securewithtrace 0.43.0 → 0.44.0

package/dist/index.js

@@ -3683,6 +3683,22 @@ function linkRolesDisplay(roles, role, roleLabel) {
 // ../../packages/core/src/application/environment-urls.ts
 var ENVIRONMENT_ADDITIONAL_URLS_MAX = 20;
 
+// ../../packages/core/src/pentest/attack-chain-status.ts
+var ATTACK_CHAIN_STATUS_VALUES = ["OPEN", "REMEDIATED", "VERIFIED_FIXED"];
+var ATTACK_CHAIN_STEP_STATE_VALUES = ATTACK_CHAIN_STATUS_VALUES;
+
+// ../../packages/core/src/pentest/finding-status.ts
+var PENTEST_FINDING_STATUS_VALUES = [
+  "OPEN",
+  "IN_PROGRESS",
+  "CONTESTED",
+  "REMEDIATED",
+  "VERIFIED_FIXED",
+  "VERIFIED_OPEN",
+  "ACCEPTED_WITH_CONTROLS",
+  "DISMISSED"
+];
+
 // ../../node_modules/.bun/zod@4.3.6/node_modules/zod/v4/classic/external.js
 var external_exports = {};
 __export(external_exports, {
@@ -21884,16 +21900,7 @@ var PentestStatusValues = ["SCOPING", "IN_PROGRESS", "REMEDIATION", "CLOSED"];
 var PentestStatus = external_exports.enum(PentestStatusValues);
 var PentestTestTypeValues = ["BLACK_BOX", "GREY_BOX", "WHITE_BOX"];
 var PentestTestType = external_exports.enum(PentestTestTypeValues);
-var PentestFindingStatusValues = [
-  "OPEN",
-  "IN_PROGRESS",
-  "CONTESTED",
-  "REMEDIATED",
-  "VERIFIED_FIXED",
-  "VERIFIED_OPEN",
-  "ACCEPTED_WITH_CONTROLS",
-  "DISMISSED"
-];
+var PentestFindingStatusValues = PENTEST_FINDING_STATUS_VALUES;
 var PentestFindingStatus = external_exports.enum(PentestFindingStatusValues);
 var PentestFindingDismissReasonValues = [
   "FALSE_POSITIVE",
@@ -22846,6 +22853,78 @@ var ListAgentTasksQuerySchema = external_exports.object({
 });
 var ListAgentTasksResponseSchema = external_exports.array(AgentTaskResponseSchema);
 
+// ../../packages/api-contracts/src/schemas/api/v1/inbox.api.ts
+var InboxLabelSchema = external_exports.string().regex(
+  /^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,39}$/,
+  "Inbox label must be lowercase letters/digits/dashes, starting with a letter, at most 40 characters"
+);
+var MAX_INBOX_LABEL_LENGTH = 40;
+var MAX_LOCAL_PART_LENGTH = 64;
+var MAX_INBOX_ADDRESS_PREFIX_LENGTH = MAX_LOCAL_PART_LENGTH - MAX_INBOX_LABEL_LENGTH - 1;
+var MANAGED_INBOX_DOMAINS = [
+  "pentest.securewithtrace.com",
+  "pentest.rmrflabs.com"
+];
+var ManagedInboxDomainSchema = external_exports.enum(MANAGED_INBOX_DOMAINS);
+var DEFAULT_MANAGED_INBOX_DOMAIN = MANAGED_INBOX_DOMAINS[0];
+var ManagedInboxResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
+  /** Full derived address, e.g. `acme-qa-admin@pentest.securewithtrace.com`. */
+  address: external_exports.email(),
+  label: external_exports.string(),
+  createdAt: external_exports.date()
+});
+var ListManagedInboxesResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
+  inboxes: external_exports.array(ManagedInboxResponseSchema),
+  quota: external_exports.object({
+    used: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+    limit: external_exports.number().int().positive()
+  })
+});
+var CreateManagedInboxRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
+  label: InboxLabelSchema
+}).strict();
+var ManagedInboxLabelParamsSchema = OrgIdParamsSchema.extend({
+  label: external_exports.string().min(1).max(64)
+});
+var ManagedInboxMessageParamsSchema = ManagedInboxLabelParamsSchema.extend({
+  messageId: external_exports.string().min(1).max(500)
+});
+var ListInboxMessagesQuerySchema = external_exports.object({
+  /** Max messages, newest first. The provider may clamp further. */
+  limit: external_exports.coerce.number().int().positive().max(50).optional(),
+  /** Only messages received strictly after this instant. */
+  since: external_exports.coerce.date().optional()
+}).strict();
+var ManagedInboxMessageSummarySchema = external_exports.object({
+  messageId: external_exports.string().min(1).max(500),
+  from: external_exports.string().max(500),
+  /** Recipients as the provider returned them (display-name form allowed). */
+  to: external_exports.array(external_exports.string().max(500)),
+  subject: external_exports.string().max(1e3).nullable(),
+  preview: external_exports.string().max(2e3).nullable(),
+  receivedAt: external_exports.coerce.date(),
+  unread: external_exports.boolean()
+});
+var ListInboxMessagesResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
+  address: external_exports.email(),
+  label: external_exports.string(),
+  messages: external_exports.array(ManagedInboxMessageSummarySchema)
+});
+var GetInboxMessageResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
+  address: external_exports.email(),
+  label: external_exports.string(),
+  message: ManagedInboxMessageSummarySchema.extend({
+    body: external_exports.string(),
+    truncated: external_exports.boolean(),
+    /**
+     * http(s) links extracted from the message (hrefs first, then inline
+     * text URLs). Button-style mail often carries the magic link only in
+     * `href`, which a tag-stripped body can still miss if extraction fails.
+     */
+    links: external_exports.array(external_exports.string())
+  })
+});
+
 // ../../packages/api-contracts/src/schemas/api/v1/pentest-attack-chain.api.ts
 var PentestAttackChainParamsSchema = OrgIdParamsSchema.extend({
   pentestId: external_exports.uuid()
@@ -22876,6 +22955,23 @@ var UpdatePentestAttackChainRequestSchema = CreatePentestAttackChainRequestSchem
 var PublishPentestAttackChainRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
   expectedUpdatedAt: external_exports.coerce.date()
 });
+var PublishAllAttackChainsRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
+  attackChainIds: external_exports.array(external_exports.uuid()).max(1e3).optional()
+});
+var PublishedAttackChainSchema = external_exports.object({
+  attackChainId: external_exports.uuid(),
+  displayId: external_exports.int()
+});
+var SkippedAttackChainReason = external_exports.enum(["TOO_SHORT", "FINDING_UNPUBLISHED"]);
+var SkippedAttackChainSchema = external_exports.object({
+  attackChainId: external_exports.uuid(),
+  title: external_exports.string(),
+  reason: SkippedAttackChainReason
+});
+var PublishAllAttackChainsResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
+  published: external_exports.array(PublishedAttackChainSchema),
+  skipped: external_exports.array(SkippedAttackChainSchema)
+});
 var AttackChainStepFindingSchema = external_exports.object({
   pentestFindingId: external_exports.uuid(),
   displayId: external_exports.number().int().nullable(),
@@ -22884,12 +22980,15 @@ var AttackChainStepFindingSchema = external_exports.object({
   status: PentestFindingStatus,
   publishedAt: external_exports.coerce.date().nullable()
 });
+var AttackChainStatus = external_exports.enum(ATTACK_CHAIN_STATUS_VALUES);
+var AttackChainStepState = external_exports.enum(ATTACK_CHAIN_STEP_STATE_VALUES);
 var AttackChainStepSchema = external_exports.object({
   stepId: external_exports.uuid(),
   stepOrder: external_exports.number().int(),
   title: external_exports.string(),
   narrative: external_exports.string(),
-  findings: external_exports.array(AttackChainStepFindingSchema)
+  findings: external_exports.array(AttackChainStepFindingSchema),
+  remediationState: AttackChainStepState
 });
 var PentestAttackChainSchema = external_exports.object({
   attackChainId: external_exports.uuid(),
@@ -22900,6 +22999,7 @@ var PentestAttackChainSchema = external_exports.object({
   severity: PentestFindingSeverity,
   cvssVector: external_exports.string().nullable(),
   cvssScore: external_exports.number().nullable(),
+  status: AttackChainStatus,
   publishedAt: external_exports.coerce.date().nullable(),
   createdAt: external_exports.coerce.date(),
   updatedAt: external_exports.coerce.date(),
@@ -23449,6 +23549,14 @@ var FindingRewriteJsonSchema = external_exports.object({
    * falls back to live `f.status` in either case.
    */
   statusAtRewrite: PentestFindingStatus.nullish(),
+  /**
+   * Plain-language lead, two or three sentences, rendered before Description.
+   * The cap is a paragraph, not a section: a summary that needs more room is a
+   * description. `.default(null)` keeps rewrites persisted before the field
+   * shipped parseable (the JSON has no key) while the output type stays
+   * `string | null`, so every reader handles "no summary" the same way.
+   */
+  summary: external_exports.string().min(1).max(1e3).nullable().default(null),
   description: external_exports.string().min(1).max(12e3),
   rootCauseAnalysis: external_exports.string().min(1).max(12e3).nullable(),
   impact: external_exports.string().min(1).max(8e3),
@@ -23480,6 +23588,7 @@ var FindingRewritesJsonSchema = external_exports.object({
   path: ["rewrites"]
 });
 var FindingRewriteCorrectionFieldValues = [
+  "summary",
   "description",
   "rootCauseAnalysis",
   "impact",
@@ -24198,6 +24307,9 @@ var PentestFindingRetestIdParamsSchema = PentestFindingIdParamsSchema.extend({
 var PentestFindingEvidenceIdParamsSchema = PentestFindingIdParamsSchema.extend({
   artifactId: external_exports.uuid()
 });
+var PentestFindingTimelineEntryParamsSchema = PentestFindingIdParamsSchema.extend({
+  entryId: external_exports.uuid()
+});
 var CustomerExploitArtifactResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
   artifactId: external_exports.uuid(),
   kind: PentestExploitArtifactKind,
@@ -24275,6 +24387,8 @@ var PentestFindingResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
    */
   displayId: external_exports.number().int().positive().nullable(),
   title: external_exports.string(),
+  /** Plain-language lead rendered before `description`; null on findings authored before it existed. */
+  summary: external_exports.string().nullable(),
   description: external_exports.string(),
   severity: PentestFindingSeverity,
   category: external_exports.string(),
@@ -24310,6 +24424,7 @@ var PentestFindingResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
   externalTicket: ExternalTicketSummarySchema.nullable().default(null)
 });
 var PentestFindingListItemSchema = PentestFindingResponseSchema.omit({
+  summary: true,
   description: true,
   proofOfConcept: true,
   remediation: true,
@@ -24432,14 +24547,29 @@ var ResolutionTimelineVia = external_exports.object({
   identifier: external_exports.string(),
   url: external_exports.url()
 }).nullable().default(null);
+var ResolutionTimelineEntrySource = external_exports.enum(["NOTE", "CONTEST_RESOLUTION", "RETEST"]);
+var ResolutionTimelineEditHandleSchema = external_exports.object({
+  source: ResolutionTimelineEntrySource,
+  id: external_exports.uuid()
+}).nullable().default(null);
 var ResolutionTimelineEntrySchema = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("kind", [
+  // The finding became customer-visible. Derived from `publishedAt`, not from
+  // an audit row, so every published finding carries exactly one regardless of
+  // which path (batch publish, attack chain, legacy backfill) stamped it.
+  external_exports.object({
+    kind: external_exports.literal("published"),
+    at: external_exports.coerce.date(),
+    actor: external_exports.literal("TRACE").default("TRACE"),
+    actorName: ResolutionTimelineActorName
+  }),
   external_exports.object({
     kind: external_exports.literal("remediation_reported"),
     at: external_exports.coerce.date(),
     actor: ResolutionTimelineActor,
     actorName: ResolutionTimelineActorName,
     note: external_exports.string().nullable(),
-    via: ResolutionTimelineVia
+    via: ResolutionTimelineVia,
+    editHandle: ResolutionTimelineEditHandleSchema
   }),
   // Retests are run by Trace (staff or a Trace agent), so the actor is fixed;
   // the default keeps a web build ahead of the api parsing older payloads.
@@ -24449,14 +24579,16 @@ var ResolutionTimelineEntrySchema = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("kind",
     actor: external_exports.literal("TRACE").default("TRACE"),
     actorName: ResolutionTimelineActorName,
     outcome: RetestOutcome,
-    note: external_exports.string().nullable()
+    note: external_exports.string().nullable(),
+    editHandle: ResolutionTimelineEditHandleSchema
   }),
   external_exports.object({
     kind: external_exports.literal("accepted_with_controls"),
     at: external_exports.coerce.date(),
     actor: ResolutionTimelineActor,
     actorName: ResolutionTimelineActorName,
-    note: external_exports.string()
+    note: external_exports.string(),
+    editHandle: ResolutionTimelineEditHandleSchema
   }),
   external_exports.object({
     kind: external_exports.literal("dismissed"),
@@ -24464,7 +24596,8 @@ var ResolutionTimelineEntrySchema = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("kind",
     actor: ResolutionTimelineActor,
     actorName: ResolutionTimelineActorName,
     reason: PentestFindingDismissReason,
-    note: external_exports.string()
+    note: external_exports.string(),
+    editHandle: ResolutionTimelineEditHandleSchema
   }),
   // `note` nullable: webhook-driven reopens carry no customer note (the via
   // badge is the payload); human reopens always have one.
@@ -24475,7 +24608,8 @@ var ResolutionTimelineEntrySchema = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("kind",
     actorName: ResolutionTimelineActorName,
     toStatus: external_exports.enum(["OPEN", "IN_PROGRESS"]),
     note: external_exports.string().nullable(),
-    via: ResolutionTimelineVia
+    via: ResolutionTimelineVia,
+    editHandle: ResolutionTimelineEditHandleSchema
   }),
   // Legacy/unattributed note whose transition isn't on the WORM audit log.
   external_exports.object({
@@ -24483,7 +24617,8 @@ var ResolutionTimelineEntrySchema = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("kind",
     at: external_exports.coerce.date(),
     actor: ResolutionTimelineActor,
     actorName: ResolutionTimelineActorName,
-    note: external_exports.string()
+    note: external_exports.string(),
+    editHandle: ResolutionTimelineEditHandleSchema
   }),
   // Customer opened a dispute (PR 3). `note` = the customer's justification.
   external_exports.object({
@@ -24503,7 +24638,8 @@ var ResolutionTimelineEntrySchema = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("kind",
     actor: ResolutionTimelineActor,
     actorName: ResolutionTimelineActorName,
     resultStatus: PentestFindingStatus.nullable(),
-    note: external_exports.string()
+    note: external_exports.string(),
+    editHandle: ResolutionTimelineEditHandleSchema
   }),
   // An external ticket was created from this finding (PR 2). No `note` — the
   // identifier + url are the payload; actor is the customer who pushed it.
@@ -24650,7 +24786,24 @@ var RecoveredFindingResultSchema = external_exports.object({
 var RecoverStrandedFindingsResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
   results: external_exports.array(RecoveredFindingResultSchema)
 });
+var DraftMissingFindingSummariesRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
+  /** Limit the run to these findings; omit for every finding in the pentest missing a summary. */
+  pentestFindingIds: external_exports.array(external_exports.uuid()).max(500).optional()
+});
+var DraftedFindingSummaryResultSchema = external_exports.object({
+  pentestFindingId: external_exports.uuid(),
+  displayId: external_exports.int().positive().nullable(),
+  status: external_exports.enum(["written", "failed"]),
+  /** Failure shape only (no prose): what the drafter returned and what was expected. */
+  reason: external_exports.string().optional()
+});
+var DraftMissingFindingSummariesResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
+  /** Findings that already had a summary and were not touched. */
+  skipped: external_exports.int().min(0),
+  results: external_exports.array(DraftedFindingSummaryResultSchema)
+});
 var FindingProseSchema = FindingRewriteJsonSchema.pick({
+  summary: true,
   description: true,
   rootCauseAnalysis: true,
   impact: true,
@@ -24756,6 +24909,11 @@ var ResolvePentestFindingContestRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
   dismissReason: PentestFindingDismissReason.optional(),
   note: external_exports.string().min(1).max(1e4)
 });
+var UpdateResolutionTimelineEntryRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
+  source: ResolutionTimelineEntrySource,
+  note: external_exports.string().trim().min(1).max(1e4)
+});
+var UpdateResolutionTimelineEntryResponseSchema = external_exports.array(ResolutionTimelineEntrySchema);
 var PENTEST_FINDING_FEEDBACK_COMMENT_MAX_LENGTH = 5e3;
 var CreatePentestFindingFeedbackRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
   rating: PentestFindingFeedbackRating.nullable().default(null),
@@ -25531,8 +25689,19 @@ var SshPrivateKeySecretSchema = external_exports.object({
   privateKeyPem: SshPrivateKeyPemSchema,
   passphrase: external_exports.string().min(1).max(SSH_PASSPHRASE_MAX_CHARS).optional()
 }).strict();
+var PasskeySecretSchema = external_exports.object({
+  /** ECDSA P-256 private key, PKCS#8, base64. */
+  privateKey: external_exports.string().min(1).max(4096),
+  /** Opaque RP-assigned user id, base64 (≤64 bytes decoded). */
+  userHandle: external_exports.string().max(128),
+  userName: external_exports.string().max(320).optional(),
+  userDisplayName: external_exports.string().max(320).optional(),
+  /** largeBlob extension payload, base64. */
+  largeBlob: external_exports.string().max(8192).optional()
+}).strict();
 var CredentialMfaKindValues = ["TOTP"];
 var CredentialMfaKind = external_exports.enum(CredentialMfaKindValues);
+var MFA_CAPABLE_CREDENTIAL_TYPES = ["USERNAME_PASSWORD", "MAGIC_AUTH"];
 var TotpSetupKeySchema = external_exports.string().min(1).max(TOTP_MAX_SECRET_CHARS * 4).superRefine((value, ctx) => {
   const message = totpSetupKeyError(value);
   if (message !== null) ctx.addIssue({ code: "custom", message });
@@ -25999,6 +26168,9 @@ var ValidationResultProseSchema = external_exports.object({
   // Optional/nullable on the wire for rolling-deploy safety (a pre-title host omits
   // it); the api falls back to the candidate hypothesis title. The host tool requires it.
   title: external_exports.string().min(1).max(300).nullable().optional(),
+  // Same rolling-deploy shape as `title`: the host tool requires it, the wire
+  // accepts its absence so a pre-summary host image still lands its verdict.
+  summary: external_exports.string().min(1).max(1e3).nullable().optional(),
   description: external_exports.string().min(1).max(12e3),
   impact: external_exports.string().min(1).max(8e3),
   remediation: external_exports.string().min(1).max(12e3),
@@ -26345,7 +26517,22 @@ var AgentSessionCreateTestEmailRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
    * `too_big` blob for a purpose it then rephrased to something shorter and
    * equivalent. Validate what the target requires, not what our storage prefers.
    */
-  purpose: external_exports.string().min(1).max(200)
+  purpose: external_exports.string().min(1).max(200),
+  /**
+   * Which Trace-managed mail domain to mint on. Omitted means the server's
+   * default (`pentest.securewithtrace.com` unless overridden per environment).
+   *
+   * An enum rather than free text: the address is registered on the customer's
+   * target as a login identity, so the set of domains mail can be minted on is
+   * a Trace decision, not an agent one. The alternates exist for a target that
+   * blocks or rate-limits one domain, or a check that needs two accounts whose
+   * email domains differ.
+   *
+   * Reuse of an unsaved address is per domain: asking for the alternate never
+   * hands back an address minted on the default, since the agent asked for a
+   * different domain precisely because that one did not do.
+   */
+  domain: ManagedInboxDomainSchema.optional()
 });
 var AgentSessionCreateTestEmailResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
   /**
@@ -26528,6 +26715,74 @@ var AgentSessionSessionStateResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
   /** The decrypted, parsed captured browser session. */
   state: StorageStateSchema
 });
+var AgentSessionGetSshPrivateKeyRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
+  runVersion: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  /** Which SSH_PRIVATE_KEY credential to fetch (from the non-secret env reference). */
+  credentialId: external_exports.uuid()
+});
+var AgentSessionSshPrivateKeyResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
+  credentialId: external_exports.uuid(),
+  /** `Credential.updatedAt` (ISO): logged so a run names the revision it loaded. */
+  revision: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
+  /**
+   * The decrypted key material. Returned VERBATIM as stored: the host seeds its
+   * redactor with these exact bytes, and `redactString` matches exact substrings,
+   * so normalizing line endings here would silently defeat redaction downstream.
+   */
+  secret: SshPrivateKeySecretSchema
+});
+var AgentSessionPasskeySchema = external_exports.object({
+  /** Relying party id (a hostname). */
+  rpId: external_exports.string().min(1).max(253),
+  /** WebAuthn credential id, base64 (≤1023 bytes decoded). */
+  webauthnCredentialId: external_exports.string().min(1).max(1400),
+  /** ECDSA P-256 private key, PKCS#8, base64. */
+  privateKey: external_exports.string().min(1).max(4096).optional(),
+  /** Opaque RP-assigned user id, base64. */
+  userHandle: external_exports.string().max(128).optional(),
+  userName: external_exports.string().max(320).optional(),
+  userDisplayName: external_exports.string().max(320).optional(),
+  largeBlob: external_exports.string().max(8192).optional(),
+  /** Signature counter as the authenticator reports it. Never -1 on this wire. */
+  signCount: external_exports.number().int().min(0),
+  backupEligibility: external_exports.boolean(),
+  backupState: external_exports.boolean()
+});
+var AgentSessionListPasskeysRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
+  runVersion: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  /** Which account (by `Credential.label`). Required: the host persists under it. */
+  credentialLabel: external_exports.string().min(1).max(200)
+});
+var AgentSessionStoredPasskeySchema = AgentSessionPasskeySchema.extend({
+  credentialPasskeyId: external_exports.uuid(),
+  privateKey: external_exports.string().min(1).max(4096),
+  userHandle: external_exports.string().max(128)
+});
+var AgentSessionListPasskeysResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
+  credentialId: external_exports.uuid(),
+  credentialLabel: external_exports.string().max(200),
+  /** The account types a browser logs in as; the same set that can carry a second factor. */
+  credentialType: external_exports.enum(MFA_CAPABLE_CREDENTIAL_TYPES),
+  passkeys: external_exports.array(AgentSessionStoredPasskeySchema),
+  /**
+   * Stored rows whose envelope could not be read. Reported rather than swallowed so a
+   * partial list is never presented to the agent as the whole store, and rather than
+   * failing the call so the readable passkeys still load.
+   */
+  unreadable: external_exports.number().int().min(0)
+});
+var AgentSessionUpsertPasskeyRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
+  runVersion: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  /** From the list response, never agent-supplied. */
+  credentialId: external_exports.uuid(),
+  passkey: AgentSessionPasskeySchema
+});
+var AgentSessionUpsertPasskeyResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
+  credentialPasskeyId: external_exports.uuid(),
+  created: external_exports.boolean(),
+  /** The stored counter after the write (never lower than before). */
+  signCount: external_exports.number().int().min(0)
+});
 var ParkAgentSessionRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
   runVersion: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
   outcome: external_exports.enum(["IDLE", "WAITING_ON_STAFF", "FAILED"]),
@@ -27239,9 +27494,8 @@ var agentSessionInternalContract = c4.router({
       // Session type receives no account credentials, or its pinned toolset does
       // not carry these tools.
       403: ErrorResponseSchema,
-      // RUN_REVOKED only. Provider-side label collisions are resolved by
-      // re-suffixing rather than surfaced, and quota is a 422 — a bare 409 here
-      // would read as run revocation and kill the session.
+      // RUN_REVOKED or INBOX_ALREADY_EXISTS. The host treats only RUN_REVOKED
+      // as fatal; a concurrent label claim is a recoverable conflict.
       409: ErrorResponseSchema,
       // The org is at its managed-inbox quota (INBOX_QUOTA_EXCEEDED) — the agent
       // has no delete tool, so it must escalate rather than retry. Also
@@ -27344,11 +27598,81 @@ var agentSessionInternalContract = c4.router({
       401: ErrorResponseSchema,
       409: ErrorResponseSchema,
       // Credential not found, not SESSION_STATE, or outside the run's
-      // org/pentest/environments — no cross-tenant existence leak.
+      // org/pentest/environments: no cross-tenant existence leak.
       404: ErrorResponseSchema,
       500: ErrorResponseSchema
     }
   },
+  // get_ssh_private_key: the SESSION_STATE counterpart for SSH_PRIVATE_KEY. Same
+  // scoping (org + pentest environments from the run token), same 404 for anything
+  // outside it. The host calls this once per reference at boot and pipes the result
+  // into ssh-add; nothing downstream can read the key back.
+  getSshPrivateKey: {
+    method: "POST",
+    path: "/internal/v1/agent-sessions/:agentSessionId/ssh-private-key",
+    pathParams: AgentSessionInternalParamsSchema,
+    body: AgentSessionGetSshPrivateKeyRequestSchema,
+    responses: {
+      200: AgentSessionSshPrivateKeyResponseSchema,
+      400: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      401: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      409: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      // Credential not found, not SSH_PRIVATE_KEY, or outside the run's
+      // org/pentest/environments: no cross-tenant existence leak.
+      404: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      500: ErrorResponseSchema
+    }
+  },
+  // provision_passkey, read half: every passkey Trace holds for one of the run's
+  // accounts, decrypted, so the host can load them into the virtual authenticator
+  // it arms on the agent's browser. Same resolution and ownership gate as
+  // enroll-mfa (org + pentest from the run token; label must resolve to exactly
+  // one launch-visible credential). Returns 200 with an empty array for an
+  // account with no passkeys yet: that is how the host learns the credentialId
+  // it will persist a new one under.
+  listPasskeys: {
+    method: "POST",
+    path: "/internal/v1/agent-sessions/:agentSessionId/passkeys",
+    pathParams: AgentSessionInternalParamsSchema,
+    body: AgentSessionListPasskeysRequestSchema,
+    responses: {
+      200: AgentSessionListPasskeysResponseSchema,
+      // Label on more than one environment (terminal), or a Trace fixture label.
+      400: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      401: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      // Session type receives no account credentials.
+      403: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      // No launch-visible credential with that label; same message for another
+      // tenant's.
+      404: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      // RUN_REVOKED, including the liveness recheck inside the service.
+      409: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      // The credential's type is not an account a browser logs in as.
+      422: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      500: ErrorResponseSchema
+    }
+  },
+  // provision_passkey, write half: the host observed a passkey on the armed
+  // authenticator (new, or its counter moved) and persists it. Keyed by the
+  // credentialId the list call returned, never by label, and idempotent on
+  // (credentialId, rpId, webauthnCredentialId) because the host retries on 5xx.
+  upsertPasskey: {
+    method: "POST",
+    path: "/internal/v1/agent-sessions/:agentSessionId/passkeys/upsert",
+    pathParams: AgentSessionInternalParamsSchema,
+    body: AgentSessionUpsertPasskeyRequestSchema,
+    responses: {
+      200: AgentSessionUpsertPasskeyResponseSchema,
+      // PASSKEY_SECRET_REQUIRED: no row for the natural key and no key in the body.
+      400: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      401: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      403: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      // credentialId not on this run's pentest under this org.
+      404: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      409: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      500: ErrorResponseSchema
+    }
+  },
   // renew_cloud_credentials (GCP integration PR 7): agent-invoked re-mint of the
   // ~1 h AWS/GCP recon creds. Run-token authed; org+pentest from the session row;
   // 403 for a non-credentialed session type (ADHOC/CODE_REVIEW/REPORT).
@@ -30704,7 +31028,13 @@ var VulnerabilityTypeValues = [
   "MISCONFIGURATION"
 ];
 var VulnerabilityType = external_exports.enum(VulnerabilityTypeValues);
-var DismissReasonValues = ["ACCEPTED_RISK", "FALSE_POSITIVE", "OTHER"];
+var DismissReasonValues = [
+  "ACCEPTED_RISK",
+  "FALSE_POSITIVE",
+  "OTHER",
+  "INTENDED_BEHAVIOR",
+  "DEFERRED"
+];
 var DismissReason = external_exports.enum(DismissReasonValues);
 
 // ../../packages/api-contracts/src/schemas/api/v1/engagement.api.ts
@@ -31274,72 +31604,6 @@ var staffGithubContract = c18.router({
   }
 });
 
-// ../../packages/api-contracts/src/schemas/api/v1/inbox.api.ts
-var InboxLabelSchema = external_exports.string().regex(
-  /^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,39}$/,
-  "Inbox label must be lowercase letters/digits/dashes, starting with a letter, at most 40 characters"
-);
-var MAX_INBOX_LABEL_LENGTH = 40;
-var MAX_LOCAL_PART_LENGTH = 64;
-var MAX_INBOX_ADDRESS_PREFIX_LENGTH = MAX_LOCAL_PART_LENGTH - MAX_INBOX_LABEL_LENGTH - 1;
-var ManagedInboxResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
-  /** Full derived address, e.g. `acme-qa-admin@pentest.securewithtrace.com`. */
-  address: external_exports.email(),
-  label: external_exports.string(),
-  createdAt: external_exports.date()
-});
-var ListManagedInboxesResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
-  inboxes: external_exports.array(ManagedInboxResponseSchema),
-  quota: external_exports.object({
-    used: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
-    limit: external_exports.number().int().positive()
-  })
-});
-var CreateManagedInboxRequestSchema = external_exports.object({
-  label: InboxLabelSchema
-}).strict();
-var ManagedInboxLabelParamsSchema = OrgIdParamsSchema.extend({
-  label: external_exports.string().min(1).max(64)
-});
-var ManagedInboxMessageParamsSchema = ManagedInboxLabelParamsSchema.extend({
-  messageId: external_exports.string().min(1).max(500)
-});
-var ListInboxMessagesQuerySchema = external_exports.object({
-  /** Max messages, newest first. The provider may clamp further. */
-  limit: external_exports.coerce.number().int().positive().max(50).optional(),
-  /** Only messages received strictly after this instant. */
-  since: external_exports.coerce.date().optional()
-}).strict();
-var ManagedInboxMessageSummarySchema = external_exports.object({
-  messageId: external_exports.string().min(1).max(500),
-  from: external_exports.string().max(500),
-  /** Recipients as the provider returned them (display-name form allowed). */
-  to: external_exports.array(external_exports.string().max(500)),
-  subject: external_exports.string().max(1e3).nullable(),
-  preview: external_exports.string().max(2e3).nullable(),
-  receivedAt: external_exports.coerce.date(),
-  unread: external_exports.boolean()
-});
-var ListInboxMessagesResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
-  address: external_exports.email(),
-  label: external_exports.string(),
-  messages: external_exports.array(ManagedInboxMessageSummarySchema)
-});
-var GetInboxMessageResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
-  address: external_exports.email(),
-  label: external_exports.string(),
-  message: ManagedInboxMessageSummarySchema.extend({
-    body: external_exports.string(),
-    truncated: external_exports.boolean(),
-    /**
-     * http(s) links extracted from the message (hrefs first, then inline
-     * text URLs). Button-style mail often carries the magic link only in
-     * `href`, which a tag-stripped body can still miss if extraction fails.
-     */
-    links: external_exports.array(external_exports.string())
-  })
-});
-
 // ../../packages/api-contracts/src/contracts/v1/inbox.ts
 var c19 = initContract();
 var inboxContract = c19.router({
@@ -32517,9 +32781,35 @@ var PrScanAnalyticsMonthSchema = external_exports.object({
   /** Same metrics as the month, split by PR author. Sorted by findings, then PRs. */
   developers: external_exports.array(PrScanAnalyticsDeveloperSchema)
 });
+var PrScanAnalyticsClassCountSchema = external_exports.object({
+  label: external_exports.string(),
+  count: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
+});
+var PrScanAnalyticsTimeToFixSchema = external_exports.object({
+  severity: VulnerabilitySeverity,
+  fixedCount: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  /** Median minutes from the finding's first detection to the fixing scan; null when nothing was fixed. */
+  medianMinutes: external_exports.number().nonnegative().nullable(),
+  fixedWithinDayCount: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
+});
+var PrScanAnalyticsSummarySchema = external_exports.object({
+  /** First completed PR scan on a tracked PR in the window; null when none. */
+  since: external_exports.iso.datetime().nullable(),
+  prCount: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  findingsCount: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  criticalHighCount: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  criticalHighFixedBeforeMergeCount: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  /** Critical/high fixed on a PR that is still open. */
+  criticalHighFixedAwaitingMergeCount: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
+  /** Critical/high by weakness class, largest first, at most five rows with "Other" last. */
+  criticalHighByClass: external_exports.array(PrScanAnalyticsClassCountSchema),
+  /** One row per severity, CRITICAL first. */
+  timeToFix: external_exports.array(PrScanAnalyticsTimeToFixSchema).length(VulnerabilitySeverityValues.length)
+});
 var PrScanAnalyticsResponseSchema = external_exports.object({
   generatedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
-  months: external_exports.array(PrScanAnalyticsMonthSchema).length(12)
+  months: external_exports.array(PrScanAnalyticsMonthSchema).length(12),
+  summary: PrScanAnalyticsSummarySchema
 });
 var ProductPlanParamsSchema = external_exports.object({
   organizationId: external_exports.uuid(),
@@ -33793,6 +34083,26 @@ var pentestAttackChainContract = c29.router({
       500: ErrorResponseSchema
     }
   },
+  /**
+   * The "Publish all" control. Mirrors `pentestFindingContract.publishAllFindings`
+   * (`/findings/publications`): a collection resource of publications rather than a verb
+   * on the chain list.
+   */
+  publishAllAttackChains: {
+    method: "POST",
+    path: "/organizations/:organizationId/pentests/:pentestId/attack-chains/publications",
+    pathParams: PentestAttackChainParamsSchema,
+    body: PublishAllAttackChainsRequestSchema,
+    responses: {
+      200: PublishAllAttackChainsResponseSchema,
+      400: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      401: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      403: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      404: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      409: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      500: ErrorResponseSchema
+    }
+  },
   unpublishAttackChain: {
     method: "POST",
     path: "/organizations/:organizationId/pentests/:pentestId/attack-chains/:attackChainId/unpublish",
@@ -34647,6 +34957,22 @@ var pentestFindingContract = c36.router({
       500: ErrorResponseSchema
     }
   },
+  draftMissingFindingSummaries: {
+    method: "POST",
+    path: "/organizations/:organizationId/pentests/:pentestId/findings/summaries/draft",
+    pathParams: PentestFindingParamsSchema,
+    body: DraftMissingFindingSummariesRequestSchema,
+    responses: {
+      200: DraftMissingFindingSummariesResponseSchema,
+      400: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      401: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      403: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      404: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      // PENTEST_CLOSED (reopen first).
+      409: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      500: ErrorResponseSchema
+    }
+  },
   applyFindingCvss: {
     method: "PUT",
     path: "/organizations/:organizationId/pentests/:pentestId/findings/:pentestFindingId/cvss",
@@ -34924,6 +35250,26 @@ var pentestFindingContract = c36.router({
   },
   // Note CRUD removed in PR 2 — the resolution timeline replaces the read
   // surface; resolution workflows + the operator agent write notes directly.
+  // ─── Resolution timeline ───
+  // Staff-only: rewrite the customer-visible note behind one history entry.
+  // `entryId` + `body.source` come from the entry's `editHandle` on the staff GET.
+  updateTimelineEntry: {
+    method: "PATCH",
+    path: "/organizations/:organizationId/pentests/:pentestId/findings/:pentestFindingId/timeline-entries/:entryId",
+    pathParams: PentestFindingTimelineEntryParamsSchema,
+    body: UpdateResolutionTimelineEntryRequestSchema,
+    responses: {
+      200: UpdateResolutionTimelineEntryResponseSchema,
+      400: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      401: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      // Non-staff caller, or the entry is customer-authored.
+      403: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      404: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      // PENTEST_CLOSED.
+      409: ErrorResponseSchema,
+      500: ErrorResponseSchema
+    }
+  },
   // ─── AI parsing ───
   parseFindingMarkdown: {
     method: "POST",
@@ -45425,7 +45771,7 @@ function collectAdditionalUrl(value, previous) {
 function buildCreateEnvironmentBody(input) {
   return {
     name: input.name,
-    primaryUrl: input.primaryUrl,
+    ...input.primaryUrl !== void 0 ? { primaryUrl: input.primaryUrl } : {},
     ...input.additionalUrls !== void 0 && input.additionalUrls.length > 0 ? { additionalUrls: input.additionalUrls } : {},
     ...input.description !== void 0 ? { description: input.description } : {},
     ...input.isProduction !== void 0 ? { isProduction: input.isProduction } : {}
@@ -45909,13 +46255,20 @@ async function runDelete4(environmentId, options) {
   console.log(colorSuccess(`Deleted environment ${environmentId}`));
 }
 function createCreateCommand4() {
-  return new Command("create").description("Create an environment for an application").argument("<name>", "Environment name (lowercase letters/digits/dashes)").requiredOption("--app <applicationId>", "Parent application UUID").requiredOption("--url <url>", "Primary URL for the environment").option("--additional-url <url>", "Extra probe URL (repeatable)", collectAdditionalUrl).option("--description <text>", "Description").option("--production", "Mark as the production environment").option("-o, --output <format>", "Output format: table, json, tsv (default: table)", "table").addHelpText(
+  return new Command("create").description("Create an environment for an application").argument("<name>", "Environment name (lowercase letters/digits/dashes)").requiredOption("--app <applicationId>", "Parent application UUID").option(
+    "--url <url>",
+    "Primary URL for the environment (web and API applications only; omit for CLI and desktop)"
+  ).option("--additional-url <url>", "Extra probe URL (repeatable)", collectAdditionalUrl).option("--description <text>", "Description").option("--production", "Mark as the production environment").option("-o, --output <format>", "Output format: table, json, tsv (default: table)", "table").addHelpText(
     "after",
     `
+A web or API application requires --url. A CLI or desktop application is a
+credential context with no network target and must omit it.
+
 Examples:
   tracecli environment create staging --app <appId> --url https://staging.acme.com
   tracecli environment create production --app <appId> --url https://acme.com --production
-  tracecli environment create production --app <appId> --url https://app.acme.com --additional-url https://api.acme.com`
+  tracecli environment create production --app <appId> --url https://app.acme.com --additional-url https://api.acme.com
+  tracecli environment create pentest-sandbox --app <cliAppId>`
   ).action(async (name, options) => {
     await runCreate4(name, options);
   });
@@ -46672,6 +47025,7 @@ function isOutputFormat2(value) {
   return OUTPUT_FORMATS2.includes(value);
 }
 var PROSE_SECTIONS = [
+  { key: "summary", heading: "Summary" },
   { key: "description", heading: "Description" },
   { key: "impact", heading: "Impact" },
   { key: "attackScenario", heading: "Attack Scenario" },

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "securewithtrace",
-  "version": "0.43.0",
+  "version": "0.44.0",
   "description": "Official Trace CLI for vulnerability intelligence in your terminal",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {