security-mcp 1.1.3 → 1.3.1

package/dist/gate/checks/crypto.js

@@ -26,6 +26,381 @@ function checkPbkdf2Iterations(hits) {
     }
     return null;
 }
+async function checkAesCbcUnauthenticated() {
+    const findings = [];
+    // Primary: string literal match
+    const cbcLiteralHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `createCipheriv\s*\(\s*['"]aes-(?:128|192|256)-cbc['"]`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    // Secondary: detect concatenated or dynamic AES-CBC strings that evade the
+    // string-literal regex (e.g. 'aes-' + '256-cbc', `aes-${bits}-cbc`).
+    // CWE-327 evasion via string concatenation is a documented bypass technique.
+    const cbcConcatHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `createCipheriv\s*\([^)]*['"\x60][^)]*-cbc['"\x60]|['"]aes-['"].*cbc|['"\x60].*-cbc['"\x60].*createCipheriv`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    const cbcHits = [
+        ...cbcLiteralHits,
+        ...cbcConcatHits.filter((h) => !cbcLiteralHits.some((l) => l.file === h.file && l.line === h.line))
+    ];
+    if (cbcHits.length === 0)
+        return findings;
+    // Check for HMAC authentication near AES-CBC usage
+    const hmacHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `createHmac|hmac\.digest|crypto\.sign|authenticate`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    // If AES-CBC is used and no HMAC found anywhere nearby, flag it
+    const hmacFiles = new Set(hmacHits.map((m) => m.file));
+    const unauthenticated = cbcHits.filter((m) => !hmacFiles.has(m.file));
+    if (unauthenticated.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            id: "CRYPTO_AES_CBC_NO_AUTH",
+            title: "AES-CBC without HMAC authentication is vulnerable to padding oracle attacks. Use AES-256-GCM instead.",
+            severity: "CRITICAL",
+            evidence: unauthenticated.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(unauthenticated.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Replace createCipheriv('aes-256-cbc') with createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm') and use the GCM authentication tag"
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    return findings;
+}
+async function checkGcmNonceReuse() {
+    const findings = [];
+    const gcmHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `createCipheriv\s*\(\s*['"]aes-(?:128|192|256)-gcm['"]`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    if (gcmHits.length === 0)
+        return findings;
+    // Check for nonce reuse patterns
+    const nonceReuseHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `(?:let|var)\s+(?:iv|nonce|counter)\s*=|iv\+\+|nonce\+\+|counter\+\+|iv\s*\+=|nonce\s*\+=|Date\.now\(\)|new Date\(\)|performance\.now`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    const gcmFiles = new Set(gcmHits.map((m) => m.file));
+    const reuseInGcmFiles = nonceReuseHits.filter((m) => gcmFiles.has(m.file));
+    if (reuseInGcmFiles.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            id: "CRYPTO_GCM_NONCE_REUSE_RISK",
+            title: "GCM nonce reuse risk detected — mutable or time-based IV/nonce near AES-GCM cipher",
+            severity: "CRITICAL",
+            evidence: reuseInGcmFiles.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(reuseInGcmFiles.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Generate a fresh random 12-byte nonce for every encryption with crypto.randomBytes(12).",
+                "GCM nonce reuse completely breaks confidentiality and authentication."
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    // Check for missing crypto.randomBytes near GCM usage
+    const randomBytesHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `crypto\.randomBytes`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    const randomBytesFiles = new Set(randomBytesHits.map((m) => m.file));
+    const gcmWithoutRandom = gcmHits.filter((m) => !randomBytesFiles.has(m.file));
+    if (gcmWithoutRandom.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            id: "CRYPTO_GCM_NO_RANDOM_NONCE",
+            title: "AES-GCM used without crypto.randomBytes for nonce generation",
+            severity: "HIGH",
+            evidence: gcmWithoutRandom.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(gcmWithoutRandom.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Use crypto.randomBytes(12) to generate a random 12-byte nonce for each AES-GCM encryption.",
+                "Never use a fixed, sequential, or time-based nonce with GCM."
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    // Check for module-level (top-scope) nonce/iv assigned from randomBytes — reused across calls.
+    // Pattern: const/let iv = (crypto.)randomBytes(...) appearing at module scope (not inside a function).
+    // Heuristic: the assignment is not indented (or indented only by whitespace without a function keyword
+    // on the same line), combined with GCM usage in the same file.
+    const moduleLevelNonceHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `^(?:const|let|var)\s+(?:iv|nonce|counter)\s*=\s*(?:crypto\.)?randomBytes\s*\(`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    const moduleLevelInGcmFiles = moduleLevelNonceHits.filter((m) => gcmFiles.has(m.file));
+    if (moduleLevelInGcmFiles.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            id: "CRYPTO_GCM_MODULE_LEVEL_NONCE",
+            title: "AES-GCM nonce generated at module scope — nonce is reused across all encrypt calls",
+            severity: "CRITICAL",
+            evidence: moduleLevelInGcmFiles.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(moduleLevelInGcmFiles.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Move crypto.randomBytes(12) inside the encryption function so a fresh nonce is generated per call.",
+                "A module-level nonce is initialised once and reused — GCM nonce reuse completely breaks confidentiality and authentication (CWE-329)."
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    return findings;
+}
+async function checkRsaPaddingScheme() {
+    const findings = [];
+    const rsaHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `crypto\.publicEncrypt|crypto\.privateDecrypt`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    if (rsaHits.length === 0)
+        return findings;
+    // Check for explicit OAEP padding
+    const oaepHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING|oaepHash`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    // Check for explicit PKCS1 v1.5 padding
+    const pkcs1Hits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `RSA_PKCS1_PADDING|'pkcs1'|padding.*PKCS1`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    const oaepFiles = new Set(oaepHits.map((m) => m.file));
+    const rsaWithoutOaep = rsaHits.filter((m) => !oaepFiles.has(m.file));
+    if (rsaWithoutOaep.length > 0 || pkcs1Hits.length > 0) {
+        const allEvidence = [...rsaWithoutOaep, ...pkcs1Hits].slice(0, 10);
+        findings.push({
+            id: "CRYPTO_RSA_PKCS1_PADDING",
+            title: "RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding is vulnerable to Bleichenbacher attacks. Use RSA-OAEP padding: { key, padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING }",
+            severity: "HIGH",
+            evidence: allEvidence.map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(allEvidence.map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Pass an options object with padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING to publicEncrypt/privateDecrypt.",
+                "The default RSA padding (PKCS#1 v1.5) is vulnerable to adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks."
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    return findings;
+}
+async function checkShaUsedForPassword(weakHashHits) {
+    const findings = [];
+    // Detect SHA-256/384/512 used in password context
+    const shaPasswordHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `createHash\s*\(\s*['"]sha(?:256|384|512|2)['"]`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    if (shaPasswordHits.length === 0)
+        return findings;
+    const passwordContextRe = /password|passwd|pwd|credential/i;
+    const shaPasswordContext = shaPasswordHits.filter((m) => passwordContextRe.test(m.preview));
+    // Also search for direct pattern: createHash('sha256').update(password
+    const directPatternHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `createHash\s*\(\s*['"]sha(?:256|384|512)['"]\s*\)\.update\s*\(\s*(?:password|passwd|pwd)`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    const combined = [...shaPasswordContext, ...directPatternHits];
+    const unique = combined.filter((m, i, arr) => arr.findIndex((x) => x.file === m.file && x.line === m.line) === i);
+    if (unique.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            id: "CRYPTO_SHA_USED_FOR_PASSWORD",
+            title: "SHA-256/SHA-512 are fast hash functions unsuitable for password storage. Use bcrypt, argon2, or scrypt.",
+            severity: "HIGH",
+            evidence: unique.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(unique.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Replace SHA-based password hashing with bcrypt (cost ≥ 12), argon2id, or scrypt.",
+                "Fast hash functions allow billions of guesses per second with GPU hardware."
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    return findings;
+}
+async function checkHardcodedSalt() {
+    const findings = [];
+    const hardcodedSaltHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `pbkdf2(?:Sync)?\s*\([^,]+,\s*(?:['"][^'"]{1,}['"]|Buffer\.from\s*\(\s*['"][^'"]+['"]\s*\))`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    if (hardcodedSaltHits.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            id: "CRYPTO_PBKDF2_HARDCODED_SALT",
+            title: "Hardcoded salt makes PBKDF2 equivalent to an unsalted hash. Generate a unique random salt per user with crypto.randomBytes(32).",
+            severity: "HIGH",
+            evidence: hardcodedSaltHits.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(hardcodedSaltHits.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Replace the hardcoded salt with crypto.randomBytes(32) generated uniquely per user.",
+                "Store the random salt alongside the hash in the database."
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    return findings;
+}
+async function checkTlsConfig() {
+    const findings = [];
+    // Check for weak TLS minimum version
+    const weakTlsHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `minVersion\s*:\s*['"]TLSv1(?:\.[01])?['"]|secureProtocol\s*:\s*['"](?:SSLv3|TLSv1)_method['"]`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    if (weakTlsHits.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            id: "TLS_WEAK_MIN_VERSION",
+            title: "TLS 1.0/1.1 or SSL configured as minimum version — insecure protocol",
+            severity: "HIGH",
+            evidence: weakTlsHits.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(weakTlsHits.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Set minVersion: 'TLSv1.2' or 'TLSv1.3' in TLS/HTTPS server configuration.",
+                "TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated by RFC 8996 and prohibited by PCI DSS 4.0."
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    // Check for disabled certificate verification
+    const rejectUnauthorizedHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `rejectUnauthorized\s*:\s*false|NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED\s*=\s*['"]0['"]`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    if (rejectUnauthorizedHits.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            id: "TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_DISABLED",
+            title: "rejectUnauthorized: false disables TLS certificate verification, enabling MITM attacks.",
+            severity: "HIGH",
+            evidence: rejectUnauthorizedHits.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(rejectUnauthorizedHits.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Remove rejectUnauthorized: false and fix the underlying certificate issue.",
+                "If using a self-signed cert, add it via the ca option rather than disabling verification."
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    return findings;
+}
+async function checkZeroFilledIv() {
+    const findings = [];
+    const zeroIvHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `(?:Buffer\.alloc\s*\(\s*(?:8|12|16|24|32)\s*\)|new\s+Uint8Array\s*\(\s*(?:8|12|16|24|32)\s*\))[^\n]*(?:iv|IV|nonce|Nonce)`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    const zeroIvAssignHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `(?:iv|nonce)\s*=\s*Buffer\.alloc\s*\(`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    const combined = [
+        ...zeroIvHits,
+        ...zeroIvAssignHits.filter((h) => !zeroIvHits.some((l) => l.file === h.file && l.line === h.line))
+    ];
+    if (combined.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            id: "CRYPTO_ZERO_IV",
+            title: "Zero-filled IV or nonce (Buffer.alloc creates all-zeros) — deterministic IV breaks cipher security (CWE-330)",
+            severity: "CRITICAL",
+            evidence: combined.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(combined.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Replace Buffer.alloc(n) with crypto.randomBytes(n) for IV/nonce generation.",
+                "A zero-filled IV is equivalent to a hardcoded IV — every encryption with the same key produces the same ciphertext."
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    return findings;
+}
+async function checkWeakRsaKeySize() {
+    const findings = [];
+    const weakRsaHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `modulusLength\s*:\s*(?:512|768|1536)`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    if (weakRsaHits.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            id: "CRYPTO_RSA_WEAK_KEY",
+            title: "RSA key size 512/768/1536 bits — sub-2048 keys factorable with commodity hardware (CWE-326)",
+            severity: "CRITICAL",
+            evidence: weakRsaHits.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(weakRsaHits.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Use a minimum modulusLength of 2048; prefer 4096 for long-lived keys.",
+                "Keys below 2048 bits can be factored with commodity hardware and are prohibited by NIST SP 800-131A Rev 2."
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    return findings;
+}
+async function checkWeakDhParams() {
+    const findings = [];
+    const weakDhSizeHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `createDiffieHellman\s*\(\s*(?:[0-9]{1,3}|1[0-9]{3}|[5-9][0-9]{2})\s*[,)]`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    const weakDhGroupHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `createDiffieHellmanGroup\s*\(\s*['"]modp(?:1|2|5)['"]`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    const combined = [
+        ...weakDhSizeHits,
+        ...weakDhGroupHits.filter((h) => !weakDhSizeHits.some((l) => l.file === h.file && l.line === h.line))
+    ];
+    if (combined.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            id: "CRYPTO_WEAK_DH_PARAMS",
+            title: "DH parameters below 2048 bits or weak group (modp1/2/5) — vulnerable to Logjam precomputation (CWE-326)",
+            severity: "HIGH",
+            evidence: combined.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(combined.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Use createDiffieHellmanGroup('modp14') or higher (modp14 = 2048-bit), or prefer ECDH with P-256 or P-384.",
+                "modp1/2/5 and DH groups below 2048 bits are broken by Logjam-style precomputation attacks."
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    return findings;
+}
+async function checkMissingForwardSecrecy() {
+    const findings = [];
+    const weakCipherSuiteHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `ciphers\s*:\s*['"][^'"]*(?:TLS_RSA_WITH|RC4|NULL|EXPORT|!ECDHE|!DHE)[^'"]*['"]`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    const honorCipherOrderHits = await searchRepo({
+        query: String.raw `honorCipherOrder\s*:\s*false`,
+        isRegex: true,
+        maxMatches: 200
+    });
+    const combined = [
+        ...weakCipherSuiteHits,
+        ...honorCipherOrderHits.filter((h) => !weakCipherSuiteHits.some((l) => l.file === h.file && l.line === h.line))
+    ];
+    if (combined.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({
+            id: "CRYPTO_NO_FORWARD_SECRECY",
+            title: "TLS cipher suite config without forward secrecy (no ECDHE/DHE) — retroactive decryption possible (PCI DSS 4.0)",
+            severity: "HIGH",
+            evidence: combined.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+            files: [...new Set(combined.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+            requiredActions: [
+                "Configure ciphers to prefer ECDHE or DHE key exchange (e.g. 'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256').",
+                "Set honorCipherOrder: true so the server's cipher preference (which should list ECDHE first) takes effect.",
+                "Without forward secrecy, a compromised private key retroactively decrypts all recorded sessions (PCI DSS 4.0 requirement 4.2.1)."
+            ]
+        });
+    }
+    return findings;
+}
 export async function checkCrypto(_opts) {
     const findings = [];
     try {
@@ -48,6 +423,9 @@ export async function checkCrypto(_opts) {
                 ]
             });
         }
+        // SHA-256/512 used for password hashing (extends weak hash check)
+        const shaPasswordFindings = await checkShaUsedForPassword(weakHashHits);
+        findings.push(...shaPasswordFindings);
         // 2. Weak symmetric ciphers
         const weakCipherHits = await searchRepo({
             query: String.raw `createCipheriv\s*\(\s*['"](?:des|rc4|rc2|blowfish|3des|des-ede)['"]\)|Cipher\.getInstance\(['"](?:DES|RC4|RC2|Blowfish)['"]`,
@@ -67,19 +445,20 @@ export async function checkCrypto(_opts) {
                 ]
             });
         }
-        // 3. Insecure random for security use
+        // 3. Insecure random — security-specific contexts (CRITICAL)
         const insecureRandomHits = await searchRepo({
             query: String.raw `Math\.random\(\)|random\.random\(\)|rand\(\)|srand\(`,
             isRegex: true,
             maxMatches: 200
         });
         const securityContextRe = /token|key|secret|password|nonce|salt|csrf|session/i;
+        const identifierContextRe = /id|path|url|upload|order|invoice|coupon|code|ref|link|hash/i;
         const insecureSecRandom = insecureRandomHits.filter((m) => securityContextRe.test(m.preview));
         if (insecureSecRandom.length > 0) {
             findings.push({
                 id: "CRYPTO_INSECURE_RANDOM",
                 title: "Non-cryptographic random used in security-sensitive context",
-                severity: "HIGH",
+                severity: "CRITICAL",
                 evidence: insecureSecRandom.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
                 files: [...new Set(insecureSecRandom.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
                 requiredActions: [
@@ -88,6 +467,21 @@ export async function checkCrypto(_opts) {
                 ]
             });
         }
+        // Insecure random — identifier/path contexts (HIGH)
+        const insecureIdentifierRandom = insecureRandomHits.filter((m) => !securityContextRe.test(m.preview) && identifierContextRe.test(m.preview));
+        if (insecureIdentifierRandom.length > 0) {
+            findings.push({
+                id: "CRYPTO_INSECURE_RANDOM_IDENTIFIER",
+                title: "Non-cryptographic random used to generate identifiers or paths — predictable IDs enable enumeration attacks",
+                severity: "HIGH",
+                evidence: insecureIdentifierRandom.slice(0, 10).map((m) => `${m.file}:${m.line}:${m.preview}`),
+                files: [...new Set(insecureIdentifierRandom.slice(0, 10).map((m) => m.file))],
+                requiredActions: [
+                    "Use crypto.randomBytes() or crypto.randomUUID() for generating IDs, paths, and codes.",
+                    "Predictable identifiers enable IDOR and enumeration attacks."
+                ]
+            });
+        }
         // 4. Weak JWT algorithm
         const weakJwtHits = await searchRepo({
             query: String.raw `algorithm\s*[:=]\s*['"]HS(?:256|384|512)['"]|sign\(.*['"]HS256['"]`,
@@ -116,6 +510,9 @@ export async function checkCrypto(_opts) {
         const pbkdf2Finding = checkPbkdf2Iterations(pbkdf2Hits);
         if (pbkdf2Finding)
             findings.push(pbkdf2Finding);
+        // Hardcoded PBKDF2 salt
+        const hardcodedSaltFindings = await checkHardcodedSalt();
+        findings.push(...hardcodedSaltFindings);
         // 6. Hardcoded IV/nonce
         const hardcodedIvHits = await searchRepo({
             query: String.raw `iv\s*[:=]\s*(?:Buffer\.from\(['"][0-9a-fA-F]+['"]\)|['"][0-9a-fA-F]{16,}['"])`,
@@ -214,6 +611,30 @@ export async function checkCrypto(_opts) {
                 ]
             });
         }
+        // 11. AES-CBC without authentication (padding oracle)
+        const aesCbcFindings = await checkAesCbcUnauthenticated();
+        findings.push(...aesCbcFindings);
+        // 12. GCM nonce reuse
+        const gcmNonceFindings = await checkGcmNonceReuse();
+        findings.push(...gcmNonceFindings);
+        // 13. RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
+        const rsaPaddingFindings = await checkRsaPaddingScheme();
+        findings.push(...rsaPaddingFindings);
+        // 14. TLS configuration weaknesses
+        const tlsFindings = await checkTlsConfig();
+        findings.push(...tlsFindings);
+        // 15. Zero-filled IV/nonce
+        const zeroIvFindings = await checkZeroFilledIv();
+        findings.push(...zeroIvFindings);
+        // 16. Weak RSA key sizes (512/768/1536)
+        const weakRsaKeyFindings = await checkWeakRsaKeySize();
+        findings.push(...weakRsaKeyFindings);
+        // 17. Weak DH parameters or named groups
+        const weakDhFindings = await checkWeakDhParams();
+        findings.push(...weakDhFindings);
+        // 18. Missing forward secrecy in TLS cipher config
+        const forwardSecrecyFindings = await checkMissingForwardSecrecy();
+        findings.push(...forwardSecrecyFindings);
     }
     catch (err) {
         console.warn("[checkCrypto] Internal error:", sanitizeErrorMessage(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)));