saaslayer 0.2.0 → 0.4.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (68) hide show
  1. package/README.md +132 -16
  2. package/bin/saaslayer.js +387 -61
  3. package/package.json +3 -2
  4. package/src/api-client.js +37 -1
  5. package/src/aws-sigv4.js +74 -26
  6. package/src/cognito-user-api.js +80 -0
  7. package/src/commands/access-admins.js +2 -2
  8. package/src/commands/account-email.js +43 -0
  9. package/src/commands/admin-allowlist.js +65 -0
  10. package/src/commands/api-keys.js +83 -0
  11. package/src/commands/audit.js +77 -0
  12. package/src/commands/aws.js +355 -82
  13. package/src/commands/binding-handoff.js +174 -0
  14. package/src/commands/bindings.js +111 -0
  15. package/src/commands/catalog.js +30 -3
  16. package/src/commands/deploy.js +33 -10
  17. package/src/commands/env-export.js +58 -0
  18. package/src/commands/first-admin.js +15 -4
  19. package/src/commands/foundation.js +75 -117
  20. package/src/commands/hooks.js +271 -0
  21. package/src/commands/integration-credentials.js +1 -1
  22. package/src/commands/lifecycle.js +149 -24
  23. package/src/commands/login-domain.js +259 -0
  24. package/src/commands/login.js +53 -16
  25. package/src/commands/org-members.js +109 -0
  26. package/src/commands/permission-orgs.js +80 -0
  27. package/src/commands/release-manifest.js +17 -8
  28. package/src/commands/service-principals.js +42 -5
  29. package/src/commands/settings.js +21 -5
  30. package/src/commands/sms-registration.js +182 -0
  31. package/src/commands/sms.js +178 -0
  32. package/src/commands/social.js +265 -0
  33. package/src/commands/support-staff.js +72 -0
  34. package/src/commands/trust-policies.js +172 -0
  35. package/src/commands/users-management.js +2 -20
  36. package/src/commands/users.js +56 -11
  37. package/src/commands/versions.js +61 -0
  38. package/src/connection-proof.js +41 -0
  39. package/src/deployment-api-auth.js +166 -8
  40. package/src/deployments.js +1 -1
  41. package/src/foundation-change-set.js +180 -0
  42. package/src/foundation-home.js +121 -0
  43. package/src/foundation-template.js +51 -10
  44. package/src/foundation-trust-write.js +379 -0
  45. package/src/iam-session.js +14 -8
  46. package/src/login-domain.js +139 -0
  47. package/src/login-methods.js +118 -0
  48. package/src/module-catalog.js +3 -2
  49. package/src/permissions-request.js +15 -9
  50. package/src/release-manifest.js +11 -4
  51. package/src/scope.js +3 -1
  52. package/src/settings.js +85 -13
  53. package/src/sms/number.js +37 -0
  54. package/src/sms/registration-fields.js +167 -0
  55. package/src/sms/registration-validate.js +151 -0
  56. package/src/sms/registration.js +216 -0
  57. package/src/sms/release.js +55 -0
  58. package/src/sms/scope.js +86 -0
  59. package/src/sms/status.js +181 -0
  60. package/src/ssm-api.js +31 -0
  61. package/src/trust-entries.js +350 -0
  62. package/src/user-service-instance.js +27 -0
  63. package/src/users-api.js +55 -8
  64. package/src/users-import/checkpoint.js +76 -0
  65. package/src/users-import/import.js +233 -24
  66. package/src/versions.js +80 -0
  67. package/templates/saaslayer-foundation-region.yml +45 -1
  68. package/templates/saaslayer-foundation.yml +747 -296
@@ -10,27 +10,46 @@
10
10
  #
11
11
  # SECURITY REVIEWER SUMMARY
12
12
  #
13
- # This template creates one S3 bucket, one permissions-boundary managed policy, and three IAM roles:
13
+ # This template creates one S3 bucket, one permissions-boundary managed policy, one managed policy attached to the
14
+ # execution role (sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy), and three IAM roles:
14
15
  #
15
- # 1. SaaSLayerDeploymentRole — the only cross-account WRITE entry point. Assumable solely by the
16
- # SaaSLayer control-plane account (ControlPlaneAccountId parameter) and only with the shared
17
- # ExternalId. It can drive the CloudFormation lifecycle of stacks whose names start with
16
+ # 1. SaaSLayerDeploymentRole — the only cross-account WRITE entry point. Its trust is rendered from
17
+ # the TrustEntries parameter: one statement per managing control plane, each naming only that
18
+ # control plane's account, its deploy identity role (aws:PrincipalArn) and its trust identifiers
19
+ # (sts:ExternalId). It can drive the CloudFormation lifecycle of stacks whose names start with
18
20
  # StackNamePrefix (default "sl-"), read/write the deployment artifact buckets, update the
19
21
  # configuration of StackNamePrefix functions (credential hot-swap), and pass exactly
20
22
  # one role (SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole) to CloudFormation. It cannot create IAM
21
- # resources or touch anything outside the managed stack namespace directly. Its only
23
+ # resources. Its direct writes reach only StackNamePrefix-named resources (stacks, buckets, tables,
24
+ # functions, log groups, secrets) or resources carrying managed-by=saaslayer-deployer (user pools,
25
+ # KMS keys, ACM certificates, API Gateway custom domains and REST API stages, native-edge CloudFront
26
+ # distributions); it creates certificates, custom domains and distributions only carrying that tag.
27
+ # It may import resources into a stack only through the
28
+ # retained-resource adoption change set (saaslayer-adopt-*) and only the types adoption handles. It
29
+ # also writes /saaslayer/deployment/* SSM parameters (deployment handoff values). Its only
22
30
  # sts:AssumeRole grant is into a module stack's own data-migration role
23
- # (role/${StackNamePrefix}*-migrate), whose policy limits it to that service's tables.
31
+ # (role/${StackNamePrefix}*-migrate), whose policy limits it to that service's tables. It may read
32
+ # exactly one SSM parameter under /saaslayer/foundation: connection-authorizers (below).
24
33
  #
25
34
  # 2. SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole — assumable ONLY by the CloudFormation service, never
26
35
  # cross-account. CloudFormation uses it to create/update/delete the resources declared by
27
36
  # approved SaaSLayer module templates. Its permissions are the provisioning verbs derived from
28
- # the module resource inventory (see per-statement comments below). Because only
29
- # SaaSLayerDeploymentRole can pass this role, it is reachable exclusively through the audited
30
- # stack lifecycle above.
37
+ # the module resource inventory (see per-statement comments below). Buckets, tables, functions,
38
+ # topics, KMS aliases, IAM roles/policies, SMS configuration sets, alarms, dashboards, event buses
39
+ # and rules, log groups, schedules, SSM parameters, queues and CloudFront functions are scoped to
40
+ # StackNamePrefix names (the alarm-to-queue grants sit in sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy, attached
41
+ # to this role); user pools, identity pools, KMS keys, CloudFront distributions and secrets to
42
+ # resources carrying managed-by=saaslayer-deployer (created only carrying it, and managed-by can never
43
+ # be added to a user pool that lacks it); API Gateway to the API paths (never custom domains,
44
+ # mappings, the account or VPC links). CloudFront origin access controls (id ARNs, no condition keys)
45
+ # still take Resource '*', as do the Cognito log-delivery verbs and the identity pool role
46
+ # attachment, which take no resource.
47
+ # Because only SaaSLayerDeploymentRole can pass this role, it is reachable exclusively through the
48
+ # audited stack lifecycle above.
31
49
  #
32
50
  # 3. SaaSLayerSupportReadOnlyRole — a separate cross-account READ-ONLY role for SaaSLayer support
33
- # staff. Same account + ExternalId trust gate as the deployment role, plus an enforced
51
+ # staff. Trust rendered from TrustEntries like the deployment role (each control plane's support
52
+ # identity role + trust identifiers), plus an enforced
34
53
  # "saaslayer-support-*" session-name pattern so every assumption is attributable in CloudTrail.
35
54
  # It carries only Get/List/Describe verbs, is tag-scoped to resources carrying
36
55
  # managed-by=saaslayer-deployer where IAM supports resource-tag conditions, and deliberately
@@ -38,6 +57,15 @@
38
57
  # values, no Secrets Manager secret values, no function code downloads). An explicit Deny
39
58
  # (DenySecretValueReads) covers the /saaslayer/deployment/* SecureStrings and their KMS decrypt.
40
59
  #
60
+ # SaaSLayerConnectionAuthorizers is an SSM String parameter publishing ConnectionAuthorizerArns and the
61
+ # control-plane ids in TrustEntries, so a control plane can read who may authorize connections through
62
+ # the deployment role. It holds no secret.
63
+ #
64
+ # TRUST RENDERING: CloudFormation cannot parse JSON, so the SaaSLayer CLI renders the trust statements
65
+ # from TrustEntries into this template before submitting it: each entry role's Statement line below is a
66
+ # single-line JSON flow sequence (empty here, filled at deploy time), and the SSM value's controlPlanes
67
+ # literal is filled the same way. Trust-only edits replace only those lines of the INSTALLED template.
68
+ #
41
69
  # SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary is a permissions boundary attached to every IAM role that
42
70
  # SaaSLayer module templates create: whatever a module role's own policy says, its effective
43
71
  # runtime permissions can never exceed this boundary.
@@ -46,11 +74,11 @@
46
74
  # deploymentId, customerId, and moduleName for inventory and audit.
47
75
  #
48
76
  # Contract tests for this template live at tests/bootstrap.test.js (read-only guarantee for the
49
- # support role, external-id enforcement, wildcard justification audit).
77
+ # support role, rendered trust-statement enforcement, wildcard justification audit).
50
78
  AWSTemplateFormatVersion: '2010-09-09'
51
79
  Description: >-
52
- SaaSLayer foundation stack: grants the SaaSLayer control plane scoped, external-ID-gated access
53
- to deploy and support SaaSLayer modules in this account. Installed once per account. Details:
80
+ SaaSLayer foundation stack: grants each managing SaaSLayer control plane listed in TrustEntries scoped,
81
+ trust-identifier-gated access to deploy and support SaaSLayer modules in this account. Installed once per account. Details:
54
82
  https://saaslayer.com/docs/account-access
55
83
 
56
84
  Parameters:
@@ -58,14 +86,21 @@ Parameters:
58
86
  Type: String
59
87
  AllowedPattern: '^[0-9]{12}$'
60
88
  Description: >-
61
- AWS account ID that runs the SaaSLayer deployer control plane. This is the only account the
62
- cross-account roles in this template trust.
63
- ExternalId:
89
+ AWS account ID of the control plane that first connected this account. Informational only: trust
90
+ is rendered from TrustEntries, which names each managing control plane's own account.
91
+ TrustEntries:
64
92
  Type: String
65
- NoEcho: true
93
+ MaxLength: 4096
66
94
  Description: >-
67
- External ID required when assuming SaaSLayerDeploymentRole or SaaSLayerSupportReadOnlyRole.
68
- Shared out-of-band during onboarding; assume-role calls without it are denied.
95
+ JSON array of trust entries, one per managing SaaSLayer control plane (v 1): controlPlaneId,
96
+ principalAccountId, trustIdentifiers, deployCallerArns, supportCallerArns. The SaaSLayer CLI renders
97
+ the entry roles' trust statements from it. Trust identifiers are AWS ExternalIds, not secrets.
98
+ ConnectionAuthorizerArns:
99
+ Type: CommaDelimitedList
100
+ Description: >-
101
+ IAM principal ARNs (path-less role ARNs) permitted to authorize SaaSLayer org connections to this
102
+ account. Defaults to the principal that first deploys this stack; changed only by an explicit
103
+ authorizer update.
69
104
  StackNamePrefix:
70
105
  Type: String
71
106
  Default: sl-
@@ -115,7 +150,7 @@ Mappings:
115
150
  # patch = comments/docs/no behavior change
116
151
  Meta:
117
152
  Foundation:
118
- Version: '6.0.0'
153
+ Version: '8.0.0'
119
154
 
120
155
  Resources:
121
156
  # The shared deployment-artifact bucket moved OUT of this account-global stack into the per-region
@@ -141,6 +176,8 @@ Resources:
141
176
  Principal:
142
177
  Service: cloudformation.amazonaws.com
143
178
  Action: sts:AssumeRole
179
+ ManagedPolicyArns:
180
+ - !Ref SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionPolicy
144
181
  Policies:
145
182
  - PolicyName: saaslayer-approved-template-execution
146
183
  PolicyDocument:
@@ -149,99 +186,54 @@ Resources:
149
186
  # Provisioning verbs per service. Several AWS create/list APIs only accept
150
187
  # Resource '*'; resource-name namespacing work to tighten this is tracked in
151
188
  # docs/permissions-hardening.md.
189
+ # Services scoped by the managed name prefix or the managed-by tag have their own statements below
190
+ # (alarms, event buses and rules, log groups, schedules, parameters and queues in
191
+ # sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy). What stays on Resource '*' is reads, creates that take no resource
192
+ # ARN, verbs AWS defines with no resource type, and services not yet scoped (UNSCOPED_PENDING_ON_STAR
193
+ # in tests/bootstrap.test.js, which may only shrink).
152
194
  - Effect: Allow
153
195
  Action:
154
- # API Gateway IAM actions are bare HTTP verbs against untyped resource paths;
155
- # REST API provisioning (methods, resources, deployments, stages, authorizers)
156
- # exercises all of them. Justified service wildcard (tests/bootstrap.test.js).
157
- - apigateway:*
158
196
  # Stack introspection while executing changesets (read-only verbs).
159
197
  - cloudformation:Describe*
160
198
  - cloudformation:Get*
161
199
  - cloudformation:List*
162
- # CloudWatch alarm + dashboard lifecycle for module observability resources.
163
- - cloudwatch:DeleteAlarms
164
- - cloudwatch:DeleteDashboards
200
+ # CloudWatch alarm + dashboard reads for module observability resources. Lifecycle:
201
+ # sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy (managed prefix).
165
202
  - cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms
166
- - cloudwatch:DisableAlarmActions
167
- - cloudwatch:EnableAlarmActions
168
203
  - cloudwatch:GetDashboard
169
204
  - cloudwatch:ListDashboards
170
205
  # DetectStackDrift reads alarm tags; without this, drift checks on the ops alarms
171
206
  # 403 and block every UPDATE (fail-closed drift gate).
172
207
  - cloudwatch:ListTagsForResource
173
- - cloudwatch:PutDashboard
174
- - cloudwatch:PutMetricAlarm
175
- - cloudwatch:TagResource
176
- - cloudwatch:UntagResource
177
- # CloudFront distribution + origin-access-control lifecycle for static-site modules
178
- # (rbac-admin-ui: private S3 origin + OAC). CreateDistribution/OAC cannot be
179
- # resource-scoped, so these sit in the Resource:'*' statement. CreateInvalidation
180
- # busts the edge cache when a redeploy uploads a new SPA build.
181
- - cloudfront:CreateDistribution
208
+ # Origin access control lifecycle for static-site modules (frontend-hosting, permissions-admin-ui:
209
+ # private S3 origin + OAC): *OriginAccessControl is its Create/Get/Update/Delete (template size). An OAC
210
+ # ARN carries an id and AWS defines no condition key for it, so neither a name nor a tag can scope it.
211
+ # CreateInvalidation busts the edge cache when a redeploy uploads a new SPA build. Distribution
212
+ # lifecycle: tag-scoped statements below.
213
+ - cloudfront:*OriginAccessControl
182
214
  - cloudfront:CreateInvalidation
183
- - cloudfront:CreateOriginAccessControl
184
- - cloudfront:DeleteDistribution
185
- - cloudfront:DeleteOriginAccessControl
186
- - cloudfront:GetDistribution
187
- - cloudfront:GetDistributionConfig
188
- - cloudfront:GetOriginAccessControl
215
+ - cloudfront:GetDistribution*
189
216
  - cloudfront:ListTagsForResource
190
- - cloudfront:TagResource
191
- - cloudfront:UntagResource
192
- - cloudfront:UpdateDistribution
193
- - cloudfront:UpdateOriginAccessControl
194
- # SNS topic lifecycle: module stacks create an ops-alarms topic that
195
- # alarms publish to (lean health checks). Full lifecycle so
196
- # CloudFormation can create/read/tag/delete the managed topics.
197
- - sns:CreateTopic
198
- - sns:DeleteTopic
199
- - sns:GetTopicAttributes
200
- - sns:SetTopicAttributes
201
- - sns:Subscribe
202
- - sns:Unsubscribe
203
- - sns:ListSubscriptionsByTopic
204
- - sns:TagResource
205
- - sns:UntagResource
206
- # Cognito identity pool + user pool lifecycle (user-service module). Their
207
- # CloudFormation handlers exercise a broad, shifting action set; kept as
208
- # justified service wildcards until enumerated (docs/permissions-hardening.md).
209
- - cognito-identity:*
210
- - cognito-idp:*
211
- # DynamoDB table lifecycle (provisioning verbs only — no item read/write).
212
- - dynamodb:CreateTable
213
- - dynamodb:DeleteTable
214
- - dynamodb:DescribeContinuousBackups
215
- - dynamodb:DescribeContributorInsights
216
- - dynamodb:DescribeTable
217
- - dynamodb:DescribeTimeToLive
218
- - dynamodb:ListTagsOfResource
219
- - dynamodb:TagResource
220
- - dynamodb:UntagResource
221
- - dynamodb:UpdateContinuousBackups
222
- - dynamodb:UpdateContributorInsights
223
- - dynamodb:UpdateTable
224
- - dynamodb:UpdateTimeToLive
217
+ # Identity pool calls that take no pool ARN: the pool list and the role attachment (user-service
218
+ # IdentityPoolRoleAttachment). Pool lifecycle: tag-scoped statements below.
219
+ - cognito-identity:ListIdentityPools
220
+ - cognito-identity:SetIdentityPoolRoles
221
+ # User-pool reads that take no resource ARN.
222
+ - cognito-idp:DescribeUserPoolDomain
223
+ - cognito-idp:ListUserPools
225
224
  # EventBridge custom event bus lifecycle (module event buses) + rule lifecycle for
226
225
  # scheduled Lambdas (serverless `schedule` events generate AWS::Events::Rule — e.g.
227
226
  # rbac-service's event-delivery poller). DescribeRule/PutRule/*Targets are required
228
- # or the rule CREATE fails with AccessDenied.
229
- - events:CreateEventBus
230
- - events:DeleteEventBus
231
- - events:DeleteRule
227
+ # or the rule CREATE fails with AccessDenied. Reads here; lifecycle: sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy.
232
228
  - events:DescribeEventBus
233
229
  - events:DescribeRule
234
- - events:DisableRule
235
- - events:EnableRule
236
230
  - events:ListTagsForResource
237
231
  - events:ListTargetsByRule
238
- - events:PutPermission
239
- - events:PutRule
240
- - events:PutTargets
241
- - events:RemovePermission
242
- - events:RemoveTargets
243
- - events:TagResource
244
- - events:UntagResource
232
+ # EarlyValidation runs a KMS::Alias name-conflict check on change-set creation; without
233
+ # ListAliases it reports a (non-fatal) "not allowed to check if resource already exists"
234
+ # FAIL in the console Hooks view and can't detect a real alias collision. Enumeration API,
235
+ # no resource-level scoping (monorepo-pcren). Key and alias lifecycle: tag/prefix-scoped statements below.
236
+ - kms:ListAliases
245
237
  # IAM read-only introspection during changeset execution. Mutating IAM verbs
246
238
  # (Create/Delete/Update/Attach/Pass/Tag) are prefix-scoped in dedicated
247
239
  # statements below — never Resource '*' — and CreateRole additionally requires
@@ -254,202 +246,274 @@ Resources:
254
246
  - iam:ListEntitiesForPolicy
255
247
  - iam:ListPolicyVersions
256
248
  - iam:ListRolePolicies
257
- # KMS customer-managed key + alias lifecycle. rbac-service provisions an
258
- # EventDeliveryKey (AWS::KMS::Key, rotation on) + alias for webhook payload
259
- # encryption; CreateKey mandates Resource '*', and TagResource on the new key
260
- # is required or CloudFormation fails with UnauthorizedTaggingOperation.
261
- - kms:CreateAlias
262
- - kms:CreateKey
263
- # EarlyValidation runs a KMS::Alias name-conflict check on change-set creation; without
264
- # ListAliases it reports a (non-fatal) "not allowed to check if resource already exists"
265
- # FAIL in the console Hooks view and can't detect a real alias collision. Enumeration API,
266
- # no resource-level scoping (monorepo-pcren).
267
- - kms:ListAliases
268
- # Grant + data-plane actions: a resource encrypted with a customer CMK (email-inbound's
269
- # InboundTable via DynamoDB SSE-KMS) makes the service create a grant AND
270
- # decrypt/generate data keys against the CMK during provisioning — without these the
271
- # table create fails AccessDenied (kms:CreateGrant, then kms:Decrypt/GenerateDataKey).
272
- - kms:CreateGrant
273
- - kms:Decrypt
274
- - kms:DeleteAlias
275
- - kms:DescribeKey
276
- - kms:DisableKeyRotation
277
- - kms:EnableKeyRotation
278
- - kms:Encrypt
279
- - kms:GenerateDataKey
280
- - kms:GenerateDataKeyWithoutPlaintext
281
- - kms:GetKeyPolicy
282
- - kms:GetKeyRotationStatus
283
- - kms:ListGrants
284
- - kms:ListResourceTags
285
- - kms:PutKeyPolicy
286
- - kms:ReEncryptFrom
287
- - kms:ReEncryptTo
288
- - kms:RevokeGrant
289
- - kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion
290
- - kms:TagResource
291
- - kms:UntagResource
292
- - kms:UpdateAlias
293
- # Lambda function/layer/alias/event-source lifecycle. lambda:InvokeFunction is
294
- # required because module templates use CloudFormation custom resources
295
- # (Custom::Delay in user-service) that CloudFormation invokes during deploys.
296
- - lambda:AddPermission
249
+ # Lambda calls that take no function ARN (event-source-mapping create, account and list reads).
250
+ # Function lifecycle: the managed-prefix statement below.
297
251
  - lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping
298
- - lambda:CreateFunction
299
- - lambda:DeleteEventSourceMapping
300
- - lambda:DeleteFunction
301
- - lambda:DeleteFunctionConcurrency
302
- - lambda:DeleteFunctionEventInvokeConfig
303
- - lambda:DeleteLayerVersion
304
- - lambda:DeleteProvisionedConcurrencyConfig
305
252
  - lambda:GetAccountSettings
306
- - lambda:GetAlias
307
253
  - lambda:GetEventSourceMapping
308
- - lambda:GetFunction
309
- - lambda:GetFunctionCodeSigningConfig
310
- - lambda:GetFunctionConcurrency
311
- - lambda:GetFunctionConfiguration
312
- - lambda:GetFunctionEventInvokeConfig
313
- - lambda:GetLayerVersion
314
- - lambda:GetPolicy
315
- - lambda:GetProvisionedConcurrencyConfig
316
- - lambda:GetRuntimeManagementConfig
317
- - lambda:InvokeFunction
318
- - lambda:ListAliases
319
254
  - lambda:ListEventSourceMappings
320
255
  - lambda:ListFunctions
321
256
  - lambda:ListLayerVersions
322
- - lambda:ListTags
323
- - lambda:ListVersionsByFunction
324
- - lambda:PublishLayerVersion
325
- - lambda:PublishVersion
326
- - lambda:PutFunctionCodeSigningConfig
327
- - lambda:PutFunctionConcurrency
328
- - lambda:PutFunctionEventInvokeConfig
329
- - lambda:PutProvisionedConcurrencyConfig
330
- - lambda:RemovePermission
331
- - lambda:TagResource
332
- - lambda:UntagResource
333
- - lambda:UpdateAlias
334
- - lambda:UpdateEventSourceMapping
335
- - lambda:UpdateFunctionCode
336
- - lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration
337
- # Log group lifecycle for module functions/services. The LogDelivery and
257
+ # Log group reads for module functions/services. The LogDelivery and
338
258
  # resource-policy verbs support AWS::Cognito::LogDeliveryConfiguration
339
- # (user-service auth event logging).
259
+ # (user-service auth event logging) and take no resource ARN. Log group and metric filter
260
+ # (billing-service ops alarms on its log events) lifecycle: sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy.
340
261
  - logs:CreateLogDelivery
341
- - logs:CreateLogGroup
342
- - logs:CreateLogStream
343
262
  - logs:DeleteLogDelivery
344
- - logs:DeleteLogGroup
345
- - logs:DeleteLogStream
346
- - logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
347
263
  - logs:DescribeIndexPolicies
348
264
  - logs:DescribeLogGroups
349
265
  - logs:DescribeLogStreams
266
+ - logs:DescribeMetricFilters
350
267
  - logs:DescribeResourcePolicies
351
268
  - logs:GetLogDelivery
352
269
  - logs:ListLogDeliveries
353
270
  - logs:ListTagsForResource
354
- - logs:PutDestination
355
- - logs:PutDestinationPolicy
356
- - logs:PutLogEvents
357
271
  - logs:PutResourcePolicy
358
- - logs:PutRetentionPolicy
359
- - logs:TagLogGroup
360
- - logs:TagResource
361
- - logs:UntagLogGroup
362
- - logs:UntagResource
363
272
  - logs:UpdateLogDelivery
364
- # EventBridge Scheduler lifecycle for module-declared schedules (rbac-core
365
- # delegation expiry uses schedules; runtime CRUD is granted via the boundary).
366
- - scheduler:CreateSchedule
367
- - scheduler:CreateScheduleGroup
368
- - scheduler:DeleteSchedule
369
- - scheduler:DeleteScheduleGroup
273
+ # EventBridge Scheduler reads for module-declared schedules (rbac-core
274
+ # delegation expiry uses schedules; runtime CRUD is granted via the boundary). Lifecycle:
275
+ # sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy.
370
276
  - scheduler:GetSchedule
371
277
  - scheduler:GetScheduleGroup
372
278
  - scheduler:ListTagsForResource
373
- - scheduler:TagResource
374
- - scheduler:UntagResource
375
- - scheduler:UpdateSchedule
376
- # Secrets Manager secret lifecycle (AWS::SecretsManager::Secret in modules).
377
- # No GetSecretValue: this role provisions secrets, it cannot read their values.
378
- - secretsmanager:CreateSecret
379
- - secretsmanager:DeleteResourcePolicy
380
- - secretsmanager:DeleteSecret
279
+ # Secret metadata reads. Lifecycle: tag-scoped statements below.
381
280
  - secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
382
281
  - secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
383
- - secretsmanager:PutResourcePolicy
282
+ # SSM parameter reads for module configuration exports (AWS::SSM::Parameter). Lifecycle:
283
+ # sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy.
284
+ - ssm:DescribeParameters
285
+ - ssm:GetParameter
286
+ - ssm:GetParameters
287
+ - ssm:GetParametersByPath
288
+ - ssm:ListTagsForResource
289
+ # SQS queue reads. Lifecycle: sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy.
290
+ - sqs:GetQueueAttributes
291
+ - sqs:ListQueueTags
292
+ Resource: '*'
293
+ # API Gateway IAM actions are bare HTTP verbs against untyped resource paths; REST, HTTP and
294
+ # WebSocket API provisioning (methods, resources, deployments, stages, authorizers, routes,
295
+ # integrations) exercises all of them. Justified service wildcard (tests/bootstrap.test.js), limited
296
+ # to the API paths and their tags: no module declares a custom domain, base path / API mapping, the
297
+ # account CloudWatch role, a VPC link or a usage plan, so those paths are out of reach. API ids
298
+ # carry no name, and osls tags HTTP APIs only on request, so no prefix or tag condition applies here.
299
+ - Effect: Allow
300
+ Action:
301
+ - apigateway:*
302
+ Resource:
303
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/restapis
304
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/restapis/*
305
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/apis
306
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/apis/*
307
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/tags/*
308
+ # Cognito user and identity pools (user-service), CloudFront distributions (frontend-hosting,
309
+ # permissions-admin-ui) and secrets (user-service's PasswordlessMagicLinkHmacSecret, named by CloudFormation
310
+ # <LogicalId>-<random>, outside the managed prefix). Pool and distribution ARNs carry ids and the secret's name
311
+ # is not ours, so the managed-by tag scopes all four: created only carrying managed-by=saaslayer-deployer
312
+ # (user-service sets it in UserPoolTags, IdentityPoolTags and the secret's Tags; the modules' stack tags reach
313
+ # distributions and secrets), then changed only while they carry it. The pool and distribution create APIs take no resource
314
+ # ARN. Tags at create need TagResource with the request carrying managed-by; that grant could also stamp
315
+ # managed-by on an existing distribution, identity pool or secret, which this role reaches only through its
316
+ # own stacks (imports are limited to the adoption change set). User pools are guarded by the Deny below.
317
+ - Effect: Allow
318
+ Action:
319
+ - cloudfront:CreateDistribution
320
+ - cloudfront:TagResource
321
+ - cognito-identity:CreateIdentityPool
322
+ - cognito-identity:TagResource
323
+ - cognito-idp:CreateUserPool
324
+ - secretsmanager:CreateSecret
325
+ - secretsmanager:TagResource
326
+ Resource: '*'
327
+ Condition:
328
+ StringEquals:
329
+ aws:RequestTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
330
+ # Each action matches only its own service's ARNs. The pool CloudFormation handlers exercise a broad,
331
+ # shifting action set, so the service wildcards stay, limited to tagged pools. No GetSecretValue: this role
332
+ # provisions secrets, it cannot read their values. *TagResource is TagResource and UntagResource.
333
+ - Effect: Allow
334
+ Action:
335
+ - cloudfront:*TagResource
336
+ - cloudfront:DeleteDistribution
337
+ - cloudfront:UpdateDistribution
338
+ - cognito-identity:*
339
+ - cognito-idp:*
340
+ # Secret verbs as globs (inline policy and template size): *Replica* is RemoveRegionsFromReplication,
341
+ # ReplicateSecretToRegions and StopReplicationToReplica; Update* is UpdateSecret and
342
+ # UpdateSecretVersionStage.
343
+ - secretsmanager:*Replica*
344
+ - secretsmanager:*TagResource
345
+ - secretsmanager:DeleteSecret
384
346
  - secretsmanager:PutSecretValue
385
- - secretsmanager:RemoveRegionsFromReplication
386
- - secretsmanager:ReplicateSecretToRegions
387
347
  - secretsmanager:RestoreSecret
388
- - secretsmanager:StopReplicationToReplica
389
- - secretsmanager:TagResource
390
- - secretsmanager:UntagResource
391
- - secretsmanager:UpdateSecret
392
- - secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage
393
- # S3 bucket lifecycle + bucket configuration for module buckets, plus object
394
- # read/write used while CloudFormation stages template artifacts.
348
+ - secretsmanager:Update*
349
+ Resource:
350
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudfront::${AWS::AccountId}:distribution/*
351
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cognito-identity:*:${AWS::AccountId}:identitypool/*
352
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cognito-idp:*:${AWS::AccountId}:userpool/*
353
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:secretsmanager:*:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:*
354
+ Condition:
355
+ StringEquals:
356
+ aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
357
+ # managed-by unlocks the deploy role's tag-scoped pool actions, so it can never be added to a pool
358
+ # that does not already carry it (e.g. a customer pool brought in by an import).
359
+ - Effect: Deny
360
+ Action:
361
+ - cognito-idp:TagResource
362
+ Resource: '*'
363
+ Condition:
364
+ ForAnyValue:StringEquals:
365
+ aws:TagKeys:
366
+ - managed-by
367
+ 'Null':
368
+ aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: 'true'
369
+ # DynamoDB table lifecycle (provisioning verbs only — no item read/write). Every module table is
370
+ # ${stackName}-<suffix>, under the managed prefix.
371
+ - Effect: Allow
372
+ Action:
373
+ - dynamodb:CreateTable
374
+ - dynamodb:DeleteTable
375
+ - dynamodb:Describe*
376
+ - dynamodb:ListTagsOfResource
377
+ - dynamodb:TagResource
378
+ - dynamodb:UntagResource
379
+ - dynamodb:UpdateContinuousBackups
380
+ - dynamodb:UpdateContributorInsights
381
+ - dynamodb:UpdateTable
382
+ - dynamodb:UpdateTimeToLive
383
+ # The wildcard also covers the tables' indexes (table/<name>/index/<index>).
384
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:dynamodb:*:${AWS::AccountId}:table/${StackNamePrefix}*
385
+ # KMS customer-managed key + alias lifecycle. rbac-service provisions an
386
+ # EventDeliveryKey (AWS::KMS::Key, rotation on) + alias for webhook payload
387
+ # encryption; CreateKey mandates Resource '*', and TagResource on the new key
388
+ # is required or CloudFormation fails with UnauthorizedTaggingOperation. A key carries no name,
389
+ # so the managed-by tag (a stack tag) scopes it: CreateKey and its tags-at-create need the request
390
+ # to carry managed-by; every other key call needs a key that already carries it.
391
+ - Effect: Allow
392
+ Action:
393
+ - kms:CreateKey
394
+ Resource: '*'
395
+ Condition:
396
+ StringEquals:
397
+ aws:RequestTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
398
+ - Effect: Allow
399
+ Action:
400
+ - kms:TagResource
401
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:kms:*:${AWS::AccountId}:key/*
402
+ Condition:
403
+ StringEquals:
404
+ aws:RequestTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
405
+ # Grant + data-plane actions: a resource encrypted with a customer CMK (email-inbound's
406
+ # InboundTable via DynamoDB SSE-KMS) makes the service create a grant AND
407
+ # decrypt/generate data keys against the CMK during provisioning — without these the
408
+ # table create fails AccessDenied (kms:CreateGrant, then kms:Decrypt/GenerateDataKey).
409
+ # Alias verbs authorize against both the alias (next statement) and its key (here).
410
+ - Effect: Allow
411
+ Action:
412
+ - kms:*Alias
413
+ - kms:CreateGrant
414
+ - kms:Decrypt
415
+ - kms:DescribeKey
416
+ - kms:DisableKeyRotation
417
+ - kms:EnableKeyRotation
418
+ - kms:Encrypt
419
+ - kms:GenerateDataKey*
420
+ - kms:Get*
421
+ - kms:List*
422
+ - kms:PutKeyPolicy
423
+ - kms:ReEncrypt*
424
+ - kms:RevokeGrant
425
+ - kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion
426
+ - kms:TagResource
427
+ - kms:UntagResource
428
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:kms:*:${AWS::AccountId}:key/*
429
+ Condition:
430
+ StringEquals:
431
+ aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
432
+ - Effect: Allow
433
+ Action:
434
+ - kms:*Alias
435
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:kms:*:${AWS::AccountId}:alias/${StackNamePrefix}*
436
+ # Lambda function/layer/alias/event-source lifecycle. lambda:InvokeFunction is
437
+ # required because module templates use CloudFormation custom resources
438
+ # (Custom::Delay in user-service) that CloudFormation invokes during deploys. Every module
439
+ # function is ${stackName}-<fn> or (email-inbound's pinned custom-resource functions)
440
+ # sl-email-inbound-<stage>-<fn>, under the managed prefix.
441
+ - Effect: Allow
442
+ Action:
443
+ # Get/List/Delete/Put/Update as globs (inline policy size, as for buckets); the resources below
444
+ # keep them on managed-prefix functions and layers.
445
+ - lambda:AddPermission
446
+ - lambda:CreateFunction
447
+ - lambda:Delete*
448
+ - lambda:Get*
449
+ - lambda:InvokeFunction
450
+ - lambda:List*
451
+ - lambda:PublishLayerVersion
452
+ - lambda:PublishVersion
453
+ - lambda:Put*
454
+ - lambda:RemovePermission
455
+ - lambda:TagResource
456
+ - lambda:UntagResource
457
+ - lambda:Update*
458
+ Resource:
459
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:lambda:*:${AWS::AccountId}:function:${StackNamePrefix}*
460
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:lambda:*:${AWS::AccountId}:layer:${StackNamePrefix}*
461
+ # Event source mappings are addressed by id; lambda:FunctionArn limits them to managed-prefix functions.
462
+ - Effect: Allow
463
+ Action:
464
+ - lambda:DeleteEventSourceMapping
465
+ - lambda:UpdateEventSourceMapping
466
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:lambda:*:${AWS::AccountId}:event-source-mapping:*
467
+ Condition:
468
+ ArnLike:
469
+ lambda:FunctionArn: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:lambda:*:${AWS::AccountId}:function:${StackNamePrefix}*
470
+ # Stack tags reach event source mappings; Lambda's tag calls take no lambda:FunctionArn condition. A
471
+ # mapping's tags grant nothing anywhere in this account.
472
+ - Effect: Allow
473
+ Action:
474
+ - lambda:ListTags
475
+ - lambda:TagResource
476
+ - lambda:UntagResource
477
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:lambda:*:${AWS::AccountId}:event-source-mapping:*
478
+ # S3 bucket lifecycle + bucket configuration for module buckets, plus object
479
+ # read/write used while CloudFormation stages template artifacts. Every module bucket, the shared
480
+ # artifacts bucket and the framework's auto-named deployment bucket start with the managed prefix.
481
+ - Effect: Allow
482
+ Action:
483
+ # Bucket configuration verbs as globs (the role's inline policy is near IAM's 10,240-character
484
+ # limit); the resources below keep them on managed-prefix buckets.
395
485
  - s3:CreateBucket
396
- - s3:DeleteBucket
397
- - s3:DeleteBucketPolicy
398
- - s3:DeleteBucketWebsite
486
+ - s3:DeleteBucket*
399
487
  - s3:DeleteObject
400
488
  - s3:GetAccelerateConfiguration
401
- - s3:GetBucketAcl
402
- - s3:GetBucketCORS
403
- - s3:GetBucketLocation
404
- - s3:GetBucketLogging
405
- - s3:GetBucketNotification
406
- - s3:GetBucketObjectLockConfiguration
407
- - s3:GetBucketOwnershipControls
408
- - s3:GetBucketPolicy
409
- - s3:GetBucketPublicAccessBlock
410
- - s3:GetBucketTagging
411
- - s3:GetBucketVersioning
412
- - s3:GetBucketWebsite
489
+ - s3:GetBucket*
413
490
  - s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration
414
491
  - s3:GetLifecycleConfiguration
415
492
  - s3:GetObject
416
493
  - s3:ListBucket
417
494
  - s3:PutAccelerateConfiguration
418
- - s3:PutBucketAcl
419
- - s3:PutBucketCORS
420
- - s3:PutBucketLogging
421
- - s3:PutBucketNotification
422
- - s3:PutBucketObjectLockConfiguration
423
- - s3:PutBucketOwnershipControls
424
- - s3:PutBucketPolicy
425
- - s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock
426
- - s3:PutBucketTagging
427
- - s3:PutBucketVersioning
428
- - s3:PutBucketWebsite
495
+ - s3:PutBucket*
429
496
  - s3:PutEncryptionConfiguration
430
497
  - s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration
431
498
  - s3:PutObject
432
499
  - s3:PutObjectAcl
433
- # SSM parameter lifecycle for module configuration exports (AWS::SSM::Parameter).
434
- - ssm:AddTagsToResource
435
- - ssm:DeleteParameter
436
- - ssm:DeleteParameters
437
- - ssm:DescribeParameters
438
- - ssm:GetParameter
439
- - ssm:GetParameters
440
- - ssm:GetParametersByPath
441
- - ssm:ListTagsForResource
442
- - ssm:PutParameter
443
- - ssm:RemoveTagsFromResource
444
- # SQS queue lifecycle (provisioning verbs only — no message send/receive).
445
- - sqs:CreateQueue
446
- - sqs:DeleteQueue
447
- - sqs:GetQueueAttributes
448
- - sqs:ListQueueTags
449
- - sqs:SetQueueAttributes
450
- - sqs:TagQueue
451
- - sqs:UntagQueue
452
- Resource: '*'
500
+ # The wildcard also covers the buckets' objects (<bucket>/<key>).
501
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:s3:::${StackNamePrefix}*
502
+ # SNS topic lifecycle: module stacks create an ops-alarms topic that
503
+ # alarms publish to (lean health checks). Full lifecycle so
504
+ # CloudFormation can create/read/tag/delete the managed topics (${stackName}-ops-alarms).
505
+ - Effect: Allow
506
+ Action:
507
+ - sns:CreateTopic
508
+ - sns:DeleteTopic
509
+ - sns:GetTopicAttributes
510
+ - sns:SetTopicAttributes
511
+ - sns:Subscribe
512
+ - sns:Unsubscribe
513
+ - sns:ListSubscriptionsByTopic
514
+ - sns:TagResource
515
+ - sns:UntagResource
516
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:sns:*:${AWS::AccountId}:${StackNamePrefix}*
453
517
  # Mutating IAM verbs are scoped to the managed-resource prefix (StackNamePrefix) so
454
518
  # the exec role can only create/modify SaaSLayer module roles + customer-managed
455
519
  # policies — never a pre-existing account role, and never the control-plane primitives
@@ -486,6 +550,17 @@ Resources:
486
550
  - iam:TagPolicy
487
551
  - iam:UntagPolicy
488
552
  Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/${StackNamePrefix}*
553
+ # Cognito email through SES (user-service CognitoEmailSenderArn → DEVELOPER email): on the first such
554
+ # user pool in an account, Cognito creates its email service-linked role with these credentials
555
+ # (UPDATE failed AccessDenied "allow 'email.cognito-idp.amazonaws.com' to call iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole").
556
+ # Scoped to exactly that service and role path.
557
+ - Effect: Allow
558
+ Action:
559
+ - iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole
560
+ Resource: 'arn:aws:iam::*:role/aws-service-role/email.cognito-idp.amazonaws.com/*'
561
+ Condition:
562
+ StringEquals:
563
+ iam:AWSServiceName: email.cognito-idp.amazonaws.com
489
564
  # Self-protecting Deny (defense-in-depth): the exec role can never mutate the
490
565
  # permissions boundary or the three bootstrap roles, even though prefix scoping
491
566
  # already excludes their SaaSLayer* names. An explicit Deny overrides any Allow.
@@ -504,6 +579,7 @@ Resources:
504
579
  - iam:UpdateRole
505
580
  Resource:
506
581
  - !Ref SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary
582
+ - !Ref SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionPolicy
507
583
  - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/sl-foundation-cfn-exec-role
508
584
  - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/sl-foundation-deploy-role
509
585
  - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/sl-foundation-support-ro-role
@@ -516,14 +592,22 @@ Resources:
516
592
  - Effect: Allow
517
593
  Action:
518
594
  - cloudfront:CreateFunction
519
- - cloudfront:PublishFunction
520
- - cloudfront:UpdateFunction
521
595
  - cloudfront:DescribeFunction
522
596
  - cloudfront:GetFunction
523
597
  - cloudfront:ListFunctions
524
598
  - cloudfront:ListDistributions
525
599
  Resource: '*'
526
600
  - !Ref AWS::NoValue
601
+ # Function ARNs carry the function name; every edge function is named under the managed prefix
602
+ # (frontend-hosting ${stackName}-<region code>-f, the native edge's sl-strip-<slug>).
603
+ - Fn::If:
604
+ - TenantEdgeEnabled
605
+ - Effect: Allow
606
+ Action:
607
+ - cloudfront:PublishFunction
608
+ - cloudfront:UpdateFunction
609
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudfront::${AWS::AccountId}:function/${StackNamePrefix}*
610
+ - !Ref AWS::NoValue
527
611
  # SES receipt rule set/rule provisioning — only on hosts that run email-inbound
528
612
  # (EnableEmailInbound=true). Identity verification (VerifyDomainIdentity/DKIM) runs
529
613
  # CP-side in the domain-service, never from the tenant account.
@@ -543,6 +627,33 @@ Resources:
543
627
  - ses:DescribeReceiptRule
544
628
  Resource: '*'
545
629
  - !Ref AWS::NoValue
630
+ # Phone sign-in SMS (user-service phone pools): the AWS::SMSVOICE::ConfigurationSet
631
+ # (${stackName}-phoneSms, under the managed prefix) and its AWS::SMSVOICE::ProtectConfiguration
632
+ # (country rule set; AWS-generated id, so not name-scopable). Lifecycle + tag verbs only: no
633
+ # sending, no account-default protect, spend limit, origination identity or registration changes.
634
+ - Effect: Allow
635
+ Action:
636
+ - sms-voice:AssociateProtectConfiguration
637
+ - sms-voice:CreateConfigurationSet
638
+ - sms-voice:CreateProtectConfiguration
639
+ - sms-voice:DeleteConfigurationSet
640
+ - sms-voice:DeleteProtectConfiguration
641
+ - sms-voice:DisassociateProtectConfiguration
642
+ - sms-voice:GetProtectConfigurationCountryRuleSet
643
+ - sms-voice:ListTagsForResource
644
+ - sms-voice:TagResource
645
+ - sms-voice:UntagResource
646
+ - sms-voice:UpdateProtectConfiguration
647
+ - sms-voice:UpdateProtectConfigurationCountryRuleSet
648
+ Resource:
649
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:sms-voice:*:${AWS::AccountId}:configuration-set/${StackNamePrefix}*
650
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:sms-voice:*:${AWS::AccountId}:protect-configuration/*
651
+ # The SMS resources' read handlers enumerate with Describe*, which take no resource scope.
652
+ - Effect: Allow
653
+ Action:
654
+ - sms-voice:DescribeConfigurationSets
655
+ - sms-voice:DescribeProtectConfigurations
656
+ Resource: '*'
546
657
  # Module templates use the AWS::LanguageExtensions transform; CloudFormation
547
658
  # requires CreateChangeSet on the transform pseudo-resource to expand it.
548
659
  - Effect: Allow
@@ -550,6 +661,89 @@ Resources:
550
661
  - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
551
662
  Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudformation:${AWS::Region}:aws:transform/LanguageExtensions
552
663
 
664
+ # Managed-prefix lifecycle grants of SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole that do not fit its inline policy (IAM caps a
665
+ # role's inline policies at 10,240 characters in total). Attached to that role only; the role's self-protecting Deny
666
+ # keeps it from changing this policy.
667
+ SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionPolicy:
668
+ Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
669
+ Properties:
670
+ ManagedPolicyName: sl-foundation-cfn-exec-policy
671
+ Description: Managed-prefix lifecycle of module alarms, event buses and rules, log groups, schedules, parameters and queues.
672
+ PolicyDocument:
673
+ Version: '2012-10-17'
674
+ Statement:
675
+ # Alarm, dashboard, EventBridge bus and rule, log group, schedule, SSM parameter and queue lifecycle. Every
676
+ # module names these from its stack name: alarms ${stackName}-<alarm>, buses ${stackName}-<purpose>, rules
677
+ # ${stackName}-<fn> (unnamed schedule rules get CloudFormation's <stackName>-<LogicalId>-<random>), the schedule
678
+ # group ${stackName}, parameters /${stackName}/..., queues ${stackName}-<purpose>. Log groups are
679
+ # /aws/lambda/<function> (every function is under the managed prefix) and /aws/cognito/${stackName}-logs.
680
+ - Effect: Allow
681
+ Action:
682
+ - cloudwatch:DeleteAlarms
683
+ - cloudwatch:DeleteDashboards
684
+ - cloudwatch:DisableAlarmActions
685
+ - cloudwatch:EnableAlarmActions
686
+ - cloudwatch:PutDashboard
687
+ - cloudwatch:PutMetricAlarm
688
+ - cloudwatch:TagResource
689
+ - cloudwatch:UntagResource
690
+ - events:CreateEventBus
691
+ - events:DeleteEventBus
692
+ - events:DeleteRule
693
+ - events:DisableRule
694
+ - events:EnableRule
695
+ - events:PutRule
696
+ - events:PutTargets
697
+ - events:RemoveTargets
698
+ - events:TagResource
699
+ - events:UntagResource
700
+ - logs:CreateLogGroup
701
+ - logs:CreateLogStream
702
+ - logs:DeleteLogGroup
703
+ - logs:DeleteLogStream
704
+ - logs:DeleteMetricFilter
705
+ - logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
706
+ - logs:PutDestination
707
+ - logs:PutDestinationPolicy
708
+ - logs:PutLogEvents
709
+ - logs:PutMetricFilter
710
+ - logs:PutRetentionPolicy
711
+ - logs:TagLogGroup
712
+ - logs:TagResource
713
+ - logs:UntagLogGroup
714
+ - logs:UntagResource
715
+ - scheduler:CreateSchedule
716
+ - scheduler:CreateScheduleGroup
717
+ - scheduler:DeleteSchedule
718
+ - scheduler:DeleteScheduleGroup
719
+ - scheduler:TagResource
720
+ - scheduler:UntagResource
721
+ - scheduler:UpdateSchedule
722
+ - ssm:AddTagsToResource
723
+ - ssm:DeleteParameter
724
+ - ssm:DeleteParameters
725
+ - ssm:PutParameter
726
+ - ssm:RemoveTagsFromResource
727
+ - sqs:CreateQueue
728
+ - sqs:DeleteQueue
729
+ - sqs:SetQueueAttributes
730
+ - sqs:TagQueue
731
+ - sqs:UntagQueue
732
+ # Each action matches only its own service's ARNs, so one statement carries every service.
733
+ Resource:
734
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudwatch:*:${AWS::AccountId}:alarm:${StackNamePrefix}*
735
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudwatch::${AWS::AccountId}:dashboard/${StackNamePrefix}*
736
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:events:*:${AWS::AccountId}:event-bus/${StackNamePrefix}*
737
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:events:*:${AWS::AccountId}:event-busv2/${StackNamePrefix}*
738
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:events:*:${AWS::AccountId}:rule/${StackNamePrefix}*
739
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:logs:*:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/${StackNamePrefix}*
740
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:logs:*:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/cognito/${StackNamePrefix}*
741
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:logs:*:${AWS::AccountId}:destination:${StackNamePrefix}*
742
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:scheduler:*:${AWS::AccountId}:schedule-group/${StackNamePrefix}*
743
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:scheduler:*:${AWS::AccountId}:schedule/${StackNamePrefix}*
744
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:ssm:*:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/${StackNamePrefix}*
745
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:sqs:*:${AWS::AccountId}:${StackNamePrefix}*
746
+
553
747
  # Permissions boundary attached to every IAM role created by SaaSLayer module templates (the
554
748
  # deployer passes this policy's ARN into each module deploy). A module role's effective runtime
555
749
  # permissions are the INTERSECTION of its own policy and this boundary, so even a template bug
@@ -595,6 +789,8 @@ Resources:
595
789
  - cognito-idp:UpdateIdentityProvider
596
790
  - dynamodb:BatchGetItem
597
791
  - dynamodb:BatchWriteItem
792
+ # TransactWriteItems ConditionCheck items (permissions-service audit writes check erasure markers).
793
+ - dynamodb:ConditionCheckItem
598
794
  - dynamodb:DeleteItem
599
795
  - dynamodb:DescribeStream
600
796
  - dynamodb:DescribeTable
@@ -672,6 +868,13 @@ Resources:
672
868
  - ses:SendEmail
673
869
  Resource:
674
870
  - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:ses:*:${AWS::AccountId}:identity/*
871
+ # Phone sign-in SMS: Cognito sends through a user-service phone pool's SMS caller role. Send only; the
872
+ # role's own policy scopes it to its configuration set and origination identity.
873
+ - Effect: Allow
874
+ Action:
875
+ - sms-voice:SendTextMessage
876
+ Resource:
877
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:sms-voice:*:${AWS::AccountId}:*
675
878
  # SES runtime (forward/notify sends + the active-rule-set custom resource) — only on hosts
676
879
  # that run email-inbound. Receiving into S3 is granted to the ses.amazonaws.com service
677
880
  # principal by the module's bucket policy, not here.
@@ -687,8 +890,9 @@ Resources:
687
890
  Resource: '*'
688
891
  - !Ref AWS::NoValue
689
892
 
690
- # Cross-account WRITE entry point for the SaaSLayer control plane. Trust is double-gated: only
691
- # the control-plane account, and only with the shared external ID. Every mutating grant is scoped
893
+ # Cross-account WRITE entry point for the managing SaaSLayer control planes. Trust is rendered from
894
+ # TrustEntries: per control plane, only its account, only its deploy identity role (aws:PrincipalArn) and
895
+ # only with its trust identifier (sts:ExternalId). Every mutating grant is scoped
692
896
  # to the SaaSLayer stack namespace (StackNamePrefix) or the deployment artifact buckets; resource
693
897
  # creation itself always happens through CloudFormation with the execution role above.
694
898
  SaaSLayerDeploymentRole:
@@ -697,14 +901,7 @@ Resources:
697
901
  RoleName: sl-foundation-deploy-role
698
902
  AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
699
903
  Version: '2012-10-17'
700
- Statement:
701
- - Effect: Allow
702
- Principal:
703
- AWS: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${ControlPlaneAccountId}:root
704
- Action: sts:AssumeRole
705
- Condition:
706
- StringEquals:
707
- sts:ExternalId: !Ref ExternalId
904
+ Statement: []
708
905
  Policies:
709
906
  - PolicyName: saaslayer-stack-lifecycle
710
907
  PolicyDocument:
@@ -731,6 +928,36 @@ Resources:
731
928
  - cloudformation:DetectStackDrift
732
929
  - cloudformation:DetectStackResourceDrift
733
930
  Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cloudformation:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/${StackNamePrefix}*
931
+ # Resource import (foundation 8.0.0): only the retained-resource adoption path imports
932
+ # (src/retained-adoption.ts, change set saaslayer-adopt-<runId>), and only the resource types it
933
+ # adopts. CloudFormation has no change-set-type condition key; cloudformation:ImportResourceTypes is
934
+ # present exactly when a change set imports.
935
+ - Sid: DenyImportsOutsideAdoption
936
+ Effect: Deny
937
+ Action:
938
+ - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
939
+ Resource: '*'
940
+ Condition:
941
+ 'Null':
942
+ cloudformation:ImportResourceTypes: 'false'
943
+ StringNotLike:
944
+ cloudformation:ChangeSetName: saaslayer-adopt-*
945
+ - Sid: DenyImportOfUnadoptableTypes
946
+ Effect: Deny
947
+ Action:
948
+ - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
949
+ Resource: '*'
950
+ Condition:
951
+ ForAnyValue:StringNotEquals:
952
+ cloudformation:ImportResourceTypes:
953
+ - AWS::DynamoDB::Table
954
+ - AWS::Cognito::UserPool
955
+ - AWS::Cognito::UserPoolClient
956
+ - AWS::Cognito::UserPoolGroup
957
+ - AWS::Cognito::IdentityPool
958
+ - AWS::S3::Bucket
959
+ - AWS::KMS::Key
960
+ - AWS::SecretsManager::Secret
734
961
  # Actions the API cannot scope to a stack ARN: ValidateTemplate, and the
735
962
  # drift-detection status poll which operates on a detection id, not a stack.
736
963
  - Effect: Allow
@@ -738,6 +965,14 @@ Resources:
738
965
  - cloudformation:ValidateTemplate
739
966
  - cloudformation:DescribeStackDriftDetectionStatus
740
967
  Resource: '*'
968
+ # Connection authorization metadata (ADR 0005 §4): the control plane reads who may authorize
969
+ # SaaSLayer connections to this account through this role. Exactly one parameter, in this
970
+ # stack's (home) region; it holds role ARNs and control-plane ids, no secret.
971
+ - Sid: ReadConnectionAuthorizers
972
+ Effect: Allow
973
+ Action:
974
+ - ssm:GetParameter
975
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:ssm:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/saaslayer/foundation/connection-authorizers
741
976
  # The single permitted pass-role path: this role may hand CloudFormation exactly one
742
977
  # execution role. It cannot pass any other role in the account.
743
978
  - Effect: Allow
@@ -769,17 +1004,12 @@ Resources:
769
1004
  - !Sub arn:aws:s3:::${StackNamePrefix}*
770
1005
  - !Sub arn:aws:s3:::${StackNamePrefix}*/*
771
1006
  # Deploy tooling introspection after stack operations complete: stack enumeration
772
- # (ListStacks has no resource scoping), API Gateway lifecycle calls the Serverless
773
- # tooling makes outside CloudFormation, and lambda version/alias inspection.
1007
+ # (ListStacks has no resource scoping) and lambda version/alias inspection. The API Gateway
1008
+ # calls the Serverless tooling and the domain-service make outside CloudFormation are below.
774
1009
  - Effect: Allow
775
1010
  Action:
776
1011
  - cloudformation:ListStacks
777
1012
  - cloudformation:ListStackResources
778
- - apigateway:DELETE
779
- - apigateway:GET
780
- - apigateway:PATCH
781
- - apigateway:POST
782
- - apigateway:PUT
783
1013
  - lambda:GetAlias
784
1014
  - lambda:GetFunction
785
1015
  - lambda:GetFunctionConfiguration
@@ -787,6 +1017,56 @@ Resources:
787
1017
  - lambda:ListTags
788
1018
  - lambda:ListVersionsByFunction
789
1019
  Resource: '*'
1020
+ # API Gateway outside CloudFormation (foundation 8.0.0). Reads stay open: osls finds the module's REST
1021
+ # API by name in GET /restapis, and the domain-service probes GET /apis/<id> and lists /domainnames.
1022
+ - Sid: ApiGatewayReads
1023
+ Effect: Allow
1024
+ Action:
1025
+ - apigateway:GET
1026
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/*
1027
+ # The domain-service creates a custom domain (v1 or v2) only carrying managed-by=saaslayer-deployer.
1028
+ - Sid: CreateManagedDomains
1029
+ Effect: Allow
1030
+ Action:
1031
+ - apigateway:POST
1032
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/domainnames
1033
+ Condition:
1034
+ StringEquals:
1035
+ aws:RequestTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
1036
+ # Base path / API mappings and deletes reach only domains carrying managed-by: a customer's own
1037
+ # domain of the same name (a swallowed create Conflict) or a vanity host the deployer did not create
1038
+ # is refused. Mappings take the tags of their domain for authorization.
1039
+ - Sid: ManagedDomainChanges
1040
+ Effect: Allow
1041
+ Action:
1042
+ - apigateway:DELETE
1043
+ - apigateway:PATCH
1044
+ - apigateway:POST
1045
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/domainnames/*
1046
+ Condition:
1047
+ StringEquals:
1048
+ aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
1049
+ # osls's post-deploy stage update (REST modules with tags): create/update the stage of a REST API that
1050
+ # carries managed-by (stack tags reach the RestApi; a stage takes its API's tags for authorization).
1051
+ - Sid: ManagedRestApiStages
1052
+ Effect: Allow
1053
+ Action:
1054
+ - apigateway:PATCH
1055
+ - apigateway:POST
1056
+ Resource:
1057
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/restapis/*/stages
1058
+ - !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/restapis/*/stages/*
1059
+ Condition:
1060
+ StringEquals:
1061
+ aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
1062
+ # ...and set the stage's tags. The /tags resource takes no resource-tag condition; API Gateway also
1063
+ # requires PATCH on the tagged resource itself, which ManagedRestApiStages grants only on managed stages.
1064
+ - Sid: ApiGatewayStageTags
1065
+ Effect: Allow
1066
+ Action:
1067
+ - apigateway:DELETE
1068
+ - apigateway:PUT
1069
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:apigateway:*::/tags/*
790
1070
  # Env-mode credential hot-swap: revoke/rotate updates a managed function's environment directly
791
1071
  # (UpdateFunctionConfiguration with RevisionId, read back with GetFunctionConfiguration above) instead
792
1072
  # of a stack deploy. Managed-prefix functions only.
@@ -810,8 +1090,9 @@ Resources:
810
1090
  - cognito-idp:AdminUpdateUserAttributes
811
1091
  - cognito-idp:ListUsers
812
1092
  # Scoped to SaaSLayer-managed pools by tag — the seed can never touch the customer's
813
- # own Cognito pools. Module stacks tag the pool managed-by:saaslayer-deployer (CFN
814
- # propagates stack tags), so it is tagged before the post-deploy seed runs.
1093
+ # own Cognito pools. user-service creates the pool with managed-by:saaslayer-deployer in its
1094
+ # explicit UserPoolTags (stack tags do not reach user pools), so it is tagged before the
1095
+ # post-deploy seed runs, and the execution role cannot add managed-by to any other pool.
815
1096
  Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cognito-idp:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:userpool/*
816
1097
  Condition:
817
1098
  StringEquals:
@@ -849,6 +1130,105 @@ Resources:
849
1130
  - logs:DeleteLogGroup
850
1131
  Resource:
851
1132
  - !Sub arn:aws:logs:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/${StackNamePrefix}*
1133
+ # Recovery inventory (ADR 0006 §2.2, foundation 6.5.0): before a destroy removes anything, the deployer
1134
+ # describes every stateful resource of the module stacks to write the deployment's recovery record.
1135
+ # Metadata reads only — never a secret or parameter value. Tables, buckets and secrets are managed-prefix
1136
+ # scoped; a module's KMS key is addressed by an id the prefix does not cover, so it is scoped to the account.
1137
+ - Sid: RecoveryInventoryScopedReads
1138
+ Effect: Allow
1139
+ Action:
1140
+ - dynamodb:DescribeTable
1141
+ - dynamodb:DescribeContinuousBackups
1142
+ - s3:GetBucketVersioning
1143
+ - secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
1144
+ - kms:DescribeKey
1145
+ Resource:
1146
+ - !Sub arn:aws:dynamodb:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:table/${StackNamePrefix}*
1147
+ - !Sub arn:aws:s3:::${StackNamePrefix}*
1148
+ - !Sub arn:aws:secretsmanager:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:${StackNamePrefix}*
1149
+ - !Sub arn:aws:kms:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:key/*
1150
+ # Pool and app-client reads, limited to SaaSLayer-managed pools by tag like the seed's admin actions.
1151
+ - Sid: RecoveryInventoryPoolReads
1152
+ Effect: Allow
1153
+ Action:
1154
+ - cognito-idp:DescribeUserPool
1155
+ - cognito-idp:DescribeUserPoolClient
1156
+ Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cognito-idp:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:userpool/*
1157
+ Condition:
1158
+ StringEquals:
1159
+ aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
1160
+ # Identity pool reads (foundation 7.2.0): this account and region only, metadata (name) only. No tag condition,
1161
+ # so a retain never refuses on an identity pool its stack tags did not reach; the purge delete stays tag-limited.
1162
+ - Sid: RecoveryInventoryIdentityPoolReads
1163
+ Effect: Allow
1164
+ Action:
1165
+ - cognito-identity:DescribeIdentityPool
1166
+ Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cognito-identity:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:identitypool/*
1167
+ # DescribeUserPoolDomain and DescribeParameters support no resource-level scoping.
1168
+ - Sid: RecoveryInventoryUnscopedReads
1169
+ Effect: Allow
1170
+ Action:
1171
+ - cognito-idp:DescribeUserPoolDomain
1172
+ - ssm:DescribeParameters
1173
+ Resource: '*'
1174
+ # Purge (ADR 0006 §2.1, foundation 7.1.0): a delete destroy, or the purge of a retired deployment, deletes
1175
+ # what the deployment kept in custody, item by item from its recorded inventory: the backups of its tables,
1176
+ # its own buckets (emptied with the object grants above), its Secrets Manager secrets with no recovery
1177
+ # window, and its user pools (domain first, deletion protection off), app clients, identity pools (7.2.0) and
1178
+ # KMS keys. Tables, buckets and secrets are managed-prefix scoped; pools and keys are limited to
1179
+ # SaaSLayer-managed ones by tag.
1180
+ - Sid: PurgeScopedDeletes
1181
+ Effect: Allow
1182
+ Action:
1183
+ - dynamodb:DeleteBackup
1184
+ - s3:DeleteBucket
1185
+ - secretsmanager:DeleteSecret
1186
+ Resource:
1187
+ - !Sub arn:aws:dynamodb:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:table/${StackNamePrefix}*/backup/*
1188
+ - !Sub arn:aws:s3:::${StackNamePrefix}*
1189
+ - !Sub arn:aws:secretsmanager:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:secret:${StackNamePrefix}*
1190
+ - Sid: PurgeManagedPoolsAndKeys
1191
+ Effect: Allow
1192
+ Action:
1193
+ - cognito-idp:DeleteUserPool
1194
+ - cognito-idp:DeleteUserPoolClient
1195
+ - cognito-idp:DeleteUserPoolDomain
1196
+ - cognito-idp:UpdateUserPool
1197
+ - cognito-identity:DeleteIdentityPool
1198
+ - kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion
1199
+ Resource:
1200
+ - !Sub arn:aws:cognito-idp:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:userpool/*
1201
+ - !Sub arn:aws:cognito-identity:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:identitypool/*
1202
+ - !Sub arn:aws:kms:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:key/*
1203
+ Condition:
1204
+ StringEquals:
1205
+ aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
1206
+ # Adopt (ADR 0006 §2.2 step 5, foundation 7.2.0): once a retained user pool is imported back, every user is
1207
+ # signed out (AdminUserGlobalSignOut, listed with ListUsers) so refresh tokens issued before the retain stop
1208
+ # working. Limited to SaaSLayer-managed pools by tag; no user data is read or written beyond usernames.
1209
+ - Sid: AdoptSessionRevocation
1210
+ Effect: Allow
1211
+ Action:
1212
+ - cognito-idp:ListUsers
1213
+ - cognito-idp:AdminUserGlobalSignOut
1214
+ Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cognito-idp:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:userpool/*
1215
+ Condition:
1216
+ StringEquals:
1217
+ aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
1218
+ # ListBackups supports no resource-level scoping; the purge lists only its own tables' backups by name.
1219
+ - Sid: PurgeBackupListing
1220
+ Effect: Allow
1221
+ Action:
1222
+ - dynamodb:ListBackups
1223
+ Resource: '*'
1224
+ # Login-domain quota (foundation 7.4.0): Cognito allows 4 custom domains per account and region, so before
1225
+ # a deployment gets a branded login host the deployer counts the account's user pools in the region.
1226
+ # Read-only (pool ids and names); ListUserPools supports no resource-level scoping.
1227
+ - Sid: LoginDomainQuotaRead
1228
+ Effect: Allow
1229
+ Action:
1230
+ - cognito-idp:ListUserPools
1231
+ Resource: '*'
852
1232
  # Data migrations (@saaslayer/migrations): hop into a service stack's own migrate role; the
853
1233
  # role's own policy limits it to that service's tables. Its trust is account root + an
854
1234
  # aws:PrincipalArn condition, which delegates to this identity policy, so the grant is required.
@@ -857,8 +1237,8 @@ Resources:
857
1237
  Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/${StackNamePrefix}*-migrate
858
1238
  # Domain-mapping (D1.0, monorepo-88mn.3): the domain-service assumes this role to issue an ACM
859
1239
  # cert for the tenant's {slug}.saaslayer-cloud.com names, then attach an API-GW regional custom
860
- # domain — the apigateway create/read/update/delete verbs are ALREADY granted above (Resource
861
- # '*'), so only ACM is added here. Scoped to certs tagged managed-by=saaslayer-deployer so this
1240
+ # domain — the apigateway create/map/delete verbs are granted above (CreateManagedDomains,
1241
+ # ManagedDomainChanges), so only ACM is added here. Scoped to certs tagged managed-by=saaslayer-deployer so this
862
1242
  # role can only touch certs it created; RequestCertificate has no resource-level ARN, so the
863
1243
  # request-tag condition is the only guard. Regional custom domains do NOT need a service-linked
864
1244
  # role; add iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole for apigateway ONLY if domain-iam-spike.sh (D1.0a) proves it.
@@ -904,6 +1284,9 @@ Resources:
904
1284
  - Effect: Allow
905
1285
  Action:
906
1286
  - ssm:GetParameter
1287
+ # User-service's first-admin seed reads the endpoint and scoped service key in
1288
+ # one GetParameters call. Keep that batch read in the same deployment namespace.
1289
+ - ssm:GetParameters
907
1290
  - ssm:PutParameter
908
1291
  # DeleteParameter: the destroy/teardown phase clears the handoff params (they are written
909
1292
  # by PutParameter, NOT CloudFormation, so a stack delete leaves them behind) — M4b.
@@ -929,28 +1312,54 @@ Resources:
929
1312
  - TenantEdgeEnabled
930
1313
  - Effect: Allow
931
1314
  Action:
932
- - cloudfront:CreateDistribution
933
1315
  - cloudfront:GetDistribution
934
1316
  - cloudfront:GetDistributionConfig
935
- - cloudfront:UpdateDistribution
936
1317
  - cloudfront:ListDistributions
937
- - cloudfront:TagResource
938
1318
  - cloudfront:CreateFunction
939
- - cloudfront:PublishFunction
940
- - cloudfront:UpdateFunction
941
1319
  - cloudfront:DescribeFunction
942
1320
  - cloudfront:GetFunction
943
1321
  - cloudfront:ListFunctions
944
- # Native/B teardown (teardownNativeEdge runs via THIS DeploymentRole, direct SDK): delete
945
- # the per-tenant distro + strip Function on destroy. Without these the B teardown leaks.
1322
+ Resource: '*'
1323
+ - !Ref AWS::NoValue
1324
+ # The distro is created and tagged only with the request carrying managed-by (CreateDistributionWithTags;
1325
+ # provision and teardown tag the distro they find by its {slug} alias before changing it), and updated (the
1326
+ # teardown's disable) and deleted (native/B teardown) only while it carries managed-by.
1327
+ - Fn::If:
1328
+ - TenantEdgeEnabled
1329
+ - Effect: Allow
1330
+ Action:
1331
+ - cloudfront:CreateDistribution
1332
+ - cloudfront:TagResource
1333
+ Resource: '*'
1334
+ Condition:
1335
+ StringEquals:
1336
+ aws:RequestTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
1337
+ - !Ref AWS::NoValue
1338
+ - Fn::If:
1339
+ - TenantEdgeEnabled
1340
+ - Effect: Allow
1341
+ Action:
946
1342
  - cloudfront:DeleteDistribution
1343
+ - cloudfront:UpdateDistribution
1344
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudfront::${AWS::AccountId}:distribution/*
1345
+ Condition:
1346
+ StringEquals:
1347
+ aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
1348
+ - !Ref AWS::NoValue
1349
+ # The strip Function is sl-strip-<slug>, under the managed prefix; its ARN carries the name.
1350
+ - Fn::If:
1351
+ - TenantEdgeEnabled
1352
+ - Effect: Allow
1353
+ Action:
1354
+ - cloudfront:PublishFunction
1355
+ - cloudfront:UpdateFunction
947
1356
  - cloudfront:DeleteFunction
948
- Resource: '*'
1357
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudfront::${AWS::AccountId}:function/${StackNamePrefix}*
949
1358
  - !Ref AWS::NoValue
950
1359
 
951
1360
  # Cross-account READ-ONLY role for SaaSLayer support staff to diagnose managed deployments
952
- # without the deployment role's write power. Trust matches the deployment role (control-plane
953
- # account + external ID) and additionally pins the session name to saaslayer-support-* so each
1361
+ # without the deployment role's write power. Trust is rendered like the deployment role's (per
1362
+ # control plane: its account, its support identity role and its trust identifier) and additionally pins the session name to saaslayer-support-* so each
954
1363
  # assumption is attributable in CloudTrail. Grants carry only Get/List/Describe verbs — enforced
955
1364
  # by tests/bootstrap.test.js — and exclude all data-plane reads: no S3 object reads, no DynamoDB
956
1365
  # item reads, no SSM parameter values, no Secrets Manager secret values, no function code downloads.
@@ -964,16 +1373,7 @@ Resources:
964
1373
  RoleName: sl-foundation-support-ro-role
965
1374
  AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
966
1375
  Version: '2012-10-17'
967
- Statement:
968
- - Effect: Allow
969
- Principal:
970
- AWS: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${ControlPlaneAccountId}:root
971
- Action: sts:AssumeRole
972
- Condition:
973
- StringEquals:
974
- sts:ExternalId: !Ref ExternalId
975
- StringLike:
976
- sts:RoleSessionName: saaslayer-support-*
1376
+ Statement: []
977
1377
  Policies:
978
1378
  - PolicyName: saaslayer-support-read-only
979
1379
  PolicyDocument:
@@ -997,6 +1397,12 @@ Resources:
997
1397
  Action:
998
1398
  - cloudformation:ListStacks
999
1399
  Resource: '*'
1400
+ # Foundation home: the foundation roles' aws:cloudformation:stack-id tag names this account
1401
+ # stack and so its home region, which foundation discovery reads before DescribeStacks.
1402
+ - Effect: Allow
1403
+ Action:
1404
+ - iam:ListRoleTags
1405
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/sl-foundation-*
1000
1406
  # Configuration reads scoped by resource tag: these services support the
1001
1407
  # aws:ResourceTag condition key, and every SaaSLayer-deployed resource carries
1002
1408
  # managed-by=saaslayer-deployer via stack tags. Untagged (customer) resources
@@ -1043,6 +1449,34 @@ Resources:
1043
1449
  - logs:GetLogGroupFields
1044
1450
  - logs:GetLogRecord
1045
1451
  Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:logs:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/${StackNamePrefix}*:*
1452
+ # Phone sign-in SMS readiness (read-only): account tier + spend limit, origination identities and
1453
+ # their registrations, a sandbox account's verified destination numbers, and the read-back of a phone
1454
+ # pool's configuration set + protect country rules. Account-level facts that carry no deployer tag,
1455
+ # so not tag-scoped.
1456
+ - Effect: Allow
1457
+ Action:
1458
+ - sms-voice:DescribeAccountAttributes
1459
+ - sms-voice:DescribeConfigurationSets
1460
+ - sms-voice:DescribePhoneNumbers
1461
+ - sms-voice:DescribePools
1462
+ - sms-voice:DescribeProtectConfigurations
1463
+ - sms-voice:DescribeRegistrations
1464
+ - sms-voice:DescribeSenderIds
1465
+ - sms-voice:DescribeSpendLimits
1466
+ - sms-voice:DescribeVerifiedDestinationNumbers
1467
+ - sms-voice:GetProtectConfigurationCountryRuleSet
1468
+ Resource: '*'
1469
+ # Recovery email readiness (read-only), checked before a recovery cutover: the account's SES sending status
1470
+ # (production access, sending enabled) and whether a sender identity is verified for sending. Account-level
1471
+ # facts that carry no deployer tag, so not tag-scoped; identity reads stay within this account.
1472
+ - Effect: Allow
1473
+ Action:
1474
+ - ses:GetAccount
1475
+ Resource: '*'
1476
+ - Effect: Allow
1477
+ Action:
1478
+ - ses:GetEmailIdentity
1479
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:ses:*:${AWS::AccountId}:identity/*
1046
1480
  # Alarm/dashboard state for module observability. CloudWatch alarms support
1047
1481
  # aws:ResourceTag; DescribeAlarms is an enumeration API evaluated per-alarm.
1048
1482
  - Effect: Allow
@@ -1068,12 +1502,29 @@ Resources:
1068
1502
  kms:ViaService: ssm.*.amazonaws.com
1069
1503
  kms:EncryptionContext:PARAMETER_ARN: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:ssm:*:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/saaslayer/deployment/*
1070
1504
 
1505
+ # Connection authorization metadata (ADR 0005 §4), in this stack's (home) region: who may authorize
1506
+ # SaaSLayer org connections (ConnectionAuthorizerArns) and which control planes hold trust entries.
1507
+ # The controlPlanes literal (the line after "controlPlanes") is rendered from TrustEntries by the CLI.
1508
+ SaaSLayerConnectionAuthorizers:
1509
+ Type: AWS::SSM::Parameter
1510
+ Properties:
1511
+ Name: /saaslayer/foundation/connection-authorizers
1512
+ Type: String
1513
+ Description: SaaSLayer connection authorizers and managing control planes of this account (no secret).
1514
+ Value: !Join
1515
+ - ''
1516
+ - - '{"v":1,"connectionAuthorizerArns":["'
1517
+ - !Join ['","', !Ref ConnectionAuthorizerArns]
1518
+ - '"],"controlPlanes":'
1519
+ - '[]'
1520
+ - '}'
1521
+
1071
1522
  Outputs:
1072
1523
  DeploymentRoleArn:
1073
- Description: Cross-account deployment role the SaaSLayer control plane assumes (external ID required).
1524
+ Description: Cross-account deployment role the managing SaaSLayer control planes assume (trust identifier required).
1074
1525
  Value: !GetAtt SaaSLayerDeploymentRole.Arn
1075
1526
  SupportReadOnlyRoleArn:
1076
- Description: Cross-account read-only role SaaSLayer support staff assume for diagnostics (external ID required).
1527
+ Description: Cross-account read-only role SaaSLayer support staff assume for diagnostics (trust identifier required).
1077
1528
  Value: !GetAtt SaaSLayerSupportReadOnlyRole.Arn
1078
1529
  CloudFormationExecutionRoleArn:
1079
1530
  Description: Service role CloudFormation uses to provision approved SaaSLayer module stacks; not assumable cross-account.