selfstore 1.8.35 → 1.8.36

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-export { C as CacheUnlock, a as ConnectOutcome, F as FileBytes, P as PutFileInput, b as SimpleOptions, S as SimpleRecord, c as SimpleStore, s as selfstore } from './simple-Dp1tbrwo.js';
-export { h as changePassword, g as gisDriveAuth, p as pickFromDisk, f as preloadGoogleIdentity, s as saveToDisk } from './local-Cr5cCaQ2.js';
-export { a as DriveAuth } from './drive-3K6pBAmG.js';
-export { S as S3Config, W as WebdavConfig } from './s3-C2PrgMpD.js';
-import { a as Snapshot, H as Header } from './store-B4Zo0f6G.js';
+export { C as CacheUnlock, a as ConnectOutcome, F as FileBytes, P as PutFileInput, b as SimpleOptions, S as SimpleRecord, c as SimpleStore, s as selfstore } from './simple-BmUQpsBM.js';
+export { h as changePassword, g as gisDriveAuth, p as pickFromDisk, f as preloadGoogleIdentity, s as saveToDisk } from './local-CpoBeJWk.js';
+export { a as DriveAuth } from './drive-BCRil91Q.js';
+export { S as S3Config, W as WebdavConfig } from './s3-kikEHI-g.js';
+import { a as Snapshot, H as Header } from './store-bp1VRW7R.js';
 import { EncodeOptions } from './advanced.js';
-export { L as LocalStore, e as LocalStoreState, h as Mode, i as PasswordCheck, b as PasswordPolicy, j as PasswordRequirement, o as SelfstoreError, p as SelfstoreErrorCode, q as Severity, c as SnapshotFile, r as StatusAction, d as StatusDescriptor, t as StorageState, S as StoreError, T as TargetKind, x as checkPasswordPolicy, C as errorLabelKey, G as isSelfstoreError } from './store-B4Zo0f6G.js';
+export { L as LocalStore, e as LocalStoreState, h as Mode, i as PasswordCheck, b as PasswordPolicy, j as PasswordRequirement, o as SelfstoreError, p as SelfstoreErrorCode, q as Severity, c as SnapshotFile, r as StatusAction, d as StatusDescriptor, t as StorageState, S as StoreError, T as TargetKind, x as checkPasswordPolicy, C as errorLabelKey, G as isSelfstoreError } from './store-bp1VRW7R.js';
 export { SyncConfig } from './sync.js';
-import './cache-C1edLncd.js';
-import './connect-D7Yzdi9N.js';
+import './cache-DBIn_Uo8.js';
+import './connect-CdlhiTBy.js';
 import './machine-Dhbx3Eut.js';
-import './manager-Bl16FR-e.js';
+import './manager-0puQEpZc.js';
 
 declare const BACKUP_EXTENSION = ".zip";
 declare const BACKUP_MIME = "application/zip";

package/dist/index.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { indexedDbCache, memoryCache, gisDriveAuth, isLockableCache, createLocalStore } from './chunk-SHX36MIE.js';
-export { gisDriveAuth, preloadGoogleIdentity } from './chunk-SHX36MIE.js';
+import { indexedDbCache, memoryCache, gisDriveAuth, isLockableCache, createLocalStore } from './chunk-JE3BLKXO.js';
+export { gisDriveAuth, preloadGoogleIdentity } from './chunk-JE3BLKXO.js';
 import { idOf } from './chunk-3P2W3XQD.js';
 import { saveToDisk } from './chunk-XAONTUEC.js';
 export { pickFromDisk, saveToDisk } from './chunk-XAONTUEC.js';

package/dist/{local-Cr5cCaQ2.d.ts → local-CpoBeJWk.d.ts}

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { a as Snapshot, E as EncodeOptions, H as Header } from './store-B4Zo0f6G.js';
-import { a as DriveAuth } from './drive-3K6pBAmG.js';
+import { a as Snapshot, E as EncodeOptions, H as Header } from './store-bp1VRW7R.js';
+import { a as DriveAuth } from './drive-BCRil91Q.js';
 
 /** Serialize a snapshot to a portable backup blob (compressed; encrypted if a password is given). */
 declare function exportSnapshot(snapshot: Snapshot, opts: EncodeOptions): Promise<Blob>;

package/dist/{manager-Bl16FR-e.d.ts → manager-0puQEpZc.d.ts}

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { K as KV } from './cache-C1edLncd.js';
-import { B as BackupTarget, L as LocalStore } from './store-B4Zo0f6G.js';
+import { K as KV } from './cache-DBIn_Uo8.js';
+import { B as BackupTarget, L as LocalStore } from './store-bp1VRW7R.js';
 import { F as FlowStore } from './machine-Dhbx3Eut.js';
 
 /** What the destination reports about a listed file (one cheap metadata call). */

package/dist/passkey.d.ts

@@ -63,8 +63,9 @@ interface PasskeyUnlock {
     enrolled(): boolean;
     /**
      * Create a platform passkey and seal `secret` behind it. `false` when the
-     * user cancelled, or when PRF did not yield a key here - fail closed, the
-     * host keeps its password prompt and should say so rather than pretend.
+     * user cancelled, when PRF did not yield a key here, or when this device
+     * refused to store the sealed secret - fail closed, the host keeps its
+     * password prompt and should say so rather than pretend.
      */
     enroll(secret: string): Promise<boolean>;
     /**
@@ -77,9 +78,10 @@ interface PasskeyUnlock {
      * Drop the sealed secret from this device. The platform credential itself
      * is NOT deleted - the operating system owns it, and only the user can
      * remove it from their passkey manager. Say that in the interface rather
-     * than implying a full erasure.
+     * than implying a full erasure. `false` when the storage refused the
+     * removal: the enrolment is still there, and the host must not say it is off.
      */
-    forget(): void;
+    forget(): boolean;
 }
 declare function passkeyUnlock(options: PasskeyUnlockOptions): PasskeyUnlock;
 

package/dist/passkey.js

@@ -45,10 +45,12 @@ function passkeyUnlock(options) {
   }
   function write(entry) {
     try {
-      if (typeof localStorage === "undefined") return;
+      if (typeof localStorage === "undefined") return entry === null;
       if (entry) localStorage.setItem(storageKey, JSON.stringify(entry));
       else localStorage.removeItem(storageKey);
+      return true;
     } catch {
+      return false;
     }
   }
   async function derive(credentialId) {
@@ -118,8 +120,7 @@ function passkeyUnlock(options) {
           await sealKey(created.secret),
           new TextEncoder().encode(secret)
         );
-        write({ credentialId: created.credentialId, iv: toB64(iv), sealed: toB64(sealed) });
-        return true;
+        return write({ credentialId: created.credentialId, iv: toB64(iv), sealed: toB64(sealed) });
       } catch {
         return false;
       }
@@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ function passkeyUnlock(options) {
       }
     },
     forget() {
-      write(null);
+      return write(null);
     }
   };
 }

package/dist/passkey.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Open a store with the device instead of the keyboard: Face, fingerprint or\n * Windows Hello in place of typing the password.\n *\n * WHAT IT IS. A platform passkey carrying the WebAuthn PRF extension (FIDO2\n * hmac-secret) yields a stable 32-byte secret - deterministic for that\n * credential and a fixed per-app salt, and it never leaves the authenticator.\n * That secret becomes an AES-256-GCM key, under which this module seals the\n * app's own secret (typically the backup password). Unlocking is then: user\n * verification -> PRF secret -> the password in the clear, in memory.\n *\n * WHAT IT IS NOT. It does not replace the password, it carries it. The\n * password keeps opening everything, on every device, forever; this is a\n * convenience bound to ONE browser profile on ONE machine. Losing the passkey\n * costs a typed password, never data. That asymmetry is deliberate: a second\n * independent key to the data would widen the blast radius of a stolen device,\n * which is the opposite of what a locked cache is for.\n *\n * THE PROPERTY IT PRESERVES. The sealed blob is useless on its own: a copy of\n * the browser profile does not open it, because the PRF secret lives in the\n * authenticator and demands user verification. That is exactly the guarantee a\n * lock-mode cache exists for, so enrolling does not weaken it.\n *\n * OPT-IN BY CONSTRUCTION. Nothing here runs unless an app calls\n * `passkeyUnlock()`. An app that never does simply has no such feature, and an\n * app that does still decides when to offer it - the recommended shape is an\n * explicit control the user turns on, and can turn off again with `forget()`.\n *\n * Requires the PRF extension: recent Chrome/Edge, Safari 18+, recent Android;\n * inside a native WebView it depends on the system WebView version. Nothing\n * trusts that blindly - `available()` and `enroll()` feature-detect at runtime\n * and FAIL CLOSED, so the option is only ever usable where a real secret comes\n * back. Dependency-free, and guarded for SSR and no-WebAuthn environments.\n */\n\n/** How the passkey is presented by the platform, and what it protects. */\nexport interface PasskeyUnlockOptions {\n\t/**\n\t * Shown by the operating system's passkey prompt and stored with the\n\t * credential. The application name, as a person would read it.\n\t */\n\tappName: string;\n\t/**\n\t * Domain separator for the PRF evaluation - NOT a secret, and it may be a\n\t * constant: the credential's own secret is what makes the derived key\n\t * unique. Use a stable per-app string. Changing it rotates every\n\t * passkey-derived key at once, which orphans every existing enrolment.\n\t */\n\tsalt: string;\n\t/** Where the sealed secret is kept on this device (default `selfstore.passkey`). */\n\tstorageKey?: string;\n}\n\n/** The device-unlock facade. Every method is safe to call anywhere: outside a\n *  browser, or without WebAuthn, they report unavailable rather than throw. */\nexport interface PasskeyUnlock {\n\t/**\n\t * Whether a user-verifying platform authenticator exists at all. Necessary\n\t * but NOT sufficient: only an actual `enroll()` proves the PRF extension\n\t * works here. Use it to decide whether to show the control, not to promise\n\t * that it will succeed.\n\t */\n\tavailable(): Promise<boolean>;\n\t/** Whether this device currently holds a sealed secret to reveal. */\n\tenrolled(): boolean;\n\t/**\n\t * Create a platform passkey and seal `secret` behind it. `false` when the\n\t * user cancelled, or when PRF did not yield a key here - fail closed, the\n\t * host keeps its password prompt and should say so rather than pretend.\n\t */\n\tenroll(secret: string): Promise<boolean>;\n\t/**\n\t * Ask for Face / fingerprint / Hello and return the sealed secret. `null`\n\t * on cancel, on a missing enrolment, or on any failure; the host then falls\n\t * back to asking for the password. Never throws.\n\t */\n\treveal(): Promise<string | null>;\n\t/**\n\t * Drop the sealed secret from this device. The platform credential itself\n\t * is NOT deleted - the operating system owns it, and only the user can\n\t * remove it from their passkey manager. Say that in the interface rather\n\t * than implying a full erasure.\n\t */\n\tforget(): void;\n}\n\n/** PRF extension shapes are absent from some TS DOM libs; describe what we use. */\ntype PrfInputs = { prf?: { eval?: { first: BufferSource } } };\ntype PrfOutputs = { prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } } };\n\n/** What one device remembers: which credential to prefer, and the sealed secret. */\ninterface StoredEnrolment {\n\tcredentialId: string;\n\tiv: string;\n\tsealed: string;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_STORAGE_KEY = 'selfstore.passkey';\nconst PRF_BYTES = 32;\n\nfunction toB64(bytes: ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array): string {\n\tconst b = bytes instanceof Uint8Array ? bytes : new Uint8Array(bytes);\n\tlet s = '';\n\tfor (const byte of b) s += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n\treturn btoa(s);\n}\n\nfunction fromB64(s: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {\n\tconst bin = atob(s);\n\tconst out = new Uint8Array(bin.length);\n\tfor (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) out[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);\n\treturn out;\n}\n\nfunction webauthnUsable(): boolean {\n\treturn (\n\t\ttypeof window !== 'undefined' &&\n\t\t!!window.PublicKeyCredential &&\n\t\ttypeof navigator !== 'undefined' &&\n\t\t!!navigator.credentials &&\n\t\ttypeof crypto !== 'undefined' &&\n\t\t!!crypto.subtle\n\t);\n}\n\nfunction prfSecret(credential: PublicKeyCredential | null): Uint8Array | null {\n\tconst first = (credential?.getClientExtensionResults() as PrfOutputs | undefined)?.prf?.results\n\t\t?.first;\n\tif (!first) return null;\n\tconst bytes = new Uint8Array(first);\n\treturn bytes.length === PRF_BYTES ? bytes : null;\n}\n\n/**\n * The 32 bytes coming out of PRF are an HMAC output, so they are already\n * uniform: import them straight as an AES-GCM key rather than running a KDF\n * over them. Stretching high-entropy material buys nothing and would only make\n * every unlock slower.\n */\nfunction sealKey(secret: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n\treturn crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', secret as BufferSource, 'AES-GCM', false, [\n\t\t'encrypt',\n\t\t'decrypt'\n\t]);\n}\n\nexport function passkeyUnlock(options: PasskeyUnlockOptions): PasskeyUnlock {\n\tconst storageKey = options.storageKey ?? DEFAULT_STORAGE_KEY;\n\tconst prfSalt = new TextEncoder().encode(options.salt);\n\n\tfunction read(): StoredEnrolment | null {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tif (typeof localStorage === 'undefined') return null;\n\t\t\tconst raw = localStorage.getItem(storageKey);\n\t\t\tif (!raw) return null;\n\t\t\tconst parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as StoredEnrolment;\n\t\t\tconst complete =\n\t\t\t\ttypeof parsed?.credentialId === 'string' &&\n\t\t\t\ttypeof parsed?.iv === 'string' &&\n\t\t\t\ttypeof parsed?.sealed === 'string';\n\t\t\treturn complete ? parsed : null;\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\treturn null;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tfunction write(entry: StoredEnrolment | null): void {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tif (typeof localStorage === 'undefined') return;\n\t\t\tif (entry) localStorage.setItem(storageKey, JSON.stringify(entry));\n\t\t\telse localStorage.removeItem(storageKey);\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t/* storage blocked: the enrolment is simply not remembered */\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Re-derive the PRF secret. With a credential id it targets that one; with\n\t * none, the platform offers the user's discoverable passkeys for this site.\n\t */\n\tasync function derive(credentialId?: string): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst assertion = (await navigator.credentials.get({\n\t\t\t\tpublicKey: {\n\t\t\t\t\tchallenge: crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n\t\t\t\t\tallowCredentials: credentialId\n\t\t\t\t\t\t? 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Try the cheap path first to save the user one prompt.\n\t\tconst secret = prfSecret(credential) ?? 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* Open a store with the device instead of the keyboard: Face, fingerprint or\n * Windows Hello in place of typing the password.\n *\n * WHAT IT IS. A platform passkey carrying the WebAuthn PRF extension (FIDO2\n * hmac-secret) yields a stable 32-byte secret - deterministic for that\n * credential and a fixed per-app salt, and it never leaves the authenticator.\n * That secret becomes an AES-256-GCM key, under which this module seals the\n * app's own secret (typically the backup password). Unlocking is then: user\n * verification -> PRF secret -> the password in the clear, in memory.\n *\n * WHAT IT IS NOT. It does not replace the password, it carries it. The\n * password keeps opening everything, on every device, forever; this is a\n * convenience bound to ONE browser profile on ONE machine. Losing the passkey\n * costs a typed password, never data. That asymmetry is deliberate: a second\n * independent key to the data would widen the blast radius of a stolen device,\n * which is the opposite of what a locked cache is for.\n *\n * THE PROPERTY IT PRESERVES. The sealed blob is useless on its own: a copy of\n * the browser profile does not open it, because the PRF secret lives in the\n * authenticator and demands user verification. That is exactly the guarantee a\n * lock-mode cache exists for, so enrolling does not weaken it.\n *\n * OPT-IN BY CONSTRUCTION. Nothing here runs unless an app calls\n * `passkeyUnlock()`. An app that never does simply has no such feature, and an\n * app that does still decides when to offer it - the recommended shape is an\n * explicit control the user turns on, and can turn off again with `forget()`.\n *\n * Requires the PRF extension: recent Chrome/Edge, Safari 18+, recent Android;\n * inside a native WebView it depends on the system WebView version. Nothing\n * trusts that blindly - `available()` and `enroll()` feature-detect at runtime\n * and FAIL CLOSED, so the option is only ever usable where a real secret comes\n * back. 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DEFAULT_STORAGE_KEY;\n\tconst prfSalt = new TextEncoder().encode(options.salt);\n\n\tfunction read(): StoredEnrolment | null {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tif (typeof localStorage === 'undefined') return null;\n\t\t\tconst raw = localStorage.getItem(storageKey);\n\t\t\tif (!raw) return null;\n\t\t\tconst parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as StoredEnrolment;\n\t\t\tconst complete =\n\t\t\t\ttypeof parsed?.credentialId === 'string' &&\n\t\t\t\ttypeof parsed?.iv === 'string' &&\n\t\t\t\ttypeof parsed?.sealed === 'string';\n\t\t\treturn complete ? parsed : null;\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\treturn null;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t/** Whether the storage took the write. A blocked or full storage used to be\n\t *  swallowed, so `enroll()` announced an enrolment nothing remembered. */\n\tfunction write(entry: StoredEnrolment | null): boolean {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tif (typeof localStorage === 'undefined') return entry === null;\n\t\t\tif (entry) localStorage.setItem(storageKey, JSON.stringify(entry));\n\t\t\telse localStorage.removeItem(storageKey);\n\t\t\treturn true;\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\treturn false;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Re-derive the PRF secret. With a credential id it targets that one; with\n\t * none, the platform offers the user's discoverable passkeys for this site.\n\t */\n\tasync function derive(credentialId?: string): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst assertion = (await navigator.credentials.get({\n\t\t\t\tpublicKey: {\n\t\t\t\t\tchallenge: crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n\t\t\t\t\tallowCredentials: credentialId\n\t\t\t\t\t\t? [{ type: 'public-key', id: fromB64(credentialId) as BufferSource }]\n\t\t\t\t\t\t: [],\n\t\t\t\t\tuserVerification: 'required',\n\t\t\t\t\textensions: { prf: { eval: { first: prfSalt } } } as PrfInputs,\n\t\t\t\t\ttimeout: 60_000\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t})) as PublicKeyCredential | null;\n\t\t\treturn prfSecret(assertion);\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\treturn null;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tasync function create(): Promise<{ credentialId: string; secret: Uint8Array } | null> {\n\t\tconst credential = (await navigator.credentials.create({\n\t\t\tpublicKey: {\n\t\t\t\tchallenge: crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n\t\t\t\trp: { name: options.appName, id: location.hostname },\n\t\t\t\tuser: {\n\t\t\t\t\tid: crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16)),\n\t\t\t\t\tname: options.appName,\n\t\t\t\t\tdisplayName: options.appName\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\tpubKeyCredParams: [\n\t\t\t\t\t{ type: 'public-key', alg: -7 },\n\t\t\t\t\t{ type: 'public-key', alg: -257 }\n\t\t\t\t],\n\t\t\t\tauthenticatorSelection: {\n\t\t\t\t\tauthenticatorAttachment: 'platform',\n\t\t\t\t\tuserVerification: 'required',\n\t\t\t\t\tresidentKey: 'required'\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\textensions: { prf: { eval: { first: prfSalt } } } as PrfInputs,\n\t\t\t\ttimeout: 60_000\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t})) as PublicKeyCredential | null;\n\t\tif (!credential) return null;\n\t\tconst credentialId = toB64(credential.rawId);\n\t\t// Some platforms hand the PRF result back from create(); most need a\n\t\t// second get(). Try the cheap path first to save the user one prompt.\n\t\tconst secret = prfSecret(credential) ?? (await derive(credentialId));\n\t\treturn secret ? { credentialId, secret } : null;\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tasync available(): Promise<boolean> {\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tif (!webauthnUsable()) return false;\n\t\t\t\treturn await window.PublicKeyCredential.isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable();\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\treturn false;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\n\t\tenrolled(): boolean {\n\t\t\treturn read() !== null;\n\t\t},\n\n\t\tasync enroll(secret: string): Promise<boolean> {\n\t\t\tif (!webauthnUsable()) return false;\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst created = await create();\n\t\t\t\tif (!created) return false;\n\t\t\t\tconst iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));\n\t\t\t\tconst sealed = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n\t\t\t\t\t{ name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n\t\t\t\t\tawait sealKey(created.secret),\n\t\t\t\t\tnew TextEncoder().encode(secret)\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t\treturn write({ credentialId: created.credentialId, iv: toB64(iv), sealed: toB64(sealed) });\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\treturn false;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\n\t\tasync reveal(): Promise<string | null> {\n\t\t\tconst entry = read();\n\t\t\tif (!entry || !webauthnUsable()) return null;\n\t\t\tconst secret = await derive(entry.credentialId);\n\t\t\tif (!secret) return null;\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tconst opened = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n\t\t\t\t\t{ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: fromB64(entry.iv) as BufferSource },\n\t\t\t\t\tawait sealKey(secret),\n\t\t\t\t\tfromB64(entry.sealed) as BufferSource\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t\treturn new TextDecoder().decode(opened);\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t// A wrong key or a tampered blob: an unopenable enrolment is dead\n\t\t\t\t// weight that would fail at every attempt, so drop it and let the\n\t\t\t\t// host fall back to the password.\n\t\t\t\twrite(null);\n\t\t\t\treturn null;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\n\t\tforget(): boolean {\n\t\t\treturn write(null);\n\t\t}\n\t};\n}\n"]}

package/dist/proof.d.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 import { SimpleRecord, FileBytes } from './index.js';
-import './store-B4Zo0f6G.js';
-import './cache-C1edLncd.js';
+import './store-bp1VRW7R.js';
+import './cache-DBIn_Uo8.js';
 import './sync.js';
-import './connect-D7Yzdi9N.js';
-import './drive-3K6pBAmG.js';
-import './s3-C2PrgMpD.js';
+import './connect-CdlhiTBy.js';
+import './drive-BCRil91Q.js';
+import './s3-kikEHI-g.js';
 import './machine-Dhbx3Eut.js';
-import './manager-Bl16FR-e.js';
+import './manager-0puQEpZc.js';
 
 /**
  * What a notary hands back for one digest. `evidence` is the notary's own

package/dist/{s3-C2PrgMpD.d.ts → s3-kikEHI-g.d.ts}

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { B as BackupTarget, P as PeerSource } from './store-B4Zo0f6G.js';
-import { K as KV } from './cache-C1edLncd.js';
+import { B as BackupTarget, P as PeerSource } from './store-bp1VRW7R.js';
+import { K as KV } from './cache-DBIn_Uo8.js';
 
 /**
  * WebDAV backup target: the store re-writes one .selfstore file on a WebDAV

package/dist/{simple-Dp1tbrwo.d.ts → simple-BmUQpsBM.d.ts}

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-import { a as Snapshot, b as PasswordPolicy, c as SnapshotFile, B as BackupTarget, d as StatusDescriptor, S as StoreError, e as LocalStoreState, L as LocalStore } from './store-B4Zo0f6G.js';
-import { L as LocalCache, K as KV } from './cache-C1edLncd.js';
+import { a as Snapshot, b as PasswordPolicy, c as SnapshotFile, B as BackupTarget, d as StatusDescriptor, S as StoreError, e as LocalStoreState, L as LocalStore } from './store-bp1VRW7R.js';
+import { L as LocalCache, K as KV } from './cache-DBIn_Uo8.js';
 import { SyncConfig } from './sync.js';
-import { R as ResumeOffer, C as ConnectTargets } from './connect-D7Yzdi9N.js';
-import { f as BackupsManager } from './manager-Bl16FR-e.js';
-import { a as DriveAuth } from './drive-3K6pBAmG.js';
-import { W as WebdavConfig, S as S3Config } from './s3-C2PrgMpD.js';
+import { R as ResumeOffer, C as ConnectTargets } from './connect-CdlhiTBy.js';
+import { f as BackupsManager } from './manager-0puQEpZc.js';
+import { a as DriveAuth } from './drive-BCRil91Q.js';
+import { W as WebdavConfig, S as S3Config } from './s3-kikEHI-g.js';
 
 /** What a file body may be handed in as. */
 type FileBytes = Uint8Array | ArrayBuffer | Blob;

package/dist/{store-B4Zo0f6G.d.ts → store-bp1VRW7R.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { G as GroupIdentity, S as SignedManifest, L as LocalCache } from './cache-C1edLncd.js';
+import { G as GroupIdentity, S as SignedManifest, L as LocalCache } from './cache-DBIn_Uo8.js';
 import { CollectionChanges, Conflict, SyncConfig } from './sync.js';
 
 /** A binary attachment (image, PDF, any bytes). */

package/dist/widgets.d.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-import { S as StoreLike } from './connect-D7Yzdi9N.js';
+import { S as StoreLike } from './connect-CdlhiTBy.js';
 import { FlowHost, ConnectTargets, ConnectFlowOptions, ConnectKind, ConnectFlow } from './flows.js';
 import { ShareEngine, ShareLevel, ShareFlow, JoinEngine, JoinFlow, ReplicaFlow } from './flows.js';
 import { BackupsManager } from './backups.js';
-import './store-B4Zo0f6G.js';
-import './cache-C1edLncd.js';
+import './store-bp1VRW7R.js';
+import './cache-DBIn_Uo8.js';
 import './sync.js';
-import './drive-3K6pBAmG.js';
-import './s3-C2PrgMpD.js';
+import './drive-BCRil91Q.js';
+import './s3-kikEHI-g.js';
 import './machine-Dhbx3Eut.js';
 
 /** Flat key -> string map; widgets merge a partial override over EN defaults. */

package/dist/widgets.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { saveToDisk, datedName } from './chunk-XAONTUEC.js';
-import { connectFlow, shareFlow, joinFlow } from './chunk-VRWAV3GI.js';
+import { connectFlow, shareFlow, joinFlow } from './chunk-UU4PS3UH.js';
 import './chunk-TNYL6FNW.js';
 import { isOpenSupported } from './chunk-HVHQLPP6.js';
 import './chunk-2BNTCXQN.js';

package/llms.txt

@@ -422,7 +422,8 @@ MANIFEST_ROLLBACK. Needs WebCrypto Ed25519+X25519 (evergreen browsers, Node
 ## Household sharing (mirror model), 'selfstore/households'
 
 Read-write sharing without re-keying anyone's backup: `createHouseholdGroup({
-store, kv, backend, storageKey? })`. The admin calls
+store, kv, sealedKv?, backend, storageKey? })` - pass `cache.sealedKv` so K and the
+invitation capability rest sealed, not in the clear kv. The admin calls
 startShare() (refused on an encrypted store - the honest rule), publishes an
 invitation via the backend; a visitor opens it (openIncoming) and join()s:
 their own file stays theirs, a dedicated copy file mirrors it under K, and the

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
 	"name": "selfstore",
-	"version": "1.8.35",
+	"version": "1.8.36",
 	"description": "Local-first storage for browser apps: an IndexedDB working copy, portable encrypted ZIP backups (AES-256-GCM over Argon2id), durable homes (disk, Google Drive, WebDAV) and a serverless multi-device merge.",
 	"type": "module",
 	"license": "MIT",