sealnet-mcp 0.9.0 → 0.11.0

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package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -16,16 +16,17 @@ When an MCP-connected AI agent (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, etc.) creates a S
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  | Tool | Purpose |
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  |------|---------|
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- | `seal_share(path, mode='inbox'\|'handoff'\|'forward', expire?, max_reads?, tier?)` / `seal_share(payment)` | Create a SEAL from a local file or folder (sent as one ZIP), streamed from disk. Default: inbox once connected, else handoff; without `expire`, 1d in the inbox, 5m for a handoff, or 1d for one over 100 MB. Above the free limit the user pays once by card (smallest tier that fits, or `tier`): the payment page goes through URL-mode elicitation, or comes back as `payment_url` and a second call with `payment` finishes the upload into the same seal |
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- | `seal_request(what, kind='any'\|'secret'\|'file', where_url?, wait=true, from?)` / `seal_request(request)` | Ask the user for a file or a secret without it passing through the chat. On the user's computer the `seal` CLI draws the system dialog (`seal request --local --json`); otherwise the user answers at `seal.net/i/<id>`, sealed to this server's bundle, shown with three words of its address; once connected the request also waits in the user's inbox (`from=owner`, or `from=anyone` for a plain link). Returns the path of a 0600 file, never the value |
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+ | `seal_share(path, kind='file'\|'secret', key?, mode='inbox'\|'handoff'\|'forward', expire?, max_reads?, tier?)` / `seal_share(payment)` | Create a SEAL from a local file or folder (sent as one ZIP), streamed from disk. `kind='secret'` marks a password, key or token: the recipient's agent saves it and never reads it into a chat, a browser shows it hidden. `key` sends one value of a .env-style file as a secret, without writing it anywhere. Default: inbox once connected, else handoff; without `expire`, 1d in the inbox, 1h for a handoff, 5m forward, or 1d for one over 100 MB. Above the free limit the user pays once by card (smallest tier that fits, or `tier`): the payment page goes through URL-mode elicitation, or comes back as `payment_url` and a second call with `payment` finishes the upload into the same seal |
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+ | `seal_link(handle)` | Put the link of a handoff seal on the clipboard (or in its 0600 file) again, for a link lost on the way; the model never gets it |
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+ | `seal_request(what, kind='any'\|'secret'\|'file', where_url?, wait=true, from?, dir?)` / `seal_request(request)` | Ask the user for a file or a secret without it passing through the chat. On the user's computer the `seal` CLI draws the system dialog (`seal request --local --json`); otherwise the user answers at `seal.net/i/<id>`, sealed to this server's bundle, shown with three words of its address; once connected the request also waits in the user's inbox (`from=owner`, or `from=anyone` for a plain link). Returns the path of a 0600 file (in `dir`, or a private temp directory), never the value |
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  | `seal_pair(name?, wait=true)` | Connect this agent to the user's SEAL inbox, once: the user opens a page, compares three words and connects; the chat then shows the inbox's three words. After it `seal_share` sends to the inbox by default |
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  | `seal_open(url\|item, mode='metadata'\|'file'\|'inline', dir?)` | Read metadata (default — no download, no counter consumption), save to disk (`file`: streamed, verified before it gets its name, 0600, returns paths) or inline parse (whitelisted MIMEs only, ≤100 KB, refuses secrets, HTML and binary). `item` is an inbox handle instead of a link |
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  | `seal_inbox(wait?)` | Seals other agents or people sent to this server's address: handles, the sender's three words and name, never a link. `seal_share mode=forward to=<address>` puts a link there; `wait` (0 to 300 s) waits for something new |
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  | `seal_run(command, secrets, cwd?, timeout?)` | Run a program with secrets from links or inbox items in its environment, through the `seal` CLI (`seal run --redact`): every value is replaced with `[sealed:NAME]` in the output that comes back, and none enters this server. Needs `seal` on PATH (`run_cli_missing` otherwise). Not a sandbox: a program that prints a value transformed escapes the redaction |
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- | `seal_list()` | List SEALs created by **this MCP server only** (scope: `state.json`; never reveals user's CLI seals) |
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+ | `seal_list()` | List SEALs created by **this MCP server only** (scope: `state.json`; never reveals user's CLI seals): handle, name, secret or not, status, expiry, reads |
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  | `seal_revoke(handle)` | Revoke by opaque handle (model never learns raw `seal_id`) |
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- With SEAL Pro workload credentials (`sealpro agent enroll`, or `SEALPRO_WORKLOAD_ID`, `SEALPRO_WORKLOAD_SEED` and `SEALPRO_BASE_URL`) three tools appear: `seal_pro_secret_use(secret, version?)` saves a secret your organisation granted to this agent to a 0600 file and returns its path, never the value; `seal_pro_secret_request(secret, reason, ttl_seconds?)` asks a person for one, for a while, and waits for the decision; `seal_pro_file_get(seal, file?, dir?)` saves the files of a room whose key a person granted this agent, 0600 and digest-checked, and returns their paths.
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+ With `sealfs` on PATH holding a SEAL Pro workload enrolled under this server's key (`sealfs enroll` with the same `SEAL_SEED`) four tools appear, `sealfs` doing the work: `seal_pro_secret_use(secret, version?)` saves a secret your organisation granted to this agent to a 0600 file and returns its path, never the value; `seal_pro_secret_request(secret, reason, ttl_seconds?)` asks a person for one, for a while, and waits for the decision; `seal_pro_file_get(seal, file?, dir?)` saves the files of a room whose key a person granted this agent, 0600 and digest-checked, and returns their paths; `seal_pro_run(command, secrets, cwd?, timeout?)` runs a program with granted secrets in its environment, every value replaced in the output that comes back.
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  Large transfers report `notifications/progress` when the host sends a `progressToken`. Where the host supports URL-mode elicitation, `seal_request` and `seal_pair` show the page link through it and wait in one call; otherwise they return the link and a second call waits.
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@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ The first start makes the key (keychain, else the file); there is no setup step.
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  - `identity` — the seed itself, which opens the links sent to the agent's address
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  - `owner` — the user's inbox this agent is connected to (`seal_pair`): its address and name
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- - `handles[]` — opaque handle → `{ seal_id, owner_token, mode, created_at }`. Each `owner_token` is full owner-capability for that seal; encrypting only `identity` and leaving tokens plain would be a security illusion.
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+ - `handles[]` — opaque handle → `{ seal_id, owner_token, mode, created_at, expires_at, name, secret, max_reads }`, and for a handoff its link until `seal_revoke` (for `seal_link`). Each `owner_token` is full owner-capability for that seal; encrypting only `identity` and leaving tokens plain would be a security illusion.
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  - `audit[]` — historical tool invocations (timestamps, handles, modes). Side-channel relevant.
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  Several MCP hosts on one machine (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor) share the key and the state: each write re-reads the file under a lock. `serve --ephemeral` (or `SEAL_MCP_EPHEMERAL=1`) keeps nothing on disk and makes a new key each start; handles then last until restart, and seal expiry does not depend on it.