sealbridge 0.0.1 → 0.2.0

package/dist/packages/runtime/dist/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+export * from './policy.js';
+export * from './quota.js';
+export * from './mcp.js';
+export * from './mcp-server.js';
+export * from './verifier.js';
+export * from './gateway.js';
+export * from './a2a.js';
+export * from './inbox.js';
+export * from './adapter.js';
+export * from './approval-providers.js';
+export { createSignedAgentCard, verifySignedAgentCard, toA2AAgentCard, createInviteToken, parseAndVerifyInviteToken, } from '../../core/dist/index.js';
+export * from './session.js';
+export { PeerRejectedError } from './session-audit.js';
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/packages/runtime/dist/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/packages/runtime/dist/mcp-server.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+import type { Json, KeyPair } from '@acp/core';
+import { RevocationRegistry } from '@acp/core';
+import type { RelayTransport } from '@acp/relay';
+import type { Readable, Writable } from 'node:stream';
+import type { ApprovalProvider } from './approval-providers.js';
+export interface AcpMcpServerOptions {
+    owner: KeyPair;
+    relay?: RelayTransport | string;
+    revocation?: RevocationRegistry;
+    name?: string;
+    /** Signs agentDid on acp_create_invite when that DID is not the server owner. */
+    agentKey?: KeyPair;
+    /**
+     * When set, a task may proceed only if its worker DID is listed. An invite
+     * matches when either agentDid or ownerDid is listed. Checked before dialing.
+     */
+    allowedWorkerDids?: string[];
+    /**
+     * When set, every outbound relay URL must match an entry after normalization
+     * to origin + pathname with no trailing slash. Includes tool arguments, the
+     * configured relay, and relay URLs embedded in invite tokens.
+     */
+    allowedRelayUrls?: string[];
+    /**
+     * Permit a tool call or invite to select a relay other than `relay` when no
+     * allowlist is set. `allowedRelayUrls` still wins when it is set.
+     */
+    allowAnyRelay?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Opt in to loopback and RFC1918 relays. Untrusted invites stay blocked by default.
+     * Passed through to relay URL validation and invite parsing.
+     */
+    allowPrivateRelay?: boolean;
+    /** Used for pre-send and final-verification approvals instead of the default. */
+    approvalProvider?: ApprovalProvider;
+    /**
+     * POST `{ taskId, summaryHash, reason, approverDid }` and sign the owner
+     * decision only when the webhook returns `{ approved: true }`.
+     */
+    approvalWebhookUrl?: string;
+    approvalWebhookFetcher?: typeof fetch;
+    /** Use InteractiveCliApprovalProvider instead of policy auto-approval. */
+    requireInteractiveApproval?: boolean;
+    /** Streams for `requireInteractiveApproval`. Default to process stdin and stdout. */
+    approvalInput?: Readable;
+    approvalOutput?: Writable;
+}
+/** Origin plus pathname, without a trailing slash. Query and fragment are dropped. */
+export declare function normalizeMcpRelayUrl(value: string): string;
+/** Dependency-free MCP server for ACP delegation, discovery, audit verification, and revocation. */
+export declare class AcpMcpServer {
+    readonly options: AcpMcpServerOptions;
+    readonly revocation: RevocationRegistry;
+    private readonly allowedWorkers?;
+    private readonly allowedRelays?;
+    private readonly approval;
+    private framed;
+    constructor(options: AcpMcpServerOptions);
+    handle(message: unknown): Promise<Json | undefined>;
+    /** Read newline-delimited JSON or Content-Length frames and answer in the same framing. */
+    serve(input: Readable, output: Writable): Promise<void>;
+    private drain;
+    private reply;
+    private write;
+    private dispatch;
+    private toolsCall;
+    private callTool;
+    private client;
+    private isInvite;
+    private parseInvite;
+    /** Reject unlisted workers before any relay dial. */
+    private assertWorker;
+    /**
+     * Reject unlisted or switched relay URLs before any relay dial.
+     * Explicit tool URLs are dial targets. Invite URLs are outbound destinations
+     * even when the configured transport is what would be dialed.
+     */
+    private assertRelays;
+    private outboundApprovalRequired;
+    /** Ask the configured provider before task input is written to the relay. */
+    private approveOutbound;
+    private delegateTask;
+    private delegateMulti;
+    private relayList;
+    private verifyBundle;
+    private createInvite;
+    private revokeToken;
+    private discoverWorkers;
+    private inspectRevocations;
+}