seisin 0.4.2 → 0.6.0

package/src/owners.js

@@ -11,9 +11,13 @@
  * exception, and they are handled separately below.
  */
 import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
-import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
-import { join } from "node:path";
+import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
+import { isAbsolute, join } from "node:path";
 import { protectedBy } from "./surface.js";
+import { entriesOf, parseKey, BUILTIN } from "./keys.js";
+import { WILD, fromCwd, toRepoRelative } from "./paths.js";
+import { AGENTS, AGENT_CREDENTIALS, CREDENTIAL_HOMES, expand } from "./grants.js";
+import { keptFor, shutByTerritory } from "./territory.js";
 
 /**
  * Does this glob cover this path? Supports `**`, `*`, `?` and a trailing `/`.
@@ -43,9 +47,23 @@ import { protectedBy } from "./surface.js";
 export function covers(glob, path) {
   const p = normalized(path);
   const m = matcherOf(glob);
+  /**
+   * Above the root only for a glob that climbs there itself.
+   *
+   * `../../etc/passwd` is a path the kernel refuses to every role, and `**`
+   * matched it as a string, so `explain` answered "inside territory" for it.
+   * A territory reaches outside the repo only by saying so — the
+   * `../shared/lab/dev.md` a role writes beside its own directory — and
+   * that one still matches, because both sides start with the same `..`.
+   */
+  if (climbs(p) && !m.climbs) return false;
   // The path itself, or anything beneath it. The `/` is load-bearing: without
   // it `src/api` would also cover `src/apifoo.ts`, which the kernel does not.
   if (m.prefix !== null) return p === m.prefix || p.startsWith(m.prefix + "/");
+  // The literal head of the glob, before its first wildcard, has to be the
+  // head of the path too. Most pairs fail here, for the price of a
+  // startsWith — `check` asks ~400k of them on a real policy.
+  if (!p.startsWith(m.head)) return false;
   return matchGlob(m.glob, p);
 }
 
@@ -69,7 +87,8 @@ function matcherOf(glob) {
   if (m) return m;
   let g = normalize(glob);
   if (glob.endsWith("/")) g += "/**";
-  m = WILD.test(g) ? { prefix: null, glob: g } : { prefix: g, glob: null };
+  const wild = WILD.test(g);
+  m = { prefix: wild ? null : g, glob: wild ? g : null, climbs: climbs(g), head: wild ? headOf(g) : "" };
   if (GLOBS.size >= MAX_CACHED) GLOBS.clear();
   GLOBS.set(glob, m);
   return m;
@@ -84,8 +103,15 @@ function normalized(path) {
   return p;
 }
 
-/** The four characters toRegExp() treats as wildcards. */
-const WILD = /[*?[\]]/;
+/**
+ * What every path a glob matches starts with: its text up to the first
+ * wildcard, minus a final `/` — `src/api/**` matches `src/api` itself, and
+ * `a/**\/b` matches `a/b`.
+ */
+const headOf = (g) => g.slice(0, g.search(WILD)).replace(/\/$/, "");
+
+/** Does a normalised path start above the repo root? */
+const climbs = (p) => p === ".." || p.startsWith("../");
 
 /**
  * One spelling per file, before anybody decides anything about it.
@@ -97,8 +123,10 @@ const WILD = /[*?[\]]/;
  * every sentence seisin said about it was wrong, which is the half of the tool
  * that is actually ours.
  *
- * A path that climbs above the repo root comes back as `..`, which owns
- * nothing and matches nothing. Outside the repo has no owner by definition.
+ * A path that climbs above the repo root keeps its leading `..` segments
+ * (`src/../../x` is `../x`). `covers` matches such a path only against a glob
+ * that climbs out too, so outside the repo has no owner unless a territory
+ * names that place explicitly.
  */
 export function normalize(s) {
   const flat = s.replace(/\\/g, "/").replace(/\/+/g, "/").replace(/\/+$/, "");
@@ -111,22 +139,9 @@ export function normalize(s) {
   return up.join("/");
 }
 
-/**
- * Glob to RegExp.
- *
- * The wildcards are parked on sentinels before `*` is expanded, because
- * expanding `**` first produces a `.*` whose own `*` the next pass would
- * rewrite again. Getting that order wrong is silent: the regex still compiles
- * and quietly matches the wrong set of files.
- *
- * `src/api/**` also matches `src/api` itself. Without that, the directory a
- * role was just granted comes back ownerless, which reads as a bug every time.
- *
- * Dotfiles are matched like any other name: `*.env` covers `.env`. Shell globs
- * hide them by default, and most glob libraries copy that. A permission tool
- * must not: covering one file too many costs an argument, covering one too few
- * is the hole. When the two readings disagree, this one takes the wider set.
- */
+/** matchGlob's memo, shared between calls (see there). */
+let MEMO = new Uint8Array(4096);
+
 /**
  * Does `glob` cover `path`? A linear matcher, not a regular expression.
  *
@@ -141,11 +156,31 @@ export function normalize(s) {
  * Same wildcards as before: `?` one non-`/`, `*` a run of non-`/`, `**` any run
  * including `/`, `**\/` zero or more whole directories, a trailing `/**` the
  * subtree. Characters are compared literally; nothing is treated as regex.
+ *
+ * `src/api/**` also matches `src/api` itself. Without that, the directory a
+ * role was just granted comes back ownerless, which reads as a bug every time.
+ *
+ * Dotfiles are matched like any other name: `*.env` covers `.env`. Shell globs
+ * hide them by default, and most glob libraries copy that. A permission tool
+ * must not: covering one file too many costs an argument, covering one too few
+ * is the hole. When the two readings disagree, this one takes the wider set.
  */
 function matchGlob(glob, path) {
   const G = glob.length, P = path.length;
-  // memo[gi * (P+1) + pi]: 0 unknown, 1 true, 2 false. One flat array, reused.
-  const memo = new Uint8Array((G + 1) * (P + 1));
+  // memo[gi * (P+1) + pi]: 0 unknown, 1 true, 2 false. One flat array, kept
+  // between calls and cleared over the part this call uses: allocating it
+  // fresh was most of the cost of a call that fails on its second character.
+  // Nothing re-enters matchGlob while it runs, so sharing it is safe.
+  // An outsized pair gets its own array, so one long path does not pin
+  // megabytes for the life of a server.
+  const size = (G + 1) * (P + 1);
+  let memo;
+  if (size > 1 << 20) memo = new Uint8Array(size);
+  else {
+    if (MEMO.length < size) MEMO = new Uint8Array(Math.max(size, MEMO.length * 2));
+    memo = MEMO;
+    memo.fill(0, 0, size);
+  }
   const at = (gi, pi) => {
     for (;;) {
       const key = gi * (P + 1) + pi;
@@ -210,11 +245,55 @@ export function ownersOf(config, path) {
     if (!config.root || !path.startsWith(root)) return [];
     path = path.slice(root.length);
   }
+  // A private folder has one owner, whatever else covers it: every other role
+  // is given a denyWrite on it (srt.js), and denyWrite wins over any territory.
+  const mine = privateOwner(config, path);
   return Object.values(config.roles)
     .filter((r) => r.writes.some((g) => covers(g, path)) && !neverWrites(r, path, config))
+    .filter((r) => !mine || r.name === mine.role)
     .map((r) => r.name);
 }
 
+/**
+ * The private folder that holds `path` — `{ role, entry }` — or null.
+ *
+ * `path` is repo-relative, or absolute inside the repo. One answer for the
+ * settings, `explain`, the hook and `check`, so the denies the kernel is given
+ * and the sentence about them cannot drift apart.
+ */
+export function privateOwner(config, path) {
+  let p = String(path ?? "");
+  if (p.startsWith("/")) {
+    const root = config.root?.endsWith("/") ? config.root : `${config.root}/`;
+    if (!config.root || !p.startsWith(root)) return null;
+    p = p.slice(root.length);
+  }
+  for (const r of Object.values(config.roles ?? {}))
+    for (const entry of r.private ?? [])
+      if (covers(entry.replace(/\/\*\*$/, "").replace(/\/+$/, ""), p)) return { role: r.name, entry };
+  return null;
+}
+
+/** The answer for `role` touching another role's private folder, or null. */
+function privateAnswer(config, role, target, read = false) {
+  const hit = privateOwner(config, target);
+  if (!hit) return null;
+  // The owner's write goes on through the ordinary questions (never_writes
+  // still subtracts inside it); its read is answered here, because "every
+  // role reads it" is exactly what is no longer true.
+  if (hit.role === role)
+    return read
+      ? { allowed: true, owners: [role], privateTo: role,
+          reason: `${target} is in ${role}'s private folder (private = ["${hit.entry}"]): ${role} reads it, and no other role does` }
+      : null;
+  return {
+    allowed: false, owners: [hit.role], privateTo: hit.role,
+    reason: `${target} is in ${hit.role}'s private folder (private = ["${hit.entry}"]): only ${hit.role} ` +
+      `reads or writes it, and every other role is denied both, in any read mode. ` +
+      `There is nothing to grant — ask ${hit.role} for what you need from it`,
+  };
+}
+
 /**
  * Where a refused target stands against the policy as it is now.
  *
@@ -238,9 +317,17 @@ export function standing(config, entry) {
   const target = entry.target;
   if (entry.kind === "network")
     return { kind: "outside", owners: [], why: "a port or a socket, which no role owns" };
+  if (entry.kind === "system")
+    return { kind: "outside", owners: [], why: "a system service, which no role owns" };
   if (entry.kind === "key")
     return { kind: "outside", owners: [], why: "a key directory, closed on purpose" };
   const guard = protectedBy(config, target);
+  // A family the policy hands to a role is protected from everybody else and
+  // owned by that role — if it is also that role's territory.
+  if (guard?.family) {
+    const holders = ownersOf(config, target).filter((o) => config.roles[o]?.controlFiles?.includes(guard.family));
+    if (holders.length) return { kind: "owned", owners: holders };
+  }
   if (guard) return { kind: "protected", owners: [], why: guard.why };
   if (target.startsWith("/")) {
     const root = config.root?.endsWith("/") ? config.root : `${config.root}/`;
@@ -323,6 +410,127 @@ export function neverWrites(role, path, config = null) {
   return enforcedNeverWrites(config, role).find((g) => covers(g, path)) ?? null;
 }
 
+/** A key dir as the policy's paths spell it: no leading `./`, no trailing `/`. */
+const dirSpelling = (d) => String(d).replace(/^\.\/+/, "").replace(/\/+$/, "");
+
+/** Is the repo-relative `rel` one of the key directories, or inside one? */
+export function inKeyDir(config, rel) {
+  return (config.keyDirs ?? []).some((d) => {
+    const k = dirSpelling(d);
+    const r = k.startsWith("/") ? relFromRoot(config, k) : k;
+    return r !== null && (rel === r || rel.startsWith(r + "/"));
+  });
+}
+
+function relFromRoot(config, abs) {
+  const root = config.root ?? "";
+  return abs === root ? "." : abs.startsWith(root + "/") ? abs.slice(root.length + 1) : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * How a key is written in a role's `keys` list: relative to the first key
+ * directory when it lives there, with its directory otherwise — the same form
+ * settingsFor and keyHolders resolve back.
+ */
+export function keyName(config, target) {
+  const t = String(target ?? "");
+  const first = config.keyDirs?.length ? dirSpelling(config.keyDirs[0]) : null;
+  return first && t.startsWith(first + "/") ? t.slice(first.length + 1) : t;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A read of a FILE — a path, not a key name — and whether the role gets it.
+ *
+ * Reads are open by design: every role reads everything outside the `[keys]`
+ * dirs (and, under `isolate`, outside the credential homes). `explain` used to
+ * send every read through the key question, so `explain dev read .env` said
+ * "denied — no role declares .env" about a file every role could read. A wrong
+ * no from the tool whose job is saying what the kernel will do. Now a path
+ * inside a key directory is a key question; anything else is answered as the
+ * open read it is, with how to make it a key.
+ */
+/**
+ * An agent's sign-in file: closed to every run but a run of that agent, which
+ * is a fact about the command and not the role (AGENT_CREDENTIALS, grants.js).
+ * explain has no command, so it answers for the ordinary case and names the
+ * exception. Nothing to grant either way, and the sentence says so: the advice
+ * it replaced was "add it to a role's keys", which would hand a ChatGPT token
+ * to a role by policy.
+ */
+function signInAnswer(role, target) {
+  if (!String(target ?? "").startsWith("/")) return null;
+  const agent = AGENTS.find((a) => AGENT_CREDENTIALS[a].map(expand).includes(target));
+  if (!agent) return null;
+  return {
+    allowed: false, owners: [], signIn: agent,
+    reason: `${target} is ${agent}'s sign-in: only a run whose command is ${agent} reads it ` +
+      `(seisin run ${role} -- ${agent} …), and the commands that run inside it. ` +
+      `Any other command run as ${role} is denied it, and there is nothing to grant`,
+  };
+}
+
+export function explainFileRead(config, role, rel, credentialHomes = []) {
+  // Only a key directory makes a key: settingsFor refuses a key declared
+  // anywhere else, so nothing outside one is denied by being a key.
+  if (inKeyDir(config, rel)) return explainPolicy(config, role, "read", rel);
+  const level = config.isolate === true ? "home" : config.isolate;
+  if ((level === "credentials" || level === "home") && rel.startsWith("/")) {
+    const hit = credentialHomes.find((h) => rel === h || rel.startsWith(h + "/"));
+    if (hit)
+      return {
+        allowed: false, owners: [],
+        reason: `${rel} is under ${hit}, which isolate = "${level}" closes to every role`,
+      };
+  }
+  const signIn = signInAnswer(role, rel);
+  if (signIn) return signIn;
+  const shut = privateAnswer(config, role, rel, true);
+  if (shut) return shut;
+  if (config.read === "territory" && rel.startsWith("/") &&
+      shutByTerritory(rel, keptFor(config, config.roles[role])))
+    return {
+      allowed: false, owners: [], readTerritory: true,
+      reason: `${rel} is outside what ${role} keeps readable under read = "territory". ` +
+        `Declare it in reads, or declare the tool that needs it in toolchain`,
+    };
+  const dirs = (config.keyDirs ?? []).map(dirSpelling);
+  return {
+    allowed: true, owners: [], open: true,
+    reason: dirs.length
+      ? `${rel} is outside every [keys] dir (${dirs.join(", ")}), so every role reads it. ` +
+        `Move it into ${dirs[0]}/ to make it a key`
+      : `no [keys] dir is declared, so every role reads every file. ` +
+        `Declare one under [keys] and move ${rel} into it to make it a key`,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * What a read is about: a key, named the way the policy names keys, or a file.
+ *
+ * `explain dev read stripe` asks about a key — a bare name some role declares,
+ * or one sitting in a key directory. Everything else is a path, resolved from
+ * where you stand, and inside a key directory it is a key question again.
+ */
+export function readTarget(config, target, cwd = process.cwd()) {
+  // A reference is a key by its spelling, never a path: resolving
+  // `keychain://x` from where you stand printed `keychain:/x` and answered
+  // a question about a file nobody asked about.
+  if (refOf(target)) return { key: true, target };
+  if (!target.includes("/") && !isAbsolute(target)) {
+    const declared = keyHolders(config, target).length > 0;
+    const bare = (s) => s.replace(/\.[^.]+$/, "");
+    const inDir = (config.keyDirs ?? []).some((d) => {
+      const dir = isAbsolute(d) ? d : join(config.root, d);
+      if (existsSync(join(dir, target))) return true;
+      try { return readdirSync(dir).some((f) => bare(f) === target); } catch { return false; }
+    });
+    const here = fromCwd(config, target, cwd);
+    const isFileHere = existsSync(here) && !inKeyDir(config, toRepoRelative(config, here));
+    if ((declared || inDir) && !isFileHere) return { key: true, target };
+  }
+  return { key: false, target: toRepoRelative(config, fromCwd(config, target, cwd)) };
+}
+
 /** Every role allowed to read `key`, matched with or without its extension. */
 export function keyHolders(config, key) {
   const dirs = config.keyDirs ?? [];
@@ -349,19 +557,88 @@ export function keyHolders(config, key) {
   // netlify` — so it stays, and only for an unqualified question.
   const loose = !key.includes("/");
 
+  /**
+   * Only path keys. A reference — `keychain://x`, `NAME=file://.secrets/a#X` —
+   * is resolved by the parent and delivered as a value; the role is never
+   * given the file. Comparing the raw strings let `explain` say "declares
+   * a.env" about a role whose key merely pointed into it, a yes the kernel
+   * would refuse.
+   */
   return Object.values(config.roles)
-    .filter((r) => r.keys.some((k) =>
+    .filter((r) => fileKeys(r).some((k) =>
       resolve(k) === wanted || (loose && bare(k) === bare(key))))
     .map((r) => r.name);
 }
 
+/** `scheme://…`, optionally `NAME=scheme://…`, read as a key entry — or null. */
+function refOf(target) {
+  try {
+    const e = parseKey(target);
+    return e.kind === "ref" ? e : null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
 /**
- * The sentence a blocked agent should read.
+ * A reference key is a question about the policy, not about the disk.
  *
- * Three outcomes, and the third is the one worth having: a path nobody owns is
- * not a permission problem, it is a hole in the map. Saying so is more useful
- * than denying quietly, and it is the only way the hole ever gets fixed.
+ * Two facts answer it: whether the role lists the reference in its `keys`,
+ * and which provider turns it into a value. The role never reads where the
+ * secret lives — the parent resolves it before the sandbox starts and hands
+ * over the value — so there is no path to normalise and no key directory to
+ * be inside of. Matched on scheme and reference; the variable name in front is
+ * how it is delivered, not which secret it is.
  */
+function explainRef(config, role, ref) {
+  const spelled = `${ref.scheme}://${ref.ref}`;
+  const declaring = (r) => {
+    try {
+      return entriesOf(r).find((e) => e.kind === "ref" && e.scheme === ref.scheme && e.ref === ref.ref);
+    } catch {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+  };
+  const holders = Object.values(config.roles).filter(declaring).map((r) => r.name);
+  const provider = BUILTIN.has(ref.scheme)
+    ? `seisin's built-in ${ref.scheme}:// provider`
+    : Object.hasOwn(config.keyProviders ?? {}, ref.scheme) ? `[keys.providers.${ref.scheme}]` : null;
+  if (!provider)
+    return {
+      allowed: false, owners: holders, key: "ref",
+      reason: `${spelled} uses the "${ref.scheme}" scheme and no [keys.providers.${ref.scheme}] is declared, ` +
+        `so nothing resolves it — declare the provider before a role can hold this key`,
+    };
+  const mine = config.roles[role] && declaring(config.roles[role]);
+  if (mine)
+    return {
+      allowed: true, owners: holders, key: "ref", provider,
+      reason: `${role} declares ${mine.raw}: the parent resolves it through ${provider} and hands ` +
+        `${role} the value as ${mine.name} — the role never reads where it is kept`,
+    };
+  if (!holders.length)
+    return {
+      allowed: false, owners: [], key: "ref", provider,
+      reason: `no role declares ${spelled} (${provider} would resolve it) — ` +
+        `add it to a role's keys: [roles.${role}] keys = ["${ref.raw}"]`,
+    };
+  return {
+    allowed: false, owners: holders, key: "ref", provider,
+    reason: `${spelled} belongs to ${holders.join(", ")}, through ${provider}`,
+  };
+}
+
+/** The keys of `role` that grant a read: the path ones. A malformed entry grants nothing. */
+function fileKeys(role) {
+  let entries;
+  try {
+    entries = entriesOf(role);
+  } catch {
+    return [];
+  }
+  return entries.filter((e) => e.kind === "file").map((e) => e.raw);
+}
+
 /**
  * A connection the kernel refused: `tcp:<port>` or a unix socket path.
  *
@@ -425,14 +702,32 @@ function explainMcp(config, role, name) {
       : `${role} declares mcp = [], no MCP servers` };
 }
 
-export function explain(config, role, action, target) {
+/**
+ * The sentence a blocked agent should read.
+ *
+ * Three outcomes, and the third is the one worth having: a path nobody owns is
+ * not a permission problem, it is a hole in the map. Saying so is more useful
+ * than denying quietly, and it is the only way the hole ever gets fixed.
+ */
+function explainPolicy(config, role, action, target) {
   if (action === "connect") return explainConnect(config, role, target);
   if (action === "mcp") return explainMcp(config, role, target);
   if (action === "read") {
+    const ref = refOf(target);
+    if (ref) return explainRef(config, role, ref);
+    const signIn = signInAnswer(role, target);
+    if (signIn) return signIn;
     const holders = keyHolders(config, target);
     if (holders.includes(role)) return { allowed: true, owners: holders, reason: `${role} declares ${target}` };
-    if (holders.length === 0)
-      return { allowed: false, owners: [], reason: `no role declares ${target} — add it under a [roles.<name>] keys list` };
+    if (holders.length === 0) {
+      // A key is written as a name relative to the key directory — `stripe.txt`,
+      // not `.secrets/stripe.txt` — so the advice says the name to write.
+      const name = keyName(config, target);
+      return {
+        allowed: false, owners: [],
+        reason: `no role declares ${target} — add "${name}" to a role's keys: [roles.<name>] keys = ["${name}"]`,
+      };
+    }
     return { allowed: false, owners: holders, reason: `${target} belongs to ${holders.join(", ")}` };
   }
 
@@ -442,11 +737,18 @@ export function explain(config, role, action, target) {
    *
    * The policy, seisin's state, the key directories, what the parent executes
    * or reads for a key, and the files that make git or Claude Code run
-   * something outside the box. The kernel denies all of them to every role —
+   * something outside the sandbox. The kernel denies all of them to every role —
    * surface.js has the list and the reasons — so saying "belongs to dev" about
    * `seisin.toml` sent a request to a person that no grant could satisfy.
    */
-  const guard = protectedBy(config, target);
+  const guard = protectedBy(config, target, { role });
+  if (guard?.family)
+    return {
+      allowed: false, owners, protected: guard.why, family: guard.family,
+      reason: `${target} is protected (${guard.why}). A role writes it only when the policy hands it ` +
+        `that family: control_files = ["${guard.family}"] under [roles.${role}], and inside its own ` +
+        `territory. That is a person's decision about the policy, not a grant to request`,
+    };
   if (guard)
     return {
       allowed: false, owners, protected: guard.why,
@@ -460,13 +762,15 @@ export function explain(config, role, action, target) {
    * approves it, and the subtraction is undone from the other side without
    * anyone deciding to undo it.
    */
+  const shut = privateAnswer(config, role, target);
+  if (shut) return shut;
   const r = config.roles[role];
   const barred = r && r.writes.some((g) => covers(g, target)) ? neverWrites(r, target, config) : null;
   if (barred)
     return {
       allowed: false, owners, neverWrites: barred,
       reason: `${target} is denied by never_writes of ${role} ("${barred}") — ` +
-        `a subtraction written into the policy, not a missing permission`,
+        `a subtraction written into the policy, not a missing grant`,
     };
   if (owners.includes(role)) return { allowed: true, owners, reason: `${target} is inside ${role}'s territory` };
   /**
@@ -477,17 +781,32 @@ export function explain(config, role, action, target) {
    * else's history. Codex keeps `.git` read-only under a writable root for the
    * same reason; nono and Gemini grant the whole of it. Here it stays refused
    * and is said for what it is — not "belongs to X, ask them", which filed a
-   * request per lock file (327 of them for one index.lock on one portfolio)
-   * that nobody could sensibly approve. The requests side skips it too.
+   * request per lock file (327 of them for one index.lock in one multi-repo workspace)
+   * that nobody could sensibly grant. The requests side skips it too.
    */
   if (isGitMetadata(target))
     return {
       allowed: false, owners, gitMetadata: true,
       reason: `${target} is git's own bookkeeping in a repository ${role} does not write — ` +
-        `not a permission to ask for. Read what you need (git log, git show, git ls-remote) ` +
+        `not something to request. Read what you need (git log, git show, git ls-remote) ` +
         `or work in a worktree of your own`,
     };
   if (owners.length === 0)
     return { allowed: false, owners: [], reason: `${target} has no owner — no role can write it until one claims it` };
   return { allowed: false, owners, reason: `${target} belongs to ${owners.join(", ")}` };
 }
+
+/**
+ * One public answer for CLI, MCP and library callers.
+ *
+ * Reads first decide whether the target is a declared key or a file, then ask
+ * the same territory/isolation question. Callers may supply their cwd; servers
+ * use the policy root, while the CLI uses the directory it is standing in.
+ */
+export function explain(config, role, action, target, cwd = config.root) {
+  if (action !== "read") return explainPolicy(config, role, action, target);
+  const asked = readTarget(config, target, cwd);
+  return asked.key
+    ? explainPolicy(config, role, "read", asked.target)
+    : explainFileRead(config, role, asked.target, CREDENTIAL_HOMES.map(expand));
+}

package/src/paths.js

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  * project refuses. Found by the read-only review of 2026-09-22.
  */
 import { realpathSync } from "node:fs";
-import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, sep } from "node:path";
+import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, normalize, relative, sep } from "node:path";
 
 /**
  * `p` with its deepest existing ancestor resolved through symlinks and the rest
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ export function realAncestor(p) {
   let head = p, tail = "";
   while (head !== dirname(head)) {
     try {
-      const real = realpathSync(head);
+      // `.native`: the disk's own case on APFS — see realOrSelf in grants.js.
+      const real = realpathSync.native(head);
       return tail ? join(real, tail) : real;
     } catch {
       tail = tail ? join(basename(head), tail) : basename(head);
@@ -33,6 +34,13 @@ export function realAncestor(p) {
   return p;
 }
 
+/**
+ * The four characters the glob matcher treats as wildcards. Here, in a module
+ * that imports nothing of seisin's, so that owners.js and grants.js share one
+ * definition without importing each other.
+ */
+export const WILD = /[*?[\]]/;
+
 /**
  * Repo-relative when `target` is inside the repo, spelled either way; exactly as
  * written when it is relative already or lies outside. A path outside keeps its
@@ -48,3 +56,47 @@ export function toRepoRelative(config, target) {
   if (inside(realRoot, realTarget)) return relative(realRoot, realTarget) || ".";
   return target;
 }
+
+/**
+ * One spelling for a path, so two of them can be compared with `===`.
+ *
+ * Repo-relative and normalized inside the repo (`./a/`, `a/../a` and the
+ * absolute path through either symlinked spelling of the root are all `a`);
+ * absolute and resolved through its existing ancestors outside it. Used where
+ * a path a caller gave must match the path a denial names exactly — never as
+ * a prefix and never as a glob.
+ */
+export function samePath(config, target) {
+  if (typeof target !== "string" || !target.trim()) return null;
+  const rel = toRepoRelative(config, isAbsolute(target) ? normalize(target) : target);
+  if (isAbsolute(rel)) return realAncestor(normalize(rel)).replace(/(.)\/+$/, "$1");
+  return normalize(rel).replace(/\/+$/, "") || ".";
+}
+
+/**
+ * A path typed at a prompt, made absolute the way a shell user means it:
+ * against the directory they are standing in. Relative arguments used to be
+ * read against the policy's root, so `seisin explain web write app.js` from
+ * web/src asked about ./app.js at the root and answered "no owner".
+ *
+ * Only when the working directory is inside the repo. From anywhere else —
+ * `SEISIN_CONFIG` pointing at a policy elsewhere, a test harness — a relative
+ * path keeps meaning what it always meant: relative to the root.
+ */
+export function fromCwd(config, target, cwd = process.cwd()) {
+  if (typeof target !== "string" || isAbsolute(target)) return target;
+  const root = config.root;
+  const inside = (r, t) => t === r || t.startsWith(r + sep);
+  // The cwd and the root compared in the same spelling: as written, or both
+  // through their symlinks (on macOS /tmp is /private/tmp).
+  let base = root, here = cwd;
+  if (!inside(root, cwd)) {
+    base = realAncestor(root);
+    here = realAncestor(cwd);
+    if (!inside(base, here)) return target;
+  }
+  const rel = relative(base, join(here, target));
+  if (rel === "") return root;
+  if (rel === ".." || rel.startsWith(".." + sep)) return join(here, target);
+  return join(root, rel);
+}