sealnet-mcp 0.11.1 → 0.11.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/cli.cjs +13 -7
- package/dist/cli.js +13 -7
- package/dist/index.cjs +13 -7
- package/dist/index.d.cts +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +13 -7
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/cli.cjs
CHANGED
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@@ -1999,7 +1999,7 @@ var seal_address_default = {
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1999
1999
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guard: {
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2000
2000
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kind: "guard",
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2001
2001
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is: "a pair request whose requester is this machine's guard (SPEC agent egress \xA73.1): the same answer as `pair` (the pairing file), and the inbox marks the agent as a guard. A request for a secret whose recipient_bundle is a guard's is shown by the inbox as sealed to that guard; one whose bundle is no known guard's is answered only after the person types its three words (\xA76.1, T2\u0430).",
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2002
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-
bind: "POST /intake may carry `bind`: what the agent proposes the key be bound to \u2014 {hosts: [<host>], place?: <place>, class?: outbound|inprocess} (secrets.json guard_note). The page shows
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2002
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+
bind: "POST /intake may carry `bind`: what the agent proposes the key be bound to \u2014 {hosts: [<host>], place?: <place>, class?: outbound|inprocess} (secrets.json guard_note). `bind` is sent only when the recipient_bundle is a guard's, hosts proposed or not: its presence is what lets the page bind the key and lend it under a lease; without it the page says the value goes to the agent as it is. The page shows the proposal as the binding when no entry of secrets.json knows the key's form; the person confirms, narrows or removes it. At most 16 hosts of 253 characters, each a name of two labels or more (`*.` with two labels under it, three under secrets.json wildcard_public_second_level); the server checks the shape and keeps it as given."
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2003
2003
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},
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2004
2004
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payloads: {
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2005
2005
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name_max: 80,
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@@ -6193,6 +6193,8 @@ var secrets_default = {
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6193
6193
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},
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6194
6194
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patterns_note: "What a key looks like, for every reader: `seal doctor --transcripts`, the scanner of the Pro web page and the `sealfs` detector (C1 \u042039). `pattern` is an expression in the subset all three run alike \u2014 JS, Python `re`, Rust `regex`: no lookaround, no backreference, no inline flag; a boundary is `\\b` inside the expression. The flags are shared: case-insensitive and multiline. A match that contains a string of the entry's `allowlist` (case-insensitive) is no finding. A match of an entry with `checksum` is a finding only when it passes that sum: `luhn` \u2014 the Luhn sum of its digits is 0 modulo 10; `iban` \u2014 its characters but spaces, upper-cased, the first four moved to the end, each letter read as a number (A = 10 \u2026 Z = 35), are 1 modulo 97. A finding is shown masked: its first four characters, `\u2026`, its last two. `vectors.hit` holds a finding of the entry, `vectors.clean` none; every reader passes them. The scanner page does not take a file larger than `max_file_bytes`; `seal doctor` reads agent transcripts of any size, a line at a time \u2014 skipping a long transcript would hide its leak. Data, not code: a service is added with one entry.",
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6195
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max_file_bytes: 10485760,
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6196
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+
wildcard_public_second_level: ["ac", "co", "com", "edu", "gov", "go", "ne", "net", "or", "org", "mil", "int", "gob", "ltd", "plc", "me", "nom"],
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6197
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+
wildcard_note: "A proposed `*.<name>` binds a key only with two labels under it, three when the first is one of wildcard_public_second_level (`*.co.uk` would be a root for every .co.uk host); a bare name needs two labels (SPEC agent egress \xA74.2, review of phase 1).",
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guard_note: "What the guard does with a key of an entry (SPEC agent egress \xA74.1, read by `seal-client-core::guard`). `hosts`: where the key is a way in, the default binding a person confirms or narrows; `*.` is one label. `place`: where the guard puts the value \u2014 `bearer` (Authorization: Bearer), `header:<name>`, `query:<param>`, `basic_user`, `basic_pass`, `userinfo`, `url` (the secret is the request address itself, a webhook). `class`: `outbound` \u2014 a key a program enters a service with, the proxy puts it in; `inprocess` \u2014 a key a program works with itself (a webhook signing secret, a database password of a driver that uses no proxy, a private key, an assignment the pattern matches with its name): the program gets the value, by the person's word on the page. `surrogate`: the form of the stand-in the agent sees \u2014 `keep_prefix` (kept as it is), `alphabet` (`base62`, `base64url`, `hex`, `digits`, `base32`, `classes` \u2014 each character keeps its class and punctuation stays), `length` (a number, else the value's), `checksum` (`github_crc32`: the last six characters are the CRC32 of the body, base62), `parts` (`password`: of a connection URI only the password changes). An entry without `surrogate` is treated by classes. `provision_commands`: commands that write a key as data into a service's own store; a surrogate in their arguments or stdin is refused unless the binding's `provision` names the host (\xA75.4, \xA76.4). Data, not code: a service is added with one entry.",
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provision_commands: [
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{ command: "wrangler secret put", host: "api.cloudflare.com" },
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@@ -13687,11 +13689,12 @@ async function sealRequest(ctx, input, deps) {
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13689
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await appendAudit(ctx, "seal_request", handle, "link");
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return { handle, source: "link", files: here.files.map(cliFile), ...here.note ? { note: here.note } : {} };
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}
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13690
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-
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-
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13692
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+
const code = here && "error" in here && typeof here.error?.code === "string" ? here.error.code : "request.no_local";
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13693
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if (code === "request.expired") {
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throw new ToolError("request_expired", here && "error" in here ? here.error.message : "nobody answered in time");
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}
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13693
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-
if (
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13694
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-
throw new ToolError("request_failed", `seal request: ${here.error.message}`);
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13696
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if (code !== "request.no_local" && code !== "request.ask_other" && code !== "request.cancelled") {
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throw new ToolError("request_failed", `seal request: ${here && "error" in here ? here.error.message : code}`);
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}
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}
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const guard = kind === "file" ? null : await guardStatus(runCli);
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@@ -13713,7 +13716,10 @@ async function sealRequest(ctx, input, deps) {
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whereUrl: input.whereUrl,
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kind,
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to: card && owner !== null ? owner.address : void 0,
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13716
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-
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13719
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+
// A binding is the guard's to keep: the page shows one, and lends the key under a lease, only
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13720
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// when the request says a guard is its recipient — `bind` present, hosts proposed or not.
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13721
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// Without a guard the value lands in the file as it is, and the page says so (review of phase 1).
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13722
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bind: guard ? input.bind ?? { hosts: [] } : void 0
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});
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} catch (err2) {
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13719
13725
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throw new ToolError("request_failed", `POST /intake failed: ${err2 instanceof Error ? err2.message : String(err2)}`, err2);
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@@ -14427,7 +14433,7 @@ function proFileGetOutputToWire(out) {
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14427
14433
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}
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14428
14434
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14435
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// src/server.ts
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14430
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-
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.11.
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14436
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+
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.11.2";
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14431
14437
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var toolMeta = (name2) => {
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const { title, description, annotations } = seal_mcp_v1_default.tools[name2];
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14433
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return { title, description, annotations };
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package/dist/cli.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1965,7 +1965,7 @@ var seal_address_default = {
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1965
1965
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guard: {
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1966
1966
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kind: "guard",
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1967
1967
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is: "a pair request whose requester is this machine's guard (SPEC agent egress \xA73.1): the same answer as `pair` (the pairing file), and the inbox marks the agent as a guard. A request for a secret whose recipient_bundle is a guard's is shown by the inbox as sealed to that guard; one whose bundle is no known guard's is answered only after the person types its three words (\xA76.1, T2\u0430).",
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1968
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-
bind: "POST /intake may carry `bind`: what the agent proposes the key be bound to \u2014 {hosts: [<host>], place?: <place>, class?: outbound|inprocess} (secrets.json guard_note). The page shows
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1968
|
+
bind: "POST /intake may carry `bind`: what the agent proposes the key be bound to \u2014 {hosts: [<host>], place?: <place>, class?: outbound|inprocess} (secrets.json guard_note). `bind` is sent only when the recipient_bundle is a guard's, hosts proposed or not: its presence is what lets the page bind the key and lend it under a lease; without it the page says the value goes to the agent as it is. The page shows the proposal as the binding when no entry of secrets.json knows the key's form; the person confirms, narrows or removes it. At most 16 hosts of 253 characters, each a name of two labels or more (`*.` with two labels under it, three under secrets.json wildcard_public_second_level); the server checks the shape and keeps it as given."
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1969
1969
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},
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1970
1970
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payloads: {
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1971
1971
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name_max: 80,
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@@ -6159,6 +6159,8 @@ var secrets_default = {
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6159
6159
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},
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6160
6160
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patterns_note: "What a key looks like, for every reader: `seal doctor --transcripts`, the scanner of the Pro web page and the `sealfs` detector (C1 \u042039). `pattern` is an expression in the subset all three run alike \u2014 JS, Python `re`, Rust `regex`: no lookaround, no backreference, no inline flag; a boundary is `\\b` inside the expression. The flags are shared: case-insensitive and multiline. A match that contains a string of the entry's `allowlist` (case-insensitive) is no finding. A match of an entry with `checksum` is a finding only when it passes that sum: `luhn` \u2014 the Luhn sum of its digits is 0 modulo 10; `iban` \u2014 its characters but spaces, upper-cased, the first four moved to the end, each letter read as a number (A = 10 \u2026 Z = 35), are 1 modulo 97. A finding is shown masked: its first four characters, `\u2026`, its last two. `vectors.hit` holds a finding of the entry, `vectors.clean` none; every reader passes them. The scanner page does not take a file larger than `max_file_bytes`; `seal doctor` reads agent transcripts of any size, a line at a time \u2014 skipping a long transcript would hide its leak. Data, not code: a service is added with one entry.",
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6161
6161
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max_file_bytes: 10485760,
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6162
|
+
wildcard_public_second_level: ["ac", "co", "com", "edu", "gov", "go", "ne", "net", "or", "org", "mil", "int", "gob", "ltd", "plc", "me", "nom"],
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6163
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+
wildcard_note: "A proposed `*.<name>` binds a key only with two labels under it, three when the first is one of wildcard_public_second_level (`*.co.uk` would be a root for every .co.uk host); a bare name needs two labels (SPEC agent egress \xA74.2, review of phase 1).",
|
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6162
6164
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guard_note: "What the guard does with a key of an entry (SPEC agent egress \xA74.1, read by `seal-client-core::guard`). `hosts`: where the key is a way in, the default binding a person confirms or narrows; `*.` is one label. `place`: where the guard puts the value \u2014 `bearer` (Authorization: Bearer), `header:<name>`, `query:<param>`, `basic_user`, `basic_pass`, `userinfo`, `url` (the secret is the request address itself, a webhook). `class`: `outbound` \u2014 a key a program enters a service with, the proxy puts it in; `inprocess` \u2014 a key a program works with itself (a webhook signing secret, a database password of a driver that uses no proxy, a private key, an assignment the pattern matches with its name): the program gets the value, by the person's word on the page. `surrogate`: the form of the stand-in the agent sees \u2014 `keep_prefix` (kept as it is), `alphabet` (`base62`, `base64url`, `hex`, `digits`, `base32`, `classes` \u2014 each character keeps its class and punctuation stays), `length` (a number, else the value's), `checksum` (`github_crc32`: the last six characters are the CRC32 of the body, base62), `parts` (`password`: of a connection URI only the password changes). An entry without `surrogate` is treated by classes. `provision_commands`: commands that write a key as data into a service's own store; a surrogate in their arguments or stdin is refused unless the binding's `provision` names the host (\xA75.4, \xA76.4). Data, not code: a service is added with one entry.",
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6163
6165
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provision_commands: [
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6164
6166
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{ command: "wrangler secret put", host: "api.cloudflare.com" },
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@@ -13653,11 +13655,12 @@ async function sealRequest(ctx, input, deps) {
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13653
13655
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await appendAudit(ctx, "seal_request", handle, "link");
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13654
13656
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return { handle, source: "link", files: here.files.map(cliFile), ...here.note ? { note: here.note } : {} };
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13655
13657
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}
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13656
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-
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13657
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-
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13658
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+
const code = here && "error" in here && typeof here.error?.code === "string" ? here.error.code : "request.no_local";
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13659
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+
if (code === "request.expired") {
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13660
|
+
throw new ToolError("request_expired", here && "error" in here ? here.error.message : "nobody answered in time");
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13658
13661
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}
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13659
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-
if (
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13660
|
-
throw new ToolError("request_failed", `seal request: ${here.error.message}`);
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13662
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+
if (code !== "request.no_local" && code !== "request.ask_other" && code !== "request.cancelled") {
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13663
|
+
throw new ToolError("request_failed", `seal request: ${here && "error" in here ? here.error.message : code}`);
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13661
13664
|
}
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13662
13665
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}
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13663
13666
|
const guard = kind === "file" ? null : await guardStatus(runCli);
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@@ -13679,7 +13682,10 @@ async function sealRequest(ctx, input, deps) {
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|
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13679
13682
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whereUrl: input.whereUrl,
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13680
13683
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kind,
|
|
13681
13684
|
to: card && owner !== null ? owner.address : void 0,
|
|
13682
|
-
|
|
13685
|
+
// A binding is the guard's to keep: the page shows one, and lends the key under a lease, only
|
|
13686
|
+
// when the request says a guard is its recipient — `bind` present, hosts proposed or not.
|
|
13687
|
+
// Without a guard the value lands in the file as it is, and the page says so (review of phase 1).
|
|
13688
|
+
bind: guard ? input.bind ?? { hosts: [] } : void 0
|
|
13683
13689
|
});
|
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13684
13690
|
} catch (err2) {
|
|
13685
13691
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throw new ToolError("request_failed", `POST /intake failed: ${err2 instanceof Error ? err2.message : String(err2)}`, err2);
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@@ -14393,7 +14399,7 @@ function proFileGetOutputToWire(out) {
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|
|
14393
14399
|
}
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14394
14400
|
|
|
14395
14401
|
// src/server.ts
|
|
14396
|
-
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.11.
|
|
14402
|
+
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.11.2";
|
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14397
14403
|
var toolMeta = (name2) => {
|
|
14398
14404
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const { title, description, annotations } = seal_mcp_v1_default.tools[name2];
|
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14399
14405
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return { title, description, annotations };
|
package/dist/index.cjs
CHANGED
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@@ -6895,7 +6895,7 @@ var seal_address_default = {
|
|
|
6895
6895
|
guard: {
|
|
6896
6896
|
kind: "guard",
|
|
6897
6897
|
is: "a pair request whose requester is this machine's guard (SPEC agent egress \xA73.1): the same answer as `pair` (the pairing file), and the inbox marks the agent as a guard. A request for a secret whose recipient_bundle is a guard's is shown by the inbox as sealed to that guard; one whose bundle is no known guard's is answered only after the person types its three words (\xA76.1, T2\u0430).",
|
|
6898
|
-
bind: "POST /intake may carry `bind`: what the agent proposes the key be bound to \u2014 {hosts: [<host>], place?: <place>, class?: outbound|inprocess} (secrets.json guard_note). The page shows
|
|
6898
|
+
bind: "POST /intake may carry `bind`: what the agent proposes the key be bound to \u2014 {hosts: [<host>], place?: <place>, class?: outbound|inprocess} (secrets.json guard_note). `bind` is sent only when the recipient_bundle is a guard's, hosts proposed or not: its presence is what lets the page bind the key and lend it under a lease; without it the page says the value goes to the agent as it is. The page shows the proposal as the binding when no entry of secrets.json knows the key's form; the person confirms, narrows or removes it. At most 16 hosts of 253 characters, each a name of two labels or more (`*.` with two labels under it, three under secrets.json wildcard_public_second_level); the server checks the shape and keeps it as given."
|
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6899
6899
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},
|
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6900
6900
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payloads: {
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6901
6901
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name_max: 80,
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@@ -11089,6 +11089,8 @@ var secrets_default = {
|
|
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11089
11089
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},
|
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11090
11090
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patterns_note: "What a key looks like, for every reader: `seal doctor --transcripts`, the scanner of the Pro web page and the `sealfs` detector (C1 \u042039). `pattern` is an expression in the subset all three run alike \u2014 JS, Python `re`, Rust `regex`: no lookaround, no backreference, no inline flag; a boundary is `\\b` inside the expression. The flags are shared: case-insensitive and multiline. A match that contains a string of the entry's `allowlist` (case-insensitive) is no finding. A match of an entry with `checksum` is a finding only when it passes that sum: `luhn` \u2014 the Luhn sum of its digits is 0 modulo 10; `iban` \u2014 its characters but spaces, upper-cased, the first four moved to the end, each letter read as a number (A = 10 \u2026 Z = 35), are 1 modulo 97. A finding is shown masked: its first four characters, `\u2026`, its last two. `vectors.hit` holds a finding of the entry, `vectors.clean` none; every reader passes them. The scanner page does not take a file larger than `max_file_bytes`; `seal doctor` reads agent transcripts of any size, a line at a time \u2014 skipping a long transcript would hide its leak. Data, not code: a service is added with one entry.",
|
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11091
11091
|
max_file_bytes: 10485760,
|
|
11092
|
+
wildcard_public_second_level: ["ac", "co", "com", "edu", "gov", "go", "ne", "net", "or", "org", "mil", "int", "gob", "ltd", "plc", "me", "nom"],
|
|
11093
|
+
wildcard_note: "A proposed `*.<name>` binds a key only with two labels under it, three when the first is one of wildcard_public_second_level (`*.co.uk` would be a root for every .co.uk host); a bare name needs two labels (SPEC agent egress \xA74.2, review of phase 1).",
|
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11092
11094
|
guard_note: "What the guard does with a key of an entry (SPEC agent egress \xA74.1, read by `seal-client-core::guard`). `hosts`: where the key is a way in, the default binding a person confirms or narrows; `*.` is one label. `place`: where the guard puts the value \u2014 `bearer` (Authorization: Bearer), `header:<name>`, `query:<param>`, `basic_user`, `basic_pass`, `userinfo`, `url` (the secret is the request address itself, a webhook). `class`: `outbound` \u2014 a key a program enters a service with, the proxy puts it in; `inprocess` \u2014 a key a program works with itself (a webhook signing secret, a database password of a driver that uses no proxy, a private key, an assignment the pattern matches with its name): the program gets the value, by the person's word on the page. `surrogate`: the form of the stand-in the agent sees \u2014 `keep_prefix` (kept as it is), `alphabet` (`base62`, `base64url`, `hex`, `digits`, `base32`, `classes` \u2014 each character keeps its class and punctuation stays), `length` (a number, else the value's), `checksum` (`github_crc32`: the last six characters are the CRC32 of the body, base62), `parts` (`password`: of a connection URI only the password changes). An entry without `surrogate` is treated by classes. `provision_commands`: commands that write a key as data into a service's own store; a surrogate in their arguments or stdin is refused unless the binding's `provision` names the host (\xA75.4, \xA76.4). Data, not code: a service is added with one entry.",
|
|
11093
11095
|
provision_commands: [
|
|
11094
11096
|
{ command: "wrangler secret put", host: "api.cloudflare.com" },
|
|
@@ -13519,11 +13521,12 @@ async function sealRequest(ctx, input, deps) {
|
|
|
13519
13521
|
await appendAudit(ctx, "seal_request", handle, "link");
|
|
13520
13522
|
return { handle, source: "link", files: here.files.map(cliFile), ...here.note ? { note: here.note } : {} };
|
|
13521
13523
|
}
|
|
13522
|
-
|
|
13523
|
-
|
|
13524
|
+
const code = here && "error" in here && typeof here.error?.code === "string" ? here.error.code : "request.no_local";
|
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13525
|
+
if (code === "request.expired") {
|
|
13526
|
+
throw new ToolError("request_expired", here && "error" in here ? here.error.message : "nobody answered in time");
|
|
13524
13527
|
}
|
|
13525
|
-
if (
|
|
13526
|
-
throw new ToolError("request_failed", `seal request: ${here.error.message}`);
|
|
13528
|
+
if (code !== "request.no_local" && code !== "request.ask_other" && code !== "request.cancelled") {
|
|
13529
|
+
throw new ToolError("request_failed", `seal request: ${here && "error" in here ? here.error.message : code}`);
|
|
13527
13530
|
}
|
|
13528
13531
|
}
|
|
13529
13532
|
const guard = kind === "file" ? null : await guardStatus(runCli);
|
|
@@ -13545,7 +13548,10 @@ async function sealRequest(ctx, input, deps) {
|
|
|
13545
13548
|
whereUrl: input.whereUrl,
|
|
13546
13549
|
kind,
|
|
13547
13550
|
to: card && owner !== null ? owner.address : void 0,
|
|
13548
|
-
|
|
13551
|
+
// A binding is the guard's to keep: the page shows one, and lends the key under a lease, only
|
|
13552
|
+
// when the request says a guard is its recipient — `bind` present, hosts proposed or not.
|
|
13553
|
+
// Without a guard the value lands in the file as it is, and the page says so (review of phase 1).
|
|
13554
|
+
bind: guard ? input.bind ?? { hosts: [] } : void 0
|
|
13549
13555
|
});
|
|
13550
13556
|
} catch (err2) {
|
|
13551
13557
|
throw new ToolError("request_failed", `POST /intake failed: ${err2 instanceof Error ? err2.message : String(err2)}`, err2);
|
|
@@ -14259,7 +14265,7 @@ function proFileGetOutputToWire(out) {
|
|
|
14259
14265
|
}
|
|
14260
14266
|
|
|
14261
14267
|
// src/server.ts
|
|
14262
|
-
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.11.
|
|
14268
|
+
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.11.2";
|
|
14263
14269
|
var toolMeta = (name2) => {
|
|
14264
14270
|
const { title, description, annotations } = seal_mcp_v1_default.tools[name2];
|
|
14265
14271
|
return { title, description, annotations };
|
package/dist/index.d.cts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ interface AuditEntry {
|
|
|
1096
1096
|
* (`{ "type": ["string", "null"] }`) and the value carries
|
|
1097
1097
|
* tool-specific meaning:
|
|
1098
1098
|
* - seal_share → 'inbox' | 'handoff' | 'forward'
|
|
1099
|
-
* - seal_request → '
|
|
1099
|
+
* - seal_request → 'link' | 'card' (older state files may carry 'local', the page once opened here)
|
|
1100
1100
|
* - seal_pair → 'paired'
|
|
1101
1101
|
* - seal_open → 'metadata' | 'inline' | 'file'
|
|
1102
1102
|
* - seal_list → null
|
package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ interface AuditEntry {
|
|
|
1096
1096
|
* (`{ "type": ["string", "null"] }`) and the value carries
|
|
1097
1097
|
* tool-specific meaning:
|
|
1098
1098
|
* - seal_share → 'inbox' | 'handoff' | 'forward'
|
|
1099
|
-
* - seal_request → '
|
|
1099
|
+
* - seal_request → 'link' | 'card' (older state files may carry 'local', the page once opened here)
|
|
1100
1100
|
* - seal_pair → 'paired'
|
|
1101
1101
|
* - seal_open → 'metadata' | 'inline' | 'file'
|
|
1102
1102
|
* - seal_list → null
|
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -6811,7 +6811,7 @@ var seal_address_default = {
|
|
|
6811
6811
|
guard: {
|
|
6812
6812
|
kind: "guard",
|
|
6813
6813
|
is: "a pair request whose requester is this machine's guard (SPEC agent egress \xA73.1): the same answer as `pair` (the pairing file), and the inbox marks the agent as a guard. A request for a secret whose recipient_bundle is a guard's is shown by the inbox as sealed to that guard; one whose bundle is no known guard's is answered only after the person types its three words (\xA76.1, T2\u0430).",
|
|
6814
|
-
bind: "POST /intake may carry `bind`: what the agent proposes the key be bound to \u2014 {hosts: [<host>], place?: <place>, class?: outbound|inprocess} (secrets.json guard_note). The page shows
|
|
6814
|
+
bind: "POST /intake may carry `bind`: what the agent proposes the key be bound to \u2014 {hosts: [<host>], place?: <place>, class?: outbound|inprocess} (secrets.json guard_note). `bind` is sent only when the recipient_bundle is a guard's, hosts proposed or not: its presence is what lets the page bind the key and lend it under a lease; without it the page says the value goes to the agent as it is. The page shows the proposal as the binding when no entry of secrets.json knows the key's form; the person confirms, narrows or removes it. At most 16 hosts of 253 characters, each a name of two labels or more (`*.` with two labels under it, three under secrets.json wildcard_public_second_level); the server checks the shape and keeps it as given."
|
|
6815
6815
|
},
|
|
6816
6816
|
payloads: {
|
|
6817
6817
|
name_max: 80,
|
|
@@ -11005,6 +11005,8 @@ var secrets_default = {
|
|
|
11005
11005
|
},
|
|
11006
11006
|
patterns_note: "What a key looks like, for every reader: `seal doctor --transcripts`, the scanner of the Pro web page and the `sealfs` detector (C1 \u042039). `pattern` is an expression in the subset all three run alike \u2014 JS, Python `re`, Rust `regex`: no lookaround, no backreference, no inline flag; a boundary is `\\b` inside the expression. The flags are shared: case-insensitive and multiline. A match that contains a string of the entry's `allowlist` (case-insensitive) is no finding. A match of an entry with `checksum` is a finding only when it passes that sum: `luhn` \u2014 the Luhn sum of its digits is 0 modulo 10; `iban` \u2014 its characters but spaces, upper-cased, the first four moved to the end, each letter read as a number (A = 10 \u2026 Z = 35), are 1 modulo 97. A finding is shown masked: its first four characters, `\u2026`, its last two. `vectors.hit` holds a finding of the entry, `vectors.clean` none; every reader passes them. The scanner page does not take a file larger than `max_file_bytes`; `seal doctor` reads agent transcripts of any size, a line at a time \u2014 skipping a long transcript would hide its leak. Data, not code: a service is added with one entry.",
|
|
11007
11007
|
max_file_bytes: 10485760,
|
|
11008
|
+
wildcard_public_second_level: ["ac", "co", "com", "edu", "gov", "go", "ne", "net", "or", "org", "mil", "int", "gob", "ltd", "plc", "me", "nom"],
|
|
11009
|
+
wildcard_note: "A proposed `*.<name>` binds a key only with two labels under it, three when the first is one of wildcard_public_second_level (`*.co.uk` would be a root for every .co.uk host); a bare name needs two labels (SPEC agent egress \xA74.2, review of phase 1).",
|
|
11008
11010
|
guard_note: "What the guard does with a key of an entry (SPEC agent egress \xA74.1, read by `seal-client-core::guard`). `hosts`: where the key is a way in, the default binding a person confirms or narrows; `*.` is one label. `place`: where the guard puts the value \u2014 `bearer` (Authorization: Bearer), `header:<name>`, `query:<param>`, `basic_user`, `basic_pass`, `userinfo`, `url` (the secret is the request address itself, a webhook). `class`: `outbound` \u2014 a key a program enters a service with, the proxy puts it in; `inprocess` \u2014 a key a program works with itself (a webhook signing secret, a database password of a driver that uses no proxy, a private key, an assignment the pattern matches with its name): the program gets the value, by the person's word on the page. `surrogate`: the form of the stand-in the agent sees \u2014 `keep_prefix` (kept as it is), `alphabet` (`base62`, `base64url`, `hex`, `digits`, `base32`, `classes` \u2014 each character keeps its class and punctuation stays), `length` (a number, else the value's), `checksum` (`github_crc32`: the last six characters are the CRC32 of the body, base62), `parts` (`password`: of a connection URI only the password changes). An entry without `surrogate` is treated by classes. `provision_commands`: commands that write a key as data into a service's own store; a surrogate in their arguments or stdin is refused unless the binding's `provision` names the host (\xA75.4, \xA76.4). Data, not code: a service is added with one entry.",
|
|
11009
11011
|
provision_commands: [
|
|
11010
11012
|
{ command: "wrangler secret put", host: "api.cloudflare.com" },
|
|
@@ -13435,11 +13437,12 @@ async function sealRequest(ctx, input, deps) {
|
|
|
13435
13437
|
await appendAudit(ctx, "seal_request", handle, "link");
|
|
13436
13438
|
return { handle, source: "link", files: here.files.map(cliFile), ...here.note ? { note: here.note } : {} };
|
|
13437
13439
|
}
|
|
13438
|
-
|
|
13439
|
-
|
|
13440
|
+
const code = here && "error" in here && typeof here.error?.code === "string" ? here.error.code : "request.no_local";
|
|
13441
|
+
if (code === "request.expired") {
|
|
13442
|
+
throw new ToolError("request_expired", here && "error" in here ? here.error.message : "nobody answered in time");
|
|
13440
13443
|
}
|
|
13441
|
-
if (
|
|
13442
|
-
throw new ToolError("request_failed", `seal request: ${here.error.message}`);
|
|
13444
|
+
if (code !== "request.no_local" && code !== "request.ask_other" && code !== "request.cancelled") {
|
|
13445
|
+
throw new ToolError("request_failed", `seal request: ${here && "error" in here ? here.error.message : code}`);
|
|
13443
13446
|
}
|
|
13444
13447
|
}
|
|
13445
13448
|
const guard = kind === "file" ? null : await guardStatus(runCli);
|
|
@@ -13461,7 +13464,10 @@ async function sealRequest(ctx, input, deps) {
|
|
|
13461
13464
|
whereUrl: input.whereUrl,
|
|
13462
13465
|
kind,
|
|
13463
13466
|
to: card && owner !== null ? owner.address : void 0,
|
|
13464
|
-
|
|
13467
|
+
// A binding is the guard's to keep: the page shows one, and lends the key under a lease, only
|
|
13468
|
+
// when the request says a guard is its recipient — `bind` present, hosts proposed or not.
|
|
13469
|
+
// Without a guard the value lands in the file as it is, and the page says so (review of phase 1).
|
|
13470
|
+
bind: guard ? input.bind ?? { hosts: [] } : void 0
|
|
13465
13471
|
});
|
|
13466
13472
|
} catch (err2) {
|
|
13467
13473
|
throw new ToolError("request_failed", `POST /intake failed: ${err2 instanceof Error ? err2.message : String(err2)}`, err2);
|
|
@@ -14175,7 +14181,7 @@ function proFileGetOutputToWire(out) {
|
|
|
14175
14181
|
}
|
|
14176
14182
|
|
|
14177
14183
|
// src/server.ts
|
|
14178
|
-
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.11.
|
|
14184
|
+
var SERVER_VERSION = "0.11.2";
|
|
14179
14185
|
var toolMeta = (name2) => {
|
|
14180
14186
|
const { title, description, annotations } = seal_mcp_v1_default.tools[name2];
|
|
14181
14187
|
return { title, description, annotations };
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "sealnet-mcp",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.11.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.11.2",
|
|
4
4
|
"mcpName": "net.seal/mcp",
|
|
5
5
|
"description": "Model Context Protocol server for SEAL: files go to the user's SEAL inbox once connected, else the link goes on the clipboard or in a 0600 file, never in the chat; explicit opt-in to forward mode with strict TTL/recipient policy.",
|
|
6
6
|
"type": "module",
|