sealnet-mcp 0.12.0 → 0.13.1
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- package/README.md +3 -3
- package/dist/cli.cjs +241 -188
- package/dist/cli.js +246 -193
- package/dist/index.cjs +260 -207
- package/dist/index.d.cts +560 -540
- package/dist/index.d.ts +560 -540
- package/dist/index.js +267 -214
- package/dist/seal_crypto.wasm +0 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -16,13 +16,13 @@ When an MCP-connected AI agent (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, etc.) creates a S
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| Tool | Purpose |
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|------|---------|
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| `seal_share(path, kind='file'\|'secret', key?, mode='inbox'\|'handoff'\|'forward', expire?, max_reads?, tier?)` / `seal_share(payment)` | Create a SEAL from a local file or folder (sent as one ZIP), streamed from disk. `kind='secret'` marks a password, key or token: the recipient's agent saves it and never reads it into a chat, a browser shows it hidden. `key` sends one value of a .env-style file as a secret, without writing it anywhere. Default: inbox once connected, else handoff; without `expire`, 1d in the inbox, 1h for a handoff, 5m forward, or 1d for one over 100 MB. Above the free limit the user pays once by card (smallest tier that fits, or `tier`): the payment page goes through URL-mode elicitation, or comes back as `payment_url` and a second call with `payment` finishes the upload into the same seal |
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| `seal_share(path, kind='file'\|'secret', key?, mode='inbox'\|'handoff'\|'forward', expire?, max_reads?, tier?, password?\|password_file?, message?, nda?, owner_email?)` / `seal_share(payment)` | Create a SEAL from a local file or folder (sent as one ZIP), streamed from disk. `password` (or `password_file`, the first line of a file `seal_request` saved, so the password never enters the chat), `message` (a note inside the seal, never sent to the server) and `nda` with `owner_email` (a link to a person only) are the site's access rules. `kind='secret'` marks a password, key or token: the recipient's agent saves it and never reads it into a chat, a browser shows it hidden. `key` sends one value of a .env-style file as a secret, without writing it anywhere. Default: inbox once connected, else handoff; without `expire`, 1d in the inbox, 1h for a handoff, 5m forward, or 1d for one over 100 MB. Above the free limit the user pays once by card (smallest tier that fits, or `tier`): the payment page goes through URL-mode elicitation, or comes back as `payment_url` and a second call with `payment` finishes the upload into the same seal |
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| `seal_link(handle)` | Put the link of a handoff seal on the clipboard (or in its 0600 file) again, for a link lost on the way; the model never gets it |
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| `seal_request(what, kind='any'\|'secret'\|'file', where_url?, wait=true, from?, dir?)` / `seal_request(request)` | Ask the user for a file or a secret without it passing through the chat. The user answers at `seal.net/i/<id>`, sealed to this machine's guard or to this server, shown with eight words of its address: on the user's computer the `seal` CLI opens the page in their browser (`seal request --local --json`); once connected the request also waits in the user's inbox (`from=owner`, or `from=anyone` for a plain link). Returns the path of a 0600 file (in `dir`, or a private temp directory), never the value |
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| `seal_pair(name?, wait=true)` | Connect this agent to the user's SEAL inbox, once: the user opens a page, compares eight words and connects; the chat then shows the inbox's eight words. After it `seal_share` sends to the inbox by default |
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| `seal_open(url\|item, mode='metadata'\|'file'\|'inline', dir?)` | Read metadata (default — no download, no counter consumption), save to disk (`file`: streamed, verified before it gets its name, 0600, returns paths) or inline parse (whitelisted MIMEs only, ≤100 KB, refuses secrets, HTML and binary). `item` is an inbox handle instead of a link |
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| `seal_open(url\|item, mode='metadata'\|'file'\|'inline', dir?, password?\|password_file?)` | Read metadata (default — no download, no counter consumption), save to disk (`file`: streamed, verified before it gets its name, 0600, returns paths) or inline parse (whitelisted MIMEs only, ≤100 KB, refuses secrets, HTML and binary). `item` is an inbox handle instead of a link. A seal behind a password opens with `password` or `password_file`; one under an NDA is a browser's. The handoff link of a seal this agent made itself is described, never downloaded (`own_seal`): its opens are the recipient's |
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| `seal_inbox(wait?)` | Seals other agents or people sent to this server's address: handles, the sender's eight words and name, never a link. `seal_share mode=forward to=<address>` puts a link there; `wait` (0 to 300 s) waits for something new |
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| `seal_run(command, secrets, cwd?, timeout?)` | Run a program with secrets from links or inbox items in its environment, through the `seal` CLI (`seal run --redact`): every value is replaced with `[sealed:NAME]` in the output that comes back, and none enters this server. Needs `seal` on PATH (`run_cli_missing` otherwise). Not a sandbox: a program that prints a value transformed escapes the redaction |
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| `seal_run(command, secrets, cwd?, timeout?)` | Run a program with secrets from links or inbox items in its environment, through the `seal` CLI (`seal run --redact`): every value is replaced with `[sealed:NAME]` in the output that comes back, and none enters this server. With `secrets=[]` the program runs under this machine's guard alone: its proxy and the stand-ins of the keys it holds (`run_no_guard` without a running guard). Needs the `seal` CLI, on PATH or where its installers put it (`run_cli_missing` otherwise). Not a sandbox: a program that prints a value transformed escapes the redaction |
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| `seal_list()` | List SEALs created by **this MCP server only** (scope: `state.json`; never reveals user's CLI seals): handle, name, secret or not, status, expiry, reads |
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| `seal_revoke(handle)` | Revoke by opaque handle (model never learns raw `seal_id`) |
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