sessionpipe-core 0.7.0 → 0.10.0

package/README.md

@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@
 
 sessionpipe core: protocol types, harness adapters, privacy filter and redaction rulesets, outbox and sinks. Zero runtime dependencies.
 
-Part of [sessionpipe](https://github.com/micmmakarov/sessionpipe) · docs at [sessionpipe.org](https://sessionpipe.org). Apache-2.0.
+Part of [sessionpipe](https://github.com/spacesheep-dev/sessionpipe) · docs at [sessionpipe.org](https://sessionpipe.org). Apache-2.0.

package/dist/control.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// sessionpipe-core 0.7.0 · Apache-2.0 · https://sessionpipe.org
+// sessionpipe-core 0.10.0 · Apache-2.0 · https://sessionpipe.org
 
 // src/control/verify.ts
 var GRANT_MAX_MS = 24 * 36e5;
@@ -10,20 +10,42 @@ var CMD_MAX = 48e3;
 var TEXT_MAX = 2e4;
 var NOTE_MAX = 2e3;
 var GRANT_STR_MAX = 2e3;
+var FILES_MAX = 10;
+var FILE_SIZE_MAX = 26214400;
+var FILES_TOTAL_MAX = 52428800;
+var FILE_NAME_MAX = 200;
+var FILE_TYPE_MAX = 100;
+var MODEL_MAX = 100;
+var MODEL_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@[\]-]*$/;
+var START_PERMISSIONS = ["read", "safe", "edits", "auto"];
+var levelRank = (l) => START_PERMISSIONS.indexOf(l);
+var narrower = (a, b) => levelRank(a) <= levelRank(b) ? a : b;
 var COMMAND_TYPE = "sessionpipe.control";
 var GRANT_TYPE = "sessionpipe.grant";
 var CONTROL_KINDS = ["prompt", "permission.answer", "cancel", "start", "key.add"];
 var KEY_STORE_SESSION = "sessionpipe:keys";
 var ES256 = -7;
 var RS256 = -257;
+var KEY_TYPES = ["passkey", "device"];
 var NONCE_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$/;
 var MACHINE_RE = /^m_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,40}$/;
 var HARNESS_RE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,39}$/;
 var SESSION_ID_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,128}$/;
 var UUID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
 var B64URL_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]*$/;
+var SHA256_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
+var MEDIA_TYPE_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*$/i;
+var BAD_NAME_CHAR_RE = /[/\\\x00-\x1f\x7f]/;
 var UP = 1;
 var UV = 4;
+var COMMON_FIELDS = ["v", "t", "machine", "kind", "session", "nonce", "iat", "note"];
+var FIELDS = {
+  prompt: ["text", "files"],
+  "permission.answer": ["for", "decision"],
+  cancel: [],
+  start: ["text", "cwd", "files", "permission", "model"],
+  "key.add": ["key", "name"]
+};
 var enc = new TextEncoder();
 var dec = new TextDecoder();
 function b64url(bytes) {
@@ -92,15 +114,33 @@ async function importKey(key) {
       const k = await crypto.subtle.importKey("spki", u8(spki), { name: "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5", hash: "SHA-256" }, false, [
         "verify"
       ]);
-      const bits = k.algorithm.modulusLength ?? 0;
+      const bits = k.algorithm.modulusLength;
       return bits >= 2048 ? k : null;
     }
   } catch {
   }
   return null;
 }
+var PASSKEY_FIELDS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["id", "alg", "spki"]);
+var DEVICE_FIELDS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["id", "alg", "spki", "type", "store", "uv"]);
+var DEVICE_SIG_FIELDS = ["cred", "sig", "str"];
+async function deviceKeyId(spki) {
+  return b64url(await sha256(fromB64url(spki) ?? new Uint8Array()));
+}
+async function deviceRecordValid(key) {
+  if (key.type !== "device" || key.alg !== ES256 || key.store !== "hardware" || key.uv !== "each-use") return false;
+  if (typeof key.id !== "string" || !SHA256_RE.test(key.id) || key.id !== await deviceKeyId(key.spki)) return false;
+  return !!await importKey(key);
+}
 async function keyUsable(key) {
-  return !!key && typeof key.id === "string" && /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,1400}$/.test(key.id) && (key.alg === ES256 || key.alg === RS256) && !!await importKey(key);
+  if (!key || typeof key !== "object" || Array.isArray(key)) return false;
+  const fields = Object.keys(key).filter((k) => key[k] !== void 0);
+  if ("type" in key && key.type !== void 0) {
+    if (!fields.every((f) => DEVICE_FIELDS.has(f))) return false;
+    return deviceRecordValid(key);
+  }
+  if (!fields.every((f) => PASSKEY_FIELDS.has(f))) return false;
+  return typeof key.id === "string" && /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,1400}$/.test(key.id) && (key.alg === ES256 || key.alg === RS256) && !!await importKey(key);
 }
 function originAllowed(origin, rpId) {
   if (typeof origin !== "string" || !rpId) return false;
@@ -116,8 +156,47 @@ function originAllowed(origin, rpId) {
   return u.protocol === "http:" && rpId === "localhost";
 }
 var no = (why) => ({ ok: false, why });
-async function verifyAssertion(challenge, a, key, rpId) {
+var DEVICE_CONTEXT = "sessionpipe.device.v1";
+function deviceMessage(purpose, rpId, challenge) {
+  return enc.encode(`${DEVICE_CONTEXT}
+${purpose}
+${rpId}
+${b64url(challenge)}`);
+}
+async function verifyDeviceSignature(challenge, a, key, rpId, purpose) {
+  const sig = a;
+  for (const f of Object.keys(sig)) {
+    if (f === "str" && purpose === "grant") continue;
+    if (f !== "cred" && f !== "sig") return no(`a device key's signature carries no ${f}`);
+  }
+  if (sig.cred !== key.id) return no("signed with a key this machine doesn't trust");
+  if (!await deviceRecordValid(key)) return no("a trusted key is unusable");
+  const raw = fromB64url(sig.sig);
+  if (raw?.length !== 64) return no("a device key's signature is 64 bytes, r\u2016s");
+  const pub = await importKey(key);
+  if (!pub) return no("a trusted key is unusable");
+  let good = false;
+  try {
+    good = await crypto.subtle.verify(
+      { name: "ECDSA", hash: "SHA-256" },
+      pub,
+      u8(raw),
+      u8(deviceMessage(purpose, rpId, challenge))
+    );
+  } catch {
+    good = false;
+  }
+  return good ? { ok: true } : no("the device key's signature doesn't verify");
+}
+async function verifyAssertion(challenge, a, key, rpId, purpose) {
   if (!a || typeof a !== "object") return no("no passkey signature");
+  if (key.type !== void 0) {
+    if (key.type !== "device") return no("a trusted key is unusable");
+    return verifyDeviceSignature(challenge, a, key, rpId, purpose);
+  }
+  return verifyPasskeyAssertion(challenge, a, key, rpId);
+}
+async function verifyPasskeyAssertion(challenge, a, key, rpId) {
   if (a.cred !== key.id) return no("signed with a key this machine doesn't trust");
   const cdBytes = fromB64url(a.cd);
   const ad = fromB64url(a.ad);
@@ -159,7 +238,7 @@ function pairChallenge(machine, code) {
 }
 async function verifyEnrollment(o) {
   if (!await keyUsable(o.key)) return no("the key is in a shape this machine can't use");
-  return verifyAssertion(await pairChallenge(o.machine, o.code), o.proof, o.key, o.rpId);
+  return verifyAssertion(await pairChallenge(o.machine, o.code), o.proof, o.key, o.rpId, "pair");
 }
 var bad = (code, why) => ({
   ok: false,
@@ -205,13 +284,26 @@ function parseCommand(str) {
   switch (c.kind) {
     case "prompt":
       if (!text()) return bad("bad_fields", `a prompt needs text, at most ${TEXT_MAX} characters`);
-      if (has("for") || has("decision") || has("cwd")) return bad("bad_fields", "a prompt carries only text");
+      if (has("for") || has("decision") || has("cwd")) return bad("bad_fields", "a prompt carries text and files");
+      if (has("files")) {
+        const why = filesProblem(c.files);
+        if (why) return bad("bad_fields", why);
+      }
       break;
     case "start":
       if (!text()) return bad("bad_fields", `a new session needs text, at most ${TEXT_MAX} characters`);
-      if (typeof c.cwd !== "string" || !isAbsolute(c.cwd) || c.cwd.length > 1024)
-        return bad("bad_fields", "a new session needs an absolute folder");
-      if (has("for") || has("decision")) return bad("bad_fields", "a start carries text and cwd");
+      if (typeof c.cwd !== "string" || !(isAbsolute(c.cwd) || HOME_RELATIVE_RE.test(c.cwd)) || c.cwd.length > 1024)
+        return bad("bad_fields", "a new session needs an absolute folder, or one under ~");
+      if (has("for") || has("decision"))
+        return bad("bad_fields", "a start carries text, cwd, files, a permission and a model");
+      if (has("files")) {
+        const why = filesProblem(c.files);
+        if (why) return bad("bad_fields", why);
+      }
+      if (has("permission") && levelRank(c.permission) < 0)
+        return bad("bad_fields", `a permission is one of ${START_PERMISSIONS.join(", ")}`);
+      if (has("model") && (typeof c.model !== "string" || c.model.length > MODEL_MAX || !MODEL_RE.test(c.model)))
+        return bad("bad_fields", `a model is 1 to ${MODEL_MAX} letters, digits and ._:/@[]-, not starting with a dash`);
       break;
     case "permission.answer":
       if (typeof c.for !== "string" || !c.for || c.for.length > 128) return bad("bad_fields", "which attention?");
@@ -226,8 +318,16 @@ function parseCommand(str) {
       if (c.session !== KEY_STORE_SESSION) return bad("bad_session", `a key.add names ${KEY_STORE_SESSION}`);
       const k = c.key;
       const b64 = (v, min, max) => typeof v === "string" && v.length >= min && v.length <= max && /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(v);
-      if (!k || typeof k !== "object" || !b64(k.id, 16, 1400) || k.alg !== -7 && k.alg !== -257 || !b64(k.spki, 40, 2e3))
+      if (!k || typeof k !== "object" || Array.isArray(k) || !b64(k.id, 16, 1400) || k.alg !== -7 && k.alg !== -257 || !b64(k.spki, 40, 2e3))
         return bad("bad_fields", "a key.add carries the key: id, alg (-7 or -257) and spki");
+      if (k.type !== void 0) {
+        if (k.type !== "device") return bad("bad_fields", "a key's type is device, or absent for a passkey");
+        if (k.alg !== ES256 || k.store !== "hardware" || k.uv !== "each-use" || !SHA256_RE.test(k.id))
+          return bad("bad_fields", "a device key is ES256, store hardware, uv each-use, named by its SPKI's hash");
+        if (Object.keys(k).some((f) => !DEVICE_FIELDS.has(f)))
+          return bad("bad_fields", "a device key carries id, alg, spki, type, store and uv");
+      } else if (Object.keys(k).some((f) => !PASSKEY_FIELDS.has(f)))
+        return bad("bad_fields", "a passkey carries id, alg and spki: store and uv belong to a device key");
       if (has("name") && (typeof c.name !== "string" || !c.name.trim() || c.name.length > 80))
         return bad("bad_fields", "a device name is text, at most 80 characters");
       if (has("text") || has("for") || has("decision") || has("cwd"))
@@ -236,10 +336,50 @@ function parseCommand(str) {
     }
   }
   if (c.kind !== "key.add" && (has("key") || has("name"))) return bad("bad_fields", "only a key.add carries a key");
+  if (c.kind !== "start" && c.kind !== "prompt" && has("files"))
+    return bad("bad_fields", "only a start or a prompt carries files");
+  if (c.kind !== "start" && (has("permission") || has("model")))
+    return bad("bad_fields", "only a start carries a model or a permission");
+  const allowed = FIELDS[c.kind];
+  for (const k of Object.keys(c))
+    if (!COMMON_FIELDS.includes(k) && !allowed.includes(k))
+      return bad("bad_fields", `the command carries a field its kind doesn't have: ${k.slice(0, 40)}`);
   if (has("note") && (typeof c.note !== "string" || c.note.length > NOTE_MAX))
     return bad("bad_fields", `a note is text, at most ${NOTE_MAX} characters`);
   return { ok: true, cmd: c };
 }
+function filesProblem(files) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(files) || files.length < 1 || files.length > FILES_MAX)
+    return `files is a list of 1 to ${FILES_MAX} files`;
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  let total = 0;
+  for (const f of files) {
+    if (!f || typeof f !== "object" || Array.isArray(f)) return "each file is an object";
+    const { name, type, size, sha256: hash } = f;
+    const why = fileNameProblem(name);
+    if (why) return why;
+    const key = name.normalize("NFC").toLowerCase();
+    if (seen.has(key)) return "two files have the same name";
+    seen.add(key);
+    if (typeof type !== "string" || type.length > FILE_TYPE_MAX || !MEDIA_TYPE_RE.test(type))
+      return "a file's type isn't a media type";
+    if (!isNum(size) || !Number.isInteger(size) || size < 1 || size > FILE_SIZE_MAX)
+      return `a file is 1 byte to ${FILE_SIZE_MAX / 1048576} MiB`;
+    total += size;
+    if (typeof hash !== "string" || !SHA256_RE.test(hash)) return "a file's sha256 isn't 43 base64url characters";
+  }
+  if (total > FILES_TOTAL_MAX) return `the files add up to more than ${FILES_TOTAL_MAX / 1048576} MiB`;
+  return null;
+}
+function fileNameProblem(name) {
+  if (typeof name !== "string") return "a file has no name";
+  const n = name.normalize("NFC");
+  if (n.length < 1 || n.length > FILE_NAME_MAX) return `a file name is 1 to ${FILE_NAME_MAX} characters`;
+  if (BAD_NAME_CHAR_RE.test(n)) return "a file name has a slash, a backslash or a control character";
+  if (n.startsWith(".")) return "a file name can't start with a dot";
+  return null;
+}
+var HOME_RELATIVE_RE = /^~(?:[\\/]|$)/;
 function isAbsolute(p) {
   return p.startsWith("/") || /^[A-Za-z]:[\\/]/.test(p);
 }
@@ -294,7 +434,7 @@ async function verifyCommand(s, o) {
     const key = o.trusted.find((k) => k && k.id === s.confirm?.cred);
     if (!key) refusal = { code: "untrusted_key", why: "confirmed with a key this machine doesn't trust" };
     else {
-      const a = await verifyAssertion(await sha256(s.cmd), s.confirm, key, o.rpId);
+      const a = await verifyAssertion(await sha256(s.cmd), s.confirm, key, o.rpId, "confirm");
       if (a.ok) {
         via = "confirm";
         keyId = key.id;
@@ -305,6 +445,8 @@ async function verifyCommand(s, o) {
     if (refusal) return bad(refusal.code, refusal.why);
     return bad("unsigned", "the command isn't signed");
   }
+  if (c.kind === "key.add" && !await keyUsable(c.key))
+    return bad("bad_fields", "the key a key.add brings is in a shape this machine can't use");
   if (c.iat > o.now + SKEW_MS) return bad("future", "the command is dated in the future (is this clock right?)");
   if (o.now - c.iat > (o.maxAgeMs ?? MACHINE_MAX_AGE_MS)) return bad("too_old", "the command was signed too long ago");
   if (o.seenNonce) {
@@ -324,7 +466,7 @@ async function checkGrantPath(s, c, o) {
   if (!g.ok) return bad("bad_grant", g.why);
   const key = o.trusted.find((k) => k && k.id === bundle.cred);
   if (!key) return bad("untrusted_key", "the grant was signed with a key this machine doesn't trust");
-  const a = await verifyAssertion(await sha256(bundle.str), bundle, key, o.rpId);
+  const a = await verifyAssertion(await sha256(bundle.str), bundle, key, o.rpId, "grant");
   if (!a.ok) return bad("bad_assertion", a.why);
   if (!await verifyCsig(s.cmd, s.csig, g.grant.pub))
     return bad("bad_csig", "the command's signature doesn't verify \u2014 it was changed after it was signed");
@@ -336,27 +478,45 @@ export {
   CMD_MAX,
   COMMAND_TYPE,
   CONTROL_KINDS,
+  DEVICE_CONTEXT,
+  DEVICE_SIG_FIELDS,
   ES256,
+  FILES_MAX,
+  FILES_TOTAL_MAX,
+  FILE_NAME_MAX,
+  FILE_SIZE_MAX,
+  FILE_TYPE_MAX,
   GRANT_MAX_MS,
   GRANT_STR_MAX,
   GRANT_TYPE,
+  HOME_RELATIVE_RE,
   KEY_STORE_SESSION,
+  KEY_TYPES,
   MACHINE_MAX_AGE_MS,
+  MODEL_MAX,
+  MODEL_RE,
   NONCE_TTL_MS,
   NOTE_MAX,
   RECEIVER_MAX_AGE_MS,
   RS256,
   SKEW_MS,
+  START_PERMISSIONS,
   TEXT_MAX,
   b64url,
   derToRaw,
+  deviceKeyId,
+  deviceMessage,
+  filesProblem,
   fromB64url,
   keyUsable,
+  levelRank,
+  narrower,
   originAllowed,
   pairChallenge,
   parseCommand,
   parseGrant,
   parseSessionRef,
+  sameBytes,
   sessionIdOk,
   sha256,
   verifyAssertion,

package/dist/control.js.map

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 3,
   "sources": ["../src/control/verify.ts"],
-  "sourcesContent": ["// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0\n// The one verifier for signed control commands (spec/CONTROL.md \u00A74\u2013\u00A75). A machine\n// runs a command only when this says yes; a receiver MAY run it too, as an early\n// word, so a bad command is refused where the person can see why.\n//\n// WebCrypto only (globalThis.crypto.subtle), no node: imports, no clock of its own\n// (`now` is passed in): the same file runs in a Cloudflare Worker, in a browser and\n// in Node \u2265 20, and conformance/control-vectors/ pins its answers.\n//\n// Every signature covers the EXACT bytes as transmitted (`cmd`, `grant.str`): the\n// strings are parsed to read their fields and never re-serialized to verify.\n\n/** One passkey tap vouches for a day key for at most this long. */\nexport const GRANT_MAX_MS = 24 * 3600_000;\n/** Clock slack between the signing device, the receiver and the machine. */\nexport const SKEW_MS = 5 * 60_000;\n/** The machine judges a command by when it was SIGNED: a message sent while the lid\n *  was shut still runs when the machine wakes, up to a day later. */\nexport const MACHINE_MAX_AGE_MS = 24 * 3600_000;\n/** A receiver's early check is stricter: a command is carried within ten minutes of\n *  being signed, or not at all. */\nexport const RECEIVER_MAX_AGE_MS = 10 * 60_000;\n/** How long a machine remembers a nonce: longer than MACHINE_MAX_AGE_MS + SKEW_MS. */\nexport const NONCE_TTL_MS = 25 * 3600_000;\n/** The whole command string, in UTF-16 code units (what JSON.parse sees). */\nexport const CMD_MAX = 48_000;\n/** A prompt's text, in characters. */\nexport const TEXT_MAX = 20_000;\n/** A permission answer's note. */\nexport const NOTE_MAX = 2_000;\n/** A grant string. */\nexport const GRANT_STR_MAX = 2_000;\n\nexport const COMMAND_TYPE = \"sessionpipe.control\";\nexport const GRANT_TYPE = \"sessionpipe.grant\";\nexport const CONTROL_KINDS = [\"prompt\", \"permission.answer\", \"cancel\", \"start\", \"key.add\"] as const;\n/** The session a `key.add` names: the machine's own key store, not a coding session. */\nexport const KEY_STORE_SESSION = \"sessionpipe:keys\";\nexport type ControlKind = (typeof CONTROL_KINDS)[number];\n\n/** COSE algorithm ids a trusted key may use. */\nexport const ES256 = -7;\nexport const RS256 = -257;\n\n/** A key enrolled on the machine: a passkey's credential id, COSE alg and SPKI (base64url). */\nexport interface TrustedKey {\n  id: string;\n  alg: number;\n  spki: string;\n}\n/** A WebAuthn assertion: credential id, authenticatorData, clientDataJSON, signature (base64url). */\nexport interface Assertion {\n  cred: string;\n  ad: string;\n  cd: string;\n  sig: string;\n}\n/** The day's grant: a passkey's assertion over sha256(str), where str names the day key. */\nexport interface GrantBundle extends Assertion {\n  str: string;\n}\n/** What a receiver carries for one command (control.json minus the receiver's envelope). */\nexport interface SignedCommand {\n  cmd: string;\n  csig?: string | null;\n  grant?: GrantBundle | null;\n  confirm?: Assertion | null;\n}\nexport interface Grant {\n  v: 1;\n  t: typeof GRANT_TYPE;\n  pub: string;\n  iat: number;\n  exp: number;\n  rp: string;\n}\nexport interface ControlCommand {\n  v: 1;\n  t: typeof COMMAND_TYPE;\n  machine: string;\n  kind: ControlKind;\n  /** `<harness>:<id>`, e.g. `claude-code:8c132906-\u2026`. */\n  session: string;\n  text?: string;\n  for?: string;\n  decision?: \"allow\" | \"deny\";\n  note?: string;\n  cwd?: string;\n  /** key.add only: the passkey to trust from now on, as the receiver holds it. */\n  key?: { id: string; alg: -7 | -257; spki: string };\n  /** key.add only: what the person calls the device (\"iPhone\"), for `control keys`. */\n  name?: string;\n  nonce: string;\n  iat: number;\n}\n\n/** Why a command was refused. Stable: conformance vectors and acks name these. */\nexport type RefusalCode =\n  | \"malformed\"\n  | \"not_a_command\"\n  | \"wrong_machine\"\n  | \"unknown_kind\"\n  | \"bad_session\"\n  | \"bad_fields\"\n  | \"bad_nonce\"\n  | \"too_old\"\n  | \"future\"\n  | \"unsigned\"\n  | \"untrusted_key\"\n  | \"bad_assertion\"\n  | \"bad_grant\"\n  | \"outside_grant\"\n  | \"bad_csig\"\n  | \"replay\"\n  | \"nonce_store\";\n\nexport type Verdict =\n  | { ok: true; cmd: ControlCommand; via: \"grant\" | \"confirm\"; key: string }\n  | { ok: false; code: RefusalCode; why: string };\n\nexport interface VerifyOptions {\n  /** This machine's id; a command for another machine is refused. */\n  machine: string;\n  /** The receiver's WebAuthn rp id the keys were enrolled for (well-known control.signing.rp_id). */\n  rpId: string;\n  /** The keys enrolled on this machine (or, for a receiver's early check, the account's). */\n  trusted: TrustedKey[];\n  /** Epoch ms. */\n  now: number;\n  /** MACHINE_MAX_AGE_MS on a machine (default), RECEIVER_MAX_AGE_MS on a receiver. */\n  maxAgeMs?: number;\n  /** Called once, last, only for a command whose signatures all verified: answer\n   *  true when the nonce was seen before, otherwise record it (durably) and answer\n   *  false. A throw refuses the command (`nonce_store`): never run what could not\n   *  be remembered. Omit it on a receiver's early check. */\n  seenNonce?: (nonce: string) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;\n}\n\nconst NONCE_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$/;\nconst MACHINE_RE = /^m_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,40}$/;\nconst HARNESS_RE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,39}$/;\nconst SESSION_ID_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,128}$/;\nconst UUID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;\nconst B64URL_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]*$/;\nconst UP = 0x01;\nconst UV = 0x04;\n\n// --- encodings ------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nconst enc = new TextEncoder();\nconst dec = new TextDecoder();\n\nexport function b64url(bytes: Uint8Array | ArrayBuffer): string {\n  const u = bytes instanceof Uint8Array ? bytes : new Uint8Array(bytes);\n  let s = \"\";\n  for (const b of u) s += String.fromCharCode(b);\n  return btoa(s).replace(/\\+/g, \"-\").replace(/\\//g, \"_\").replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n}\n\n/** base64url without padding, strictly; null for anything else. */\nexport function fromB64url(s: unknown): Uint8Array | null {\n  if (typeof s !== \"string\" || !B64URL_RE.test(s) || s.length % 4 === 1) return null;\n  try {\n    const bin = atob(s.replace(/-/g, \"+\").replace(/_/g, \"/\") + \"===\".slice((s.length + 3) % 4));\n    const out = new Uint8Array(bin.length);\n    for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) out[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);\n    return out;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function sha256(data: string | Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const bytes = typeof data === \"string\" ? enc.encode(data) : data;\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest(\"SHA-256\", bytes as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>));\n}\n\nfunction concat(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n  const out = new Uint8Array(a.length + b.length);\n  out.set(a, 0);\n  out.set(b, a.length);\n  return out;\n}\n\nfunction sameBytes(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean {\n  if (a.length !== b.length) return false;\n  let d = 0;\n  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) d |= (a[i] as number) ^ (b[i] as number);\n  return d === 0;\n}\n\n/** A DER ECDSA signature (what WebAuthn returns) as the 64-byte r\u2016s WebCrypto verifies.\n *  Strict: every length must match the bytes, so one signature has one encoding (a\n *  P-256 signature is at most 72 bytes, so the short length form is the only one). */\nexport function derToRaw(der: Uint8Array): Uint8Array | null {\n  if (der[0] !== 0x30 || der.length < 8 || der[1] !== der.length - 2) return null;\n  let i = 2;\n  const part = (): Uint8Array | null => {\n    if (der[i] !== 0x02) return null;\n    const len = der[i + 1] as number;\n    if (len < 1 || len > 33) return null;\n    let v = der.slice(i + 2, i + 2 + len);\n    if (v.length !== len) return null;\n    // Minimal integers only: no needless leading zero, and never negative.\n    if ((v[0] as number) & 0x80) return null;\n    if (len > 1 && v[0] === 0 && !((v[1] as number) & 0x80)) return null;\n    i += 2 + len;\n    while (v.length > 32 && v[0] === 0) v = v.slice(1);\n    if (v.length > 32) return null;\n    const out = new Uint8Array(32);\n    out.set(v, 32 - v.length);\n    return out;\n  };\n  const r = part();\n  const s = part();\n  return r && s && i === der.length ? concat(r, s) : null;\n}\n\nconst u8 = (b: Uint8Array) => b as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;\n/** WebCrypto's key type, named without the DOM lib (Workers, Node and browsers all have it). */\ntype CryptoKey = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof crypto.subtle.importKey>>;\n\nasync function importKey(key: TrustedKey): Promise<CryptoKey | null> {\n  const spki = fromB64url(key.spki);\n  if (!spki?.length) return null;\n  try {\n    if (key.alg === ES256)\n      return await crypto.subtle.importKey(\"spki\", u8(spki), { name: \"ECDSA\", namedCurve: \"P-256\" }, false, [\"verify\"]);\n    if (key.alg === RS256) {\n      const k = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\"spki\", u8(spki), { name: \"RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5\", hash: \"SHA-256\" }, false, [\n        \"verify\",\n      ]);\n      const bits = (k.algorithm as { modulusLength?: number }).modulusLength ?? 0;\n      return bits >= 2048 ? k : null;\n    }\n  } catch {}\n  return null;\n}\n\n/** Can this key be enrolled at all? A machine refuses to trust a key it could never verify with. */\nexport async function keyUsable(key: TrustedKey): Promise<boolean> {\n  return (\n    !!key &&\n    typeof key.id === \"string\" &&\n    /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,1400}$/.test(key.id) &&\n    (key.alg === ES256 || key.alg === RS256) &&\n    !!(await importKey(key))\n  );\n}\n\n// --- WebAuthn -------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** A WebAuthn origin a key may have been used from: https on the rp id or a subdomain;\n *  for rp id `localhost`, plain http on any port too. A bare origin, as a browser writes it. */\nexport function originAllowed(origin: unknown, rpId: string): boolean {\n  if (typeof origin !== \"string\" || !rpId) return false;\n  let u: URL;\n  try {\n    u = new URL(origin);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (u.origin !== origin) return false;\n  if (u.hostname !== rpId && !u.hostname.endsWith(`.${rpId}`)) return false;\n  if (u.protocol === \"https:\") return true;\n  return u.protocol === \"http:\" && rpId === \"localhost\";\n}\n\ntype Check = { ok: true } | { ok: false; why: string };\nconst no = (why: string): Check => ({ ok: false, why });\n\n/** One passkey assertion over `challenge`, made with `key`, by a verified person. */\nexport async function verifyAssertion(\n  challenge: Uint8Array,\n  a: Assertion | null | undefined,\n  key: TrustedKey,\n  rpId: string,\n): Promise<Check> {\n  if (!a || typeof a !== \"object\") return no(\"no passkey signature\");\n  if (a.cred !== key.id) return no(\"signed with a key this machine doesn't trust\");\n  const cdBytes = fromB64url(a.cd);\n  const ad = fromB64url(a.ad);\n  const sig = fromB64url(a.sig);\n  if (!cdBytes || !ad || !sig?.length) return no(\"the passkey signature is malformed\");\n  let cd: { type?: unknown; challenge?: unknown; origin?: unknown; crossOrigin?: unknown };\n  try {\n    cd = JSON.parse(dec.decode(cdBytes));\n  } catch {\n    return no(\"the passkey signature is malformed\");\n  }\n  if (!cd || typeof cd !== \"object\") return no(\"the passkey signature is malformed\");\n  if (cd.type !== \"webauthn.get\") return no(\"the passkey answered a different question\");\n  if (cd.challenge !== b64url(challenge)) return no(\"the passkey signed something else\");\n  if (!originAllowed(cd.origin, rpId)) return no(`the passkey was used on another site, not ${rpId}`);\n  if (cd.crossOrigin === true) return no(\"the passkey was used inside another site's frame\");\n  if (ad.length < 37) return no(\"the passkey signature is malformed\");\n  if (!sameBytes(ad.slice(0, 32), await sha256(rpId))) return no(`the passkey belongs to another site, not ${rpId}`);\n  const flags = ad[32] as number;\n  if (!(flags & UP) || !(flags & UV)) return no(\"the passkey signed without verifying the person\");\n  const pub = await importKey(key);\n  if (!pub) return no(\"a trusted key is unusable\");\n  const signed = concat(ad, await sha256(cdBytes));\n  let good = false;\n  try {\n    if (key.alg === ES256) {\n      const raw = derToRaw(sig);\n      good = !!raw && (await crypto.subtle.verify({ name: \"ECDSA\", hash: \"SHA-256\" }, pub, u8(raw), u8(signed)));\n    } else {\n      good = await crypto.subtle.verify({ name: \"RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5\" }, pub, u8(sig), u8(signed));\n    }\n  } catch {\n    good = false;\n  }\n  return good ? { ok: true } : no(\"the passkey signature doesn't verify\");\n}\n\n/** What a passkey signs to enroll on a machine: bound to that machine and that pairing code. */\nexport function pairChallenge(machine: string, code: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  return sha256(`sessionpipe.pair:${machine}:${code}`);\n}\n\n/** The enrollment proof: the new key's assertion over pairChallenge(machine, code).\n *  Only after this verifies does the key go into the machine's trust store. */\nexport async function verifyEnrollment(o: {\n  machine: string;\n  code: string;\n  key: TrustedKey;\n  proof: Assertion;\n  rpId: string;\n}): Promise<Check> {\n  if (!(await keyUsable(o.key))) return no(\"the key is in a shape this machine can't use\");\n  return verifyAssertion(await pairChallenge(o.machine, o.code), o.proof, o.key, o.rpId);\n}\n\n// --- the command ------------------------------------------------------------------\n\ntype Parsed = { ok: true; cmd: ControlCommand } | { ok: false; code: RefusalCode; why: string };\nconst bad = (code: RefusalCode, why: string): { ok: false; code: RefusalCode; why: string } => ({\n  ok: false,\n  code,\n  why,\n});\nconst isNum = (n: unknown): n is number => typeof n === \"number\" && Number.isFinite(n);\n\n/** The session id rule per harness (ADAPTERS.md): Claude Code ids are UUIDs. */\nexport function sessionIdOk(harness: string, id: string): boolean {\n  if (!SESSION_ID_RE.test(id)) return false;\n  if (harness === \"claude-code\") return UUID_RE.test(id);\n  return true;\n}\n\n/** Split `<harness>:<id>`; null when either half breaks its rule. */\nexport function parseSessionRef(ref: unknown): { harness: string; id: string } | null {\n  if (typeof ref !== \"string\") return null;\n  const i = ref.indexOf(\":\");\n  if (i <= 0) return null;\n  const harness = ref.slice(0, i);\n  const id = ref.slice(i + 1);\n  return HARNESS_RE.test(harness) && sessionIdOk(harness, id) ? { harness, id } : null;\n}\n\n/** Read the command's fields from the exact string. Structure only; no clock, no keys. */\nexport function parseCommand(str: unknown): Parsed {\n  if (typeof str !== \"string\" || !str || str.length > CMD_MAX)\n    return bad(\"malformed\", \"the command is missing or too long\");\n  let c: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    c = JSON.parse(str);\n  } catch {\n    return bad(\"malformed\", \"the command is not JSON\");\n  }\n  if (!c || typeof c !== \"object\" || Array.isArray(c)) return bad(\"malformed\", \"the command is not an object\");\n  if (c.v !== 1 || c.t !== COMMAND_TYPE) return bad(\"not_a_command\", \"not a sessionpipe control command\");\n  if (typeof c.machine !== \"string\" || !MACHINE_RE.test(c.machine)) return bad(\"malformed\", \"which machine?\");\n  if (!CONTROL_KINDS.includes(c.kind as ControlKind))\n    return bad(\"unknown_kind\", \"the command asks for something unknown\");\n  const ref = parseSessionRef(c.session);\n  if (!ref) return bad(\"bad_session\", \"which session?\");\n  if (typeof c.nonce !== \"string\" || !NONCE_RE.test(c.nonce))\n    return bad(\"bad_nonce\", \"the nonce is missing or malformed\");\n  if (!isNum(c.iat) || !Number.isInteger(c.iat) || c.iat <= 0)\n    return bad(\"malformed\", \"the command has no signing time\");\n  const has = (k: string) => c[k] !== undefined;\n  const text = () => typeof c.text === \"string\" && c.text.trim().length > 0 && c.text.length <= TEXT_MAX;\n  switch (c.kind as ControlKind) {\n    case \"prompt\":\n      if (!text()) return bad(\"bad_fields\", `a prompt needs text, at most ${TEXT_MAX} characters`);\n      if (has(\"for\") || has(\"decision\") || has(\"cwd\")) return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a prompt carries only text\");\n      break;\n    case \"start\":\n      if (!text()) return bad(\"bad_fields\", `a new session needs text, at most ${TEXT_MAX} characters`);\n      if (typeof c.cwd !== \"string\" || !isAbsolute(c.cwd) || c.cwd.length > 1024)\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a new session needs an absolute folder\");\n      if (has(\"for\") || has(\"decision\")) return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a start carries text and cwd\");\n      break;\n    case \"permission.answer\":\n      if (typeof c.for !== \"string\" || !c.for || c.for.length > 128) return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"which attention?\");\n      if (c.decision !== \"allow\" && c.decision !== \"deny\") return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"allow or deny?\");\n      if (has(\"text\") || has(\"cwd\")) return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a permission answer carries for, decision and note\");\n      break;\n    case \"cancel\":\n      if (has(\"text\") || has(\"for\") || has(\"decision\") || has(\"cwd\"))\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a cancel carries nothing\");\n      break;\n    case \"key.add\": {\n      // A device the machine already trusts vouches for a new one (CONTROL.md \u00A72): the\n      // new passkey's id, algorithm and public key are inside the signed bytes.\n      if (c.session !== KEY_STORE_SESSION) return bad(\"bad_session\", `a key.add names ${KEY_STORE_SESSION}`);\n      const k = c.key as { id?: unknown; alg?: unknown; spki?: unknown } | undefined;\n      const b64 = (v: unknown, min: number, max: number) =>\n        typeof v === \"string\" && v.length >= min && v.length <= max && /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(v);\n      if (\n        !k ||\n        typeof k !== \"object\" ||\n        !b64(k.id, 16, 1400) ||\n        (k.alg !== -7 && k.alg !== -257) ||\n        !b64(k.spki, 40, 2000)\n      )\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a key.add carries the key: id, alg (-7 or -257) and spki\");\n      if (has(\"name\") && (typeof c.name !== \"string\" || !c.name.trim() || c.name.length > 80))\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a device name is text, at most 80 characters\");\n      if (has(\"text\") || has(\"for\") || has(\"decision\") || has(\"cwd\"))\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a key.add carries the key and a name\");\n      break;\n    }\n  }\n  if (c.kind !== \"key.add\" && (has(\"key\") || has(\"name\"))) return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"only a key.add carries a key\");\n  if (has(\"note\") && (typeof c.note !== \"string\" || c.note.length > NOTE_MAX))\n    return bad(\"bad_fields\", `a note is text, at most ${NOTE_MAX} characters`);\n  return { ok: true, cmd: c as unknown as ControlCommand };\n}\n\nfunction isAbsolute(p: string): boolean {\n  return p.startsWith(\"/\") || /^[A-Za-z]:[\\\\/]/.test(p);\n}\n\n/** The grant's fields, read from its exact string. */\nexport function parseGrant(str: unknown, rpId: string): { ok: true; grant: Grant } | { ok: false; why: string } {\n  if (typeof str !== \"string\" || !str || str.length > GRANT_STR_MAX)\n    return { ok: false, why: \"the grant is missing or too long\" };\n  let g: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    g = JSON.parse(str);\n  } catch {\n    return { ok: false, why: \"the grant is not JSON\" };\n  }\n  if (!g || typeof g !== \"object\" || Array.isArray(g)) return { ok: false, why: \"the grant is not an object\" };\n  if (g.v !== 1 || g.t !== GRANT_TYPE) return { ok: false, why: \"not a sessionpipe grant\" };\n  if (g.rp !== rpId) return { ok: false, why: `the grant is for another site, not ${rpId}` };\n  if (typeof g.pub !== \"string\" || !fromB64url(g.pub)?.length || !isNum(g.iat) || !isNum(g.exp))\n    return { ok: false, why: \"the grant is missing parts\" };\n  if (g.exp <= g.iat) return { ok: false, why: \"the grant ends before it starts\" };\n  if (g.exp - g.iat > GRANT_MAX_MS + SKEW_MS) return { ok: false, why: \"the grant lasts longer than a day\" };\n  return { ok: true, grant: g as unknown as Grant };\n}\n\nasync function verifyCsig(cmd: string, csig: unknown, pub: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  const sig = fromB64url(csig);\n  const spki = fromB64url(pub);\n  if (sig?.length !== 64 || !spki) return false;\n  try {\n    const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\"spki\", u8(spki), { name: \"ECDSA\", namedCurve: \"P-256\" }, false, [\n      \"verify\",\n    ]);\n    return await crypto.subtle.verify({ name: \"ECDSA\", hash: \"SHA-256\" }, key, u8(sig), u8(enc.encode(cmd)));\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Is this a command this machine may run? The checks, in the spec's order\n * (CONTROL.md \u00A75): the exact bytes parse; the command is for this machine; it is\n * signed \u2014 a grant from a trusted key plus the day key's signature, or a confirm\n * over sha256(cmd); it was signed within the age window; its nonce is new.\n * The folder and open-attention checks that follow are the daemon's (they read\n * the machine, not the command).\n */\nexport async function verifyCommand(s: SignedCommand | null | undefined, o: VerifyOptions): Promise<Verdict> {\n  if (!s || typeof s !== \"object\") return bad(\"malformed\", \"nothing to verify\");\n  const p = parseCommand(s.cmd);\n  if (!p.ok) return p;\n  const c = p.cmd;\n  if (c.machine !== o.machine) return bad(\"wrong_machine\", \"the command is for another machine\");\n\n  let via: \"grant\" | \"confirm\" | null = null;\n  let keyId = \"\";\n  let refusal: { code: RefusalCode; why: string } | null = null;\n  if (s.grant && s.csig) {\n    const r = await checkGrantPath(s, c, o);\n    if (r.ok) {\n      via = \"grant\";\n      keyId = r.key;\n    } else refusal = r;\n  }\n  if (!via && s.confirm) {\n    const key = o.trusted.find((k) => k && k.id === s.confirm?.cred);\n    if (!key) refusal = { code: \"untrusted_key\", why: \"confirmed with a key this machine doesn't trust\" };\n    else {\n      const a = await verifyAssertion(await sha256(s.cmd), s.confirm, key, o.rpId);\n      if (a.ok) {\n        via = \"confirm\";\n        keyId = key.id;\n      } else refusal = { code: \"bad_assertion\", why: a.why };\n    }\n  }\n  if (!via) {\n    if (refusal) return bad(refusal.code, refusal.why);\n    return bad(\"unsigned\", \"the command isn't signed\");\n  }\n  if (c.iat > o.now + SKEW_MS) return bad(\"future\", \"the command is dated in the future (is this clock right?)\");\n  if (o.now - c.iat > (o.maxAgeMs ?? MACHINE_MAX_AGE_MS)) return bad(\"too_old\", \"the command was signed too long ago\");\n  if (o.seenNonce) {\n    let seen: boolean;\n    try {\n      seen = await o.seenNonce(c.nonce);\n    } catch {\n      return bad(\"nonce_store\", \"the nonce couldn't be recorded, so the command didn't run\");\n    }\n    if (seen) return bad(\"replay\", \"this command was already used once\");\n  }\n  return { ok: true, cmd: c, via, key: keyId };\n}\n\nasync function checkGrantPath(\n  s: SignedCommand,\n  c: ControlCommand,\n  o: VerifyOptions,\n): Promise<{ ok: true; key: string } | { ok: false; code: RefusalCode; why: string }> {\n  const bundle = s.grant as GrantBundle;\n  const g = parseGrant(bundle.str, o.rpId);\n  if (!g.ok) return bad(\"bad_grant\", g.why);\n  const key = o.trusted.find((k) => k && k.id === bundle.cred);\n  if (!key) return bad(\"untrusted_key\", \"the grant was signed with a key this machine doesn't trust\");\n  const a = await verifyAssertion(await sha256(bundle.str), bundle, key, o.rpId);\n  if (!a.ok) return bad(\"bad_assertion\", a.why);\n  if (!(await verifyCsig(s.cmd, s.csig, g.grant.pub)))\n    return bad(\"bad_csig\", \"the command's signature doesn't verify \u2014 it was changed after it was signed\");\n  if (c.iat < g.grant.iat - SKEW_MS || c.iat > g.grant.exp)\n    return bad(\"outside_grant\", \"the command was signed outside its grant's window\");\n  return { ok: true, key: key.id };\n}\n"],
-  "mappings": 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+  "sourcesContent": ["// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0\n// The one verifier for signed control commands (spec/CONTROL.md \u00A74\u2013\u00A75). A machine\n// runs a command only when this says yes; a receiver MAY run it too, as an early\n// word, so a bad command is refused where the person can see why.\n//\n// WebCrypto only (globalThis.crypto.subtle), no node: imports, no clock of its own\n// (`now` is passed in): the same file runs in a Cloudflare Worker, in a browser and\n// in Node \u2265 20, and conformance/control-vectors/ pins its answers.\n//\n// Every signature covers the EXACT bytes as transmitted (`cmd`, `grant.str`): the\n// strings are parsed to read their fields and never re-serialized to verify.\n\n/** One passkey tap vouches for a day key for at most this long. */\nexport const GRANT_MAX_MS = 24 * 3600_000;\n/** Clock slack between the signing device, the receiver and the machine. */\nexport const SKEW_MS = 5 * 60_000;\n/** The machine judges a command by when it was SIGNED: a message sent while the lid\n *  was shut still runs when the machine wakes, up to a day later. */\nexport const MACHINE_MAX_AGE_MS = 24 * 3600_000;\n/** A receiver's early check is stricter: a command is carried within ten minutes of\n *  being signed, or not at all. */\nexport const RECEIVER_MAX_AGE_MS = 10 * 60_000;\n/** How long a machine remembers a nonce: longer than MACHINE_MAX_AGE_MS + SKEW_MS. */\nexport const NONCE_TTL_MS = 25 * 3600_000;\n/** The whole command string, in UTF-16 code units (what JSON.parse sees). */\nexport const CMD_MAX = 48_000;\n/** A prompt's text, in characters. */\nexport const TEXT_MAX = 20_000;\n/** A permission answer's note. */\nexport const NOTE_MAX = 2_000;\n/** A grant string. */\nexport const GRANT_STR_MAX = 2_000;\n/** Attachments on a `start` or a `prompt` (CONTROL.md \u00A73.1): at most this many files, */\nexport const FILES_MAX = 10;\n/** each at most this many bytes, */\nexport const FILE_SIZE_MAX = 26_214_400;\n/** together at most this many, */\nexport const FILES_TOTAL_MAX = 52_428_800;\n/** with a name of at most this many characters (after NFC) */\nexport const FILE_NAME_MAX = 200;\n/** and a media type of at most this many. */\nexport const FILE_TYPE_MAX = 100;\n/** A start's `model` (CONTROL.md \u00A73.1): at most this many characters, */\nexport const MODEL_MAX = 100;\n/** in this alphabet, never starting with a dash, so it can never read as a flag. */\nexport const MODEL_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@[\\]-]*$/;\n/** The levels a start may ask for (CONTROL.md \u00A73.1), narrowest first. Closed: no level\n *  is wider than `auto`, and none turns a harness's approval off. */\nexport const START_PERMISSIONS = [\"read\", \"safe\", \"edits\", \"auto\"] as const;\nexport type StartPermission = (typeof START_PERMISSIONS)[number];\n/** What a run is started with: a level, or `inherit` (CONTROL.md \u00A72) \u2014 no permission\n *  flag at all, so the harness starts in its own default on the machine. Only a machine\n *  the person put in inherit mode runs that way; a command never names it. */\nexport type RunLevel = StartPermission | \"inherit\";\n\n/** Where a level sits, narrowest (0) to widest; -1 for anything that isn't one. */\nexport const levelRank = (l: unknown): number => START_PERMISSIONS.indexOf(l as StartPermission);\n/** The narrower of two levels: what a later run of a session gets, its recorded level\n *  against what the machine's mode allows now. */\nexport const narrower = (a: StartPermission, b: StartPermission): StartPermission =>\n  levelRank(a) <= levelRank(b) ? a : b;\n\nexport const COMMAND_TYPE = \"sessionpipe.control\";\nexport const GRANT_TYPE = \"sessionpipe.grant\";\nexport const CONTROL_KINDS = [\"prompt\", \"permission.answer\", \"cancel\", \"start\", \"key.add\"] as const;\n/** The session a `key.add` names: the machine's own key store, not a coding session. */\nexport const KEY_STORE_SESSION = \"sessionpipe:keys\";\nexport type ControlKind = (typeof CONTROL_KINDS)[number];\n\n/** COSE algorithm ids a trusted key may use. */\nexport const ES256 = -7;\nexport const RS256 = -257;\n\n/** The kinds of key a machine may trust (CONTROL.md \u00A72): a WebAuthn passkey, or a\n *  device key an app holds in hardware where it has no passkey to offer. */\nexport const KEY_TYPES = [\"passkey\", \"device\"] as const;\nexport type KeyType = (typeof KEY_TYPES)[number];\n\n/** A key enrolled on the machine: a passkey's credential id, COSE alg and SPKI\n *  (base64url); a device key also says so (`type`), and what its app declared about\n *  it (`store`, `uv`). The machine verifies by its own record, never by a message. */\nexport interface TrustedKey {\n  id: string;\n  alg: number;\n  spki: string;\n  /** Present only on a device key (CONTROL.md \u00A72 \"Device keys\"). */\n  type?: \"device\";\n  store?: \"hardware\";\n  uv?: \"each-use\";\n}\n/** A WebAuthn assertion: credential id, authenticatorData, clientDataJSON, signature (base64url). */\nexport interface Assertion {\n  cred: string;\n  ad: string;\n  cd: string;\n  sig: string;\n}\n/** A device key's signature (CONTROL.md \u00A73.2): its id and 64 bytes r\u2016s over deviceMessage(). */\nexport interface DeviceSignature {\n  cred: string;\n  sig: string;\n}\n/** The day's grant: a passkey's assertion over sha256(str), where str names the day key. */\nexport interface GrantBundle extends Assertion {\n  str: string;\n}\n/** The day's grant from a device key: its signature over deviceMessage(\"grant\", rp, sha256(str)). */\nexport interface DeviceGrant extends DeviceSignature {\n  str: string;\n}\n/** What a receiver carries for one command (control.json minus the receiver's envelope). */\nexport interface SignedCommand {\n  cmd: string;\n  csig?: string | null;\n  grant?: GrantBundle | DeviceGrant | null;\n  confirm?: Assertion | DeviceSignature | null;\n}\nexport interface Grant {\n  v: 1;\n  t: typeof GRANT_TYPE;\n  pub: string;\n  iat: number;\n  exp: number;\n  rp: string;\n}\n/** One file attached to a `start`: the bytes live on the receiver, named by their hash. */\nexport interface ControlFile {\n  /** The file name the machine writes (NFC). */\n  name: string;\n  /** Media type, `type/subtype`. */\n  type: string;\n  /** Bytes. */\n  size: number;\n  /** SHA-256 of the bytes, base64url without padding (43 characters). */\n  sha256: string;\n}\nexport interface ControlCommand {\n  v: 1;\n  t: typeof COMMAND_TYPE;\n  machine: string;\n  kind: ControlKind;\n  /** `<harness>:<id>`, e.g. `claude-code:8c132906-\u2026`. */\n  session: string;\n  text?: string;\n  for?: string;\n  decision?: \"allow\" | \"deny\";\n  note?: string;\n  cwd?: string;\n  /** key.add only: the key to trust from now on, as the receiver holds it (a passkey,\n   *  or a device key with its `type`, `store` and `uv`). */\n  key?: TrustedKey;\n  /** key.add only: what the person calls the device (\"iPhone\"), for `control keys`. */\n  name?: string;\n  /** start, prompt: files to download, verify and write into the session's folder. */\n  files?: ControlFile[];\n  /** start only: the level the new session runs at (never above the machine's mode). */\n  permission?: StartPermission;\n  /** start only: the model the harness runs, as the harness names it. */\n  model?: string;\n  nonce: string;\n  iat: number;\n}\n\n/** Why a command was refused. Stable: conformance vectors and acks name these. */\nexport type RefusalCode =\n  | \"malformed\"\n  | \"not_a_command\"\n  | \"wrong_machine\"\n  | \"unknown_kind\"\n  | \"bad_session\"\n  | \"bad_fields\"\n  | \"bad_nonce\"\n  | \"too_old\"\n  | \"future\"\n  | \"unsigned\"\n  | \"untrusted_key\"\n  | \"bad_assertion\"\n  | \"bad_grant\"\n  | \"outside_grant\"\n  | \"bad_csig\"\n  | \"replay\"\n  | \"nonce_store\";\n\nexport type Verdict =\n  | { ok: true; cmd: ControlCommand; via: \"grant\" | \"confirm\"; key: string }\n  | { ok: false; code: RefusalCode; why: string };\n\nexport interface VerifyOptions {\n  /** This machine's id; a command for another machine is refused. */\n  machine: string;\n  /** The receiver's WebAuthn rp id the keys were enrolled for (well-known control.signing.rp_id). */\n  rpId: string;\n  /** The keys enrolled on this machine (or, for a receiver's early check, the account's). */\n  trusted: TrustedKey[];\n  /** Epoch ms. */\n  now: number;\n  /** MACHINE_MAX_AGE_MS on a machine (default), RECEIVER_MAX_AGE_MS on a receiver. */\n  maxAgeMs?: number;\n  /** Called once, last, only for a command whose signatures all verified: answer\n   *  true when the nonce was seen before, otherwise record it (durably) and answer\n   *  false. A throw refuses the command (`nonce_store`): never run what could not\n   *  be remembered. Omit it on a receiver's early check. */\n  seenNonce?: (nonce: string) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;\n}\n\nconst NONCE_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,64}$/;\nconst MACHINE_RE = /^m_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,40}$/;\nconst HARNESS_RE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,39}$/;\nconst SESSION_ID_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,128}$/;\nconst UUID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;\nconst B64URL_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]*$/;\nconst SHA256_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;\nconst MEDIA_TYPE_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*\\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*$/i;\n// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noControlCharactersInRegex: control characters are exactly what it rejects\nconst BAD_NAME_CHAR_RE = /[/\\\\\\x00-\\x1f\\x7f]/;\nconst UP = 0x01;\nconst UV = 0x04;\n\n/** The fields each kind carries besides the common ones (CONTROL.md \u00A73.1). The set is\n *  closed: a field it doesn't list is `bad_fields`, so a field added later fails closed\n *  on a machine that predates it instead of being ignored. */\nconst COMMON_FIELDS: readonly string[] = [\"v\", \"t\", \"machine\", \"kind\", \"session\", \"nonce\", \"iat\", \"note\"];\nconst FIELDS: Record<ControlKind, readonly string[]> = {\n  prompt: [\"text\", \"files\"],\n  \"permission.answer\": [\"for\", \"decision\"],\n  cancel: [],\n  start: [\"text\", \"cwd\", \"files\", \"permission\", \"model\"],\n  \"key.add\": [\"key\", \"name\"],\n};\n\n// --- encodings ------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nconst enc = new TextEncoder();\nconst dec = new TextDecoder();\n\nexport function b64url(bytes: Uint8Array | ArrayBuffer): string {\n  const u = bytes instanceof Uint8Array ? bytes : new Uint8Array(bytes);\n  let s = \"\";\n  for (const b of u) s += String.fromCharCode(b);\n  return btoa(s).replace(/\\+/g, \"-\").replace(/\\//g, \"_\").replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n}\n\n/** base64url without padding, strictly; null for anything else. */\nexport function fromB64url(s: unknown): Uint8Array | null {\n  if (typeof s !== \"string\" || !B64URL_RE.test(s) || s.length % 4 === 1) return null;\n  try {\n    const bin = atob(s.replace(/-/g, \"+\").replace(/_/g, \"/\") + \"===\".slice((s.length + 3) % 4));\n    const out = new Uint8Array(bin.length);\n    for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) out[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);\n    return out;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function sha256(data: string | Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const bytes = typeof data === \"string\" ? enc.encode(data) : data;\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest(\"SHA-256\", bytes as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>));\n}\n\nfunction concat(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n  const out = new Uint8Array(a.length + b.length);\n  out.set(a, 0);\n  out.set(b, a.length);\n  return out;\n}\n\n/** Equal, compared whole: a mismatch costs the same as a match. */\nexport function sameBytes(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean {\n  if (a.length !== b.length) return false;\n  let d = 0;\n  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) d |= (a[i] as number) ^ (b[i] as number);\n  return d === 0;\n}\n\n/** A DER ECDSA signature (what WebAuthn returns) as the 64-byte r\u2016s WebCrypto verifies.\n *  Strict: every length must match the bytes, so one signature has one encoding (a\n *  P-256 signature is at most 72 bytes, so the short length form is the only one). */\nexport function derToRaw(der: Uint8Array): Uint8Array | null {\n  if (der[0] !== 0x30 || der.length < 8 || der[1] !== der.length - 2) return null;\n  let i = 2;\n  const part = (): Uint8Array | null => {\n    if (der[i] !== 0x02) return null;\n    const len = der[i + 1] as number;\n    if (len < 1 || len > 33) return null;\n    let v = der.slice(i + 2, i + 2 + len);\n    if (v.length !== len) return null;\n    // Minimal integers only: no needless leading zero, and never negative.\n    if ((v[0] as number) & 0x80) return null;\n    if (len > 1 && v[0] === 0 && !((v[1] as number) & 0x80)) return null;\n    i += 2 + len;\n    while (v.length > 32 && v[0] === 0) v = v.slice(1);\n    if (v.length > 32) return null;\n    const out = new Uint8Array(32);\n    out.set(v, 32 - v.length);\n    return out;\n  };\n  const r = part();\n  const s = part();\n  return r && s && i === der.length ? concat(r, s) : null;\n}\n\nconst u8 = (b: Uint8Array) => b as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;\n/** WebCrypto's key type, named without the DOM lib (Workers, Node and browsers all have it). */\ntype CryptoKey = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof crypto.subtle.importKey>>;\n\nasync function importKey(key: TrustedKey): Promise<CryptoKey | null> {\n  const spki = fromB64url(key.spki);\n  if (!spki?.length) return null;\n  try {\n    if (key.alg === ES256)\n      return await crypto.subtle.importKey(\"spki\", u8(spki), { name: \"ECDSA\", namedCurve: \"P-256\" }, false, [\"verify\"]);\n    if (key.alg === RS256) {\n      const k = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\"spki\", u8(spki), { name: \"RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5\", hash: \"SHA-256\" }, false, [\n        \"verify\",\n      ]);\n      const bits = (k.algorithm as { modulusLength?: number }).modulusLength as number; // every RSA key has one\n      return bits >= 2048 ? k : null;\n    }\n  } catch {}\n  return null;\n}\n\nconst PASSKEY_FIELDS = new Set([\"id\", \"alg\", \"spki\"]);\nconst DEVICE_FIELDS = new Set([\"id\", \"alg\", \"spki\", \"type\", \"store\", \"uv\"]);\n/** The only fields a device signature has (`str` only in a grant). */\nexport const DEVICE_SIG_FIELDS = [\"cred\", \"sig\", \"str\"] as const;\n\n/** A device key's id: the SHA-256 of its SPKI bytes, base64url without padding. */\nexport async function deviceKeyId(spki: string): Promise<string> {\n  return b64url(await sha256(fromB64url(spki) ?? new Uint8Array()));\n}\n\n/** A device key's declared rules, ignoring any bookkeeping fields a store keeps beside\n *  them (a name, when it was added): ES256, hardware, verified each use, named by its\n *  SPKI's hash, and a P-256 key WebCrypto can import. */\nasync function deviceRecordValid(key: TrustedKey): Promise<boolean> {\n  if (key.type !== \"device\" || key.alg !== ES256 || key.store !== \"hardware\" || key.uv !== \"each-use\") return false;\n  if (typeof key.id !== \"string\" || !SHA256_RE.test(key.id) || key.id !== (await deviceKeyId(key.spki))) return false;\n  return !!(await importKey(key));\n}\n\n/** Can this key be enrolled at all? A machine refuses to trust a key it could never\n *  verify with. The key's fields are closed: a passkey is `id`, `alg`, `spki` and\n *  nothing else; a device key adds exactly `type`, `store` and `uv` (CONTROL.md \u00A72),\n *  so a kind added later is refused by every machine that predates it. */\nexport async function keyUsable(key: TrustedKey): Promise<boolean> {\n  if (!key || typeof key !== \"object\" || Array.isArray(key)) return false;\n  const fields = Object.keys(key).filter((k) => (key as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)[k] !== undefined);\n  if (\"type\" in key && key.type !== undefined) {\n    if (!fields.every((f) => DEVICE_FIELDS.has(f))) return false;\n    return deviceRecordValid(key);\n  }\n  if (!fields.every((f) => PASSKEY_FIELDS.has(f))) return false;\n  return (\n    typeof key.id === \"string\" &&\n    /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,1400}$/.test(key.id) &&\n    (key.alg === ES256 || key.alg === RS256) &&\n    !!(await importKey(key))\n  );\n}\n\n// --- WebAuthn -------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** A WebAuthn origin a key may have been used from: https on the rp id or a subdomain;\n *  for rp id `localhost`, plain http on any port too. A bare origin, as a browser writes it. */\nexport function originAllowed(origin: unknown, rpId: string): boolean {\n  if (typeof origin !== \"string\" || !rpId) return false;\n  let u: URL;\n  try {\n    u = new URL(origin);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (u.origin !== origin) return false;\n  if (u.hostname !== rpId && !u.hostname.endsWith(`.${rpId}`)) return false;\n  if (u.protocol === \"https:\") return true;\n  return u.protocol === \"http:\" && rpId === \"localhost\";\n}\n\ntype Check = { ok: true } | { ok: false; why: string };\nconst no = (why: string): Check => ({ ok: false, why });\n\n// --- device keys (CONTROL.md \u00A73.2) ------------------------------------------------\n\n/** The first line of every message a device key signs. */\nexport const DEVICE_CONTEXT = \"sessionpipe.device.v1\";\n/** What a device signature is for: one use can never answer for another. */\nexport type DevicePurpose = \"grant\" | \"confirm\" | \"pair\";\n\n/** The exact bytes a device key signs: the context, the purpose, the rp id as the\n *  machine recorded it, and the base64url (no padding) of the 32-byte challenge a\n *  passkey would sign for that purpose, joined by single line feeds, none at the end. */\nexport function deviceMessage(purpose: DevicePurpose, rpId: string, challenge: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n  return enc.encode(`${DEVICE_CONTEXT}\\n${purpose}\\n${rpId}\\n${b64url(challenge)}`);\n}\n\n/** One device signature over `challenge` for `purpose`, made with the device key `key`. */\nasync function verifyDeviceSignature(\n  challenge: Uint8Array,\n  a: object,\n  key: TrustedKey,\n  rpId: string,\n  purpose: DevicePurpose,\n): Promise<Check> {\n  const sig = a as Record<string, unknown>;\n  for (const f of Object.keys(sig)) {\n    if (f === \"str\" && purpose === \"grant\") continue;\n    if (f !== \"cred\" && f !== \"sig\") return no(`a device key's signature carries no ${f}`);\n  }\n  if (sig.cred !== key.id) return no(\"signed with a key this machine doesn't trust\");\n  if (!(await deviceRecordValid(key))) return no(\"a trusted key is unusable\");\n  const raw = fromB64url(sig.sig);\n  if (raw?.length !== 64) return no(\"a device key's signature is 64 bytes, r\u2016s\");\n  const pub = await importKey(key);\n  /* v8 ignore next -- deviceRecordValid imported it already */\n  if (!pub) return no(\"a trusted key is unusable\");\n  let good = false;\n  try {\n    good = await crypto.subtle.verify(\n      { name: \"ECDSA\", hash: \"SHA-256\" },\n      pub,\n      u8(raw),\n      u8(deviceMessage(purpose, rpId, challenge)),\n    );\n  } catch {\n    /* v8 ignore next -- WebCrypto answers false for a bad signature; a throw is a broken runtime */\n    good = false;\n  }\n  return good ? { ok: true } : no(\"the device key's signature doesn't verify\");\n}\n\n/** One signature over `challenge` by `key`, chosen from the machine's own record of\n *  the key, never from the signature: a device key's signature for `purpose`\n *  (CONTROL.md \u00A73.2), or a passkey assertion made by a verified person. */\nexport async function verifyAssertion(\n  challenge: Uint8Array,\n  a: Assertion | DeviceSignature | null | undefined,\n  key: TrustedKey,\n  rpId: string,\n  purpose: DevicePurpose,\n): Promise<Check> {\n  if (!a || typeof a !== \"object\") return no(\"no passkey signature\");\n  if (key.type !== undefined) {\n    if (key.type !== \"device\") return no(\"a trusted key is unusable\");\n    return verifyDeviceSignature(challenge, a, key, rpId, purpose);\n  }\n  return verifyPasskeyAssertion(challenge, a as Assertion, key, rpId);\n}\n\nasync function verifyPasskeyAssertion(\n  challenge: Uint8Array,\n  a: Assertion,\n  key: TrustedKey,\n  rpId: string,\n): Promise<Check> {\n  if (a.cred !== key.id) return no(\"signed with a key this machine doesn't trust\");\n  const cdBytes = fromB64url(a.cd);\n  const ad = fromB64url(a.ad);\n  const sig = fromB64url(a.sig);\n  if (!cdBytes || !ad || !sig?.length) return no(\"the passkey signature is malformed\");\n  let cd: { type?: unknown; challenge?: unknown; origin?: unknown; crossOrigin?: unknown };\n  try {\n    cd = JSON.parse(dec.decode(cdBytes));\n  } catch {\n    return no(\"the passkey signature is malformed\");\n  }\n  if (!cd || typeof cd !== \"object\") return no(\"the passkey signature is malformed\");\n  if (cd.type !== \"webauthn.get\") return no(\"the passkey answered a different question\");\n  if (cd.challenge !== b64url(challenge)) return no(\"the passkey signed something else\");\n  if (!originAllowed(cd.origin, rpId)) return no(`the passkey was used on another site, not ${rpId}`);\n  if (cd.crossOrigin === true) return no(\"the passkey was used inside another site's frame\");\n  if (ad.length < 37) return no(\"the passkey signature is malformed\");\n  if (!sameBytes(ad.slice(0, 32), await sha256(rpId))) return no(`the passkey belongs to another site, not ${rpId}`);\n  const flags = ad[32] as number;\n  if (!(flags & UP) || !(flags & UV)) return no(\"the passkey signed without verifying the person\");\n  const pub = await importKey(key);\n  if (!pub) return no(\"a trusted key is unusable\");\n  const signed = concat(ad, await sha256(cdBytes));\n  let good = false;\n  try {\n    if (key.alg === ES256) {\n      const raw = derToRaw(sig);\n      good = !!raw && (await crypto.subtle.verify({ name: \"ECDSA\", hash: \"SHA-256\" }, pub, u8(raw), u8(signed)));\n    } else {\n      good = await crypto.subtle.verify({ name: \"RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5\" }, pub, u8(sig), u8(signed));\n    }\n  } catch {\n    good = false;\n  }\n  return good ? { ok: true } : no(\"the passkey signature doesn't verify\");\n}\n\n/** What a passkey signs to enroll on a machine: bound to that machine and that pairing code. */\nexport function pairChallenge(machine: string, code: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  return sha256(`sessionpipe.pair:${machine}:${code}`);\n}\n\n/** The enrollment proof: the new key's assertion over pairChallenge(machine, code).\n *  Only after this verifies does the key go into the machine's trust store. */\nexport async function verifyEnrollment(o: {\n  machine: string;\n  code: string;\n  key: TrustedKey;\n  proof: Assertion | DeviceSignature;\n  rpId: string;\n}): Promise<Check> {\n  if (!(await keyUsable(o.key))) return no(\"the key is in a shape this machine can't use\");\n  return verifyAssertion(await pairChallenge(o.machine, o.code), o.proof, o.key, o.rpId, \"pair\");\n}\n\n// --- the command ------------------------------------------------------------------\n\ntype Parsed = { ok: true; cmd: ControlCommand } | { ok: false; code: RefusalCode; why: string };\nconst bad = (code: RefusalCode, why: string): { ok: false; code: RefusalCode; why: string } => ({\n  ok: false,\n  code,\n  why,\n});\nconst isNum = (n: unknown): n is number => typeof n === \"number\" && Number.isFinite(n);\n\n/** The session id rule per harness (ADAPTERS.md): Claude Code ids are UUIDs. */\nexport function sessionIdOk(harness: string, id: string): boolean {\n  if (!SESSION_ID_RE.test(id)) return false;\n  if (harness === \"claude-code\") return UUID_RE.test(id);\n  return true;\n}\n\n/** Split `<harness>:<id>`; null when either half breaks its rule. */\nexport function parseSessionRef(ref: unknown): { harness: string; id: string } | null {\n  if (typeof ref !== \"string\") return null;\n  const i = ref.indexOf(\":\");\n  if (i <= 0) return null;\n  const harness = ref.slice(0, i);\n  const id = ref.slice(i + 1);\n  return HARNESS_RE.test(harness) && sessionIdOk(harness, id) ? { harness, id } : null;\n}\n\n/** Read the command's fields from the exact string. Structure only; no clock, no keys. */\nexport function parseCommand(str: unknown): Parsed {\n  if (typeof str !== \"string\" || !str || str.length > CMD_MAX)\n    return bad(\"malformed\", \"the command is missing or too long\");\n  let c: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    c = JSON.parse(str);\n  } catch {\n    return bad(\"malformed\", \"the command is not JSON\");\n  }\n  if (!c || typeof c !== \"object\" || Array.isArray(c)) return bad(\"malformed\", \"the command is not an object\");\n  if (c.v !== 1 || c.t !== COMMAND_TYPE) return bad(\"not_a_command\", \"not a sessionpipe control command\");\n  if (typeof c.machine !== \"string\" || !MACHINE_RE.test(c.machine)) return bad(\"malformed\", \"which machine?\");\n  if (!CONTROL_KINDS.includes(c.kind as ControlKind))\n    return bad(\"unknown_kind\", \"the command asks for something unknown\");\n  const ref = parseSessionRef(c.session);\n  if (!ref) return bad(\"bad_session\", \"which session?\");\n  if (typeof c.nonce !== \"string\" || !NONCE_RE.test(c.nonce))\n    return bad(\"bad_nonce\", \"the nonce is missing or malformed\");\n  if (!isNum(c.iat) || !Number.isInteger(c.iat) || c.iat <= 0)\n    return bad(\"malformed\", \"the command has no signing time\");\n  const has = (k: string) => c[k] !== undefined;\n  const text = () => typeof c.text === \"string\" && c.text.trim().length > 0 && c.text.length <= TEXT_MAX;\n  switch (c.kind as ControlKind) {\n    case \"prompt\":\n      if (!text()) return bad(\"bad_fields\", `a prompt needs text, at most ${TEXT_MAX} characters`);\n      if (has(\"for\") || has(\"decision\") || has(\"cwd\")) return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a prompt carries text and files\");\n      if (has(\"files\")) {\n        const why = filesProblem(c.files);\n        if (why) return bad(\"bad_fields\", why);\n      }\n      break;\n    case \"start\":\n      if (!text()) return bad(\"bad_fields\", `a new session needs text, at most ${TEXT_MAX} characters`);\n      if (typeof c.cwd !== \"string\" || !(isAbsolute(c.cwd) || HOME_RELATIVE_RE.test(c.cwd)) || c.cwd.length > 1024)\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a new session needs an absolute folder, or one under ~\");\n      if (has(\"for\") || has(\"decision\"))\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a start carries text, cwd, files, a permission and a model\");\n      if (has(\"files\")) {\n        const why = filesProblem(c.files);\n        if (why) return bad(\"bad_fields\", why);\n      }\n      if (has(\"permission\") && levelRank(c.permission) < 0)\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", `a permission is one of ${START_PERMISSIONS.join(\", \")}`);\n      if (has(\"model\") && (typeof c.model !== \"string\" || c.model.length > MODEL_MAX || !MODEL_RE.test(c.model)))\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", `a model is 1 to ${MODEL_MAX} letters, digits and ._:/@[]-, not starting with a dash`);\n      break;\n    case \"permission.answer\":\n      if (typeof c.for !== \"string\" || !c.for || c.for.length > 128) return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"which attention?\");\n      if (c.decision !== \"allow\" && c.decision !== \"deny\") return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"allow or deny?\");\n      if (has(\"text\") || has(\"cwd\")) return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a permission answer carries for, decision and note\");\n      break;\n    case \"cancel\":\n      if (has(\"text\") || has(\"for\") || has(\"decision\") || has(\"cwd\"))\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a cancel carries nothing\");\n      break;\n    case \"key.add\": {\n      // A device the machine already trusts vouches for a new one (CONTROL.md \u00A72): the\n      // new key's id, algorithm and public key (and, for a device key, its type, store\n      // and uv) are inside the signed bytes.\n      if (c.session !== KEY_STORE_SESSION) return bad(\"bad_session\", `a key.add names ${KEY_STORE_SESSION}`);\n      const k = c.key as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n      const b64 = (v: unknown, min: number, max: number) =>\n        typeof v === \"string\" && v.length >= min && v.length <= max && /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(v);\n      if (\n        !k ||\n        typeof k !== \"object\" ||\n        Array.isArray(k) ||\n        !b64(k.id, 16, 1400) ||\n        (k.alg !== -7 && k.alg !== -257) ||\n        !b64(k.spki, 40, 2000)\n      )\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a key.add carries the key: id, alg (-7 or -257) and spki\");\n      if (k.type !== undefined) {\n        if (k.type !== \"device\") return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a key's type is device, or absent for a passkey\");\n        if (k.alg !== ES256 || k.store !== \"hardware\" || k.uv !== \"each-use\" || !SHA256_RE.test(k.id as string))\n          return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a device key is ES256, store hardware, uv each-use, named by its SPKI's hash\");\n        if (Object.keys(k).some((f) => !DEVICE_FIELDS.has(f)))\n          return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a device key carries id, alg, spki, type, store and uv\");\n      } else if (Object.keys(k).some((f) => !PASSKEY_FIELDS.has(f)))\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a passkey carries id, alg and spki: store and uv belong to a device key\");\n      if (has(\"name\") && (typeof c.name !== \"string\" || !c.name.trim() || c.name.length > 80))\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a device name is text, at most 80 characters\");\n      if (has(\"text\") || has(\"for\") || has(\"decision\") || has(\"cwd\"))\n        return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"a key.add carries the key and a name\");\n      break;\n    }\n  }\n  if (c.kind !== \"key.add\" && (has(\"key\") || has(\"name\"))) return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"only a key.add carries a key\");\n  if (c.kind !== \"start\" && c.kind !== \"prompt\" && has(\"files\"))\n    return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"only a start or a prompt carries files\");\n  if (c.kind !== \"start\" && (has(\"permission\") || has(\"model\")))\n    return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"only a start carries a model or a permission\");\n  const allowed = FIELDS[c.kind as ControlKind];\n  for (const k of Object.keys(c))\n    if (!COMMON_FIELDS.includes(k) && !allowed.includes(k))\n      return bad(\"bad_fields\", `the command carries a field its kind doesn't have: ${k.slice(0, 40)}`);\n  if (has(\"note\") && (typeof c.note !== \"string\" || c.note.length > NOTE_MAX))\n    return bad(\"bad_fields\", `a note is text, at most ${NOTE_MAX} characters`);\n  return { ok: true, cmd: c as unknown as ControlCommand };\n}\n\n/** Why a start's or a prompt's `files` breaks the rules (CONTROL.md \u00A73.1), or null when it doesn't. */\nexport function filesProblem(files: unknown): string | null {\n  if (!Array.isArray(files) || files.length < 1 || files.length > FILES_MAX)\n    return `files is a list of 1 to ${FILES_MAX} files`;\n  const seen = new Set<string>();\n  let total = 0;\n  for (const f of files as unknown[]) {\n    if (!f || typeof f !== \"object\" || Array.isArray(f)) return \"each file is an object\";\n    const { name, type, size, sha256: hash } = f as Record<string, 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The checks, in the spec's order\n * (CONTROL.md \u00A75): the exact bytes parse; the command is for this machine; it is\n * signed \u2014 a grant from a trusted key plus the day key's signature, or a confirm\n * over sha256(cmd); it was signed within the age window; its nonce is new.\n * The folder and open-attention checks that follow are the daemon's (they read\n * the machine, not the command).\n */\nexport async function verifyCommand(s: SignedCommand | null | undefined, o: VerifyOptions): Promise<Verdict> {\n  if (!s || typeof s !== \"object\") return bad(\"malformed\", \"nothing to verify\");\n  const p = parseCommand(s.cmd);\n  if (!p.ok) return p;\n  const c = p.cmd;\n  if (c.machine !== o.machine) return bad(\"wrong_machine\", \"the command is for another machine\");\n\n  let via: \"grant\" | \"confirm\" | null = null;\n  let keyId = \"\";\n  let refusal: { code: RefusalCode; why: string } | null = null;\n  if (s.grant && s.csig) {\n    const r = await checkGrantPath(s, c, o);\n    if (r.ok) {\n      via = \"grant\";\n      keyId = r.key;\n    } else refusal = r;\n  }\n  if (!via && s.confirm) {\n    const key = o.trusted.find((k) => k && k.id === s.confirm?.cred);\n    if (!key) refusal = { code: \"untrusted_key\", why: \"confirmed with a key this machine doesn't trust\" };\n    else {\n      const a = await verifyAssertion(await sha256(s.cmd), s.confirm, key, o.rpId, \"confirm\");\n      if (a.ok) {\n        via = \"confirm\";\n        keyId = key.id;\n      } else refusal = { code: \"bad_assertion\", why: a.why };\n    }\n  }\n  if (!via) {\n    if (refusal) return bad(refusal.code, refusal.why);\n    return bad(\"unsigned\", \"the command isn't signed\");\n  }\n  // The key a key.add brings must be one this machine could ever verify with: an\n  // SPKI it can import for that alg, and every rule of a device key (CONTROL.md \u00A72).\n  if (c.kind === \"key.add\" && !(await keyUsable(c.key as TrustedKey)))\n    return bad(\"bad_fields\", \"the key a key.add brings is in a shape this machine can't use\");\n  if (c.iat > o.now + SKEW_MS) return bad(\"future\", \"the command is dated in the future (is this clock right?)\");\n  if (o.now - c.iat > (o.maxAgeMs ?? MACHINE_MAX_AGE_MS)) return bad(\"too_old\", \"the command was signed too long ago\");\n  if (o.seenNonce) {\n    let seen: boolean;\n    try {\n      seen = await o.seenNonce(c.nonce);\n    } catch {\n      return bad(\"nonce_store\", \"the nonce couldn't be recorded, so the command didn't run\");\n    }\n    if (seen) return bad(\"replay\", \"this command was already used once\");\n  }\n  return { ok: true, cmd: c, via, key: keyId };\n}\n\nasync function checkGrantPath(\n  s: SignedCommand,\n  c: ControlCommand,\n  o: VerifyOptions,\n): Promise<{ ok: true; key: string } | { ok: false; code: RefusalCode; why: string }> {\n  const bundle = s.grant as GrantBundle | DeviceGrant;\n  const g = parseGrant(bundle.str, o.rpId);\n  if (!g.ok) return bad(\"bad_grant\", g.why);\n  const key = o.trusted.find((k) => k && k.id === bundle.cred);\n  if (!key) return bad(\"untrusted_key\", \"the grant was signed with a key this machine doesn't trust\");\n  const a = await verifyAssertion(await sha256(bundle.str), bundle, key, o.rpId, \"grant\");\n  if (!a.ok) return bad(\"bad_assertion\", a.why);\n  if (!(await verifyCsig(s.cmd, s.csig, g.grant.pub)))\n    return bad(\"bad_csig\", \"the command's signature doesn't verify \u2014 it was changed after it was signed\");\n  if (c.iat < g.grant.iat - SKEW_MS || c.iat > g.grant.exp)\n    return bad(\"outside_grant\", \"the command was signed outside its grant's window\");\n  return { ok: true, key: key.id };\n}\n"],
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