resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf-8')));
             res.on('error', reject);
-        }).on('error', reject);
+        });
+        req.setTimeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS, () => {
+            req.destroy(new Error(`Request timed out after ${FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS}ms for ${url}`));
+        });
+        req.on('error', reject);
     });
 }
 /**
  * Download a tarball to a temp file and return the path.
+ *
+ * Bounds redirect following, applies a socket timeout, and caps the number of
+ * downloaded bytes (MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES) so an attacker cannot fill the disk or
+ * stream forever. The compressed cap is a first line of defence; the
+ * decompressed cap in extractTarball is the gzip-bomb guard.
  */
 function downloadTarball(url) {
     return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
         const tmpFile = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `shieldcortex-xray-${Date.now()}.tgz`);
         const file = fs.createWriteStream(tmpFile);
-        const doGet = (targetUrl) => {
-            https.get(targetUrl, (res) => {
+        let settled = false;
+        const fail = (err) => {
+            if (settled)
+                return;
+            settled = true;
+            file.destroy();
+            fs.rm(tmpFile, { force: true }, () => reject(err));
+        };
+        const doGet = (targetUrl, redirectsLeft) => {
+            const req = https.get(targetUrl, (res) => {
                 if (res.statusCode && res.statusCode >= 300 && res.statusCode < 400 && res.headers.location) {
-                    doGet(res.headers.location);
+                    res.resume();
+                    if (redirectsLeft <= 0) {
+                        fail(new Error(`Too many redirects (>${MAX_REDIRECTS}) downloading tarball`));
+                        return;
+                    }
+                    doGet(res.headers.location, redirectsLeft - 1);
                     return;
                 }
                 if (res.statusCode !== 200) {
-                    reject(new Error(`HTTP ${res.statusCode} downloading tarball`));
                     res.resume();
+                    fail(new Error(`HTTP ${res.statusCode} downloading tarball`));
                     return;
                 }
+                let downloaded = 0;
+                res.on('data', (chunk) => {
+                    downloaded += chunk.length;
+                    if (downloaded > MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES) {
+                        req.destroy();
+                        fail(new Error(`Tarball exceeds ${MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES} byte download cap`));
+                    }
+                });
                 res.pipe(file);
                 file.on('finish', () => {
+                    if (settled)
+                        return;
+                    settled = true;
                     file.close();
                     resolve(tmpFile);
                 });
-            }).on('error', reject);
+                res.on('error', fail);
+            });
+            req.setTimeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS, () => {
+                req.destroy(new Error(`Tarball download timed out after ${FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`));
+            });
+            req.on('error', fail);
         };
-        doGet(url);
+        file.on('error', fail);
+        doGet(url, MAX_REDIRECTS);
     });
 }
 /**
- * Extract a .tgz to a temp directory using Node built-ins (zlib + tar parsing).
- * Returns path to the extracted directory.
+ * Accumulate a decompressed stream into a single Buffer, aborting if the total
+ * exceeds `maxBytes`. This is the gzip-bomb guard: a hostile .tgz can be tiny
+ * on disk yet decompress to gigabytes, so we cap the INFLATED size, not just
+ * the download. Pure (no fs/network) so it can be tested with a fake stream.
  */
-async function extractTarball(tgzPath) {
-    const extractDir = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `shieldcortex-xray-extract-${Date.now()}`);
-    fs.mkdirSync(extractDir, { recursive: true });
+export function collectDecompressed(stream, maxBytes = MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES) {
     return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-        const gunzip = createGunzip();
-        const input = fs.createReadStream(tgzPath);
         const chunks = [];
-        input.pipe(gunzip);
-        gunzip.on('data', (chunk) => chunks.push(chunk));
-        gunzip.on('end', () => {
-            try {
-                const tarData = Buffer.concat(chunks);
-                extractTarBuffer(tarData, extractDir);
-                resolve(extractDir);
-            }
-            catch (err) {
-                reject(err);
+        let total = 0;
+        let aborted = false;
+        stream.on('data', (chunk) => {
+            if (aborted)
+                return;
+            total += chunk.length;
+            if (total > maxBytes) {
+                aborted = true;
+                stream.destroy?.(new Error('aborted: decompressed size cap exceeded'));
+                reject(new Error(`Decompressed tarball exceeds ${maxBytes} byte cap (possible gzip bomb)`));
+                return;
             }
+            chunks.push(chunk);
+        });
+        stream.on('end', () => {
+            if (aborted)
+                return;
+            resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks));
+        });
+        stream.on('error', (err) => {
+            if (aborted)
+                return;
+            reject(err);
         });
-        gunzip.on('error', reject);
-        input.on('error', reject);
     });
 }
+/**
+ * Extract a .tgz to a temp directory using Node built-ins (zlib + tar parsing).
+ * Returns path to the extracted directory.
+ *
+ * Enforces the decompressed-size cap (gzip-bomb guard) while inflating and the
+ * entry-count cap while parsing the tar.
+ */
+async function extractTarball(tgzPath) {
+    const extractDir = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `shieldcortex-xray-extract-${Date.now()}`);
+    fs.mkdirSync(extractDir, { recursive: true });
+    const gunzip = createGunzip();
+    const input = fs.createReadStream(tgzPath);
+    input.on('error', (err) => gunzip.destroy(err));
+    input.pipe(gunzip);
+    const tarData = await collectDecompressed(gunzip);
+    extractTarBuffer(tarData, extractDir);
+    return extractDir;
+}
 /**
  * Minimal tar extraction from a buffer. Handles ustar format.
  */
 function extractTarBuffer(buf, outDir) {
     let offset = 0;
+    let entries = 0;
     while (offset < buf.length - 512) {
         // Read header (512 bytes)
         const header = buf.subarray(offset, offset + 512);
         // Check for empty block (end of archive)
         if (header.every(b => b === 0))
             break;
+        // Entry-count cap: a hostile tarball can pack millions of tiny entries to
+        // exhaust inodes / fd churn even within the decompressed-size cap.
+        if (++entries > MAX_TARBALL_ENTRIES) {
+            throw new Error(`Tarball exceeds ${MAX_TARBALL_ENTRIES} entry cap`);
+        }
         // Extract filename (0-100 bytes, null-terminated)
         const nameEnd = header.indexOf(0, 0);
         const name = header.subarray(0, Math.min(nameEnd, 100)).toString('utf-8');

package/dist/xray/patterns.d.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * Comprehensive pattern groups for detecting hidden risk in packages, files,
  * and metadata. Follows the same conventions as skill-scanner/patterns.ts:
  *   - safeRegexTest wrapper for every test
- *   - MAX_SCAN_LENGTH truncation to prevent ReDOS
+ *   - Overlapping windowed scanning to bound per-regex work (ReDOS guard)
  *   - PatternGroup style with weighted confidence
  *   - One match per group is enough (break after first)
  */

package/dist/xray/patterns.js

@@ -4,21 +4,11 @@
  * Comprehensive pattern groups for detecting hidden risk in packages, files,
  * and metadata. Follows the same conventions as skill-scanner/patterns.ts:
  *   - safeRegexTest wrapper for every test
- *   - MAX_SCAN_LENGTH truncation to prevent ReDOS
+ *   - Overlapping windowed scanning to bound per-regex work (ReDOS guard)
  *   - PatternGroup style with weighted confidence
  *   - One match per group is enough (break after first)
  */
-// ── Constants ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-/** Maximum content length to analyse (prevents ReDOS on very long inputs). */
-const MAX_SCAN_LENGTH = 50000;
-// ── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-/**
- * Safely test a regex against content with a length limit.
- */
-function safeRegexTest(pattern, text) {
-    const truncated = text.length > MAX_SCAN_LENGTH ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN_LENGTH) : text;
-    return pattern.test(truncated);
-}
+import { forEachWindow } from '../defence/scan-windows.js';
 // ── Pattern Groups ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 const XRAY_PATTERN_GROUPS = [
     // 1. eval/exec with dynamic input
@@ -210,19 +200,26 @@ const XRAY_PATTERN_GROUPS = [
  */
 export function detectPatterns(content, filePath) {
     const findings = [];
-    const truncated = content.length > MAX_SCAN_LENGTH ? content.slice(0, MAX_SCAN_LENGTH) : content;
     for (const group of XRAY_PATTERN_GROUPS) {
         for (const pattern of group.patterns) {
-            if (safeRegexTest(pattern, truncated)) {
-                const match = pattern.exec(truncated);
-                let line;
-                let evidence;
-                if (match) {
-                    // Calculate line number from match index
-                    const before = truncated.slice(0, match.index);
-                    line = (before.match(/\n/g) || []).length + 1;
-                    evidence = match[0].slice(0, 120);
-                }
+            // Scan the WHOLE content as overlapping windows (<= SCAN_WINDOW_SIZE each)
+            // instead of truncating to the first 50KB, so a finding buried past the
+            // cap is still detected. `start` is the window's absolute char offset, used
+            // to translate the window-local match index back to a content-absolute one
+            // for an accurate line number.
+            let line;
+            let evidence;
+            const matched = forEachWindow(content, (window, start) => {
+                const match = pattern.exec(window);
+                if (!match)
+                    return false;
+                const absoluteIndex = start + match.index;
+                const before = content.slice(0, absoluteIndex);
+                line = (before.match(/\n/g) || []).length + 1;
+                evidence = match[0].slice(0, 120);
+                return true;
+            });
+            if (matched) {
                 findings.push({
                     severity: group.severity,
                     category: group.category,

package/dist/xray/sarif.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/**
+ * SARIF 2.1.0 output for ShieldCortex findings.
+ *
+ * Phase 15b — turns X-Ray / audit / mcp-scan findings into a SARIF 2.1.0
+ * document so they surface in GitHub Code Scanning (the Security tab).
+ *
+ * Lives in the xray layer (its `index.ts` already re-exports the other
+ * formatters) but is shape-agnostic: it accepts BOTH the xray `XRayFinding`
+ * and the audit `AuditFinding` via a single internal normaliser, so the SARIF
+ * builder never branches on the source shape.
+ *
+ * Spec: https://docs.oasis-open.org/sarif/sarif/v2.1.0/sarif-v2.1.0.html
+ */
+import type { XRayFinding } from './types.js';
+import type { AuditFinding } from '../audit/types.js';
+export type SarifLevel = 'error' | 'warning' | 'note' | 'none';
+export interface SarifRule {
+    id: string;
+    name?: string;
+    shortDescription?: {
+        text: string;
+    };
+    helpUri?: string;
+}
+export interface SarifArtifactLocation {
+    uri: string;
+}
+export interface SarifRegion {
+    startLine: number;
+}
+export interface SarifPhysicalLocation {
+    artifactLocation: SarifArtifactLocation;
+    region?: SarifRegion;
+}
+export interface SarifLogicalLocation {
+    fullyQualifiedName: string;
+    kind?: string;
+}
+export interface SarifLocation {
+    physicalLocation?: SarifPhysicalLocation;
+    logicalLocations?: SarifLogicalLocation[];
+}
+export interface SarifResult {
+    ruleId: string;
+    level: SarifLevel;
+    message: {
+        text: string;
+    };
+    locations?: SarifLocation[];
+}
+export interface SarifDriver {
+    name: string;
+    version: string;
+    informationUri: string;
+    rules: SarifRule[];
+}
+export interface SarifRun {
+    tool: {
+        driver: SarifDriver;
+    };
+    results: SarifResult[];
+}
+export interface SarifLog {
+    $schema: string;
+    version: '2.1.0';
+    runs: SarifRun[];
+}
+export interface ToSarifOptions {
+    /** Tool version recorded in tool.driver.version. Resolved from package.json when omitted. */
+    version?: string;
+    /** Base directory to make file URIs relative to (defaults to process.cwd()). */
+    baseDir?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Build a SARIF 2.1.0 log from a list of findings (either shape).
+ * Rules are deduped into `tool.driver.rules` by ruleId.
+ */
+export declare function toSarif(findings: (XRayFinding | AuditFinding)[], options?: ToSarifOptions): SarifLog;