saaslayer 0.3.0 → 0.4.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +199 -18
- package/bin/saaslayer.js +335 -62
- package/package.json +3 -2
- package/src/aws-sigv4.js +74 -26
- package/src/commands/access-admins.js +2 -2
- package/src/commands/admin-allowlist.js +23 -3
- package/src/commands/api-keys.js +83 -0
- package/src/commands/audit.js +77 -0
- package/src/commands/aws.js +355 -82
- package/src/commands/binding-handoff.js +174 -0
- package/src/commands/bindings.js +111 -0
- package/src/commands/catalog.js +30 -3
- package/src/commands/deploy.js +49 -11
- package/src/commands/env-export.js +58 -0
- package/src/commands/first-admin.js +15 -4
- package/src/commands/foundation.js +75 -117
- package/src/commands/hooks.js +271 -0
- package/src/commands/integration-credentials.js +1 -1
- package/src/commands/lifecycle.js +149 -24
- package/src/commands/login-domain.js +259 -0
- package/src/commands/permission-orgs.js +80 -0
- package/src/commands/release-manifest.js +17 -8
- package/src/commands/service-principals.js +42 -5
- package/src/commands/settings.js +21 -5
- package/src/commands/sms-registration.js +182 -0
- package/src/commands/sms.js +178 -0
- package/src/commands/social.js +265 -0
- package/src/commands/support-staff.js +72 -0
- package/src/commands/users-management.js +2 -20
- package/src/commands/users.js +56 -11
- package/src/commands/versions.js +61 -0
- package/src/connection-proof.js +41 -0
- package/src/deployments.js +14 -2
- package/src/foundation-change-set.js +180 -0
- package/src/foundation-home.js +121 -0
- package/src/foundation-template.js +51 -10
- package/src/foundation-trust-write.js +379 -0
- package/src/iam-session.js +14 -8
- package/src/login-domain.js +138 -0
- package/src/login-methods.js +118 -0
- package/src/module-catalog.js +3 -2
- package/src/release-manifest.js +11 -4
- package/src/scope.js +3 -1
- package/src/settings.js +85 -13
- package/src/sms/number.js +37 -0
- package/src/sms/registration-fields.js +167 -0
- package/src/sms/registration-validate.js +151 -0
- package/src/sms/registration.js +216 -0
- package/src/sms/release.js +55 -0
- package/src/sms/scope.js +86 -0
- package/src/sms/status.js +181 -0
- package/src/ssm-api.js +31 -0
- package/src/trust-entries.js +350 -0
- package/src/user-service-instance.js +27 -0
- package/src/users-api.js +55 -8
- package/src/users-import/checkpoint.js +76 -0
- package/src/users-import/import.js +233 -24
- package/src/versions.js +80 -0
- package/templates/bootstrap/saaslayer-bootstrap-permission-set-inline-policy.json +148 -0
- package/templates/bootstrap/saaslayer-bootstrap-policy-email-sender.json +22 -0
- package/templates/bootstrap/saaslayer-bootstrap-policy-sms-number.json +22 -0
- package/templates/bootstrap/saaslayer-bootstrap-policy.json +114 -0
- package/templates/bootstrap/saaslayer-bootstrap-trust-policy.json +18 -0
- package/templates/saaslayer-foundation-region.yml +45 -1
- package/templates/saaslayer-foundation.yml +759 -309
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#
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# SECURITY REVIEWER SUMMARY
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#
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# This template creates one S3 bucket, one permissions-boundary managed policy,
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# This template creates one S3 bucket, one permissions-boundary managed policy, one managed policy attached to the
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# execution role (sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy), and three IAM roles:
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#
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# 1. SaaSLayerDeploymentRole — the only cross-account WRITE entry point.
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#
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#
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# 1. SaaSLayerDeploymentRole — the only cross-account WRITE entry point. Its trust is rendered from
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# the TrustEntries parameter: one statement per managing control plane, each naming only that
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# control plane's account, its deploy identity role (aws:PrincipalArn) and its trust identifiers
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# (sts:ExternalId). It can drive the CloudFormation lifecycle of stacks whose names start with
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# StackNamePrefix (default "sl-"), read/write the deployment artifact buckets, update the
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# configuration of StackNamePrefix functions (credential hot-swap), and pass exactly
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# one role (SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole) to CloudFormation. It cannot create IAM
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# resources
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# resources. Its direct writes reach only StackNamePrefix-named resources (stacks, buckets, tables,
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# functions, log groups, secrets) or resources carrying managed-by=saaslayer-deployer (user pools,
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# KMS keys, ACM certificates, API Gateway custom domains and REST API stages, native-edge CloudFront
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# distributions); it creates certificates, custom domains and distributions only carrying that tag.
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# It may import resources into a stack only through the
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# retained-resource adoption change set (saaslayer-adopt-*) and only the types adoption handles. It
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# also writes /saaslayer/deployment/* SSM parameters (deployment handoff values). Its only
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# sts:AssumeRole grant is into a module stack's own data-migration role
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# (role/${StackNamePrefix}*-migrate), whose policy limits it to that service's tables.
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# (role/${StackNamePrefix}*-migrate), whose policy limits it to that service's tables. It may read
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# exactly one SSM parameter under /saaslayer/foundation: connection-authorizers (below).
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#
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# 2. SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole — assumable ONLY by the CloudFormation service, never
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# cross-account. CloudFormation uses it to create/update/delete the resources declared by
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# approved SaaSLayer module templates. Its permissions are the provisioning verbs derived from
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# the module resource inventory (see per-statement comments below).
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#
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#
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# the module resource inventory (see per-statement comments below). Buckets, tables, functions,
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# topics, KMS aliases, IAM roles/policies, SMS configuration sets, alarms, dashboards, event buses
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# and rules, log groups, schedules, SSM parameters, queues and CloudFront functions are scoped to
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# StackNamePrefix names (the alarm-to-queue grants sit in sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy, attached
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# to this role); user pools, identity pools, KMS keys, CloudFront distributions and secrets to
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# resources carrying managed-by=saaslayer-deployer (created only carrying it, and managed-by can never
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# be added to a user pool that lacks it); API Gateway to the API paths (never custom domains,
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# mappings, the account or VPC links). CloudFront origin access controls (id ARNs, no condition keys)
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# still take Resource '*', as do the Cognito log-delivery verbs and the identity pool role
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# attachment, which take no resource.
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# Because only SaaSLayerDeploymentRole can pass this role, it is reachable exclusively through the
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# audited stack lifecycle above.
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#
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# 3. SaaSLayerSupportReadOnlyRole — a separate cross-account READ-ONLY role for SaaSLayer support
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# staff.
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# staff. Trust rendered from TrustEntries like the deployment role (each control plane's support
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# identity role + trust identifiers), plus an enforced
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# "saaslayer-support-*" session-name pattern so every assumption is attributable in CloudTrail.
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# It carries only Get/List/Describe verbs, is tag-scoped to resources carrying
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# managed-by=saaslayer-deployer where IAM supports resource-tag conditions, and deliberately
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# values, no Secrets Manager secret values, no function code downloads). An explicit Deny
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# (DenySecretValueReads) covers the /saaslayer/deployment/* SecureStrings and their KMS decrypt.
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#
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# SaaSLayerConnectionAuthorizers is an SSM String parameter publishing ConnectionAuthorizerArns and the
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# control-plane ids in TrustEntries, so a control plane can read who may authorize connections through
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# the deployment role. It holds no secret.
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#
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# TRUST RENDERING: CloudFormation cannot parse JSON, so the SaaSLayer CLI renders the trust statements
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# from TrustEntries into this template before submitting it: each entry role's Statement line below is a
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# single-line JSON flow sequence (empty here, filled at deploy time), and the SSM value's controlPlanes
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# literal is filled the same way. Trust-only edits replace only those lines of the INSTALLED template.
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#
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# SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary is a permissions boundary attached to every IAM role that
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# SaaSLayer module templates create: whatever a module role's own policy says, its effective
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# runtime permissions can never exceed this boundary.
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# deploymentId, customerId, and moduleName for inventory and audit.
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#
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# Contract tests for this template live at tests/bootstrap.test.js (read-only guarantee for the
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# support role,
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# support role, rendered trust-statement enforcement, wildcard justification audit).
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AWSTemplateFormatVersion: '2010-09-09'
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Description: >-
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SaaSLayer foundation stack: grants
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to deploy and support SaaSLayer modules in this account. Installed once per account. Details:
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SaaSLayer foundation stack: grants each managing SaaSLayer control plane listed in TrustEntries scoped,
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trust-identifier-gated access to deploy and support SaaSLayer modules in this account. Installed once per account. Details:
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https://saaslayer.com/docs/account-access
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Parameters:
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Type: String
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AllowedPattern: '^[0-9]{12}$'
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Description: >-
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AWS account ID
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ExternalId:
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Initial control-plane AWS account ID (informational). TrustEntries determines each control plane's trust.
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TrustEntries:
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Type: String
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MaxLength: 4096
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Description: >-
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JSON v1 entries: controlPlaneId, principalAccountId, trustIdentifiers, deployCallerArns, supportCallerArns. The CLI renders trust; identifiers are ExternalIds, not secrets.
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ConnectionAuthorizerArns:
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Type: CommaDelimitedList
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Description: >-
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Path-less IAM principal ARNs allowed to authorize org connections. Defaults to the installer; changes require an explicit authorizer update.
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StackNamePrefix:
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Type: String
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Default: sl-
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Description: >-
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stacks whose names start with this prefix.
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The deployment role manages only CloudFormation stacks starting with this prefix.
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OrgId:
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Type: String
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Default: ''
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Description: >-
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SaaSLayer org
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trust decision. Surfaced in Outputs so support can identify the account from the stack alone.
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Connected SaaSLayer org (informational output only; never used for authorization).
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EnableEmailInbound:
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Type: String
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AllowedValues: ['true', 'false']
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email-inbound-service needs. Default 'false' so host accounts that do NOT run email-inbound are
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not over-permissioned for SES. Set per host via `cplane accounts enable-capability <host> ses`.
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Inbound SES permissions for email-inbound-service. Enable only on inbound-mail hosts: cplane accounts enable-capability <host> ses.
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AllowedValues: ['true', 'false']
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Description: >-
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single-tenant edge (epic f55t, Model B) provisions in this account. Default 'false' so host
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accounts that route through the shared edge are not granted CloudFront write. Set per host via
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`cplane accounts enable-capability <host> tenant-edge`.
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WARNING (rollout order): a host ALREADY running the native edge must have this enabled BEFORE
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its foundation is redeployed at >= 1.1.0, or the redeploy strips the perms its live edge needs.
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Native single-tenant edge CloudFront permissions. Enable: cplane accounts enable-capability <host> tenant-edge. Existing native-edge hosts must enable this before foundation >= 1.1.0 redeploy to preserve permissions.
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Conditions:
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# Capability gates. Each maps 1:1 to an entry in @saaslayer/foundation-contract (packages/
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# patch = comments/docs/no behavior change
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Meta:
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Foundation:
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Version: '
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Version: '8.3.0'
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Resources:
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# The shared deployment-artifact bucket moved OUT of this account-global stack into the per-region
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Principal:
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Service: cloudformation.amazonaws.com
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Action: sts:AssumeRole
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ManagedPolicyArns:
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- !Ref SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionPolicy
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Policies:
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- PolicyName: saaslayer-approved-template-execution
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PolicyDocument:
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# Resource '*'; resource-name namespacing work to tighten this is tracked in
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# docs/permissions-hardening.md.
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# Services scoped by the managed name prefix or the managed-by tag have their own statements below
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# (alarms, event buses and rules, log groups, schedules, parameters and queues in
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# sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy). What stays on Resource '*' is reads, creates that take no resource
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# ARN, verbs AWS defines with no resource type, and services not yet scoped (UNSCOPED_PENDING_ON_STAR
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# in tests/bootstrap.test.js, which may only shrink).
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- Effect: Allow
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Action:
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# API Gateway IAM actions are bare HTTP verbs against untyped resource paths;
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# REST API provisioning (methods, resources, deployments, stages, authorizers)
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# exercises all of them. Justified service wildcard (tests/bootstrap.test.js).
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- apigateway:*
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# Stack introspection while executing changesets (read-only verbs).
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- cloudformation:Describe*
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- cloudformation:Get*
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# sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy (managed prefix).
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# private S3 origin + OAC): *OriginAccessControl is its Create/Get/Update/Delete (template size). An OAC
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- cloudfront:GetDistribution*
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# DynamoDB table lifecycle (provisioning verbs only — no item read/write).
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# Identity pool calls that take no pool ARN: the pool list and the role attachment (user-service
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# IdentityPoolRoleAttachment). Pool lifecycle: tag-scoped statements below.
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- cognito-identity:ListIdentityPools
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- cognito-identity:SetIdentityPoolRoles
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# User-pool reads that take no resource ARN.
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- cognito-idp:DescribeUserPoolDomain
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- cognito-idp:ListUserPools
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# EventBridge custom event bus lifecycle (module event buses) + rule lifecycle for
|
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# scheduled Lambdas (serverless `schedule` events generate AWS::Events::Rule — e.g.
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# rbac-service's event-delivery poller). DescribeRule/PutRule/*Targets are required
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# or the rule CREATE fails with AccessDenied.
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- events:DeleteEventBus
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# or the rule CREATE fails with AccessDenied. Reads here; lifecycle: sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy.
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- events:EnableRule
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-
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-
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- events:UntagResource
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# EarlyValidation runs a KMS::Alias name-conflict check on change-set creation; without
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# ListAliases it reports a (non-fatal) "not allowed to check if resource already exists"
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# FAIL in the console Hooks view and can't detect a real alias collision. Enumeration API,
|
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# no resource-level scoping (monorepo-pcren). Key and alias lifecycle: tag/prefix-scoped statements below.
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- kms:ListAliases
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223
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# IAM read-only introspection during changeset execution. Mutating IAM verbs
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224
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# (Create/Delete/Update/Attach/Pass/Tag) are prefix-scoped in dedicated
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# statements below — never Resource '*' — and CreateRole additionally requires
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@@ -254,202 +232,284 @@ Resources:
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- iam:ListEntitiesForPolicy
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- iam:ListPolicyVersions
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- iam:ListRolePolicies
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#
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#
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# encryption; CreateKey mandates Resource '*', and TagResource on the new key
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# is required or CloudFormation fails with UnauthorizedTaggingOperation.
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- kms:CreateAlias
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- kms:CreateKey
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263
|
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# EarlyValidation runs a KMS::Alias name-conflict check on change-set creation; without
|
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264
|
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# ListAliases it reports a (non-fatal) "not allowed to check if resource already exists"
|
|
265
|
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# FAIL in the console Hooks view and can't detect a real alias collision. Enumeration API,
|
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266
|
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# no resource-level scoping (monorepo-pcren).
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- kms:ListAliases
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|
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# Grant + data-plane actions: a resource encrypted with a customer CMK (email-inbound's
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|
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# InboundTable via DynamoDB SSE-KMS) makes the service create a grant AND
|
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|
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# decrypt/generate data keys against the CMK during provisioning — without these the
|
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271
|
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# table create fails AccessDenied (kms:CreateGrant, then kms:Decrypt/GenerateDataKey).
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- kms:CreateGrant
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- kms:Decrypt
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274
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- kms:DeleteAlias
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275
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-
- kms:DescribeKey
|
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276
|
-
- kms:DisableKeyRotation
|
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277
|
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- kms:EnableKeyRotation
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278
|
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- kms:Encrypt
|
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279
|
-
- kms:GenerateDataKey
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280
|
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- kms:GenerateDataKeyWithoutPlaintext
|
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281
|
-
- kms:GetKeyPolicy
|
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282
|
-
- kms:GetKeyRotationStatus
|
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283
|
-
- kms:ListGrants
|
|
284
|
-
- kms:ListResourceTags
|
|
285
|
-
- kms:PutKeyPolicy
|
|
286
|
-
- kms:ReEncryptFrom
|
|
287
|
-
- kms:ReEncryptTo
|
|
288
|
-
- kms:RevokeGrant
|
|
289
|
-
- kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion
|
|
290
|
-
- kms:TagResource
|
|
291
|
-
- kms:UntagResource
|
|
292
|
-
- kms:UpdateAlias
|
|
293
|
-
# Lambda function/layer/alias/event-source lifecycle. lambda:InvokeFunction is
|
|
294
|
-
# required because module templates use CloudFormation custom resources
|
|
295
|
-
# (Custom::Delay in user-service) that CloudFormation invokes during deploys.
|
|
296
|
-
- lambda:AddPermission
|
|
235
|
+
# Lambda calls that take no function ARN (event-source-mapping create, account and list reads).
|
|
236
|
+
# Function lifecycle: the managed-prefix statement below.
|
|
297
237
|
- lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping
|
|
298
|
-
- lambda:CreateFunction
|
|
299
|
-
- lambda:DeleteEventSourceMapping
|
|
300
|
-
- lambda:DeleteFunction
|
|
301
|
-
- lambda:DeleteFunctionConcurrency
|
|
302
|
-
- lambda:DeleteFunctionEventInvokeConfig
|
|
303
|
-
- lambda:DeleteLayerVersion
|
|
304
|
-
- lambda:DeleteProvisionedConcurrencyConfig
|
|
305
238
|
- lambda:GetAccountSettings
|
|
306
|
-
- lambda:GetAlias
|
|
307
239
|
- lambda:GetEventSourceMapping
|
|
308
|
-
- lambda:GetFunction
|
|
309
|
-
- lambda:GetFunctionCodeSigningConfig
|
|
310
|
-
- lambda:GetFunctionConcurrency
|
|
311
|
-
- lambda:GetFunctionConfiguration
|
|
312
|
-
- lambda:GetFunctionEventInvokeConfig
|
|
313
|
-
- lambda:GetLayerVersion
|
|
314
|
-
- lambda:GetPolicy
|
|
315
|
-
- lambda:GetProvisionedConcurrencyConfig
|
|
316
|
-
- lambda:GetRuntimeManagementConfig
|
|
317
|
-
- lambda:InvokeFunction
|
|
318
|
-
- lambda:ListAliases
|
|
319
240
|
- lambda:ListEventSourceMappings
|
|
320
241
|
- lambda:ListFunctions
|
|
321
242
|
- lambda:ListLayerVersions
|
|
322
|
-
|
|
323
|
-
- lambda:ListVersionsByFunction
|
|
324
|
-
- lambda:PublishLayerVersion
|
|
325
|
-
- lambda:PublishVersion
|
|
326
|
-
- lambda:PutFunctionCodeSigningConfig
|
|
327
|
-
- lambda:PutFunctionConcurrency
|
|
328
|
-
- lambda:PutFunctionEventInvokeConfig
|
|
329
|
-
- lambda:PutProvisionedConcurrencyConfig
|
|
330
|
-
- lambda:RemovePermission
|
|
331
|
-
- lambda:TagResource
|
|
332
|
-
- lambda:UntagResource
|
|
333
|
-
- lambda:UpdateAlias
|
|
334
|
-
- lambda:UpdateEventSourceMapping
|
|
335
|
-
- lambda:UpdateFunctionCode
|
|
336
|
-
- lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration
|
|
337
|
-
# Log group lifecycle for module functions/services. The LogDelivery and
|
|
243
|
+
# Log group reads for module functions/services. The LogDelivery and
|
|
338
244
|
# resource-policy verbs support AWS::Cognito::LogDeliveryConfiguration
|
|
339
|
-
# (user-service auth event logging).
|
|
245
|
+
# (user-service auth event logging) and take no resource ARN. Log group and metric filter
|
|
246
|
+
# (billing-service ops alarms on its log events) lifecycle: sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy.
|
|
340
247
|
- logs:CreateLogDelivery
|
|
341
|
-
- logs:CreateLogGroup
|
|
342
|
-
- logs:CreateLogStream
|
|
343
248
|
- logs:DeleteLogDelivery
|
|
344
|
-
- logs:DeleteLogGroup
|
|
345
|
-
- logs:DeleteLogStream
|
|
346
|
-
- logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
|
|
347
249
|
- logs:DescribeIndexPolicies
|
|
348
250
|
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
|
|
349
251
|
- logs:DescribeLogStreams
|
|
252
|
+
- logs:DescribeMetricFilters
|
|
350
253
|
- logs:DescribeResourcePolicies
|
|
351
254
|
- logs:GetLogDelivery
|
|
352
255
|
- logs:ListLogDeliveries
|
|
353
256
|
- logs:ListTagsForResource
|
|
354
|
-
- logs:PutDestination
|
|
355
|
-
- logs:PutDestinationPolicy
|
|
356
|
-
- logs:PutLogEvents
|
|
357
257
|
- logs:PutResourcePolicy
|
|
358
|
-
- logs:PutRetentionPolicy
|
|
359
|
-
- logs:TagLogGroup
|
|
360
|
-
- logs:TagResource
|
|
361
|
-
- logs:UntagLogGroup
|
|
362
|
-
- logs:UntagResource
|
|
363
258
|
- logs:UpdateLogDelivery
|
|
364
|
-
# EventBridge Scheduler
|
|
365
|
-
# delegation expiry uses schedules; runtime CRUD is granted via the boundary).
|
|
366
|
-
-
|
|
367
|
-
- scheduler:CreateScheduleGroup
|
|
368
|
-
- scheduler:DeleteSchedule
|
|
369
|
-
- scheduler:DeleteScheduleGroup
|
|
259
|
+
# EventBridge Scheduler reads for module-declared schedules (rbac-core
|
|
260
|
+
# delegation expiry uses schedules; runtime CRUD is granted via the boundary). Lifecycle:
|
|
261
|
+
# sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy.
|
|
370
262
|
- scheduler:GetSchedule
|
|
371
263
|
- scheduler:GetScheduleGroup
|
|
372
264
|
- scheduler:ListTagsForResource
|
|
373
|
-
-
|
|
374
|
-
- scheduler:UntagResource
|
|
375
|
-
- scheduler:UpdateSchedule
|
|
376
|
-
# Secrets Manager secret lifecycle (AWS::SecretsManager::Secret in modules).
|
|
377
|
-
# No GetSecretValue: this role provisions secrets, it cannot read their values.
|
|
378
|
-
- secretsmanager:CreateSecret
|
|
379
|
-
- secretsmanager:DeleteResourcePolicy
|
|
380
|
-
- secretsmanager:DeleteSecret
|
|
265
|
+
# Secret metadata reads. Lifecycle: tag-scoped statements below.
|
|
381
266
|
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
|
|
382
267
|
- secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
|
|
383
|
-
|
|
268
|
+
# SSM parameter reads for module configuration exports (AWS::SSM::Parameter). Lifecycle:
|
|
269
|
+
# sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy.
|
|
270
|
+
- ssm:DescribeParameters
|
|
271
|
+
- ssm:GetParameter
|
|
272
|
+
- ssm:GetParameters
|
|
273
|
+
- ssm:GetParametersByPath
|
|
274
|
+
- ssm:ListTagsForResource
|
|
275
|
+
# SQS queue reads. Lifecycle: sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy.
|
|
276
|
+
- sqs:GetQueueAttributes
|
|
277
|
+
- sqs:ListQueueTags
|
|
278
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
279
|
+
# API Gateway IAM actions are bare HTTP verbs against untyped resource paths; REST, HTTP and
|
|
280
|
+
# WebSocket API provisioning (methods, resources, deployments, stages, authorizers, routes,
|
|
281
|
+
# integrations) exercises all of them. Justified service wildcard (tests/bootstrap.test.js), limited
|
|
282
|
+
# to the API paths and their tags: no module declares a custom domain, base path / API mapping, the
|
|
283
|
+
# account CloudWatch role, a VPC link or a usage plan, so those paths are out of reach. API ids
|
|
284
|
+
# carry no name, and osls tags HTTP APIs only on request, so no prefix or tag condition applies here.
|
|
285
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
286
|
+
Action:
|
|
287
|
+
- apigateway:*
|
|
288
|
+
Resource:
|
|
289
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/restapis
|
|
290
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/restapis/*
|
|
291
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/apis
|
|
292
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/apis/*
|
|
293
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/tags/*
|
|
294
|
+
# Cognito user and identity pools (user-service), CloudFront distributions (frontend-hosting,
|
|
295
|
+
# permissions-admin-ui) and secrets (user-service's PasswordlessMagicLinkHmacSecret, named by CloudFormation
|
|
296
|
+
# <LogicalId>-<random>, outside the managed prefix). Pool and distribution ARNs carry ids and the secret's name
|
|
297
|
+
# is not ours, so the managed-by tag scopes all four: created only carrying managed-by=saaslayer-deployer
|
|
298
|
+
# (user-service sets it in UserPoolTags, IdentityPoolTags and the secret's Tags; the modules' stack tags reach
|
|
299
|
+
# distributions and secrets), then changed only while they carry it. The pool and distribution create APIs take no resource
|
|
300
|
+
# ARN. Tags at create need TagResource with the request carrying managed-by; that grant could also stamp
|
|
301
|
+
# managed-by on an existing distribution, identity pool or secret, which this role reaches only through its
|
|
302
|
+
# own stacks (imports are limited to the adoption change set). User pools are guarded by the Deny below.
|
|
303
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
304
|
+
Action:
|
|
305
|
+
- cloudfront:CreateDistribution
|
|
306
|
+
- cloudfront:TagResource
|
|
307
|
+
- cognito-identity:CreateIdentityPool
|
|
308
|
+
- cognito-identity:TagResource
|
|
309
|
+
- cognito-idp:CreateUserPool
|
|
310
|
+
- secretsmanager:CreateSecret
|
|
311
|
+
- secretsmanager:TagResource
|
|
312
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
313
|
+
Condition:
|
|
314
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
315
|
+
aws:RequestTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
316
|
+
# Each action matches only its own service's ARNs. The pool CloudFormation handlers exercise a broad,
|
|
317
|
+
# shifting action set, so the service wildcards stay, limited to tagged pools. No GetSecretValue: this role
|
|
318
|
+
# provisions secrets, it cannot read their values. *TagResource is TagResource and UntagResource.
|
|
319
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
320
|
+
Action:
|
|
321
|
+
- cloudfront:*TagResource
|
|
322
|
+
- cloudfront:DeleteDistribution
|
|
323
|
+
- cloudfront:UpdateDistribution
|
|
324
|
+
- cognito-identity:*
|
|
325
|
+
- cognito-idp:*
|
|
326
|
+
# Secret verbs as globs (inline policy and template size): *Replica* is RemoveRegionsFromReplication,
|
|
327
|
+
# ReplicateSecretToRegions and StopReplicationToReplica; Update* is UpdateSecret and
|
|
328
|
+
# UpdateSecretVersionStage.
|
|
329
|
+
- secretsmanager:*Replica*
|
|
330
|
+
- secretsmanager:*TagResource
|
|
331
|
+
- secretsmanager:DeleteSecret
|
|
384
332
|
- secretsmanager:PutSecretValue
|
|
385
|
-
- secretsmanager:RemoveRegionsFromReplication
|
|
386
|
-
- secretsmanager:ReplicateSecretToRegions
|
|
387
333
|
- secretsmanager:RestoreSecret
|
|
388
|
-
- secretsmanager:
|
|
389
|
-
|
|
390
|
-
-
|
|
391
|
-
-
|
|
392
|
-
-
|
|
393
|
-
|
|
394
|
-
|
|
334
|
+
- secretsmanager:Update*
|
|
335
|
+
Resource:
|
|
336
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudfront::${AWS::AccountId}:distribution/*
|
|
337
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cognito-identity:*:${AWS::AccountId}:identitypool/*
|
|
338
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cognito-idp:*:${AWS::AccountId}:userpool/*
|
|
339
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:secretsmanager:*:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:*
|
|
340
|
+
Condition:
|
|
341
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
342
|
+
aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
343
|
+
# managed-by unlocks the deploy role's tag-scoped pool actions, so it can never be added to a pool
|
|
344
|
+
# that does not already carry it (e.g. a customer pool brought in by an import).
|
|
345
|
+
- Effect: Deny
|
|
346
|
+
Action:
|
|
347
|
+
- cognito-idp:TagResource
|
|
348
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
349
|
+
Condition:
|
|
350
|
+
ForAnyValue:StringEquals:
|
|
351
|
+
aws:TagKeys:
|
|
352
|
+
- managed-by
|
|
353
|
+
'Null':
|
|
354
|
+
aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: 'true'
|
|
355
|
+
# DynamoDB table lifecycle (provisioning verbs only — no item read/write). Every module table is
|
|
356
|
+
# ${stackName}-<suffix>, under the managed prefix.
|
|
357
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
358
|
+
Action:
|
|
359
|
+
- dynamodb:CreateTable
|
|
360
|
+
- dynamodb:DeleteTable
|
|
361
|
+
- dynamodb:Describe*
|
|
362
|
+
- dynamodb:ListTagsOfResource
|
|
363
|
+
- dynamodb:TagResource
|
|
364
|
+
- dynamodb:UntagResource
|
|
365
|
+
- dynamodb:UpdateContinuousBackups
|
|
366
|
+
- dynamodb:UpdateContributorInsights
|
|
367
|
+
- dynamodb:UpdateTable
|
|
368
|
+
- dynamodb:UpdateTimeToLive
|
|
369
|
+
# The wildcard also covers the tables' indexes (table/<name>/index/<index>).
|
|
370
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:dynamodb:*:${AWS::AccountId}:table/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
371
|
+
# KMS customer-managed key + alias lifecycle. rbac-service provisions an
|
|
372
|
+
# EventDeliveryKey (AWS::KMS::Key, rotation on) + alias for webhook payload
|
|
373
|
+
# encryption; CreateKey mandates Resource '*', and TagResource on the new key
|
|
374
|
+
# is required or CloudFormation fails with UnauthorizedTaggingOperation. A key carries no name,
|
|
375
|
+
# so the managed-by tag (a stack tag) scopes it: CreateKey and its tags-at-create need the request
|
|
376
|
+
# to carry managed-by; every other key call needs a key that already carries it.
|
|
377
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
378
|
+
Action:
|
|
379
|
+
- kms:CreateKey
|
|
380
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
381
|
+
Condition:
|
|
382
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
383
|
+
aws:RequestTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
384
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
385
|
+
Action:
|
|
386
|
+
- kms:TagResource
|
|
387
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:kms:*:${AWS::AccountId}:key/*
|
|
388
|
+
Condition:
|
|
389
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
390
|
+
aws:RequestTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
391
|
+
# GlobalTable's provider reads the AWS-managed DynamoDB key when SSEEnabled is true without a CMK.
|
|
392
|
+
# AWS-managed keys cannot carry our resource tag; allow metadata only, for this service alias only.
|
|
393
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
394
|
+
Action:
|
|
395
|
+
- kms:DescribeKey
|
|
396
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:kms:*:${AWS::AccountId}:key/*
|
|
397
|
+
Condition:
|
|
398
|
+
ForAnyValue:StringEquals:
|
|
399
|
+
kms:ResourceAliases:
|
|
400
|
+
- alias/aws/dynamodb
|
|
401
|
+
# Grant + data-plane actions: a resource encrypted with a customer CMK (email-inbound's
|
|
402
|
+
# InboundTable via DynamoDB SSE-KMS) makes the service create a grant AND
|
|
403
|
+
# decrypt/generate data keys against the CMK during provisioning — without these the
|
|
404
|
+
# table create fails AccessDenied (kms:CreateGrant, then kms:Decrypt/GenerateDataKey).
|
|
405
|
+
# Alias verbs authorize against both the alias (next statement) and its key (here).
|
|
406
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
407
|
+
Action:
|
|
408
|
+
- kms:*Alias
|
|
409
|
+
- kms:CreateGrant
|
|
410
|
+
- kms:Decrypt
|
|
411
|
+
- kms:DescribeKey
|
|
412
|
+
- kms:DisableKeyRotation
|
|
413
|
+
- kms:EnableKeyRotation
|
|
414
|
+
- kms:Encrypt
|
|
415
|
+
- kms:GenerateDataKey*
|
|
416
|
+
- kms:Get*
|
|
417
|
+
- kms:List*
|
|
418
|
+
- kms:PutKeyPolicy
|
|
419
|
+
- kms:ReEncrypt*
|
|
420
|
+
- kms:RevokeGrant
|
|
421
|
+
- kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion
|
|
422
|
+
- kms:TagResource
|
|
423
|
+
- kms:UntagResource
|
|
424
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:kms:*:${AWS::AccountId}:key/*
|
|
425
|
+
Condition:
|
|
426
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
427
|
+
aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
428
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
429
|
+
Action:
|
|
430
|
+
- kms:*Alias
|
|
431
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:kms:*:${AWS::AccountId}:alias/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
432
|
+
# Lambda function/layer/alias/event-source lifecycle. lambda:InvokeFunction is
|
|
433
|
+
# required because module templates use CloudFormation custom resources
|
|
434
|
+
# (Custom::Delay in user-service) that CloudFormation invokes during deploys. Every module
|
|
435
|
+
# function is ${stackName}-<fn> or (email-inbound's pinned custom-resource functions)
|
|
436
|
+
# sl-email-inbound-<stage>-<fn>, under the managed prefix.
|
|
437
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
438
|
+
Action:
|
|
439
|
+
# Get/List/Delete/Put/Update as globs (inline policy size, as for buckets); the resources below
|
|
440
|
+
# keep them on managed-prefix functions and layers.
|
|
441
|
+
- lambda:AddPermission
|
|
442
|
+
- lambda:CreateFunction
|
|
443
|
+
- lambda:Delete*
|
|
444
|
+
- lambda:Get*
|
|
445
|
+
- lambda:InvokeFunction
|
|
446
|
+
- lambda:List*
|
|
447
|
+
- lambda:PublishLayerVersion
|
|
448
|
+
- lambda:PublishVersion
|
|
449
|
+
- lambda:Put*
|
|
450
|
+
- lambda:RemovePermission
|
|
451
|
+
- lambda:TagResource
|
|
452
|
+
- lambda:UntagResource
|
|
453
|
+
- lambda:Update*
|
|
454
|
+
Resource:
|
|
455
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:lambda:*:${AWS::AccountId}:function:${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
456
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:lambda:*:${AWS::AccountId}:layer:${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
457
|
+
# Event source mappings are addressed by id; lambda:FunctionArn limits them to managed-prefix functions.
|
|
458
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
459
|
+
Action:
|
|
460
|
+
- lambda:DeleteEventSourceMapping
|
|
461
|
+
- lambda:UpdateEventSourceMapping
|
|
462
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:lambda:*:${AWS::AccountId}:event-source-mapping:*
|
|
463
|
+
Condition:
|
|
464
|
+
ArnLike:
|
|
465
|
+
lambda:FunctionArn: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:lambda:*:${AWS::AccountId}:function:${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
466
|
+
# Stack tags reach event source mappings; Lambda's tag calls take no lambda:FunctionArn condition. A
|
|
467
|
+
# mapping's tags grant nothing anywhere in this account.
|
|
468
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
469
|
+
Action:
|
|
470
|
+
- lambda:ListTags
|
|
471
|
+
- lambda:TagResource
|
|
472
|
+
- lambda:UntagResource
|
|
473
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:lambda:*:${AWS::AccountId}:event-source-mapping:*
|
|
474
|
+
# S3 bucket lifecycle + bucket configuration for module buckets, plus object
|
|
475
|
+
# read/write used while CloudFormation stages template artifacts. Every module bucket, the shared
|
|
476
|
+
# artifacts bucket and the framework's auto-named deployment bucket start with the managed prefix.
|
|
477
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
478
|
+
Action:
|
|
479
|
+
# Bucket configuration verbs as globs (the role's inline policy is near IAM's 10,240-character
|
|
480
|
+
# limit); the resources below keep them on managed-prefix buckets.
|
|
395
481
|
- s3:CreateBucket
|
|
396
|
-
- s3:DeleteBucket
|
|
397
|
-
- s3:DeleteBucketPolicy
|
|
398
|
-
- s3:DeleteBucketWebsite
|
|
482
|
+
- s3:DeleteBucket*
|
|
399
483
|
- s3:DeleteObject
|
|
400
484
|
- s3:GetAccelerateConfiguration
|
|
401
|
-
- s3:
|
|
402
|
-
- s3:GetBucketCORS
|
|
403
|
-
- s3:GetBucketLocation
|
|
404
|
-
- s3:GetBucketLogging
|
|
405
|
-
- s3:GetBucketNotification
|
|
406
|
-
- s3:GetBucketObjectLockConfiguration
|
|
407
|
-
- s3:GetBucketOwnershipControls
|
|
408
|
-
- s3:GetBucketPolicy
|
|
409
|
-
- s3:GetBucketPublicAccessBlock
|
|
410
|
-
- s3:GetBucketTagging
|
|
411
|
-
- s3:GetBucketVersioning
|
|
412
|
-
- s3:GetBucketWebsite
|
|
485
|
+
- s3:GetBucket*
|
|
413
486
|
- s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration
|
|
414
487
|
- s3:GetLifecycleConfiguration
|
|
415
488
|
- s3:GetObject
|
|
416
489
|
- s3:ListBucket
|
|
417
490
|
- s3:PutAccelerateConfiguration
|
|
418
|
-
- s3:
|
|
419
|
-
- s3:PutBucketCORS
|
|
420
|
-
- s3:PutBucketLogging
|
|
421
|
-
- s3:PutBucketNotification
|
|
422
|
-
- s3:PutBucketObjectLockConfiguration
|
|
423
|
-
- s3:PutBucketOwnershipControls
|
|
424
|
-
- s3:PutBucketPolicy
|
|
425
|
-
- s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock
|
|
426
|
-
- s3:PutBucketTagging
|
|
427
|
-
- s3:PutBucketVersioning
|
|
428
|
-
- s3:PutBucketWebsite
|
|
491
|
+
- s3:PutBucket*
|
|
429
492
|
- s3:PutEncryptionConfiguration
|
|
430
493
|
- s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration
|
|
431
494
|
- s3:PutObject
|
|
432
495
|
- s3:PutObjectAcl
|
|
433
|
-
|
|
434
|
-
|
|
435
|
-
|
|
436
|
-
|
|
437
|
-
|
|
438
|
-
|
|
439
|
-
|
|
440
|
-
-
|
|
441
|
-
-
|
|
442
|
-
-
|
|
443
|
-
-
|
|
444
|
-
|
|
445
|
-
-
|
|
446
|
-
-
|
|
447
|
-
-
|
|
448
|
-
-
|
|
449
|
-
|
|
450
|
-
- sqs:TagQueue
|
|
451
|
-
- sqs:UntagQueue
|
|
452
|
-
Resource: '*'
|
|
496
|
+
# The wildcard also covers the buckets' objects (<bucket>/<key>).
|
|
497
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:s3:::${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
498
|
+
# SNS topic lifecycle: module stacks create an ops-alarms topic that
|
|
499
|
+
# alarms publish to (lean health checks). Full lifecycle so
|
|
500
|
+
# CloudFormation can create/read/tag/delete the managed topics (${stackName}-ops-alarms).
|
|
501
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
502
|
+
Action:
|
|
503
|
+
- sns:CreateTopic
|
|
504
|
+
- sns:DeleteTopic
|
|
505
|
+
- sns:GetTopicAttributes
|
|
506
|
+
- sns:SetTopicAttributes
|
|
507
|
+
- sns:Subscribe
|
|
508
|
+
- sns:Unsubscribe
|
|
509
|
+
- sns:ListSubscriptionsByTopic
|
|
510
|
+
- sns:TagResource
|
|
511
|
+
- sns:UntagResource
|
|
512
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:sns:*:${AWS::AccountId}:${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
453
513
|
# Mutating IAM verbs are scoped to the managed-resource prefix (StackNamePrefix) so
|
|
454
514
|
# the exec role can only create/modify SaaSLayer module roles + customer-managed
|
|
455
515
|
# policies — never a pre-existing account role, and never the control-plane primitives
|
|
@@ -486,6 +546,17 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
486
546
|
- iam:TagPolicy
|
|
487
547
|
- iam:UntagPolicy
|
|
488
548
|
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
549
|
+
# Cognito email through SES (user-service CognitoEmailSenderArn → DEVELOPER email): on the first such
|
|
550
|
+
# user pool in an account, Cognito creates its email service-linked role with these credentials
|
|
551
|
+
# (UPDATE failed AccessDenied "allow 'email.cognito-idp.amazonaws.com' to call iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole").
|
|
552
|
+
# Scoped to exactly that service and role path.
|
|
553
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
554
|
+
Action:
|
|
555
|
+
- iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole
|
|
556
|
+
Resource: 'arn:aws:iam::*:role/aws-service-role/email.cognito-idp.amazonaws.com/*'
|
|
557
|
+
Condition:
|
|
558
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
559
|
+
iam:AWSServiceName: email.cognito-idp.amazonaws.com
|
|
489
560
|
# Self-protecting Deny (defense-in-depth): the exec role can never mutate the
|
|
490
561
|
# permissions boundary or the three bootstrap roles, even though prefix scoping
|
|
491
562
|
# already excludes their SaaSLayer* names. An explicit Deny overrides any Allow.
|
|
@@ -504,6 +575,7 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
504
575
|
- iam:UpdateRole
|
|
505
576
|
Resource:
|
|
506
577
|
- !Ref SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary
|
|
578
|
+
- !Ref SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionPolicy
|
|
507
579
|
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/sl-foundation-cfn-exec-role
|
|
508
580
|
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/sl-foundation-deploy-role
|
|
509
581
|
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/sl-foundation-support-ro-role
|
|
@@ -516,14 +588,22 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
516
588
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
517
589
|
Action:
|
|
518
590
|
- cloudfront:CreateFunction
|
|
519
|
-
- cloudfront:PublishFunction
|
|
520
|
-
- cloudfront:UpdateFunction
|
|
521
591
|
- cloudfront:DescribeFunction
|
|
522
592
|
- cloudfront:GetFunction
|
|
523
593
|
- cloudfront:ListFunctions
|
|
524
594
|
- cloudfront:ListDistributions
|
|
525
595
|
Resource: '*'
|
|
526
596
|
- !Ref AWS::NoValue
|
|
597
|
+
# Function ARNs carry the function name; every edge function is named under the managed prefix
|
|
598
|
+
# (frontend-hosting ${stackName}-<region code>-f, the native edge's sl-strip-<slug>).
|
|
599
|
+
- Fn::If:
|
|
600
|
+
- TenantEdgeEnabled
|
|
601
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
602
|
+
Action:
|
|
603
|
+
- cloudfront:PublishFunction
|
|
604
|
+
- cloudfront:UpdateFunction
|
|
605
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudfront::${AWS::AccountId}:function/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
606
|
+
- !Ref AWS::NoValue
|
|
527
607
|
# SES receipt rule set/rule provisioning — only on hosts that run email-inbound
|
|
528
608
|
# (EnableEmailInbound=true). Identity verification (VerifyDomainIdentity/DKIM) runs
|
|
529
609
|
# CP-side in the domain-service, never from the tenant account.
|
|
@@ -543,6 +623,33 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
543
623
|
- ses:DescribeReceiptRule
|
|
544
624
|
Resource: '*'
|
|
545
625
|
- !Ref AWS::NoValue
|
|
626
|
+
# Phone sign-in SMS (user-service phone pools): the AWS::SMSVOICE::ConfigurationSet
|
|
627
|
+
# (${stackName}-phoneSms, under the managed prefix) and its AWS::SMSVOICE::ProtectConfiguration
|
|
628
|
+
# (country rule set; AWS-generated id, so not name-scopable). Lifecycle + tag verbs only: no
|
|
629
|
+
# sending, no account-default protect, spend limit, origination identity or registration changes.
|
|
630
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
631
|
+
Action:
|
|
632
|
+
- sms-voice:AssociateProtectConfiguration
|
|
633
|
+
- sms-voice:CreateConfigurationSet
|
|
634
|
+
- sms-voice:CreateProtectConfiguration
|
|
635
|
+
- sms-voice:DeleteConfigurationSet
|
|
636
|
+
- sms-voice:DeleteProtectConfiguration
|
|
637
|
+
- sms-voice:DisassociateProtectConfiguration
|
|
638
|
+
- sms-voice:GetProtectConfigurationCountryRuleSet
|
|
639
|
+
- sms-voice:ListTagsForResource
|
|
640
|
+
- sms-voice:TagResource
|
|
641
|
+
- sms-voice:UntagResource
|
|
642
|
+
- sms-voice:UpdateProtectConfiguration
|
|
643
|
+
- sms-voice:UpdateProtectConfigurationCountryRuleSet
|
|
644
|
+
Resource:
|
|
645
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:sms-voice:*:${AWS::AccountId}:configuration-set/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
646
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:sms-voice:*:${AWS::AccountId}:protect-configuration/*
|
|
647
|
+
# The SMS resources' read handlers enumerate with Describe*, which take no resource scope.
|
|
648
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
649
|
+
Action:
|
|
650
|
+
- sms-voice:DescribeConfigurationSets
|
|
651
|
+
- sms-voice:DescribeProtectConfigurations
|
|
652
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
546
653
|
# Module templates use the AWS::LanguageExtensions transform; CloudFormation
|
|
547
654
|
# requires CreateChangeSet on the transform pseudo-resource to expand it.
|
|
548
655
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
@@ -550,6 +657,89 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
550
657
|
- cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
|
|
551
658
|
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudformation:${AWS::Region}:aws:transform/LanguageExtensions
|
|
552
659
|
|
|
660
|
+
# Managed-prefix lifecycle grants of SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole that do not fit its inline policy (IAM caps a
|
|
661
|
+
# role's inline policies at 10,240 characters in total). Attached to that role only; the role's self-protecting Deny
|
|
662
|
+
# keeps it from changing this policy.
|
|
663
|
+
SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionPolicy:
|
|
664
|
+
Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
|
|
665
|
+
Properties:
|
|
666
|
+
ManagedPolicyName: sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy
|
|
667
|
+
Description: Managed-prefix lifecycle of module alarms, event buses and rules, log groups, schedules, parameters and queues.
|
|
668
|
+
PolicyDocument:
|
|
669
|
+
Version: '2012-10-17'
|
|
670
|
+
Statement:
|
|
671
|
+
# Alarm, dashboard, EventBridge bus and rule, log group, schedule, SSM parameter and queue lifecycle. Every
|
|
672
|
+
# module names these from its stack name: alarms ${stackName}-<alarm>, buses ${stackName}-<purpose>, rules
|
|
673
|
+
# ${stackName}-<fn> (unnamed schedule rules get CloudFormation's <stackName>-<LogicalId>-<random>), the schedule
|
|
674
|
+
# group ${stackName}, parameters /${stackName}/..., queues ${stackName}-<purpose>. Log groups are
|
|
675
|
+
# /aws/lambda/<function> (every function is under the managed prefix) and /aws/cognito/${stackName}-logs.
|
|
676
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
677
|
+
Action:
|
|
678
|
+
- cloudwatch:DeleteAlarms
|
|
679
|
+
- cloudwatch:DeleteDashboards
|
|
680
|
+
- cloudwatch:DisableAlarmActions
|
|
681
|
+
- cloudwatch:EnableAlarmActions
|
|
682
|
+
- cloudwatch:PutDashboard
|
|
683
|
+
- cloudwatch:PutMetricAlarm
|
|
684
|
+
- cloudwatch:TagResource
|
|
685
|
+
- cloudwatch:UntagResource
|
|
686
|
+
- events:CreateEventBus
|
|
687
|
+
- events:DeleteEventBus
|
|
688
|
+
- events:DeleteRule
|
|
689
|
+
- events:DisableRule
|
|
690
|
+
- events:EnableRule
|
|
691
|
+
- events:PutRule
|
|
692
|
+
- events:PutTargets
|
|
693
|
+
- events:RemoveTargets
|
|
694
|
+
- events:TagResource
|
|
695
|
+
- events:UntagResource
|
|
696
|
+
- logs:CreateLogGroup
|
|
697
|
+
- logs:CreateLogStream
|
|
698
|
+
- logs:DeleteLogGroup
|
|
699
|
+
- logs:DeleteLogStream
|
|
700
|
+
- logs:DeleteMetricFilter
|
|
701
|
+
- logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
|
|
702
|
+
- logs:PutDestination
|
|
703
|
+
- logs:PutDestinationPolicy
|
|
704
|
+
- logs:PutLogEvents
|
|
705
|
+
- logs:PutMetricFilter
|
|
706
|
+
- logs:PutRetentionPolicy
|
|
707
|
+
- logs:TagLogGroup
|
|
708
|
+
- logs:TagResource
|
|
709
|
+
- logs:UntagLogGroup
|
|
710
|
+
- logs:UntagResource
|
|
711
|
+
- scheduler:CreateSchedule
|
|
712
|
+
- scheduler:CreateScheduleGroup
|
|
713
|
+
- scheduler:DeleteSchedule
|
|
714
|
+
- scheduler:DeleteScheduleGroup
|
|
715
|
+
- scheduler:TagResource
|
|
716
|
+
- scheduler:UntagResource
|
|
717
|
+
- scheduler:UpdateSchedule
|
|
718
|
+
- ssm:AddTagsToResource
|
|
719
|
+
- ssm:DeleteParameter
|
|
720
|
+
- ssm:DeleteParameters
|
|
721
|
+
- ssm:PutParameter
|
|
722
|
+
- ssm:RemoveTagsFromResource
|
|
723
|
+
- sqs:CreateQueue
|
|
724
|
+
- sqs:DeleteQueue
|
|
725
|
+
- sqs:SetQueueAttributes
|
|
726
|
+
- sqs:TagQueue
|
|
727
|
+
- sqs:UntagQueue
|
|
728
|
+
# Each action matches only its own service's ARNs, so one statement carries every service.
|
|
729
|
+
Resource:
|
|
730
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudwatch:*:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
731
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudwatch::${AWS::AccountId}:dashboard/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
732
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:events:*:${AWS::AccountId}:event-bus/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
733
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:events:*:${AWS::AccountId}:event-busv2/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
734
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:events:*:${AWS::AccountId}:rule/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
735
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:logs:*:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
736
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:logs:*:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/cognito/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
737
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:logs:*:${AWS::AccountId}:destination:${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
738
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:scheduler:*:${AWS::AccountId}:schedule-group/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
739
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:scheduler:*:${AWS::AccountId}:schedule/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
740
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:ssm:*:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
741
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:sqs:*:${AWS::AccountId}:${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
742
|
+
|
|
553
743
|
# Permissions boundary attached to every IAM role created by SaaSLayer module templates (the
|
|
554
744
|
# deployer passes this policy's ARN into each module deploy). A module role's effective runtime
|
|
555
745
|
# permissions are the INTERSECTION of its own policy and this boundary, so even a template bug
|
|
@@ -595,6 +785,8 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
595
785
|
- cognito-idp:UpdateIdentityProvider
|
|
596
786
|
- dynamodb:BatchGetItem
|
|
597
787
|
- dynamodb:BatchWriteItem
|
|
788
|
+
# TransactWriteItems ConditionCheck items (permissions-service audit writes check erasure markers).
|
|
789
|
+
- dynamodb:ConditionCheckItem
|
|
598
790
|
- dynamodb:DeleteItem
|
|
599
791
|
- dynamodb:DescribeStream
|
|
600
792
|
- dynamodb:DescribeTable
|
|
@@ -672,6 +864,13 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
672
864
|
- ses:SendEmail
|
|
673
865
|
Resource:
|
|
674
866
|
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:ses:*:${AWS::AccountId}:identity/*
|
|
867
|
+
# Phone sign-in SMS: Cognito sends through a user-service phone pool's SMS caller role. Send only; the
|
|
868
|
+
# role's own policy scopes it to its configuration set and origination identity.
|
|
869
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
870
|
+
Action:
|
|
871
|
+
- sms-voice:SendTextMessage
|
|
872
|
+
Resource:
|
|
873
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:sms-voice:*:${AWS::AccountId}:*
|
|
675
874
|
# SES runtime (forward/notify sends + the active-rule-set custom resource) — only on hosts
|
|
676
875
|
# that run email-inbound. Receiving into S3 is granted to the ses.amazonaws.com service
|
|
677
876
|
# principal by the module's bucket policy, not here.
|
|
@@ -687,8 +886,9 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
687
886
|
Resource: '*'
|
|
688
887
|
- !Ref AWS::NoValue
|
|
689
888
|
|
|
690
|
-
# Cross-account WRITE entry point for the SaaSLayer control
|
|
691
|
-
#
|
|
889
|
+
# Cross-account WRITE entry point for the managing SaaSLayer control planes. Trust is rendered from
|
|
890
|
+
# TrustEntries: per control plane, only its account, only its deploy identity role (aws:PrincipalArn) and
|
|
891
|
+
# only with its trust identifier (sts:ExternalId). Every mutating grant is scoped
|
|
692
892
|
# to the SaaSLayer stack namespace (StackNamePrefix) or the deployment artifact buckets; resource
|
|
693
893
|
# creation itself always happens through CloudFormation with the execution role above.
|
|
694
894
|
SaaSLayerDeploymentRole:
|
|
@@ -697,14 +897,7 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
697
897
|
RoleName: sl-foundation-deploy-role
|
|
698
898
|
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
|
|
699
899
|
Version: '2012-10-17'
|
|
700
|
-
Statement:
|
|
701
|
-
- Effect: Allow
|
|
702
|
-
Principal:
|
|
703
|
-
AWS: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${ControlPlaneAccountId}:root
|
|
704
|
-
Action: sts:AssumeRole
|
|
705
|
-
Condition:
|
|
706
|
-
StringEquals:
|
|
707
|
-
sts:ExternalId: !Ref ExternalId
|
|
900
|
+
Statement: []
|
|
708
901
|
Policies:
|
|
709
902
|
- PolicyName: saaslayer-stack-lifecycle
|
|
710
903
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
@@ -731,6 +924,37 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
731
924
|
- cloudformation:DetectStackDrift
|
|
732
925
|
- cloudformation:DetectStackResourceDrift
|
|
733
926
|
Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cloudformation:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
927
|
+
# Resource import (foundation 8.0.0): only the retained-resource adoption path imports
|
|
928
|
+
# (src/retained-adoption.ts, change set saaslayer-adopt-<runId>), and only the resource types it
|
|
929
|
+
# adopts. CloudFormation has no change-set-type condition key; cloudformation:ImportResourceTypes is
|
|
930
|
+
# present exactly when a change set imports.
|
|
931
|
+
- Sid: DenyImportsOutsideAdoption
|
|
932
|
+
Effect: Deny
|
|
933
|
+
Action:
|
|
934
|
+
- cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
|
|
935
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
936
|
+
Condition:
|
|
937
|
+
'Null':
|
|
938
|
+
cloudformation:ImportResourceTypes: 'false'
|
|
939
|
+
StringNotLike:
|
|
940
|
+
cloudformation:ChangeSetName: saaslayer-adopt-*
|
|
941
|
+
- Sid: DenyImportOfUnadoptableTypes
|
|
942
|
+
Effect: Deny
|
|
943
|
+
Action:
|
|
944
|
+
- cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
|
|
945
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
946
|
+
Condition:
|
|
947
|
+
ForAnyValue:StringNotEquals:
|
|
948
|
+
cloudformation:ImportResourceTypes:
|
|
949
|
+
- AWS::DynamoDB::Table
|
|
950
|
+
- AWS::DynamoDB::GlobalTable
|
|
951
|
+
- AWS::Cognito::UserPool
|
|
952
|
+
- AWS::Cognito::UserPoolClient
|
|
953
|
+
- AWS::Cognito::UserPoolGroup
|
|
954
|
+
- AWS::Cognito::IdentityPool
|
|
955
|
+
- AWS::S3::Bucket
|
|
956
|
+
- AWS::KMS::Key
|
|
957
|
+
- AWS::SecretsManager::Secret
|
|
734
958
|
# Actions the API cannot scope to a stack ARN: ValidateTemplate, and the
|
|
735
959
|
# drift-detection status poll which operates on a detection id, not a stack.
|
|
736
960
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
@@ -738,6 +962,14 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
738
962
|
- cloudformation:ValidateTemplate
|
|
739
963
|
- cloudformation:DescribeStackDriftDetectionStatus
|
|
740
964
|
Resource: '*'
|
|
965
|
+
# Connection authorization metadata (ADR 0005 §4): the control plane reads who may authorize
|
|
966
|
+
# SaaSLayer connections to this account through this role. Exactly one parameter, in this
|
|
967
|
+
# stack's (home) region; it holds role ARNs and control-plane ids, no secret.
|
|
968
|
+
- Sid: ReadConnectionAuthorizers
|
|
969
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
970
|
+
Action:
|
|
971
|
+
- ssm:GetParameter
|
|
972
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:ssm:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/saaslayer/foundation/connection-authorizers
|
|
741
973
|
# The single permitted pass-role path: this role may hand CloudFormation exactly one
|
|
742
974
|
# execution role. It cannot pass any other role in the account.
|
|
743
975
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
@@ -769,17 +1001,12 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
769
1001
|
- !Sub arn:aws:s3:::${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
770
1002
|
- !Sub arn:aws:s3:::${StackNamePrefix}*/*
|
|
771
1003
|
# Deploy tooling introspection after stack operations complete: stack enumeration
|
|
772
|
-
# (ListStacks has no resource scoping)
|
|
773
|
-
# tooling
|
|
1004
|
+
# (ListStacks has no resource scoping) and lambda version/alias inspection. The API Gateway
|
|
1005
|
+
# calls the Serverless tooling and the domain-service make outside CloudFormation are below.
|
|
774
1006
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
775
1007
|
Action:
|
|
776
1008
|
- cloudformation:ListStacks
|
|
777
1009
|
- cloudformation:ListStackResources
|
|
778
|
-
- apigateway:DELETE
|
|
779
|
-
- apigateway:GET
|
|
780
|
-
- apigateway:PATCH
|
|
781
|
-
- apigateway:POST
|
|
782
|
-
- apigateway:PUT
|
|
783
1010
|
- lambda:GetAlias
|
|
784
1011
|
- lambda:GetFunction
|
|
785
1012
|
- lambda:GetFunctionConfiguration
|
|
@@ -787,6 +1014,56 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
787
1014
|
- lambda:ListTags
|
|
788
1015
|
- lambda:ListVersionsByFunction
|
|
789
1016
|
Resource: '*'
|
|
1017
|
+
# API Gateway outside CloudFormation (foundation 8.0.0). Reads stay open: osls finds the module's REST
|
|
1018
|
+
# API by name in GET /restapis, and the domain-service probes GET /apis/<id> and lists /domainnames.
|
|
1019
|
+
- Sid: ApiGatewayReads
|
|
1020
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1021
|
+
Action:
|
|
1022
|
+
- apigateway:GET
|
|
1023
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/*
|
|
1024
|
+
# The domain-service creates a custom domain (v1 or v2) only carrying managed-by=saaslayer-deployer.
|
|
1025
|
+
- Sid: CreateManagedDomains
|
|
1026
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1027
|
+
Action:
|
|
1028
|
+
- apigateway:POST
|
|
1029
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/domainnames
|
|
1030
|
+
Condition:
|
|
1031
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
1032
|
+
aws:RequestTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
1033
|
+
# Base path / API mappings and deletes reach only domains carrying managed-by: a customer's own
|
|
1034
|
+
# domain of the same name (a swallowed create Conflict) or a vanity host the deployer did not create
|
|
1035
|
+
# is refused. Mappings take the tags of their domain for authorization.
|
|
1036
|
+
- Sid: ManagedDomainChanges
|
|
1037
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1038
|
+
Action:
|
|
1039
|
+
- apigateway:DELETE
|
|
1040
|
+
- apigateway:PATCH
|
|
1041
|
+
- apigateway:POST
|
|
1042
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/domainnames/*
|
|
1043
|
+
Condition:
|
|
1044
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
1045
|
+
aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
1046
|
+
# osls's post-deploy stage update (REST modules with tags): create/update the stage of a REST API that
|
|
1047
|
+
# carries managed-by (stack tags reach the RestApi; a stage takes its API's tags for authorization).
|
|
1048
|
+
- Sid: ManagedRestApiStages
|
|
1049
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1050
|
+
Action:
|
|
1051
|
+
- apigateway:PATCH
|
|
1052
|
+
- apigateway:POST
|
|
1053
|
+
Resource:
|
|
1054
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/restapis/*/stages
|
|
1055
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/restapis/*/stages/*
|
|
1056
|
+
Condition:
|
|
1057
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
1058
|
+
aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
1059
|
+
# ...and set the stage's tags. The /tags resource takes no resource-tag condition; API Gateway also
|
|
1060
|
+
# requires PATCH on the tagged resource itself, which ManagedRestApiStages grants only on managed stages.
|
|
1061
|
+
- Sid: ApiGatewayStageTags
|
|
1062
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1063
|
+
Action:
|
|
1064
|
+
- apigateway:DELETE
|
|
1065
|
+
- apigateway:PUT
|
|
1066
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/tags/*
|
|
790
1067
|
# Env-mode credential hot-swap: revoke/rotate updates a managed function's environment directly
|
|
791
1068
|
# (UpdateFunctionConfiguration with RevisionId, read back with GetFunctionConfiguration above) instead
|
|
792
1069
|
# of a stack deploy. Managed-prefix functions only.
|
|
@@ -810,8 +1087,9 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
810
1087
|
- cognito-idp:AdminUpdateUserAttributes
|
|
811
1088
|
- cognito-idp:ListUsers
|
|
812
1089
|
# Scoped to SaaSLayer-managed pools by tag — the seed can never touch the customer's
|
|
813
|
-
# own Cognito pools.
|
|
814
|
-
#
|
|
1090
|
+
# own Cognito pools. user-service creates the pool with managed-by:saaslayer-deployer in its
|
|
1091
|
+
# explicit UserPoolTags (stack tags do not reach user pools), so it is tagged before the
|
|
1092
|
+
# post-deploy seed runs, and the execution role cannot add managed-by to any other pool.
|
|
815
1093
|
Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cognito-idp:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:userpool/*
|
|
816
1094
|
Condition:
|
|
817
1095
|
StringEquals:
|
|
@@ -825,6 +1103,8 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
825
1103
|
- dynamodb:DeleteItem
|
|
826
1104
|
- dynamodb:Query
|
|
827
1105
|
- dynamodb:BatchWriteItem
|
|
1106
|
+
# Audit transactions (permissions seed) carry ConditionCheck items on erasure markers.
|
|
1107
|
+
- dynamodb:ConditionCheckItem
|
|
828
1108
|
# Teardown cleanup: a table with DeletionPolicy:Retain survives `serverless remove`, so the
|
|
829
1109
|
# deployer's module-runner deletes those retained sl-* tables directly after the stack is gone
|
|
830
1110
|
# (deleteStackOwnedTables) — else a same-named recreate collides. Scoped to sl-* tables only.
|
|
@@ -849,6 +1129,105 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
849
1129
|
- logs:DeleteLogGroup
|
|
850
1130
|
Resource:
|
|
851
1131
|
- !Sub arn:aws:logs:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
1132
|
+
# Recovery inventory (ADR 0006 §2.2, foundation 6.5.0): before a destroy removes anything, the deployer
|
|
1133
|
+
# describes every stateful resource of the module stacks to write the deployment's recovery record.
|
|
1134
|
+
# Metadata reads only — never a secret or parameter value. Tables, buckets and secrets are managed-prefix
|
|
1135
|
+
# scoped; a module's KMS key is addressed by an id the prefix does not cover, so it is scoped to the account.
|
|
1136
|
+
- Sid: RecoveryInventoryScopedReads
|
|
1137
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1138
|
+
Action:
|
|
1139
|
+
- dynamodb:DescribeTable
|
|
1140
|
+
- dynamodb:DescribeContinuousBackups
|
|
1141
|
+
- s3:GetBucketVersioning
|
|
1142
|
+
- secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
|
|
1143
|
+
- kms:DescribeKey
|
|
1144
|
+
Resource:
|
|
1145
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:dynamodb:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:table/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
1146
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:s3:::${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
1147
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:secretsmanager:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
1148
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:kms:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:key/*
|
|
1149
|
+
# Pool and app-client reads, limited to SaaSLayer-managed pools by tag like the seed's admin actions.
|
|
1150
|
+
- Sid: RecoveryInventoryPoolReads
|
|
1151
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1152
|
+
Action:
|
|
1153
|
+
- cognito-idp:DescribeUserPool
|
|
1154
|
+
- cognito-idp:DescribeUserPoolClient
|
|
1155
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cognito-idp:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:userpool/*
|
|
1156
|
+
Condition:
|
|
1157
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
1158
|
+
aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
1159
|
+
# Identity pool reads (foundation 7.2.0): this account and region only, metadata (name) only. No tag condition,
|
|
1160
|
+
# so a retain never refuses on an identity pool its stack tags did not reach; the purge delete stays tag-limited.
|
|
1161
|
+
- Sid: RecoveryInventoryIdentityPoolReads
|
|
1162
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1163
|
+
Action:
|
|
1164
|
+
- cognito-identity:DescribeIdentityPool
|
|
1165
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cognito-identity:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:identitypool/*
|
|
1166
|
+
# DescribeUserPoolDomain and DescribeParameters support no resource-level scoping.
|
|
1167
|
+
- Sid: RecoveryInventoryUnscopedReads
|
|
1168
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1169
|
+
Action:
|
|
1170
|
+
- cognito-idp:DescribeUserPoolDomain
|
|
1171
|
+
- ssm:DescribeParameters
|
|
1172
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
1173
|
+
# Purge (ADR 0006 §2.1, foundation 7.1.0): a delete destroy, or the purge of a retired deployment, deletes
|
|
1174
|
+
# what the deployment kept in custody, item by item from its recorded inventory: the backups of its tables,
|
|
1175
|
+
# its own buckets (emptied with the object grants above), its Secrets Manager secrets with no recovery
|
|
1176
|
+
# window, and its user pools (domain first, deletion protection off), app clients, identity pools (7.2.0) and
|
|
1177
|
+
# KMS keys. Tables, buckets and secrets are managed-prefix scoped; pools and keys are limited to
|
|
1178
|
+
# SaaSLayer-managed ones by tag.
|
|
1179
|
+
- Sid: PurgeScopedDeletes
|
|
1180
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1181
|
+
Action:
|
|
1182
|
+
- dynamodb:DeleteBackup
|
|
1183
|
+
- s3:DeleteBucket
|
|
1184
|
+
- secretsmanager:DeleteSecret
|
|
1185
|
+
Resource:
|
|
1186
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:dynamodb:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:table/${StackNamePrefix}*/backup/*
|
|
1187
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:s3:::${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
1188
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:secretsmanager:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
1189
|
+
- Sid: PurgeManagedPoolsAndKeys
|
|
1190
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1191
|
+
Action:
|
|
1192
|
+
- cognito-idp:DeleteUserPool
|
|
1193
|
+
- cognito-idp:DeleteUserPoolClient
|
|
1194
|
+
- cognito-idp:DeleteUserPoolDomain
|
|
1195
|
+
- cognito-idp:UpdateUserPool
|
|
1196
|
+
- cognito-identity:DeleteIdentityPool
|
|
1197
|
+
- kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion
|
|
1198
|
+
Resource:
|
|
1199
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:cognito-idp:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:userpool/*
|
|
1200
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:cognito-identity:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:identitypool/*
|
|
1201
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:kms:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:key/*
|
|
1202
|
+
Condition:
|
|
1203
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
1204
|
+
aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
1205
|
+
# Adopt (ADR 0006 §2.2 step 5, foundation 7.2.0): once a retained user pool is imported back, every user is
|
|
1206
|
+
# signed out (AdminUserGlobalSignOut, listed with ListUsers) so refresh tokens issued before the retain stop
|
|
1207
|
+
# working. Limited to SaaSLayer-managed pools by tag; no user data is read or written beyond usernames.
|
|
1208
|
+
- Sid: AdoptSessionRevocation
|
|
1209
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1210
|
+
Action:
|
|
1211
|
+
- cognito-idp:ListUsers
|
|
1212
|
+
- cognito-idp:AdminUserGlobalSignOut
|
|
1213
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cognito-idp:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:userpool/*
|
|
1214
|
+
Condition:
|
|
1215
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
1216
|
+
aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
1217
|
+
# ListBackups supports no resource-level scoping; the purge lists only its own tables' backups by name.
|
|
1218
|
+
- Sid: PurgeBackupListing
|
|
1219
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1220
|
+
Action:
|
|
1221
|
+
- dynamodb:ListBackups
|
|
1222
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
1223
|
+
# Login-domain quota (foundation 7.4.0): Cognito allows 4 custom domains per account and region, so before
|
|
1224
|
+
# a deployment gets a branded login host the deployer counts the account's user pools in the region.
|
|
1225
|
+
# Read-only (pool ids and names); ListUserPools supports no resource-level scoping.
|
|
1226
|
+
- Sid: LoginDomainQuotaRead
|
|
1227
|
+
Effect: Allow
|
|
1228
|
+
Action:
|
|
1229
|
+
- cognito-idp:ListUserPools
|
|
1230
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
852
1231
|
# Data migrations (@saaslayer/migrations): hop into a service stack's own migrate role; the
|
|
853
1232
|
# role's own policy limits it to that service's tables. Its trust is account root + an
|
|
854
1233
|
# aws:PrincipalArn condition, which delegates to this identity policy, so the grant is required.
|
|
@@ -857,8 +1236,8 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
857
1236
|
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/${StackNamePrefix}*-migrate
|
|
858
1237
|
# Domain-mapping (D1.0, monorepo-88mn.3): the domain-service assumes this role to issue an ACM
|
|
859
1238
|
# cert for the tenant's {slug}.saaslayer-cloud.com names, then attach an API-GW regional custom
|
|
860
|
-
# domain — the apigateway create/
|
|
861
|
-
#
|
|
1239
|
+
# domain — the apigateway create/map/delete verbs are granted above (CreateManagedDomains,
|
|
1240
|
+
# ManagedDomainChanges), so only ACM is added here. Scoped to certs tagged managed-by=saaslayer-deployer so this
|
|
862
1241
|
# role can only touch certs it created; RequestCertificate has no resource-level ARN, so the
|
|
863
1242
|
# request-tag condition is the only guard. Regional custom domains do NOT need a service-linked
|
|
864
1243
|
# role; add iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole for apigateway ONLY if domain-iam-spike.sh (D1.0a) proves it.
|
|
@@ -904,6 +1283,9 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
904
1283
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
905
1284
|
Action:
|
|
906
1285
|
- ssm:GetParameter
|
|
1286
|
+
# User-service's first-admin seed reads the endpoint and scoped service key in
|
|
1287
|
+
# one GetParameters call. Keep that batch read in the same deployment namespace.
|
|
1288
|
+
- ssm:GetParameters
|
|
907
1289
|
- ssm:PutParameter
|
|
908
1290
|
# DeleteParameter: the destroy/teardown phase clears the handoff params (they are written
|
|
909
1291
|
# by PutParameter, NOT CloudFormation, so a stack delete leaves them behind) — M4b.
|
|
@@ -929,28 +1311,54 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
929
1311
|
- TenantEdgeEnabled
|
|
930
1312
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
931
1313
|
Action:
|
|
932
|
-
- cloudfront:CreateDistribution
|
|
933
1314
|
- cloudfront:GetDistribution
|
|
934
1315
|
- cloudfront:GetDistributionConfig
|
|
935
|
-
- cloudfront:UpdateDistribution
|
|
936
1316
|
- cloudfront:ListDistributions
|
|
937
|
-
- cloudfront:TagResource
|
|
938
1317
|
- cloudfront:CreateFunction
|
|
939
|
-
- cloudfront:PublishFunction
|
|
940
|
-
- cloudfront:UpdateFunction
|
|
941
1318
|
- cloudfront:DescribeFunction
|
|
942
1319
|
- cloudfront:GetFunction
|
|
943
1320
|
- cloudfront:ListFunctions
|
|
944
|
-
|
|
945
|
-
|
|
1321
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
1322
|
+
- !Ref AWS::NoValue
|
|
1323
|
+
# The distro is created and tagged only with the request carrying managed-by (CreateDistributionWithTags;
|
|
1324
|
+
# provision and teardown tag the distro they find by its {slug} alias before changing it), and updated (the
|
|
1325
|
+
# teardown's disable) and deleted (native/B teardown) only while it carries managed-by.
|
|
1326
|
+
- Fn::If:
|
|
1327
|
+
- TenantEdgeEnabled
|
|
1328
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
1329
|
+
Action:
|
|
1330
|
+
- cloudfront:CreateDistribution
|
|
1331
|
+
- cloudfront:TagResource
|
|
1332
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
1333
|
+
Condition:
|
|
1334
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
1335
|
+
aws:RequestTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
1336
|
+
- !Ref AWS::NoValue
|
|
1337
|
+
- Fn::If:
|
|
1338
|
+
- TenantEdgeEnabled
|
|
1339
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
1340
|
+
Action:
|
|
946
1341
|
- cloudfront:DeleteDistribution
|
|
1342
|
+
- cloudfront:UpdateDistribution
|
|
1343
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudfront::${AWS::AccountId}:distribution/*
|
|
1344
|
+
Condition:
|
|
1345
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
1346
|
+
aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
1347
|
+
- !Ref AWS::NoValue
|
|
1348
|
+
# The strip Function is sl-strip-<slug>, under the managed prefix; its ARN carries the name.
|
|
1349
|
+
- Fn::If:
|
|
1350
|
+
- TenantEdgeEnabled
|
|
1351
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
1352
|
+
Action:
|
|
1353
|
+
- cloudfront:PublishFunction
|
|
1354
|
+
- cloudfront:UpdateFunction
|
|
947
1355
|
- cloudfront:DeleteFunction
|
|
948
|
-
Resource:
|
|
1356
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudfront::${AWS::AccountId}:function/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
949
1357
|
- !Ref AWS::NoValue
|
|
950
1358
|
|
|
951
1359
|
# Cross-account READ-ONLY role for SaaSLayer support staff to diagnose managed deployments
|
|
952
|
-
# without the deployment role's write power. Trust
|
|
953
|
-
# account
|
|
1360
|
+
# without the deployment role's write power. Trust is rendered like the deployment role's (per
|
|
1361
|
+
# control plane: its account, its support identity role and its trust identifier) and additionally pins the session name to saaslayer-support-* so each
|
|
954
1362
|
# assumption is attributable in CloudTrail. Grants carry only Get/List/Describe verbs — enforced
|
|
955
1363
|
# by tests/bootstrap.test.js — and exclude all data-plane reads: no S3 object reads, no DynamoDB
|
|
956
1364
|
# item reads, no SSM parameter values, no Secrets Manager secret values, no function code downloads.
|
|
@@ -964,16 +1372,7 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
964
1372
|
RoleName: sl-foundation-support-ro-role
|
|
965
1373
|
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
|
|
966
1374
|
Version: '2012-10-17'
|
|
967
|
-
Statement:
|
|
968
|
-
- Effect: Allow
|
|
969
|
-
Principal:
|
|
970
|
-
AWS: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${ControlPlaneAccountId}:root
|
|
971
|
-
Action: sts:AssumeRole
|
|
972
|
-
Condition:
|
|
973
|
-
StringEquals:
|
|
974
|
-
sts:ExternalId: !Ref ExternalId
|
|
975
|
-
StringLike:
|
|
976
|
-
sts:RoleSessionName: saaslayer-support-*
|
|
1375
|
+
Statement: []
|
|
977
1376
|
Policies:
|
|
978
1377
|
- PolicyName: saaslayer-support-read-only
|
|
979
1378
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
@@ -997,6 +1396,12 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
997
1396
|
Action:
|
|
998
1397
|
- cloudformation:ListStacks
|
|
999
1398
|
Resource: '*'
|
|
1399
|
+
# Foundation home: the foundation roles' aws:cloudformation:stack-id tag names this account
|
|
1400
|
+
# stack and so its home region, which foundation discovery reads before DescribeStacks.
|
|
1401
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
1402
|
+
Action:
|
|
1403
|
+
- iam:ListRoleTags
|
|
1404
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/sl-foundation-*
|
|
1000
1405
|
# Configuration reads scoped by resource tag: these services support the
|
|
1001
1406
|
# aws:ResourceTag condition key, and every SaaSLayer-deployed resource carries
|
|
1002
1407
|
# managed-by=saaslayer-deployer via stack tags. Untagged (customer) resources
|
|
@@ -1043,6 +1448,34 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
1043
1448
|
- logs:GetLogGroupFields
|
|
1044
1449
|
- logs:GetLogRecord
|
|
1045
1450
|
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:logs:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/${StackNamePrefix}*:*
|
|
1451
|
+
# Phone sign-in SMS readiness (read-only): account tier + spend limit, origination identities and
|
|
1452
|
+
# their registrations, a sandbox account's verified destination numbers, and the read-back of a phone
|
|
1453
|
+
# pool's configuration set + protect country rules. Account-level facts that carry no deployer tag,
|
|
1454
|
+
# so not tag-scoped.
|
|
1455
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
1456
|
+
Action:
|
|
1457
|
+
- sms-voice:DescribeAccountAttributes
|
|
1458
|
+
- sms-voice:DescribeConfigurationSets
|
|
1459
|
+
- sms-voice:DescribePhoneNumbers
|
|
1460
|
+
- sms-voice:DescribePools
|
|
1461
|
+
- sms-voice:DescribeProtectConfigurations
|
|
1462
|
+
- sms-voice:DescribeRegistrations
|
|
1463
|
+
- sms-voice:DescribeSenderIds
|
|
1464
|
+
- sms-voice:DescribeSpendLimits
|
|
1465
|
+
- sms-voice:DescribeVerifiedDestinationNumbers
|
|
1466
|
+
- sms-voice:GetProtectConfigurationCountryRuleSet
|
|
1467
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
1468
|
+
# Recovery email readiness (read-only), checked before a recovery cutover: the account's SES sending status
|
|
1469
|
+
# (production access, sending enabled) and whether a sender identity is verified for sending. Account-level
|
|
1470
|
+
# facts that carry no deployer tag, so not tag-scoped; identity reads stay within this account.
|
|
1471
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
1472
|
+
Action:
|
|
1473
|
+
- ses:GetAccount
|
|
1474
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
1475
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
1476
|
+
Action:
|
|
1477
|
+
- ses:GetEmailIdentity
|
|
1478
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:ses:*:${AWS::AccountId}:identity/*
|
|
1046
1479
|
# Alarm/dashboard state for module observability. CloudWatch alarms support
|
|
1047
1480
|
# aws:ResourceTag; DescribeAlarms is an enumeration API evaluated per-alarm.
|
|
1048
1481
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
@@ -1068,12 +1501,29 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
1068
1501
|
kms:ViaService: ssm.*.amazonaws.com
|
|
1069
1502
|
kms:EncryptionContext:PARAMETER_ARN: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:ssm:*:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/saaslayer/deployment/*
|
|
1070
1503
|
|
|
1504
|
+
# Connection authorization metadata (ADR 0005 §4), in this stack's (home) region: who may authorize
|
|
1505
|
+
# SaaSLayer org connections (ConnectionAuthorizerArns) and which control planes hold trust entries.
|
|
1506
|
+
# The controlPlanes literal (the line after "controlPlanes") is rendered from TrustEntries by the CLI.
|
|
1507
|
+
SaaSLayerConnectionAuthorizers:
|
|
1508
|
+
Type: AWS::SSM::Parameter
|
|
1509
|
+
Properties:
|
|
1510
|
+
Name: /saaslayer/foundation/connection-authorizers
|
|
1511
|
+
Type: String
|
|
1512
|
+
Description: SaaSLayer connection authorizers and managing control planes of this account (no secret).
|
|
1513
|
+
Value: !Join
|
|
1514
|
+
- ''
|
|
1515
|
+
- - '{"v":1,"connectionAuthorizerArns":["'
|
|
1516
|
+
- !Join ['","', !Ref ConnectionAuthorizerArns]
|
|
1517
|
+
- '"],"controlPlanes":'
|
|
1518
|
+
- '[]'
|
|
1519
|
+
- '}'
|
|
1520
|
+
|
|
1071
1521
|
Outputs:
|
|
1072
1522
|
DeploymentRoleArn:
|
|
1073
|
-
Description: Cross-account deployment role the SaaSLayer control
|
|
1523
|
+
Description: Cross-account deployment role the managing SaaSLayer control planes assume (trust identifier required).
|
|
1074
1524
|
Value: !GetAtt SaaSLayerDeploymentRole.Arn
|
|
1075
1525
|
SupportReadOnlyRoleArn:
|
|
1076
|
-
Description: Cross-account read-only role SaaSLayer support staff assume for diagnostics (
|
|
1526
|
+
Description: Cross-account read-only role SaaSLayer support staff assume for diagnostics (trust identifier required).
|
|
1077
1527
|
Value: !GetAtt SaaSLayerSupportReadOnlyRole.Arn
|
|
1078
1528
|
CloudFormationExecutionRoleArn:
|
|
1079
1529
|
Description: Service role CloudFormation uses to provision approved SaaSLayer module stacks; not assumable cross-account.
|