sealnet-mcp 0.6.0 → 0.7.0

package/README.md

@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ When an MCP-connected AI agent (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, etc.) creates a S
 | Tool | Purpose |
 |------|---------|
 | `seal_share(path, mode='inbox'\|'handoff'\|'forward', expire?, max_reads?, tier?)` / `seal_share(payment)` | Create a SEAL from a local file or folder (sent as one ZIP), streamed from disk. Default: inbox once connected, else handoff; without `expire`, 1d in the inbox, 5m for a handoff, or 1d for one over 100 MB. Over 1 GB the user pays once by card (smallest tier that fits, or `tier`): the payment page goes through URL-mode elicitation, or comes back as `payment_url` and a second call with `payment` finishes the upload into the same seal |
-| `seal_request(what, kind='any'\|'secret'\|'file', where_url?, wait=true, from?)` / `seal_request(request)` | Ask the user for a file or a secret without it passing through the chat. On the user's computer the `seal` CLI draws the system dialog (`seal request --local --json`); otherwise the user answers at `seal.net/i/<id>`, sealed to this server's key, shown with three emoji of that key; once connected the request also waits in the user's inbox (`from=owner`, or `from=anyone` for a plain link). Returns the path of a 0600 file, never the value |
-| `seal_pair(name?, wait=true)` | Connect this agent to the user's SEAL inbox, once: the user opens a page, compares three emoji and connects; the chat then shows the inbox's three emoji. After it `seal_share` sends to the inbox by default |
+| `seal_request(what, kind='any'\|'secret'\|'file', where_url?, wait=true, from?)` / `seal_request(request)` | Ask the user for a file or a secret without it passing through the chat. On the user's computer the `seal` CLI draws the system dialog (`seal request --local --json`); otherwise the user answers at `seal.net/i/<id>`, sealed to this server's key, shown with three words of that key; once connected the request also waits in the user's inbox (`from=owner`, or `from=anyone` for a plain link). Returns the path of a 0600 file, never the value |
+| `seal_pair(name?, wait=true)` | Connect this agent to the user's SEAL inbox, once: the user opens a page, compares three words and connects; the chat then shows the inbox's three words. After it `seal_share` sends to the inbox by default |
 | `seal_open(url\|item, mode='metadata'\|'file'\|'inline', dir?)` | Read metadata (default — no download, no counter consumption), save to disk (`file`: streamed, verified before it gets its name, 0600, returns paths) or inline parse (whitelisted MIMEs only, ≤100 KB, refuses secrets, HTML and binary). `item` is an inbox handle instead of a link |
-| `seal_inbox(wait?)` | Seals other agents or people sent to this server's key (its address): handles, the sender's three emoji and name, never a link. `seal_share mode=forward to=<address>` puts a link there; `wait` (0 to 300 s) waits for something new |
+| `seal_inbox(wait?)` | Seals other agents or people sent to this server's key (its address): handles, the sender's three words and name, never a link. `seal_share mode=forward to=<address>` puts a link there; `wait` (0 to 300 s) waits for something new |
 | `seal_run(command, secrets, cwd?, timeout?)` | Run a program with secrets from links or inbox items in its environment, through the `seal` CLI (`seal run --redact`): every value is replaced with `[sealed:NAME]` in the output that comes back, and none enters this server. Needs `seal` on PATH (`run_cli_missing` otherwise). Not a sandbox: a program that prints a value transformed escapes the redaction |
 | `seal_list()` | List SEALs created by **this MCP server only** (scope: `state.json`; never reveals user's CLI seals) |
 | `seal_revoke(handle)` | Revoke by opaque handle (model never learns raw `seal_id`) |