sealnet-mcp 0.7.0 → 0.9.0

package/README.md

@@ -10,17 +10,17 @@ When an MCP-connected AI agent (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, etc.) creates a S
 
 - **inbox mode (default once connected)**: after `seal_pair` (or with `SEAL_OWNER` set to the address of the user's inbox) the file lands in the user's SEAL inbox on box.seal.net. Nothing is copied anywhere; the model gets a handle and a receipt. Every seal this server creates, in any mode, also appears there, where the user can manage and revoke it.
 - **handoff mode (default otherwise)**: the share link (the key is in its fragment, there is no password) is delivered to the human user via **system clipboard** (primary) or **0o600 local file** (fallback when clipboard is unavailable — headless, SSH, WSL without display). The `tool_result` returned to the model contains **only** an opaque handle and a human-readable receipt. The link is never written into the conversation; on the file channel the receipt names the file, and an agent that can read files on that machine can read it.
-- **forward mode (explicit opt-in)**: model receives `{ handle, share_url, expires_at, max_reads, mode, delivered }` in `tool_result`; the link opens only with the recipient's X25519 key and also lands in the recipient's inbox (`seal_inbox`). Requires short TTL (≤30m), `max_reads=1`, mandatory `to` (recipient address). Every forward is audit-logged in the encrypted state file.
+- **forward mode (explicit opt-in)**: model receives `{ handle, share_url, expires_at, max_reads, mode, delivered }` in `tool_result`; the link carries no key: its key is wrapped to the recipient's bundle and kept by the server, so only the agent with that address opens it; it also lands in the recipient's inbox (`seal_inbox`). Requires short TTL (≤30m), `max_reads=1`, mandatory `to` (recipient address). Every forward is audit-logged in the encrypted state file.
 
 ## Tool surface
 
 | Tool | Purpose |
 |------|---------|
-| `seal_share(path, mode='inbox'\|'handoff'\|'forward', expire?, max_reads?, tier?)` / `seal_share(payment)` | Create a SEAL from a local file or folder (sent as one ZIP), streamed from disk. Default: inbox once connected, else handoff; without `expire`, 1d in the inbox, 5m for a handoff, or 1d for one over 100 MB. Over 1 GB the user pays once by card (smallest tier that fits, or `tier`): the payment page goes through URL-mode elicitation, or comes back as `payment_url` and a second call with `payment` finishes the upload into the same seal |
-| `seal_request(what, kind='any'\|'secret'\|'file', where_url?, wait=true, from?)` / `seal_request(request)` | Ask the user for a file or a secret without it passing through the chat. On the user's computer the `seal` CLI draws the system dialog (`seal request --local --json`); otherwise the user answers at `seal.net/i/<id>`, sealed to this server's key, shown with three words of that key; once connected the request also waits in the user's inbox (`from=owner`, or `from=anyone` for a plain link). Returns the path of a 0600 file, never the value |
+| `seal_share(path, mode='inbox'\|'handoff'\|'forward', expire?, max_reads?, tier?)` / `seal_share(payment)` | Create a SEAL from a local file or folder (sent as one ZIP), streamed from disk. Default: inbox once connected, else handoff; without `expire`, 1d in the inbox, 5m for a handoff, or 1d for one over 100 MB. Above the free limit the user pays once by card (smallest tier that fits, or `tier`): the payment page goes through URL-mode elicitation, or comes back as `payment_url` and a second call with `payment` finishes the upload into the same seal |
+| `seal_request(what, kind='any'\|'secret'\|'file', where_url?, wait=true, from?)` / `seal_request(request)` | Ask the user for a file or a secret without it passing through the chat. On the user's computer the `seal` CLI draws the system dialog (`seal request --local --json`); otherwise the user answers at `seal.net/i/<id>`, sealed to this server's bundle, shown with three words of its address; once connected the request also waits in the user's inbox (`from=owner`, or `from=anyone` for a plain link). Returns the path of a 0600 file, never the value |
 | `seal_pair(name?, wait=true)` | Connect this agent to the user's SEAL inbox, once: the user opens a page, compares three words and connects; the chat then shows the inbox's three words. After it `seal_share` sends to the inbox by default |
 | `seal_open(url\|item, mode='metadata'\|'file'\|'inline', dir?)` | Read metadata (default — no download, no counter consumption), save to disk (`file`: streamed, verified before it gets its name, 0600, returns paths) or inline parse (whitelisted MIMEs only, ≤100 KB, refuses secrets, HTML and binary). `item` is an inbox handle instead of a link |
-| `seal_inbox(wait?)` | Seals other agents or people sent to this server's key (its address): handles, the sender's three words and name, never a link. `seal_share mode=forward to=<address>` puts a link there; `wait` (0 to 300 s) waits for something new |
+| `seal_inbox(wait?)` | Seals other agents or people sent to this server's address: handles, the sender's three words and name, never a link. `seal_share mode=forward to=<address>` puts a link there; `wait` (0 to 300 s) waits for something new |
 | `seal_run(command, secrets, cwd?, timeout?)` | Run a program with secrets from links or inbox items in its environment, through the `seal` CLI (`seal run --redact`): every value is replaced with `[sealed:NAME]` in the output that comes back, and none enters this server. Needs `seal` on PATH (`run_cli_missing` otherwise). Not a sandbox: a program that prints a value transformed escapes the redaction |
 | `seal_list()` | List SEALs created by **this MCP server only** (scope: `state.json`; never reveals user's CLI seals) |
 | `seal_revoke(handle)` | Revoke by opaque handle (model never learns raw `seal_id`) |
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Large transfers report `notifications/progress` when the host sends a `progressT
 
 ## The agent's key and state
 
-The agent has one key: a 32-byte X25519 secret whose public half is its address (`sealnet-mcp pubkey`). It comes from, in order:
+The agent has one key: a 32-byte seed. Its bundle comes from the seed, and its address is the bundle's fingerprint (`sealnet-mcp pubkey`). It comes from, in order:
 
 1. **`SEAL_SEED`** — how a container or a cloud session gets the same address as at home (`sealnet-mcp seed --force` prints the key to put there);
 2. **the OS keychain** — `@napi-rs/keyring` (optional dependency): Secret Service on Linux, macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager;
@@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ The agent has one key: a 32-byte X25519 secret whose public half is its address
 
 The first start makes the key (keychain, else the file); there is no setup step. State lives in `${XDG_CONFIG_HOME}/seal-mcp/state.json` (mode `0o600`), encrypted with a passphrase derived from the key (HKDF-SHA256 → Argon2id → AES-256-GCM). It holds:
 
-- `identity` — the key itself, for incoming targeted seals
+- `identity` — the seed itself, which opens the links sent to the agent's address
 - `owner` — the user's inbox this agent is connected to (`seal_pair`): its address and name
 - `handles[]` — opaque handle → `{ seal_id, owner_token, mode, created_at }`. Each `owner_token` is full owner-capability for that seal; encrypting only `identity` and leaving tokens plain would be a security illusion.
 - `audit[]` — historical tool invocations (timestamps, handles, modes). Side-channel relevant.
 
-Several MCP hosts on one machine (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor) share the key and the state: each write re-reads the file under a lock. `serve --ephemeral` (or `SEAL_MCP_EPHEMERAL=1`) keeps nothing on disk and makes a new key each start; handles then last until restart, and seal expiry does not depend on it. A state from version 0.2 moves under the key on the first start, once.
+Several MCP hosts on one machine (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor) share the key and the state: each write re-reads the file under a lock. `serve --ephemeral` (or `SEAL_MCP_EPHEMERAL=1`) keeps nothing on disk and makes a new key each start; handles then last until restart, and seal expiry does not depend on it.
 
 ## Install + configure
 
@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ Environment variables consumed by the CLI:
 | `SEAL_OWNER` | `serve` | The address of the user's inbox, instead of `seal_pair`: for a cloud session with nowhere to open the page |
 | `SEAL_MCP_EPHEMERAL=1` | `serve` | As `--ephemeral`: a new key each start, nothing on disk |
 | `SEAL_MCP_CONFIG_DIR` | every subcommand | Override default state directory (mirrors Rust `seal-cli`'s `SEAL_CONFIG_DIR`) |
-| `SEAL_MCP_PASSPHRASE` | `serve` | Read once, to move a state of version 0.2 |
 | `SEAL_MCP_BACKEND_URL` | `serve`, `doctor` | SEAL backend base URL (default `https://api.seal.net`) |
 | `SEAL_MCP_PUBLIC_HOST` | `serve`, `doctor` | Public origin for minted share URLs (default `https://seal.net`) |
 | `SEAL_MCP_DEBUG=1` | all | Include stack traces in fatal-error output (otherwise plain `error: <msg>`) |
@@ -94,7 +93,7 @@ Available subcommands:
 ```
 sealnet-mcp serve         # default — start the stdio MCP server (used by MCP hosts); --ephemeral keeps nothing on disk
 sealnet-mcp init          # optional: make the key and state without starting the server
-sealnet-mcp pubkey        # print the agent's address, its X25519 public key (for senders)
+sealnet-mcp pubkey        # print the agent's address and its three words (for senders); publish its bundle
 sealnet-mcp seed --force  # print the agent's key, to set SEAL_SEED elsewhere
 sealnet-mcp doctor        # diagnose key source / keychain / file perms / backend reachability
 sealnet-mcp reset --force # wipe state.json and the key: the address is lost for good
@@ -110,6 +109,5 @@ pnpm test
 
 ## Source of truth
 
-- `docs/security/seal_phase1_plan.md` §"Phase 3 — MCP-оболочка"
 - `shared/contracts/seal_mcp.v1.json` (tool input/output schemas)
 - All cryptographic primitives are bundled into `dist/` from internal workspace packages — no algorithm code is duplicated and no external `@`-scoped dependencies are pulled at install time.