sentinelayer-cli 0.1.2 → 0.3.0

package/src/agents/jules/tools/shell.js

@@ -1,383 +1,383 @@
-import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
-import path from "node:path";
-
-const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
-const MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS = 30_000;
-const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_FETCH_HOSTS = [
-  "github.com",
-  "api.github.com",
-  "raw.githubusercontent.com",
-  "*.githubusercontent.com",
-  "registry.npmjs.org",
-  "registry.yarnpkg.com",
-  "pypi.org",
-  "files.pythonhosted.org",
-  "rubygems.org",
-  "crates.io",
-  "static.crates.io",
-];
-
-/**
- * Patterns that are BLOCKED unconditionally.
- * Sourced from review/local-review.js security rules + src bash security patterns.
- */
-const BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
-  { pattern: /rm\s+(-[rR]f?|--recursive)\s+\/($|\s)/, desc: "rm -rf /" },
-  { pattern: /:\(\)\s*\{[^}]*\}\s*;?\s*:/, desc: "fork bomb" },
-  { pattern: /\beval\s*\(/, desc: "eval injection" },
-  { pattern: /curl[^|]*\|\s*(ba)?sh/, desc: "pipe to shell" },
-  { pattern: /wget[^|]*\|\s*(ba)?sh/, desc: "wget pipe to shell" },
-  { pattern: />\s*\/dev\/sd[a-z]/, desc: "write to raw device" },
-  { pattern: /mkfs\./, desc: "filesystem format" },
-  { pattern: /dd\s+.*of=\/dev\//, desc: "dd to device" },
-  { pattern: /chmod\s+777\s+\//, desc: "chmod 777 root" },
-  { pattern: />\s*\/etc\//, desc: "write to /etc" },
-  { pattern: /rm\s+-rf?\s+~/, desc: "rm home directory" },
-  { pattern: /git\s+push\s+.*--force\s+.*main/, desc: "force push to main" },
-  { pattern: /git\s+reset\s+--hard/, desc: "git reset hard" },
-  { pattern: /DROP\s+TABLE|DROP\s+DATABASE/i, desc: "SQL drop" },
-  { pattern: /TRUNCATE\s+TABLE/i, desc: "SQL truncate" },
-];
-
-/**
- * Patterns that trigger a WARNING but are allowed.
- */
-const WARN_PATTERNS = [
-  { pattern: /npm\s+install|yarn\s+add|pnpm\s+add/, desc: "package install" },
-  { pattern: /git\s+push/, desc: "git push" },
-  { pattern: /curl\s|wget\s|fetch\(/, desc: "network request" },
-  { pattern: /rm\s+-/, desc: "file deletion" },
-  { pattern: /sudo\s/, desc: "elevated privileges" },
-];
-
-/**
- * Environment variables to strip from child process env.
- * Prevents credential leakage to spawned commands.
- */
-const EXACT_ENV_KEYS_TO_STRIP = new Set([
-  "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
-  "OPENAI_API_KEY",
-  "GOOGLE_API_KEY",
-  "GEMINI_API_KEY",
-  "SENTINELAYER_TOKEN",
-  "AIDENID_API_KEY",
-  "AIDENID_TOKEN",
-  "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID",
-  "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY",
-  "AWS_SESSION_TOKEN",
-  "AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE",
-  "AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET",
-  "GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS",
-  "GITHUB_TOKEN",
-  "GH_TOKEN",
-  "GITLAB_TOKEN",
-  "BITBUCKET_TOKEN",
-  "NPM_TOKEN",
-  "NODE_AUTH_TOKEN",
-  "PYPI_API_TOKEN",
-  "RUBYGEMS_API_KEY",
-  "CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN",
-  "ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN",
-  "ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN",
-  "CI_JOB_TOKEN",
-  "CI_JOB_JWT",
-  "STRIPE_SECRET_KEY",
-  "SLACK_BOT_TOKEN",
-  "TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN",
-  "DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN",
-  "TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN",
-  "SENDGRID_API_KEY",
-  "RESEND_API_KEY",
-  "DATABASE_URL",
-  "REDIS_URL",
-  "MONGODB_URI",
-  "SSH_SIGNING_KEY",
-  "SSH_PRIVATE_KEY",
-  "KUBECONFIG",
-  "KUBE_CONFIG_DATA",
-]);
-
-const ENV_KEY_PREFIX_PATTERNS = [
-  /^AIDENID_/i,
-  /^SENTINELAYER_/i,
-  /^OPENAI_/i,
-  /^ANTHROPIC_/i,
-  /^GOOGLE_/i,
-  /^GITHUB_/i,
-  /^GH_/i,
-  /^AWS_/i,
-  /^AZURE_/i,
-  /^SLACK_/i,
-  /^STRIPE_/i,
-  /^TELEGRAM_/i,
-  /^DISCORD_/i,
-  /^TWILIO_/i,
-  /^SENDGRID_/i,
-  /^RESEND_/i,
-];
-
-const ENV_KEY_SUFFIX_PATTERNS = [
-  /_TOKEN$/i,
-  /_API_KEY$/i,
-  /_SECRET$/i,
-  /_SECRET_KEY$/i,
-  /_PASSWORD$/i,
-  /_PRIVATE_KEY$/i,
-  /_ACCESS_KEY$/i,
-  /_AUTH_TOKEN$/i,
-  /_SESSION_TOKEN$/i,
-];
-
-/**
- * Execute a shell command with security analysis, timeout, and env scrubbing.
- *
- * @param {object} input
- * @param {string} input.command - The shell command to execute.
- * @param {string} [input.cwd] - Working directory (default: process.cwd()).
- * @param {number} [input.timeout] - Timeout in ms (default: 120000).
- * @returns {{ stdout, stderr, exitCode, durationMs, command, security }}
- */
-export function shell(input) {
-  if (!input.command || typeof input.command !== "string") {
-    throw new ShellError("command is required and must be a non-empty string.");
-  }
-
-  const command = input.command.trim();
-  const cwd = input.cwd ? path.resolve(input.cwd) : process.cwd();
-  const timeout = input.timeout ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS;
-
-  // Security analysis
-  const security = analyzeCommand(command);
-  if (security.risk === "blocked") {
-    throw new ShellBlockedError(
-      `Command blocked: ${security.patterns[0].desc}`,
-      security,
-    );
-  }
-
-  // Build scrubbed environment
-  const env = buildScrubbedEnv();
-
-  const startMs = Date.now();
-  let stdout = "";
-  let stderr = "";
-  let exitCode = 0;
-
-  try {
-    stdout = execSync(command, {
-      cwd,
-      encoding: "utf-8",
-      timeout,
-      env,
-      maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024,
-      stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"],
-    });
-  } catch (err) {
-    exitCode = err.status ?? 1;
-    stdout = err.stdout ?? "";
-    stderr = err.stderr ?? "";
-    if (err.killed) {
-      stderr += `\n[Process killed: timeout after ${timeout}ms]`;
-    }
-  }
-
-  const durationMs = Date.now() - startMs;
-
-  // Truncate large outputs
-  if (stdout.length > MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS) {
-    stdout = stdout.slice(0, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS) + "\n[... truncated]";
-  }
-  if (stderr.length > MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS) {
-    stderr = stderr.slice(0, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS) + "\n[... truncated]";
-  }
-
-  return { stdout, stderr, exitCode, durationMs, command, security };
-}
-
-/**
- * Analyze a command for security risks.
- * @param {object} [options]
- * @param {Record<string, string|undefined>} [options.env]
- * @returns {{ risk: "safe"|"warn"|"blocked", patterns: Array<{desc}>, networkPolicy?: object }}
- */
-export function analyzeCommand(command, options = {}) {
-  const networkPolicy = evaluateNetworkPolicy(command, options.env);
-  if (networkPolicy.blocking) {
-    return {
-      risk: "blocked",
-      patterns: [{ desc: networkPolicy.reason }],
-      networkPolicy,
-    };
-  }
-
-  for (const rule of BLOCKED_PATTERNS) {
-    if (rule.pattern.test(command)) {
-      return { risk: "blocked", patterns: [rule], networkPolicy };
-    }
-  }
-
-  const warnings = [];
-  for (const rule of WARN_PATTERNS) {
-    if (rule.pattern.test(command)) {
-      warnings.push(rule);
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (warnings.length > 0) {
-    return { risk: "warn", patterns: warnings, networkPolicy };
-  }
-
-  return { risk: "safe", patterns: [], networkPolicy };
-}
-
-export function buildScrubbedEnv(sourceEnv = process.env) {
-  const env = { ...sourceEnv };
-  for (const key of Object.keys(env)) {
-    if (shouldStripEnvKey(key)) {
-      delete env[key];
-    }
-  }
-  return env;
-}
-
-function shouldStripEnvKey(key) {
-  if (!key) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  const upperKey = String(key).toUpperCase();
-  if (EXACT_ENV_KEYS_TO_STRIP.has(upperKey)) {
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  if (upperKey.startsWith("INPUT_")) {
-    const baseKey = upperKey.slice("INPUT_".length);
-    if (EXACT_ENV_KEYS_TO_STRIP.has(baseKey)) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    if (ENV_KEY_PREFIX_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(baseKey))) {
-      return true;
-    }
-    if (ENV_KEY_SUFFIX_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(baseKey))) {
-      return true;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (ENV_KEY_PREFIX_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(upperKey))) {
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  return ENV_KEY_SUFFIX_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(upperKey));
-}
-
-function evaluateNetworkPolicy(command, sourceEnv = process.env) {
-  if (!/\b(curl|wget)\b/i.test(command)) {
-    return {
-      blocking: false,
-      hosts: [],
-      deniedHosts: [],
-    };
-  }
-
-  const hosts = extractNetworkHosts(command);
-  if (hosts.length === 0) {
-    return {
-      blocking: true,
-      hosts: [],
-      deniedHosts: [],
-      reason: "network command requires explicit URL host",
-    };
-  }
-
-  const allowlist = resolveAllowedFetchHosts(sourceEnv);
-  const deniedHosts = hosts.filter((host) => !isAllowedHost(host, allowlist));
-  if (deniedHosts.length > 0) {
-    return {
-      blocking: true,
-      hosts,
-      deniedHosts,
-      reason: `network host not allowlisted: ${deniedHosts.join(", ")}`,
-    };
-  }
-
-  return {
-    blocking: false,
-    hosts,
-    deniedHosts: [],
-  };
-}
-
-function resolveAllowedFetchHosts(sourceEnv = process.env) {
-  const configured = String(sourceEnv.SENTINELAYER_ALLOWED_FETCH_HOSTS || "")
-    .split(",")
-    .map((item) => normalizeHostPattern(item))
-    .filter(Boolean);
-
-  const allPatterns = [...DEFAULT_ALLOWED_FETCH_HOSTS, ...configured]
-    .map((item) => normalizeHostPattern(item))
-    .filter(Boolean);
-  return Array.from(new Set(allPatterns));
-}
-
-function extractNetworkHosts(command) {
-  const matches = command.matchAll(/\bhttps?:\/\/([^\s"'`]+)/gi);
-  const hosts = new Set();
-  for (const match of matches) {
-    const candidate = match?.[0];
-    if (!candidate) {
-      continue;
-    }
-    try {
-      const parsed = new URL(candidate);
-      const host = normalizeHostPattern(parsed.hostname);
-      if (host) {
-        hosts.add(host);
-      }
-    } catch {
-      // Skip malformed URL segments.
-    }
-  }
-  return Array.from(hosts);
-}
-
-function isAllowedHost(host, allowlist) {
-  const normalizedHost = normalizeHostPattern(host);
-  if (!normalizedHost) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  return allowlist.some((pattern) => {
-    if (!pattern) {
-      return false;
-    }
-
-    if (pattern.startsWith("*.")) {
-      const suffix = pattern.slice(2);
-      return normalizedHost === suffix || normalizedHost.endsWith(`.${suffix}`);
-    }
-
-    return normalizedHost === pattern;
-  });
-}
-
-function normalizeHostPattern(value) {
-  return String(value || "")
-    .trim()
-    .toLowerCase()
-    .replace(/\.$/, "");
-}
-
-export class ShellError extends Error {
-  constructor(message) {
-    super(message);
-    this.name = "ShellError";
-  }
-}
-
-export class ShellBlockedError extends ShellError {
-  constructor(message, security) {
-    super(message);
-    this.name = "ShellBlockedError";
-    this.security = security;
-  }
-}
+import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
+import path from "node:path";
+
+const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
+const MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS = 30_000;
+const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_FETCH_HOSTS = [
+  "github.com",
+  "api.github.com",
+  "raw.githubusercontent.com",
+  "*.githubusercontent.com",
+  "registry.npmjs.org",
+  "registry.yarnpkg.com",
+  "pypi.org",
+  "files.pythonhosted.org",
+  "rubygems.org",
+  "crates.io",
+  "static.crates.io",
+];
+
+/**
+ * Patterns that are BLOCKED unconditionally.
+ * Sourced from review/local-review.js security rules + src bash security patterns.
+ */
+const BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
+  { pattern: /rm\s+(-[rR]f?|--recursive)\s+\/($|\s)/, desc: "rm -rf /" },
+  { pattern: /:\(\)\s*\{[^}]*\}\s*;?\s*:/, desc: "fork bomb" },
+  { pattern: /\beval\s*\(/, desc: "eval injection" },
+  { pattern: /curl[^|]*\|\s*(ba)?sh/, desc: "pipe to shell" },
+  { pattern: /wget[^|]*\|\s*(ba)?sh/, desc: "wget pipe to shell" },
+  { pattern: />\s*\/dev\/sd[a-z]/, desc: "write to raw device" },
+  { pattern: /mkfs\./, desc: "filesystem format" },
+  { pattern: /dd\s+.*of=\/dev\//, desc: "dd to device" },
+  { pattern: /chmod\s+777\s+\//, desc: "chmod 777 root" },
+  { pattern: />\s*\/etc\//, desc: "write to /etc" },
+  { pattern: /rm\s+-rf?\s+~/, desc: "rm home directory" },
+  { pattern: /git\s+push\s+.*--force\s+.*main/, desc: "force push to main" },
+  { pattern: /git\s+reset\s+--hard/, desc: "git reset hard" },
+  { pattern: /DROP\s+TABLE|DROP\s+DATABASE/i, desc: "SQL drop" },
+  { pattern: /TRUNCATE\s+TABLE/i, desc: "SQL truncate" },
+];
+
+/**
+ * Patterns that trigger a WARNING but are allowed.
+ */
+const WARN_PATTERNS = [
+  { pattern: /npm\s+install|yarn\s+add|pnpm\s+add/, desc: "package install" },
+  { pattern: /git\s+push/, desc: "git push" },
+  { pattern: /curl\s|wget\s|fetch\(/, desc: "network request" },
+  { pattern: /rm\s+-/, desc: "file deletion" },
+  { pattern: /sudo\s/, desc: "elevated privileges" },
+];
+
+/**
+ * Environment variables to strip from child process env.
+ * Prevents credential leakage to spawned commands.
+ */
+const EXACT_ENV_KEYS_TO_STRIP = new Set([
+  "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
+  "OPENAI_API_KEY",
+  "GOOGLE_API_KEY",
+  "GEMINI_API_KEY",
+  "SENTINELAYER_TOKEN",
+  "AIDENID_API_KEY",
+  "AIDENID_TOKEN",
+  "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID",
+  "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY",
+  "AWS_SESSION_TOKEN",
+  "AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE",
+  "AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET",
+  "GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS",
+  "GITHUB_TOKEN",
+  "GH_TOKEN",
+  "GITLAB_TOKEN",
+  "BITBUCKET_TOKEN",
+  "NPM_TOKEN",
+  "NODE_AUTH_TOKEN",
+  "PYPI_API_TOKEN",
+  "RUBYGEMS_API_KEY",
+  "CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN",
+  "ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN",
+  "ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN",
+  "CI_JOB_TOKEN",
+  "CI_JOB_JWT",
+  "STRIPE_SECRET_KEY",
+  "SLACK_BOT_TOKEN",
+  "TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN",
+  "DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN",
+  "TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN",
+  "SENDGRID_API_KEY",
+  "RESEND_API_KEY",
+  "DATABASE_URL",
+  "REDIS_URL",
+  "MONGODB_URI",
+  "SSH_SIGNING_KEY",
+  "SSH_PRIVATE_KEY",
+  "KUBECONFIG",
+  "KUBE_CONFIG_DATA",
+]);
+
+const ENV_KEY_PREFIX_PATTERNS = [
+  /^AIDENID_/i,
+  /^SENTINELAYER_/i,
+  /^OPENAI_/i,
+  /^ANTHROPIC_/i,
+  /^GOOGLE_/i,
+  /^GITHUB_/i,
+  /^GH_/i,
+  /^AWS_/i,
+  /^AZURE_/i,
+  /^SLACK_/i,
+  /^STRIPE_/i,
+  /^TELEGRAM_/i,
+  /^DISCORD_/i,
+  /^TWILIO_/i,
+  /^SENDGRID_/i,
+  /^RESEND_/i,
+];
+
+const ENV_KEY_SUFFIX_PATTERNS = [
+  /_TOKEN$/i,
+  /_API_KEY$/i,
+  /_SECRET$/i,
+  /_SECRET_KEY$/i,
+  /_PASSWORD$/i,
+  /_PRIVATE_KEY$/i,
+  /_ACCESS_KEY$/i,
+  /_AUTH_TOKEN$/i,
+  /_SESSION_TOKEN$/i,
+];
+
+/**
+ * Execute a shell command with security analysis, timeout, and env scrubbing.
+ *
+ * @param {object} input
+ * @param {string} input.command - The shell command to execute.
+ * @param {string} [input.cwd] - Working directory (default: process.cwd()).
+ * @param {number} [input.timeout] - Timeout in ms (default: 120000).
+ * @returns {{ stdout, stderr, exitCode, durationMs, command, security }}
+ */
+export function shell(input) {
+  if (!input.command || typeof input.command !== "string") {
+    throw new ShellError("command is required and must be a non-empty string.");
+  }
+
+  const command = input.command.trim();
+  const cwd = input.cwd ? path.resolve(input.cwd) : process.cwd();
+  const timeout = input.timeout ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS;
+
+  // Security analysis
+  const security = analyzeCommand(command);
+  if (security.risk === "blocked") {
+    throw new ShellBlockedError(
+      `Command blocked: ${security.patterns[0].desc}`,
+      security,
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Build scrubbed environment
+  const env = buildScrubbedEnv();
+
+  const startMs = Date.now();
+  let stdout = "";
+  let stderr = "";
+  let exitCode = 0;
+
+  try {
+    stdout = execSync(command, {
+      cwd,
+      encoding: "utf-8",
+      timeout,
+      env,
+      maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024,
+      stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"],
+    });
+  } catch (err) {
+    exitCode = err.status ?? 1;
+    stdout = err.stdout ?? "";
+    stderr = err.stderr ?? "";
+    if (err.killed) {
+      stderr += `\n[Process killed: timeout after ${timeout}ms]`;
+    }
+  }
+
+  const durationMs = Date.now() - startMs;
+
+  // Truncate large outputs
+  if (stdout.length > MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS) {
+    stdout = stdout.slice(0, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS) + "\n[... truncated]";
+  }
+  if (stderr.length > MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS) {
+    stderr = stderr.slice(0, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS) + "\n[... truncated]";
+  }
+
+  return { stdout, stderr, exitCode, durationMs, command, security };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Analyze a command for security risks.
+ * @param {object} [options]
+ * @param {Record<string, string|undefined>} [options.env]
+ * @returns {{ risk: "safe"|"warn"|"blocked", patterns: Array<{desc}>, networkPolicy?: object }}
+ */
+export function analyzeCommand(command, options = {}) {
+  const networkPolicy = evaluateNetworkPolicy(command, options.env);
+  if (networkPolicy.blocking) {
+    return {
+      risk: "blocked",
+      patterns: [{ desc: networkPolicy.reason }],
+      networkPolicy,
+    };
+  }
+
+  for (const rule of BLOCKED_PATTERNS) {
+    if (rule.pattern.test(command)) {
+      return { risk: "blocked", patterns: [rule], networkPolicy };
+    }
+  }
+
+  const warnings = [];
+  for (const rule of WARN_PATTERNS) {
+    if (rule.pattern.test(command)) {
+      warnings.push(rule);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (warnings.length > 0) {
+    return { risk: "warn", patterns: warnings, networkPolicy };
+  }
+
+  return { risk: "safe", patterns: [], networkPolicy };
+}
+
+export function buildScrubbedEnv(sourceEnv = process.env) {
+  const env = { ...sourceEnv };
+  for (const key of Object.keys(env)) {
+    if (shouldStripEnvKey(key)) {
+      delete env[key];
+    }
+  }
+  return env;
+}
+
+function shouldStripEnvKey(key) {
+  if (!key) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const upperKey = String(key).toUpperCase();
+  if (EXACT_ENV_KEYS_TO_STRIP.has(upperKey)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (upperKey.startsWith("INPUT_")) {
+    const baseKey = upperKey.slice("INPUT_".length);
+    if (EXACT_ENV_KEYS_TO_STRIP.has(baseKey)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    if (ENV_KEY_PREFIX_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(baseKey))) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    if (ENV_KEY_SUFFIX_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(baseKey))) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ENV_KEY_PREFIX_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(upperKey))) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return ENV_KEY_SUFFIX_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(upperKey));
+}
+
+function evaluateNetworkPolicy(command, sourceEnv = process.env) {
+  if (!/\b(curl|wget)\b/i.test(command)) {
+    return {
+      blocking: false,
+      hosts: [],
+      deniedHosts: [],
+    };
+  }
+
+  const hosts = extractNetworkHosts(command);
+  if (hosts.length === 0) {
+    return {
+      blocking: true,
+      hosts: [],
+      deniedHosts: [],
+      reason: "network command requires explicit URL host",
+    };
+  }
+
+  const allowlist = resolveAllowedFetchHosts(sourceEnv);
+  const deniedHosts = hosts.filter((host) => !isAllowedHost(host, allowlist));
+  if (deniedHosts.length > 0) {
+    return {
+      blocking: true,
+      hosts,
+      deniedHosts,
+      reason: `network host not allowlisted: ${deniedHosts.join(", ")}`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    blocking: false,
+    hosts,
+    deniedHosts: [],
+  };
+}
+
+function resolveAllowedFetchHosts(sourceEnv = process.env) {
+  const configured = String(sourceEnv.SENTINELAYER_ALLOWED_FETCH_HOSTS || "")
+    .split(",")
+    .map((item) => normalizeHostPattern(item))
+    .filter(Boolean);
+
+  const allPatterns = [...DEFAULT_ALLOWED_FETCH_HOSTS, ...configured]
+    .map((item) => normalizeHostPattern(item))
+    .filter(Boolean);
+  return Array.from(new Set(allPatterns));
+}
+
+function extractNetworkHosts(command) {
+  const matches = command.matchAll(/\bhttps?:\/\/([^\s"'`]+)/gi);
+  const hosts = new Set();
+  for (const match of matches) {
+    const candidate = match?.[0];
+    if (!candidate) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    try {
+      const parsed = new URL(candidate);
+      const host = normalizeHostPattern(parsed.hostname);
+      if (host) {
+        hosts.add(host);
+      }
+    } catch {
+      // Skip malformed URL segments.
+    }
+  }
+  return Array.from(hosts);
+}
+
+function isAllowedHost(host, allowlist) {
+  const normalizedHost = normalizeHostPattern(host);
+  if (!normalizedHost) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return allowlist.some((pattern) => {
+    if (!pattern) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    if (pattern.startsWith("*.")) {
+      const suffix = pattern.slice(2);
+      return normalizedHost === suffix || normalizedHost.endsWith(`.${suffix}`);
+    }
+
+    return normalizedHost === pattern;
+  });
+}
+
+function normalizeHostPattern(value) {
+  return String(value || "")
+    .trim()
+    .toLowerCase()
+    .replace(/\.$/, "");
+}
+
+export class ShellError extends Error {
+  constructor(message) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = "ShellError";
+  }
+}
+
+export class ShellBlockedError extends ShellError {
+  constructor(message, security) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = "ShellBlockedError";
+    this.security = security;
+  }
+}