sealnet-mcp 0.13.0 → 0.13.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +1 -1
- package/dist/cli.cjs +17 -3
- package/dist/cli.js +17 -3
- package/dist/index.cjs +17 -3
- package/dist/index.d.cts +8 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/index.js +17 -3
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ When an MCP-connected AI agent (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, etc.) creates a S
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| `seal_link(handle)` | Put the link of a handoff seal on the clipboard (or in its 0600 file) again, for a link lost on the way; the model never gets it |
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| `seal_request(what, kind='any'\|'secret'\|'file', where_url?, wait=true, from?, dir?)` / `seal_request(request)` | Ask the user for a file or a secret without it passing through the chat. The user answers at `seal.net/i/<id>`, sealed to this machine's guard or to this server, shown with eight words of its address: on the user's computer the `seal` CLI opens the page in their browser (`seal request --local --json`); once connected the request also waits in the user's inbox (`from=owner`, or `from=anyone` for a plain link). Returns the path of a 0600 file (in `dir`, or a private temp directory), never the value |
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| `seal_pair(name?, wait=true)` | Connect this agent to the user's SEAL inbox, once: the user opens a page, compares eight words and connects; the chat then shows the inbox's eight words. After it `seal_share` sends to the inbox by default |
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| `seal_open(url\|item, mode='metadata'\|'file'\|'inline', dir?, password?\|password_file?)` | Read metadata (default — no download, no counter consumption), save to disk (`file`: streamed, verified before it gets its name, 0600, returns paths) or inline parse (whitelisted MIMEs only, ≤100 KB, refuses secrets, HTML and binary). `item` is an inbox handle instead of a link. A seal behind a password opens with `password` or `password_file`; one under an NDA is a browser's |
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| `seal_open(url\|item, mode='metadata'\|'file'\|'inline', dir?, password?\|password_file?)` | Read metadata (default — no download, no counter consumption), save to disk (`file`: streamed, verified before it gets its name, 0600, returns paths) or inline parse (whitelisted MIMEs only, ≤100 KB, refuses secrets, HTML and binary). `item` is an inbox handle instead of a link. A seal behind a password opens with `password` or `password_file`; one under an NDA is a browser's. The handoff link of a seal this agent made itself is described, never downloaded (`own_seal`): its opens are the recipient's |
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| `seal_inbox(wait?)` | Seals other agents or people sent to this server's address: handles, the sender's eight words and name, never a link. `seal_share mode=forward to=<address>` puts a link there; `wait` (0 to 300 s) waits for something new |
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| `seal_run(command, secrets, cwd?, timeout?)` | Run a program with secrets from links or inbox items in its environment, through the `seal` CLI (`seal run --redact`): every value is replaced with `[sealed:NAME]` in the output that comes back, and none enters this server. With `secrets=[]` the program runs under this machine's guard alone: its proxy and the stand-ins of the keys it holds (`run_no_guard` without a running guard). Needs the `seal` CLI, on PATH or where its installers put it (`run_cli_missing` otherwise). Not a sandbox: a program that prints a value transformed escapes the redaction |
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| `seal_list()` | List SEALs created by **this MCP server only** (scope: `state.json`; never reveals user's CLI seals): handle, name, secret or not, status, expiry, reads |
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package/dist/cli.cjs
CHANGED
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@@ -2875,8 +2875,9 @@ var clientIdentity;
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function setClientIdentity(name2, version) {
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clientIdentity = `${name2}/${version}`;
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}
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var requestHeaders = () => void 0;
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function clientHeaders() {
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-
return clientIdentity === void 0 ? {} : { [header]: clientIdentity };
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return { ...clientIdentity === void 0 ? {} : { [header]: clientIdentity }, ...requestHeaders() };
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}
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var BackendError = class extends Error {
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constructor(message, code, status, extra = {}) {
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@@ -12468,7 +12469,7 @@ var seal_mcp_v1_default = {
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},
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seal_open: {
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title: "Open a SEAL link",
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description: "Open a SEAL link. `metadata` shows name, size and expiry without consuming a read. `file` streams the content to disk and returns the path \u2014 use it for large files, secrets and anything you pass to a program. `inline` returns small JSON/CSV/plain text into the conversation and refuses secrets and HTML/PDF.",
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description: "Open a SEAL link. `metadata` shows name, size and expiry without consuming a read. `file` streams the content to disk and returns the path \u2014 use it for large files, secrets and anything you pass to a program. `inline` returns small JSON/CSV/plain text into the conversation and refuses secrets and HTML/PDF. The handoff link of a seal you made yourself with seal_share is not downloaded (`own_seal`): its opens are the recipient's.",
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annotations: { readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: false },
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annotations_note: "Set on the tool, not per mode: `inline` and `file` consume an open, so the tool as a whole is not read-only.",
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input: {
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@@ -12985,6 +12986,7 @@ var seal_mcp_v1_default = {
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error_codes: {
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handoff_clipboard_unavailable: "Clipboard write failed (clipboardy threw). Server falls back to file channel automatically; this code is only surfaced if BOTH channels fail.",
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handoff_both_channels_failed: "Neither clipboard nor file channel worked. Tool returns error; user gets no URL. Better than silent leak.",
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own_seal: "seal_open in mode file or inline was given the handoff link of a seal this same agent made with seal_share (mode handoff): the download would spend the opens meant for its recipient. Nothing is downloaded; mode=metadata still describes it. The link usually reached the agent by a paste from the clipboard the handoff put it on. A seal addressed to the agent's own address (modes inbox, forward) is not refused.",
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forward_policy_violated: "mode=forward called without --to, or with expire > 30m, or with max_reads > 1.",
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bind_policy_violated: "seal_share `bind` without kind=secret (or `key`), without mode=forward and `to`, with class inprocess, with no host, or with `lease_days` outside 1..`limits.json::LEASE_MAX_DAYS`. Nothing was read, made or uploaded.",
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lease_failed: "seal_share `bind`: `POST /lease` failed; nothing was uploaded. Safe to retry.",
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@@ -14685,6 +14687,7 @@ async function openSeal(ctx, input, deps, read) {
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} catch (err2) {
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throw asToolError(err2);
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}
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if (mode !== "metadata") await refuseOwnSeal(ctx, seal.sealId);
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if (mode === "file") return openToDisk(ctx, seal, handle, input, deps, await sessionOf(ctx, seal, input));
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const first = seal.files[0];
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if (mode === "inline") {
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@@ -14747,6 +14750,17 @@ async function openSeal(ctx, input, deps, read) {
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expiresAt: seal.expiresAt
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};
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}
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async function refuseOwnSeal(ctx, sealId) {
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await ctx.update(() => false);
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const made = Object.entries(ctx.state.handles).find(
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([, entry]) => entry.seal_id === sealId && entry.mode === "handoff" && !entry.revoked_at
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);
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if (!made) return;
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throw new ToolError(
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"own_seal",
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`this link is of a seal this agent made itself (handle ${made[0]}) to hand to someone else: a download here would spend its recipient's opens. Nothing was downloaded and the link still works. If the user pasted it here by mistake, tell them so: the link is the one on their clipboard; \`seal_link\` puts it there again.`
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);
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}
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async function openToDisk(ctx, seal, handle, input, deps, session) {
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const covered = seal.files.filter((f) => f.key !== null && f.sha256Hex !== null);
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if (covered.length === 0) {
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@@ -15290,7 +15304,7 @@ function proFileGetOutputToWire(out) {
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}
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// src/server.ts
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-
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.13.
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var SERVER_VERSION = "0.13.1";
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var toolMeta = (name2) => {
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const { title, description, annotations } = seal_mcp_v1_default.tools[name2];
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return { title, description, annotations };
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package/dist/cli.js
CHANGED
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@@ -2841,8 +2841,9 @@ var clientIdentity;
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function setClientIdentity(name2, version) {
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clientIdentity = `${name2}/${version}`;
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}
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var requestHeaders = () => void 0;
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function clientHeaders() {
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-
return clientIdentity === void 0 ? {} : { [header]: clientIdentity };
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return { ...clientIdentity === void 0 ? {} : { [header]: clientIdentity }, ...requestHeaders() };
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}
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var BackendError = class extends Error {
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constructor(message, code, status, extra = {}) {
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@@ -12434,7 +12435,7 @@ var seal_mcp_v1_default = {
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},
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seal_open: {
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title: "Open a SEAL link",
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description: "Open a SEAL link. `metadata` shows name, size and expiry without consuming a read. `file` streams the content to disk and returns the path \u2014 use it for large files, secrets and anything you pass to a program. `inline` returns small JSON/CSV/plain text into the conversation and refuses secrets and HTML/PDF.",
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description: "Open a SEAL link. `metadata` shows name, size and expiry without consuming a read. `file` streams the content to disk and returns the path \u2014 use it for large files, secrets and anything you pass to a program. `inline` returns small JSON/CSV/plain text into the conversation and refuses secrets and HTML/PDF. The handoff link of a seal you made yourself with seal_share is not downloaded (`own_seal`): its opens are the recipient's.",
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annotations: { readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: false },
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annotations_note: "Set on the tool, not per mode: `inline` and `file` consume an open, so the tool as a whole is not read-only.",
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input: {
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@@ -12951,6 +12952,7 @@ var seal_mcp_v1_default = {
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error_codes: {
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handoff_clipboard_unavailable: "Clipboard write failed (clipboardy threw). Server falls back to file channel automatically; this code is only surfaced if BOTH channels fail.",
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12954
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handoff_both_channels_failed: "Neither clipboard nor file channel worked. Tool returns error; user gets no URL. Better than silent leak.",
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+
own_seal: "seal_open in mode file or inline was given the handoff link of a seal this same agent made with seal_share (mode handoff): the download would spend the opens meant for its recipient. Nothing is downloaded; mode=metadata still describes it. The link usually reached the agent by a paste from the clipboard the handoff put it on. A seal addressed to the agent's own address (modes inbox, forward) is not refused.",
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forward_policy_violated: "mode=forward called without --to, or with expire > 30m, or with max_reads > 1.",
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bind_policy_violated: "seal_share `bind` without kind=secret (or `key`), without mode=forward and `to`, with class inprocess, with no host, or with `lease_days` outside 1..`limits.json::LEASE_MAX_DAYS`. Nothing was read, made or uploaded.",
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lease_failed: "seal_share `bind`: `POST /lease` failed; nothing was uploaded. Safe to retry.",
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@@ -14651,6 +14653,7 @@ async function openSeal(ctx, input, deps, read) {
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} catch (err2) {
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throw asToolError(err2);
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}
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if (mode !== "metadata") await refuseOwnSeal(ctx, seal.sealId);
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if (mode === "file") return openToDisk(ctx, seal, handle, input, deps, await sessionOf(ctx, seal, input));
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const first = seal.files[0];
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if (mode === "inline") {
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@@ -14713,6 +14716,17 @@ async function openSeal(ctx, input, deps, read) {
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expiresAt: seal.expiresAt
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};
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}
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async function refuseOwnSeal(ctx, sealId) {
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await ctx.update(() => false);
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const made = Object.entries(ctx.state.handles).find(
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([, entry]) => entry.seal_id === sealId && entry.mode === "handoff" && !entry.revoked_at
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);
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if (!made) return;
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throw new ToolError(
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"own_seal",
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`this link is of a seal this agent made itself (handle ${made[0]}) to hand to someone else: a download here would spend its recipient's opens. Nothing was downloaded and the link still works. If the user pasted it here by mistake, tell them so: the link is the one on their clipboard; \`seal_link\` puts it there again.`
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);
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}
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async function openToDisk(ctx, seal, handle, input, deps, session) {
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const covered = seal.files.filter((f) => f.key !== null && f.sha256Hex !== null);
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if (covered.length === 0) {
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@@ -15256,7 +15270,7 @@ function proFileGetOutputToWire(out) {
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}
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// src/server.ts
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var SERVER_VERSION = "0.13.
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var SERVER_VERSION = "0.13.1";
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var toolMeta = (name2) => {
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const { title, description, annotations } = seal_mcp_v1_default.tools[name2];
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return { title, description, annotations };
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package/dist/index.cjs
CHANGED
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@@ -4440,7 +4440,7 @@ var seal_mcp_v1_default = {
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},
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seal_open: {
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title: "Open a SEAL link",
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4443
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-
description: "Open a SEAL link. `metadata` shows name, size and expiry without consuming a read. `file` streams the content to disk and returns the path \u2014 use it for large files, secrets and anything you pass to a program. `inline` returns small JSON/CSV/plain text into the conversation and refuses secrets and HTML/PDF.",
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4443
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description: "Open a SEAL link. `metadata` shows name, size and expiry without consuming a read. `file` streams the content to disk and returns the path \u2014 use it for large files, secrets and anything you pass to a program. `inline` returns small JSON/CSV/plain text into the conversation and refuses secrets and HTML/PDF. The handoff link of a seal you made yourself with seal_share is not downloaded (`own_seal`): its opens are the recipient's.",
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annotations: { readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: false },
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annotations_note: "Set on the tool, not per mode: `inline` and `file` consume an open, so the tool as a whole is not read-only.",
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input: {
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@@ -4957,6 +4957,7 @@ var seal_mcp_v1_default = {
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error_codes: {
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handoff_clipboard_unavailable: "Clipboard write failed (clipboardy threw). Server falls back to file channel automatically; this code is only surfaced if BOTH channels fail.",
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handoff_both_channels_failed: "Neither clipboard nor file channel worked. Tool returns error; user gets no URL. Better than silent leak.",
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+
own_seal: "seal_open in mode file or inline was given the handoff link of a seal this same agent made with seal_share (mode handoff): the download would spend the opens meant for its recipient. Nothing is downloaded; mode=metadata still describes it. The link usually reached the agent by a paste from the clipboard the handoff put it on. A seal addressed to the agent's own address (modes inbox, forward) is not refused.",
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forward_policy_violated: "mode=forward called without --to, or with expire > 30m, or with max_reads > 1.",
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bind_policy_violated: "seal_share `bind` without kind=secret (or `key`), without mode=forward and `to`, with class inprocess, with no host, or with `lease_days` outside 1..`limits.json::LEASE_MAX_DAYS`. Nothing was read, made or uploaded.",
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lease_failed: "seal_share `bind`: `POST /lease` failed; nothing was uploaded. Safe to retry.",
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@@ -7887,8 +7888,9 @@ var clientIdentity;
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function setClientIdentity(name2, version) {
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clientIdentity = `${name2}/${version}`;
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}
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var requestHeaders = () => void 0;
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function clientHeaders() {
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-
return clientIdentity === void 0 ? {} : { [header]: clientIdentity };
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return { ...clientIdentity === void 0 ? {} : { [header]: clientIdentity }, ...requestHeaders() };
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}
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var BackendError = class extends Error {
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constructor(message, code, status, extra = {}) {
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@@ -14449,6 +14451,7 @@ async function openSeal(ctx, input, deps, read) {
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} catch (err2) {
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throw asToolError(err2);
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}
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if (mode !== "metadata") await refuseOwnSeal(ctx, seal.sealId);
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if (mode === "file") return openToDisk(ctx, seal, handle, input, deps, await sessionOf(ctx, seal, input));
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const first = seal.files[0];
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if (mode === "inline") {
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@@ -14511,6 +14514,17 @@ async function openSeal(ctx, input, deps, read) {
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expiresAt: seal.expiresAt
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};
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}
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async function refuseOwnSeal(ctx, sealId) {
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await ctx.update(() => false);
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const made = Object.entries(ctx.state.handles).find(
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([, entry]) => entry.seal_id === sealId && entry.mode === "handoff" && !entry.revoked_at
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);
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14522
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if (!made) return;
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+
throw new ToolError(
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"own_seal",
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`this link is of a seal this agent made itself (handle ${made[0]}) to hand to someone else: a download here would spend its recipient's opens. Nothing was downloaded and the link still works. If the user pasted it here by mistake, tell them so: the link is the one on their clipboard; \`seal_link\` puts it there again.`
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14526
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);
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}
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14514
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async function openToDisk(ctx, seal, handle, input, deps, session) {
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const covered = seal.files.filter((f) => f.key !== null && f.sha256Hex !== null);
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if (covered.length === 0) {
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@@ -15054,7 +15068,7 @@ function proFileGetOutputToWire(out) {
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}
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// src/server.ts
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-
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.13.
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15071
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+
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.13.1";
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var toolMeta = (name2) => {
|
|
15059
15073
|
const { title, description, annotations } = seal_mcp_v1_default.tools[name2];
|
|
15060
15074
|
return { title, description, annotations };
|
package/dist/index.d.cts
CHANGED
|
@@ -420,6 +420,9 @@ interface SealMetaWire {
|
|
|
420
420
|
files: SealFileWire[];
|
|
421
421
|
/** The organization of an organization's seal, whose brand its share link shows; null for an anonymous seal. */
|
|
422
422
|
org_id?: string | null;
|
|
423
|
+
/** Every open the seal allows is taken (single use, `max_opens`): nothing of it opens any more. Absent from an
|
|
424
|
+
* API before 17.11. */
|
|
425
|
+
spent?: boolean;
|
|
423
426
|
}
|
|
424
427
|
/** One file row of `GET /seal/{id}/owner` (includes revoked files). */
|
|
425
428
|
interface OwnerFileWire extends SealFileWire {
|
|
@@ -1714,6 +1717,11 @@ declare function sealShare(ctx: ToolContext, input: SealShareInput, deps?: SealS
|
|
|
1714
1717
|
* size. The model gets paths, sizes and plaintext digests, never content.
|
|
1715
1718
|
* Each download counts against the seal like a browser's.
|
|
1716
1719
|
*
|
|
1720
|
+
* A seal this agent handed off itself (mode handoff: the link for someone
|
|
1721
|
+
* else) is not downloaded here (`own_seal`): its opens are its recipient's.
|
|
1722
|
+
* Its metadata is read as any seal's; a seal addressed to this agent's own
|
|
1723
|
+
* address is its to open.
|
|
1724
|
+
*
|
|
1717
1725
|
* Instead of a URL, `item` names an inbox item: a link addressed to this
|
|
1718
1726
|
* server, its wrap the row's (`openInboxItem`), opened by the same reader —
|
|
1719
1727
|
* with the seed its address is of (`inboxSeed`).
|
package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -420,6 +420,9 @@ interface SealMetaWire {
|
|
|
420
420
|
files: SealFileWire[];
|
|
421
421
|
/** The organization of an organization's seal, whose brand its share link shows; null for an anonymous seal. */
|
|
422
422
|
org_id?: string | null;
|
|
423
|
+
/** Every open the seal allows is taken (single use, `max_opens`): nothing of it opens any more. Absent from an
|
|
424
|
+
* API before 17.11. */
|
|
425
|
+
spent?: boolean;
|
|
423
426
|
}
|
|
424
427
|
/** One file row of `GET /seal/{id}/owner` (includes revoked files). */
|
|
425
428
|
interface OwnerFileWire extends SealFileWire {
|
|
@@ -1714,6 +1717,11 @@ declare function sealShare(ctx: ToolContext, input: SealShareInput, deps?: SealS
|
|
|
1714
1717
|
* size. The model gets paths, sizes and plaintext digests, never content.
|
|
1715
1718
|
* Each download counts against the seal like a browser's.
|
|
1716
1719
|
*
|
|
1720
|
+
* A seal this agent handed off itself (mode handoff: the link for someone
|
|
1721
|
+
* else) is not downloaded here (`own_seal`): its opens are its recipient's.
|
|
1722
|
+
* Its metadata is read as any seal's; a seal addressed to this agent's own
|
|
1723
|
+
* address is its to open.
|
|
1724
|
+
*
|
|
1717
1725
|
* Instead of a URL, `item` names an inbox item: a link addressed to this
|
|
1718
1726
|
* server, its wrap the row's (`openInboxItem`), opened by the same reader —
|
|
1719
1727
|
* with the seed its address is of (`inboxSeed`).
|
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -4356,7 +4356,7 @@ var seal_mcp_v1_default = {
|
|
|
4356
4356
|
},
|
|
4357
4357
|
seal_open: {
|
|
4358
4358
|
title: "Open a SEAL link",
|
|
4359
|
-
description: "Open a SEAL link. `metadata` shows name, size and expiry without consuming a read. `file` streams the content to disk and returns the path \u2014 use it for large files, secrets and anything you pass to a program. `inline` returns small JSON/CSV/plain text into the conversation and refuses secrets and HTML/PDF.",
|
|
4359
|
+
description: "Open a SEAL link. `metadata` shows name, size and expiry without consuming a read. `file` streams the content to disk and returns the path \u2014 use it for large files, secrets and anything you pass to a program. `inline` returns small JSON/CSV/plain text into the conversation and refuses secrets and HTML/PDF. The handoff link of a seal you made yourself with seal_share is not downloaded (`own_seal`): its opens are the recipient's.",
|
|
4360
4360
|
annotations: { readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: false },
|
|
4361
4361
|
annotations_note: "Set on the tool, not per mode: `inline` and `file` consume an open, so the tool as a whole is not read-only.",
|
|
4362
4362
|
input: {
|
|
@@ -4873,6 +4873,7 @@ var seal_mcp_v1_default = {
|
|
|
4873
4873
|
error_codes: {
|
|
4874
4874
|
handoff_clipboard_unavailable: "Clipboard write failed (clipboardy threw). Server falls back to file channel automatically; this code is only surfaced if BOTH channels fail.",
|
|
4875
4875
|
handoff_both_channels_failed: "Neither clipboard nor file channel worked. Tool returns error; user gets no URL. Better than silent leak.",
|
|
4876
|
+
own_seal: "seal_open in mode file or inline was given the handoff link of a seal this same agent made with seal_share (mode handoff): the download would spend the opens meant for its recipient. Nothing is downloaded; mode=metadata still describes it. The link usually reached the agent by a paste from the clipboard the handoff put it on. A seal addressed to the agent's own address (modes inbox, forward) is not refused.",
|
|
4876
4877
|
forward_policy_violated: "mode=forward called without --to, or with expire > 30m, or with max_reads > 1.",
|
|
4877
4878
|
bind_policy_violated: "seal_share `bind` without kind=secret (or `key`), without mode=forward and `to`, with class inprocess, with no host, or with `lease_days` outside 1..`limits.json::LEASE_MAX_DAYS`. Nothing was read, made or uploaded.",
|
|
4878
4879
|
lease_failed: "seal_share `bind`: `POST /lease` failed; nothing was uploaded. Safe to retry.",
|
|
@@ -7803,8 +7804,9 @@ var clientIdentity;
|
|
|
7803
7804
|
function setClientIdentity(name2, version) {
|
|
7804
7805
|
clientIdentity = `${name2}/${version}`;
|
|
7805
7806
|
}
|
|
7807
|
+
var requestHeaders = () => void 0;
|
|
7806
7808
|
function clientHeaders() {
|
|
7807
|
-
return clientIdentity === void 0 ? {} : { [header]: clientIdentity };
|
|
7809
|
+
return { ...clientIdentity === void 0 ? {} : { [header]: clientIdentity }, ...requestHeaders() };
|
|
7808
7810
|
}
|
|
7809
7811
|
var BackendError = class extends Error {
|
|
7810
7812
|
constructor(message, code, status, extra = {}) {
|
|
@@ -14365,6 +14367,7 @@ async function openSeal(ctx, input, deps, read) {
|
|
|
14365
14367
|
} catch (err2) {
|
|
14366
14368
|
throw asToolError(err2);
|
|
14367
14369
|
}
|
|
14370
|
+
if (mode !== "metadata") await refuseOwnSeal(ctx, seal.sealId);
|
|
14368
14371
|
if (mode === "file") return openToDisk(ctx, seal, handle, input, deps, await sessionOf(ctx, seal, input));
|
|
14369
14372
|
const first = seal.files[0];
|
|
14370
14373
|
if (mode === "inline") {
|
|
@@ -14427,6 +14430,17 @@ async function openSeal(ctx, input, deps, read) {
|
|
|
14427
14430
|
expiresAt: seal.expiresAt
|
|
14428
14431
|
};
|
|
14429
14432
|
}
|
|
14433
|
+
async function refuseOwnSeal(ctx, sealId) {
|
|
14434
|
+
await ctx.update(() => false);
|
|
14435
|
+
const made = Object.entries(ctx.state.handles).find(
|
|
14436
|
+
([, entry]) => entry.seal_id === sealId && entry.mode === "handoff" && !entry.revoked_at
|
|
14437
|
+
);
|
|
14438
|
+
if (!made) return;
|
|
14439
|
+
throw new ToolError(
|
|
14440
|
+
"own_seal",
|
|
14441
|
+
`this link is of a seal this agent made itself (handle ${made[0]}) to hand to someone else: a download here would spend its recipient's opens. Nothing was downloaded and the link still works. If the user pasted it here by mistake, tell them so: the link is the one on their clipboard; \`seal_link\` puts it there again.`
|
|
14442
|
+
);
|
|
14443
|
+
}
|
|
14430
14444
|
async function openToDisk(ctx, seal, handle, input, deps, session) {
|
|
14431
14445
|
const covered = seal.files.filter((f) => f.key !== null && f.sha256Hex !== null);
|
|
14432
14446
|
if (covered.length === 0) {
|
|
@@ -14970,7 +14984,7 @@ function proFileGetOutputToWire(out) {
|
|
|
14970
14984
|
}
|
|
14971
14985
|
|
|
14972
14986
|
// src/server.ts
|
|
14973
|
-
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.13.
|
|
14987
|
+
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.13.1";
|
|
14974
14988
|
var toolMeta = (name2) => {
|
|
14975
14989
|
const { title, description, annotations } = seal_mcp_v1_default.tools[name2];
|
|
14976
14990
|
return { title, description, annotations };
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "sealnet-mcp",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.13.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.13.1",
|
|
4
4
|
"mcpName": "net.seal/mcp",
|
|
5
5
|
"description": "Model Context Protocol server for SEAL: files go to the user's SEAL inbox once connected, else the link goes on the clipboard or in a 0600 file, never in the chat; explicit opt-in to forward mode with strict TTL/recipient policy.",
|
|
6
6
|
"type": "module",
|