sealnet-mcp 0.11.1 → 0.12.0

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package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ When an MCP-connected AI agent (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, etc.) creates a S
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  | `seal_share(path, kind='file'\|'secret', key?, mode='inbox'\|'handoff'\|'forward', expire?, max_reads?, tier?)` / `seal_share(payment)` | Create a SEAL from a local file or folder (sent as one ZIP), streamed from disk. `kind='secret'` marks a password, key or token: the recipient's agent saves it and never reads it into a chat, a browser shows it hidden. `key` sends one value of a .env-style file as a secret, without writing it anywhere. Default: inbox once connected, else handoff; without `expire`, 1d in the inbox, 1h for a handoff, 5m forward, or 1d for one over 100 MB. Above the free limit the user pays once by card (smallest tier that fits, or `tier`): the payment page goes through URL-mode elicitation, or comes back as `payment_url` and a second call with `payment` finishes the upload into the same seal |
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  | `seal_link(handle)` | Put the link of a handoff seal on the clipboard (or in its 0600 file) again, for a link lost on the way; the model never gets it |
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- | `seal_request(what, kind='any'\|'secret'\|'file', where_url?, wait=true, from?, dir?)` / `seal_request(request)` | Ask the user for a file or a secret without it passing through the chat. The user answers at `seal.net/i/<id>`, sealed to this machine's guard or to this server, shown with three words of its address: on the user's computer the `seal` CLI opens the page in their browser (`seal request --local --json`); once connected the request also waits in the user's inbox (`from=owner`, or `from=anyone` for a plain link). Returns the path of a 0600 file (in `dir`, or a private temp directory), never the value |
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- | `seal_pair(name?, wait=true)` | Connect this agent to the user's SEAL inbox, once: the user opens a page, compares three words and connects; the chat then shows the inbox's three words. After it `seal_share` sends to the inbox by default |
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+ | `seal_request(what, kind='any'\|'secret'\|'file', where_url?, wait=true, from?, dir?)` / `seal_request(request)` | Ask the user for a file or a secret without it passing through the chat. The user answers at `seal.net/i/<id>`, sealed to this machine's guard or to this server, shown with eight words of its address: on the user's computer the `seal` CLI opens the page in their browser (`seal request --local --json`); once connected the request also waits in the user's inbox (`from=owner`, or `from=anyone` for a plain link). Returns the path of a 0600 file (in `dir`, or a private temp directory), never the value |
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+ | `seal_pair(name?, wait=true)` | Connect this agent to the user's SEAL inbox, once: the user opens a page, compares eight words and connects; the chat then shows the inbox's eight words. After it `seal_share` sends to the inbox by default |
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  | `seal_open(url\|item, mode='metadata'\|'file'\|'inline', dir?)` | Read metadata (default — no download, no counter consumption), save to disk (`file`: streamed, verified before it gets its name, 0600, returns paths) or inline parse (whitelisted MIMEs only, ≤100 KB, refuses secrets, HTML and binary). `item` is an inbox handle instead of a link |
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- | `seal_inbox(wait?)` | Seals other agents or people sent to this server's address: handles, the sender's three words and name, never a link. `seal_share mode=forward to=<address>` puts a link there; `wait` (0 to 300 s) waits for something new |
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+ | `seal_inbox(wait?)` | Seals other agents or people sent to this server's address: handles, the sender's eight words and name, never a link. `seal_share mode=forward to=<address>` puts a link there; `wait` (0 to 300 s) waits for something new |
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  | `seal_run(command, secrets, cwd?, timeout?)` | Run a program with secrets from links or inbox items in its environment, through the `seal` CLI (`seal run --redact`): every value is replaced with `[sealed:NAME]` in the output that comes back, and none enters this server. Needs `seal` on PATH (`run_cli_missing` otherwise). Not a sandbox: a program that prints a value transformed escapes the redaction |
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  | `seal_list()` | List SEALs created by **this MCP server only** (scope: `state.json`; never reveals user's CLI seals): handle, name, secret or not, status, expiry, reads |
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  | `seal_revoke(handle)` | Revoke by opaque handle (model never learns raw `seal_id`) |
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Large transfers report `notifications/progress` when the host sends a `progressT
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  ## The agent's key and state
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- The agent has one key: a 32-byte seed. Its bundle comes from the seed, and its address is the bundle's fingerprint (`sealnet-mcp pubkey`). It comes from, in order:
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+ The agent has one key: a 64-byte seed. All three keys of its bundle are derived from the seed, and its address is the bundle's fingerprint (`sealnet-mcp pubkey`). It comes from, in order:
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  1. **`SEAL_SEED`** — how a container or a cloud session gets the same address as at home (`sealnet-mcp seed --force` prints the key to put there);
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  2. **the OS keychain** — `@napi-rs/keyring` (optional dependency): Secret Service on Linux, macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager;
@@ -40,13 +40,15 @@ The agent has one key: a 32-byte seed. Its bundle comes from the seed, and its a
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  The first start makes the key (keychain, else the file); there is no setup step. State lives in `${XDG_CONFIG_HOME}/seal-mcp/state.json` (mode `0o600`), encrypted with a passphrase derived from the key (HKDF-SHA256 → Argon2id → AES-256-GCM). It holds:
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- - `identity` — the seed itself, which opens the links sent to the agent's address
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+ - `identity` — the seed itself, which opens the links sent to the agent's address, and for a while the key it replaced
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  - `owner` — the user's inbox this agent is connected to (`seal_pair`): its address and name
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  - `handles[]` — opaque handle → `{ seal_id, owner_token, mode, created_at, expires_at, name, secret, max_reads }`, and for a handoff its link until `seal_revoke` (for `seal_link`). Each `owner_token` is full owner-capability for that seal; encrypting only `identity` and leaving tokens plain would be a security illusion.
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  - `audit[]` — historical tool invocations (timestamps, handles, modes). Side-channel relevant.
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  Several MCP hosts on one machine (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor) share the key and the state: each write re-reads the file under a lock. `serve --ephemeral` (or `SEAL_MCP_EPHEMERAL=1`) keeps nothing on disk and makes a new key each start; handles then last until restart, and seal expiry does not depend on it.
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+ A key made by a release before 0.12 is of the old kind: 32 bytes, 43 characters. This release replaces it by itself at its first start: a new key is kept in the same place, the state is encrypted anew with every handle, and the old key stays beside the new one for what was sent to the old address, until the last of that has expired. The server prints the new address and its eight words: give them to whoever sends to this agent and connect the user's inbox again (`seal_pair`). A key of the old kind in `SEAL_SEED` cannot be replaced by the server: it refuses to start and says what to set.
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  ## Install + configure
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  No setup step: the first start creates the agent's key and state.
@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ Add to `~/.cursor/mcp.json` (or `claude_desktop_config.json`):
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  {
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  "seal": {
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  "command": "npx",
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- "args": ["-y", "sealnet-mcp"]
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+ "args": ["-y", "sealnet-mcp@latest"]
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  }
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  }
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  ```
@@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ Production defaults are baked in (backend `https://api.seal.net`, share URLs on
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  {
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  "seal": {
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  "command": "npx",
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- "args": ["-y", "sealnet-mcp"],
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+ "args": ["-y", "sealnet-mcp@latest"],
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  "env": {
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  "SEAL_MCP_BACKEND_URL": "https://api.example.com",
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  "SEAL_MCP_PUBLIC_HOST": "https://example.com"
@@ -81,7 +83,7 @@ Environment variables consumed by the CLI:
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  | Variable | Used by | Purpose |
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  |---|---|---|
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- | `SEAL_SEED` | every subcommand | The agent's key (43 base64url characters); the same address wherever it is set |
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+ | `SEAL_SEED` | every subcommand | The agent's key (86 base64url characters); the same address wherever it is set |
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  | `SEAL_OWNER` | `serve` | The address of the user's inbox, instead of `seal_pair`: for a cloud session with nowhere to open the page |
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  | `SEAL_MCP_EPHEMERAL=1` | `serve` | As `--ephemeral`: a new key each start, nothing on disk |
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  | `SEAL_MCP_CONFIG_DIR` | every subcommand | Override default state directory (mirrors Rust `seal-cli`'s `SEAL_CONFIG_DIR`) |
@@ -94,7 +96,7 @@ Available subcommands:
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  ```
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  sealnet-mcp serve # default — start the stdio MCP server (used by MCP hosts); --ephemeral keeps nothing on disk
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  sealnet-mcp init # optional: make the key and state without starting the server
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- sealnet-mcp pubkey # print the agent's address and its three words (for senders); publish its bundle
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+ sealnet-mcp pubkey # print the agent's address and its eight words (for senders); publish its bundle
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  sealnet-mcp seed --force # print the agent's key, to set SEAL_SEED elsewhere
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  sealnet-mcp doctor # diagnose key source / keychain / file perms / backend reachability
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  sealnet-mcp reset --force # wipe state.json and the key: the address is lost for good