saaslayer 0.0.2 → 0.1.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +195 -8
- package/bin/saaslayer.js +454 -38
- package/package.json +19 -4
- package/src/api-client.js +91 -0
- package/src/aws-sigv4.js +47 -0
- package/src/commands/access-admins.js +73 -0
- package/src/commands/accounts.js +54 -0
- package/src/commands/activity.js +33 -0
- package/src/commands/aws.js +132 -0
- package/src/commands/catalog.js +246 -0
- package/src/commands/context.js +64 -0
- package/src/commands/deploy.js +118 -0
- package/src/commands/first-admin.js +42 -0
- package/src/commands/foundation.js +405 -0
- package/src/commands/lifecycle.js +124 -0
- package/src/commands/login.js +261 -0
- package/src/commands/machine-trust.js +96 -0
- package/src/commands/migrate.js +290 -0
- package/src/commands/operations.js +140 -0
- package/src/commands/orgs.js +81 -0
- package/src/commands/permissions-inspect.js +228 -0
- package/src/commands/release-manifest.js +138 -0
- package/src/commands/service-principals.js +81 -0
- package/src/commands/settings.js +140 -0
- package/src/commands/stacks.js +22 -0
- package/src/commands/users.js +269 -0
- package/src/config.js +49 -0
- package/src/context-store.js +37 -0
- package/src/credentials.js +285 -0
- package/src/deployment-api-auth.js +61 -0
- package/src/deployment-auth.js +38 -0
- package/src/deployments.js +26 -0
- package/src/discovery.js +66 -0
- package/src/env-compare.js +143 -0
- package/src/foundation-template.js +57 -0
- package/src/iam-session.js +67 -0
- package/src/migrations-lib.js +15 -0
- package/src/module-catalog.js +66 -0
- package/src/permissions-request.js +43 -0
- package/src/prompt.js +19 -0
- package/src/release-manifest.js +334 -0
- package/src/scope.js +114 -0
- package/src/settings.js +272 -0
- package/src/users-api.js +165 -0
- package/src/users-import/ids.js +24 -0
- package/src/users-import/import.js +292 -0
- package/src/users-import/manifest.js +90 -0
- package/src/users-import/providers/cognito.js +61 -0
- package/src/users-import/providers/index.js +24 -0
- package/templates/saaslayer-foundation-region.yml +109 -0
- package/templates/{host-account.yml → saaslayer-foundation.yml} +381 -87
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# SaaSLayer host-account bootstrap. Installed once per host (customer) account; grants the
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# SaaSLayer control plane the minimum access needed to deploy and support SaaSLayer modules.
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#
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# SOURCE OF TRUTH — edit THIS file only. packages/cli/templates/saaslayer-foundation.yml is an
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# auto-synced copy (run `npm run sync-template` from packages/cli). `npm test` fails on drift.
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#
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# NAMING (tbrme.13.19): the CloudFormation LOGICAL ids below stay SaaSLayer* (internal, unchanged), while the
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# physical RoleName/ManagedPolicyName values are now sl-foundation-{deploy-role,cfn-exec-role,support-ro-role,
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# managed-boundary} (+ saaslayer-org-vending-role in account-vending-access). Prose below names the roles by logical id.
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#
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# SECURITY REVIEWER SUMMARY
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#
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# This template creates one S3 bucket, one permissions-boundary managed policy, and three IAM roles:
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# ExternalId. It can drive the CloudFormation lifecycle of stacks whose names start with
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# StackNamePrefix (default "sl-"), read/write the deployment artifact buckets, and pass exactly
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# one role (SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole) to CloudFormation. It cannot create IAM
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# resources or touch anything outside the managed stack namespace directly.
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# resources or touch anything outside the managed stack namespace directly. Its only
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# sts:AssumeRole grant is into a module stack's own data-migration role
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# (role/${StackNamePrefix}*-migrate), whose policy limits it to that service's tables.
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#
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# 2. SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole — assumable ONLY by the CloudFormation service, never
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# cross-account. CloudFormation uses it to create/update/delete the resources declared by
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# support role, external-id enforcement, wildcard justification audit).
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AWSTemplateFormatVersion: '2010-09-09'
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Description: >-
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SaaSLayer
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read-only support role. Both cross-account roles require an external ID and trust only the
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SaaSLayer control-plane account supplied as a parameter.
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SaaSLayer foundation stack: grants the SaaSLayer control plane scoped, external-ID-gated access
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to deploy and support SaaSLayer modules in this account. Installed once per account. Details:
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https://saaslayer.com/docs/account-access
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Parameters:
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ControlPlaneAccountId:
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Description: >-
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Prefix for SaaSLayer-managed CloudFormation stacks. The deployment role can only operate on
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stacks whose names start with this prefix.
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OrgId:
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Type: String
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Default: ''
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Description: >-
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SaaSLayer org this account is connected to. Informational only — never used in a policy or
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trust decision. Surfaced in Outputs so support can identify the account from the stack alone.
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EnableEmailInbound:
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Type: String
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AllowedValues: ['true', 'false']
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Description: >-
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When 'true', grant the SES receipt-rule provisioning + inbound-mail runtime permissions that
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email-inbound-service needs. Default 'false' so host accounts that do NOT run email-inbound are
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not over-permissioned for SES.
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not over-permissioned for SES. Set per host via `cplane accounts enable-capability <host> ses`.
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EnableTenantEdge:
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Type: String
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AllowedValues: ['true', 'false']
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Default: 'false'
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Description: >-
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When 'true', grant the CloudFront distribution + edge-Function permissions the NATIVE
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single-tenant edge (epic f55t, Model B) provisions in this account. Default 'false' so host
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accounts that route through the shared edge are not granted CloudFront write. Set per host via
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`cplane accounts enable-capability <host> tenant-edge`.
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WARNING (rollout order): a host ALREADY running the native edge must have this enabled BEFORE
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its foundation is redeployed at >= 1.1.0, or the redeploy strips the perms its live edge needs.
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Conditions:
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# Capability gates. Each maps 1:1 to an entry in @saaslayer/foundation-contract (packages/
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# foundation-contract/src/index.ts), which is what the CLI and the deployer read; a param here with
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# no registry entry (or vice versa) fails that package's contract test.
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# Gate email-inbound-service's SES permissions so they exist only on host accounts that run it.
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EmailInboundEnabled: !Equals [!Ref EnableEmailInbound, 'true']
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# Gate the native tenant-edge CloudFront permissions to hosts that actually run a native edge.
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TenantEdgeEnabled: !Equals [!Ref EnableTenantEdge, 'true']
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Mappings:
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# Foundation template version (semver). BUMP on every change so support can tell which bootstrap an
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# account runs (surfaced via the FoundationVersion / SaaSLayerAccountRef Outputs). Bump rules:
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# major = breaking trust/permission-contract change (role renamed, permission removed) — account must re-bootstrap
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# minor = additive capability (new resource-type perms, new optional param) — safe, no re-bootstrap
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# patch = comments/docs/no behavior change
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Meta:
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Foundation:
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Version: '5.12.0'
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Resources:
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#
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#
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Properties:
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PublicAccessBlockConfiguration:
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BlockPublicAcls: true
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BlockPublicPolicy: true
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IgnorePublicAcls: true
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RestrictPublicBuckets: true
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BucketEncryption:
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ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration:
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- ServerSideEncryptionByDefault:
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SSEAlgorithm: AES256
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# The shared deployment-artifact bucket moved OUT of this account-global stack into the per-region
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# saaslayer-foundation-<region> stack (bead .30): S3 is regional and this IAM stack cannot deploy per-region.
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# The deploy role reaches that bucket (sl-artifacts-<token>-<region>) through the ${StackNamePrefix}* grant
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# in saaslayer-stack-lifecycle below, same as every other managed bucket.
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# Service role CloudFormation assumes while creating/updating/deleting resources declared by
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# approved SaaSLayer module templates. Not assumable by any AWS account — only the CloudFormation
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SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole:
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Type: AWS::IAM::Role
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Properties:
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RoleName:
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RoleName: sl-foundation-cfn-exec-role
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AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
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Version: '2012-10-17'
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Statement:
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- cloudwatch:EnableAlarmActions
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- cloudwatch:GetDashboard
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- cloudwatch:ListDashboards
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# DetectStackDrift reads alarm tags; without this, drift checks on the ops alarms
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# 403 and block every UPDATE (fail-closed drift gate).
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- cloudwatch:ListTagsForResource
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- cloudwatch:PutDashboard
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- cloudwatch:PutMetricAlarm
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- cloudwatch:TagResource
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- events:RemoveTargets
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- events:TagResource
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- events:UntagResource
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# IAM
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- iam:CreatePolicyVersion
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- iam:CreateRole
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- iam:DeletePolicy
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- iam:DeletePolicyVersion
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- iam:DeleteRole
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- iam:DeleteRolePolicy
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- iam:DetachRolePolicy
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- iam:AttachRolePolicy
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# IAM read-only introspection during changeset execution. Mutating IAM verbs
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# (Create/Delete/Update/Attach/Pass/Tag) are prefix-scoped in dedicated
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# statements below — never Resource '*' — and CreateRole additionally requires
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# SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary so no created role can exceed the boundary.
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- iam:GetPolicy
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- iam:GetPolicyVersion
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- iam:GetRole
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- iam:ListEntitiesForPolicy
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- iam:ListPolicyVersions
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- iam:ListRolePolicies
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- iam:PassRole
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- iam:PutRolePolicy
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- iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion
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- iam:TagPolicy
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- iam:TagRole
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- iam:UntagPolicy
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- iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
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- iam:UpdateRole
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- iam:UpdateRoleDescription
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# KMS customer-managed key + alias lifecycle. rbac-service provisions an
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# EventDeliveryKey (AWS::KMS::Key, rotation on) + alias for webhook payload
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# encryption; CreateKey mandates Resource '*', and TagResource on the new key
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# is required or CloudFormation fails with UnauthorizedTaggingOperation.
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- kms:CreateKey
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# EarlyValidation runs a KMS::Alias name-conflict check on change-set creation; without
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# ListAliases it reports a (non-fatal) "not allowed to check if resource already exists"
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# FAIL in the console Hooks view and can't detect a real alias collision. Enumeration API,
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# no resource-level scoping (monorepo-pcren).
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- kms:ListAliases
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# Grant + data-plane actions: a resource encrypted with a customer CMK (email-inbound's
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# InboundTable via DynamoDB SSE-KMS) makes the service create a grant AND
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# decrypt/generate data keys against the CMK during provisioning — without these the
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# table create fails AccessDenied (kms:CreateGrant, then kms:Decrypt/GenerateDataKey).
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- kms:CreateGrant
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- kms:Decrypt
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- kms:DeleteAlias
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- kms:DescribeKey
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- kms:DisableKeyRotation
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- kms:EnableKeyRotation
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- kms:Encrypt
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- kms:GenerateDataKey
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- kms:GenerateDataKeyWithoutPlaintext
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- kms:GetKeyPolicy
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- kms:GetKeyRotationStatus
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- kms:ListGrants
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- kms:ListResourceTags
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- kms:PutKeyPolicy
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- kms:ReEncryptFrom
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- kms:ReEncryptTo
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- kms:RevokeGrant
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- kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion
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- sqs:TagQueue
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- sqs:UntagQueue
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Resource: '*'
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# Mutating IAM verbs are scoped to the managed-resource prefix (StackNamePrefix) so
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# the exec role can only create/modify SaaSLayer module roles + customer-managed
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# policies — never a pre-existing account role, and never the control-plane primitives
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# (named SaaSLayer*, outside the prefix). CreateRole additionally requires the
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# boundary, so no created role can exceed it even if a template attaches an admin policy.
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- Effect: Allow
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Action:
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- iam:CreateRole
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Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/${StackNamePrefix}*
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Condition:
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StringEquals:
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iam:PermissionsBoundary: !Ref SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary
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- Effect: Allow
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Action:
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- iam:DeleteRole
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- iam:UpdateRole
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- iam:UpdateRoleDescription
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- iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
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- iam:PutRolePolicy
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- iam:DeleteRolePolicy
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- iam:AttachRolePolicy
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- iam:DetachRolePolicy
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- iam:TagRole
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- iam:UntagRole
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- iam:PassRole
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Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/${StackNamePrefix}*
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- Effect: Allow
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Action:
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- iam:CreatePolicy
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- iam:CreatePolicyVersion
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- iam:DeletePolicy
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- iam:DeletePolicyVersion
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- iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion
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- iam:TagPolicy
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- iam:UntagPolicy
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Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:policy/${StackNamePrefix}*
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# Self-protecting Deny (defense-in-depth): the exec role can never mutate the
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# permissions boundary or the three bootstrap roles, even though prefix scoping
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# already excludes their SaaSLayer* names. An explicit Deny overrides any Allow.
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- Effect: Deny
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Action:
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- iam:CreatePolicyVersion
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- iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion
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- iam:DeletePolicy
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- iam:DeletePolicyVersion
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- iam:DeleteRole
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- iam:PutRolePolicy
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- iam:DeleteRolePolicy
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- iam:AttachRolePolicy
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- iam:DetachRolePolicy
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- iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
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- iam:UpdateRole
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Resource:
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- !Ref SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary
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- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/sl-foundation-cfn-exec-role
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- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/sl-foundation-deploy-role
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- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/sl-foundation-support-ro-role
|
|
508
|
+
# Tenant-edge B (native single-tenant edge, epic f55t): CFN-driven Model B stands up a
|
|
509
|
+
# CloudFront distro + prefix-strip Function IN this account for
|
|
510
|
+
# {slug}.saaslayer-cloud.com/{service}. Only on hosts that run a native edge
|
|
511
|
+
# (EnableTenantEdge=true); the shared-edge path needs none of it.
|
|
512
|
+
- Fn::If:
|
|
513
|
+
- TenantEdgeEnabled
|
|
514
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
515
|
+
Action:
|
|
516
|
+
- cloudfront:CreateFunction
|
|
517
|
+
- cloudfront:PublishFunction
|
|
518
|
+
- cloudfront:UpdateFunction
|
|
519
|
+
- cloudfront:DescribeFunction
|
|
520
|
+
- cloudfront:GetFunction
|
|
521
|
+
- cloudfront:ListFunctions
|
|
522
|
+
- cloudfront:ListDistributions
|
|
523
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
524
|
+
- !Ref AWS::NoValue
|
|
419
525
|
# SES receipt rule set/rule provisioning — only on hosts that run email-inbound
|
|
420
526
|
# (EnableEmailInbound=true). Identity verification (VerifyDomainIdentity/DKIM) runs
|
|
421
527
|
# CP-side in the domain-service, never from the tenant account.
|
|
@@ -428,6 +534,9 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
428
534
|
- ses:CreateReceiptRule
|
|
429
535
|
- ses:DeleteReceiptRule
|
|
430
536
|
- ses:UpdateReceiptRule
|
|
537
|
+
# CFN's AWS::SES::ReceiptRule calls SetReceiptRulePosition to (re)order a rule via its
|
|
538
|
+
# `After` property on UPDATE — without it a rule reorder 403s + wedges the stack.
|
|
539
|
+
- ses:SetReceiptRulePosition
|
|
431
540
|
- ses:DescribeReceiptRuleSet
|
|
432
541
|
- ses:DescribeReceiptRule
|
|
433
542
|
Resource: '*'
|
|
@@ -449,20 +558,39 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
449
558
|
SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary:
|
|
450
559
|
Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
|
|
451
560
|
Properties:
|
|
452
|
-
ManagedPolicyName:
|
|
561
|
+
ManagedPolicyName: sl-foundation-managed-boundary
|
|
453
562
|
Description: Maximum runtime permissions for IAM roles created by SaaSLayer managed stacks.
|
|
454
563
|
PolicyDocument:
|
|
455
564
|
Version: '2012-10-17'
|
|
456
565
|
Statement:
|
|
457
566
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
458
567
|
Action:
|
|
568
|
+
# Invitation registration creates the invited account after mailbox proof (user-service).
|
|
569
|
+
- cognito-idp:AdminCreateUser
|
|
570
|
+
- cognito-idp:AdminDeleteUser
|
|
459
571
|
- cognito-idp:AdminDeleteUserAttributes
|
|
572
|
+
- cognito-idp:AdminDisableProviderForUser
|
|
573
|
+
# User lifecycle operations by suid (user-service API: disable/enable after global sign-out, reset-password).
|
|
574
|
+
- cognito-idp:AdminDisableUser
|
|
575
|
+
- cognito-idp:AdminEnableUser
|
|
460
576
|
- cognito-idp:AdminGetUser
|
|
577
|
+
- cognito-idp:AdminLinkProviderForUser
|
|
461
578
|
- cognito-idp:AdminListGroupsForUser
|
|
579
|
+
- cognito-idp:AdminResetUserPassword
|
|
462
580
|
- cognito-idp:AdminSetUserMFAPreference
|
|
581
|
+
- cognito-idp:AdminSetUserPassword
|
|
463
582
|
- cognito-idp:AdminUpdateUserAttributes
|
|
583
|
+
- cognito-idp:AdminUserGlobalSignOut
|
|
584
|
+
# Social login + identity stitching (epic monorepo-24667): the idpResource custom-resource
|
|
585
|
+
# Lambda manages the federated IdPs; the PreSignUp/stitching + account Lambdas link/disable
|
|
586
|
+
# providers, set passwords, and delete users. The boundary is the ceiling, so it must allow
|
|
587
|
+
# every action the managed roles use (their inline policies scope the resources).
|
|
588
|
+
- cognito-idp:CreateIdentityProvider
|
|
589
|
+
- cognito-idp:DeleteIdentityProvider
|
|
590
|
+
- cognito-idp:DescribeIdentityProvider
|
|
464
591
|
- cognito-idp:GetUserPoolMfaConfig
|
|
465
592
|
- cognito-idp:ListUsers
|
|
593
|
+
- cognito-idp:UpdateIdentityProvider
|
|
466
594
|
- dynamodb:BatchGetItem
|
|
467
595
|
- dynamodb:BatchWriteItem
|
|
468
596
|
- dynamodb:DeleteItem
|
|
@@ -486,6 +614,9 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
486
614
|
- lambda:InvokeFunction
|
|
487
615
|
- logs:CreateLogGroup
|
|
488
616
|
- logs:CreateLogStream
|
|
617
|
+
# Cognito validates a user-import job's logs role for DescribeLogStreams before it starts the job
|
|
618
|
+
# (user-service UserImportLogsRole; `saaslayer users import`).
|
|
619
|
+
- logs:DescribeLogStreams
|
|
489
620
|
- logs:PutLogEvents
|
|
490
621
|
- mobiletargeting:PutEvents
|
|
491
622
|
- s3:AbortMultipartUpload
|
|
@@ -505,7 +636,34 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
505
636
|
- sqs:ReceiveMessage
|
|
506
637
|
- sqs:SendMessage
|
|
507
638
|
- sqs:SendMessageBatch
|
|
639
|
+
# Social login (epic monorepo-24667): the idpResource custom resource reads the BYO client
|
|
640
|
+
# secret from an SSM SecureString (/saaslayer/deployment/*); kms:Decrypt above covers the
|
|
641
|
+
# SecureString's aws/ssm key.
|
|
642
|
+
- ssm:GetParameter
|
|
508
643
|
Resource: '*'
|
|
644
|
+
# PITR check + opt-in on-demand backup for per-service migrate roles (@saaslayer/migrations).
|
|
645
|
+
# Managed-prefix tables only. The boundary is account-global and the role policies do the
|
|
646
|
+
# regional scoping, hence dynamodb:*:.
|
|
647
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
648
|
+
Action:
|
|
649
|
+
- dynamodb:DescribeContinuousBackups
|
|
650
|
+
- dynamodb:CreateBackup
|
|
651
|
+
- dynamodb:DescribeBackup
|
|
652
|
+
Resource:
|
|
653
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:dynamodb:*:${AWS::AccountId}:table/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
654
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:dynamodb:*:${AWS::AccountId}:table/${StackNamePrefix}*/backup/*
|
|
655
|
+
# rbac's machine-trust API renders its own IAM-principals document under the deployment's SSM namespace.
|
|
656
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
657
|
+
Action:
|
|
658
|
+
- ssm:PutParameter
|
|
659
|
+
Resource:
|
|
660
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:ssm:*:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/saaslayer/deployment/*
|
|
661
|
+
# Transactional email from this account's own SES identities (user-service registration codes).
|
|
662
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
663
|
+
Action:
|
|
664
|
+
- ses:SendEmail
|
|
665
|
+
Resource:
|
|
666
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:ses:*:${AWS::AccountId}:identity/*
|
|
509
667
|
# SES runtime (forward/notify sends + the active-rule-set custom resource) — only on hosts
|
|
510
668
|
# that run email-inbound. Receiving into S3 is granted to the ses.amazonaws.com service
|
|
511
669
|
# principal by the module's bucket policy, not here.
|
|
@@ -528,7 +686,7 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
528
686
|
SaaSLayerDeploymentRole:
|
|
529
687
|
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
|
|
530
688
|
Properties:
|
|
531
|
-
RoleName:
|
|
689
|
+
RoleName: sl-foundation-deploy-role
|
|
532
690
|
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
|
|
533
691
|
Version: '2012-10-17'
|
|
534
692
|
Statement:
|
|
@@ -553,6 +711,9 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
553
711
|
- cloudformation:UpdateStack
|
|
554
712
|
- cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet
|
|
555
713
|
- cloudformation:SetStackPolicy
|
|
714
|
+
# Protected environments (prod, staging): the deployer enables termination protection
|
|
715
|
+
# after a deploy and disables it before an authorized destroy.
|
|
716
|
+
- cloudformation:UpdateTerminationProtection
|
|
556
717
|
- cloudformation:DeleteChangeSet
|
|
557
718
|
- cloudformation:DeleteStack
|
|
558
719
|
- cloudformation:Describe*
|
|
@@ -575,11 +736,11 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
575
736
|
Action:
|
|
576
737
|
- iam:PassRole
|
|
577
738
|
Resource: !GetAtt SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole.Arn
|
|
578
|
-
# Artifact staging
|
|
579
|
-
#
|
|
580
|
-
#
|
|
581
|
-
# which teardown must empty (ListBucketVersions/DeleteObjectVersion) before the stack
|
|
582
|
-
#
|
|
739
|
+
# Artifact staging + data-bucket lifecycle: the shared deployment-artifact bucket
|
|
740
|
+
# (sl-artifacts-<token>-<region>, in the per-region foundation stack), the module data buckets
|
|
741
|
+
# named from the managed prefix (sl-) — e.g. user-service's versioned cognito-user-backup bucket,
|
|
742
|
+
# which teardown must empty (ListBucketVersions/DeleteObjectVersion) before the stack can delete
|
|
743
|
+
# it, or destroy fails with AccessDenied on s3:ListBucketVersions.
|
|
583
744
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
584
745
|
Action:
|
|
585
746
|
- s3:GetBucketLocation
|
|
@@ -591,23 +752,14 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
591
752
|
- s3:ListBucket
|
|
592
753
|
- s3:ListBucketVersions
|
|
593
754
|
Resource:
|
|
594
|
-
-
|
|
595
|
-
-
|
|
596
|
-
-
|
|
597
|
-
-
|
|
598
|
-
|
|
599
|
-
|
|
600
|
-
|
|
601
|
-
|
|
602
|
-
- arn:aws:s3:::sl-*-adminui-*
|
|
603
|
-
- arn:aws:s3:::sl-*-adminui-*/*
|
|
604
|
-
# email-inbound-service raw-MIME + attachment buckets: SES writes inbound mail here
|
|
605
|
-
# and teardown must empty them (ListBucketVersions/DeleteObjectVersion) before the
|
|
606
|
-
# stack can delete them, or destroy fails with AccessDenied.
|
|
607
|
-
- arn:aws:s3:::sl-*-email-inbound-raw-*
|
|
608
|
-
- arn:aws:s3:::sl-*-email-inbound-raw-*/*
|
|
609
|
-
- arn:aws:s3:::sl-*-email-inbound-attachments-*
|
|
610
|
-
- arn:aws:s3:::sl-*-email-inbound-attachments-*/*
|
|
755
|
+
# ALL deployer-managed service app buckets are now OPAQUE ${StackNamePrefix}<token>-<service>
|
|
756
|
+
# (naming §5, T-FOUNDATION-WILDCARDS): the opaque token replaces the old per-service name
|
|
757
|
+
# suffixes (eml-raw/att, cognito-user-backup, adminui, manifest) AND the framework
|
|
758
|
+
# *serverlessdeploymentbucket*, so ONE prefix-scoped wildcard covers every one. The deploy
|
|
759
|
+
# role can create + empty (ListBucketVersions/DeleteObjectVersion) only buckets under the
|
|
760
|
+
# managed prefix — never a bare literal (D8: StackNamePrefix is customer-configurable).
|
|
761
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:s3:::${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
762
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:s3:::${StackNamePrefix}*/*
|
|
611
763
|
# Deploy tooling introspection after stack operations complete: stack enumeration
|
|
612
764
|
# (ListStacks has no resource scoping), API Gateway lifecycle calls the Serverless
|
|
613
765
|
# tooling makes outside CloudFormation, and lambda version/alias inspection.
|
|
@@ -628,28 +780,157 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
628
780
|
- lambda:ListVersionsByFunction
|
|
629
781
|
Resource: '*'
|
|
630
782
|
# Post-deploy SEED data-plane: after a module deploys, the deployer runs its seed
|
|
631
|
-
# script under this role to make the deployment usable —
|
|
632
|
-
#
|
|
633
|
-
#
|
|
634
|
-
#
|
|
635
|
-
#
|
|
783
|
+
# script under this role to make the deployment usable — bootstrap the tenant, the
|
|
784
|
+
# designated first admin's deployment-administrator binding (and an explicit recovery's
|
|
785
|
+
# rebinding) and the trust policy in the rbac tables (rbac-core seed), then create and
|
|
786
|
+
# deliver the first admin in the just-created Cognito pool with its core-table records
|
|
787
|
+
# (user-service seed). Cognito admin actions cannot be resource-scoped to a pool that does
|
|
788
|
+
# not exist at bootstrap time; DynamoDB is scoped to the managed-prefix tables.
|
|
636
789
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
637
790
|
Action:
|
|
638
791
|
- cognito-idp:AdminCreateUser
|
|
639
792
|
- cognito-idp:AdminGetUser
|
|
640
793
|
- cognito-idp:AdminSetUserPassword
|
|
794
|
+
- cognito-idp:AdminUpdateUserAttributes
|
|
641
795
|
- cognito-idp:ListUsers
|
|
796
|
+
# Scoped to SaaSLayer-managed pools by tag — the seed can never touch the customer's
|
|
797
|
+
# own Cognito pools. Module stacks tag the pool managed-by:saaslayer-deployer (CFN
|
|
798
|
+
# propagates stack tags), so it is tagged before the post-deploy seed runs.
|
|
642
799
|
Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cognito-idp:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:userpool/*
|
|
800
|
+
Condition:
|
|
801
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
802
|
+
aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
643
803
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
644
804
|
Action:
|
|
645
805
|
- dynamodb:GetItem
|
|
646
806
|
- dynamodb:PutItem
|
|
647
807
|
- dynamodb:UpdateItem
|
|
808
|
+
# rbac unbinds a role with DeleteItem (first-admin recovery, legacy admin retirement).
|
|
809
|
+
- dynamodb:DeleteItem
|
|
648
810
|
- dynamodb:Query
|
|
649
811
|
- dynamodb:BatchWriteItem
|
|
812
|
+
# Teardown cleanup: a table with DeletionPolicy:Retain survives `serverless remove`, so the
|
|
813
|
+
# deployer's module-runner deletes those retained sl-* tables directly after the stack is gone
|
|
814
|
+
# (deleteStackOwnedTables) — else a same-named recreate collides. Scoped to sl-* tables only.
|
|
815
|
+
- dynamodb:DeleteTable
|
|
816
|
+
# Protected-environment tables carry deletion protection; a delete-custody teardown turns it off
|
|
817
|
+
# (UpdateTable DeletionProtectionEnabled=false) before DeleteTable. Same sl-* scope.
|
|
818
|
+
- dynamodb:UpdateTable
|
|
819
|
+
Resource:
|
|
820
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:dynamodb:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:table/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
821
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:dynamodb:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:table/${StackNamePrefix}*/index/*
|
|
822
|
+
# Teardown cleanup: AWS auto-creates a /aws/lambda/<function> log group on first invocation that
|
|
823
|
+
# survives `serverless remove` (and even an explicit AWS::Logs::LogGroup can outlive the stack), so
|
|
824
|
+
# the module-runner sweeps the module's log groups after remove (like the retained-table sweep) —
|
|
825
|
+
# else a same-name recreate collides ("LogGroup already exists" at EarlyValidation). DescribeLogGroups
|
|
826
|
+
# is an enumeration (no resource scoping); DeleteLogGroup is scoped to the managed prefix (monorepo-04egp).
|
|
827
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
828
|
+
Action:
|
|
829
|
+
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
|
|
830
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
831
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
832
|
+
Action:
|
|
833
|
+
- logs:DeleteLogGroup
|
|
650
834
|
Resource:
|
|
651
|
-
- !Sub arn:aws:
|
|
652
|
-
|
|
835
|
+
- !Sub arn:aws:logs:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
836
|
+
# Data migrations (@saaslayer/migrations): hop into a service stack's own migrate role; the
|
|
837
|
+
# role's own policy limits it to that service's tables. Its trust is account root + an
|
|
838
|
+
# aws:PrincipalArn condition, which delegates to this identity policy, so the grant is required.
|
|
839
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
840
|
+
Action: sts:AssumeRole
|
|
841
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:iam::${AWS::AccountId}:role/${StackNamePrefix}*-migrate
|
|
842
|
+
# Domain-mapping (D1.0, monorepo-88mn.3): the domain-service assumes this role to issue an ACM
|
|
843
|
+
# cert for the tenant's {slug}.saaslayer-cloud.com names, then attach an API-GW regional custom
|
|
844
|
+
# domain — the apigateway create/read/update/delete verbs are ALREADY granted above (Resource
|
|
845
|
+
# '*'), so only ACM is added here. Scoped to certs tagged managed-by=saaslayer-deployer so this
|
|
846
|
+
# role can only touch certs it created; RequestCertificate has no resource-level ARN, so the
|
|
847
|
+
# request-tag condition is the only guard. Regional custom domains do NOT need a service-linked
|
|
848
|
+
# role; add iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole for apigateway ONLY if domain-iam-spike.sh (D1.0a) proves it.
|
|
849
|
+
# attachDomain (domain-service.ts) creates the API Gateway service-linked role on the FIRST
|
|
850
|
+
# custom domain in the account — the earlier "regional custom domains do NOT need a
|
|
851
|
+
# service-linked role" assumption was wrong (attachDomain AccessDenied'd on
|
|
852
|
+
# iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole). Scoped to the apigateway service-linked-role path only.
|
|
853
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
854
|
+
Action:
|
|
855
|
+
- iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole
|
|
856
|
+
Resource: 'arn:aws:iam::*:role/aws-service-role/*apigateway.amazonaws.com/*'
|
|
857
|
+
Condition:
|
|
858
|
+
StringLike:
|
|
859
|
+
iam:AWSServiceName: '*apigateway.amazonaws.com'
|
|
860
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
861
|
+
Action:
|
|
862
|
+
- acm:RequestCertificate
|
|
863
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
864
|
+
Condition:
|
|
865
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
866
|
+
aws:RequestTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
867
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
868
|
+
Action:
|
|
869
|
+
- acm:DescribeCertificate
|
|
870
|
+
- acm:DeleteCertificate
|
|
871
|
+
- acm:AddTagsToCertificate
|
|
872
|
+
- acm:ListTagsForCertificate
|
|
873
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
874
|
+
Condition:
|
|
875
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
876
|
+
aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
877
|
+
# ListCertificates has no resource-level or condition support.
|
|
878
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
879
|
+
Action:
|
|
880
|
+
- acm:ListCertificates
|
|
881
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
882
|
+
# M2 vendable-key handoff (plan s7oc.9.3): the deploy role runs rbac's post-deploy SEED via
|
|
883
|
+
# DIRECT SDK calls (like the native-edge teardown below), and the seed writes the scoped
|
|
884
|
+
# onboarding endpoint (String) + service key (SecureString) into THIS deployment's SSM
|
|
885
|
+
# namespace for user-service to read (M4). GetParameter re-reads to honor the SSM-authoritative
|
|
886
|
+
# verify contract (reuse a still-valid key instead of re-minting on every deploy). Scoped to
|
|
887
|
+
# /saaslayer/deployment/* — the deploy role is the account's deploy agent across deployments.
|
|
888
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
889
|
+
Action:
|
|
890
|
+
- ssm:GetParameter
|
|
891
|
+
- ssm:PutParameter
|
|
892
|
+
# DeleteParameter: the destroy/teardown phase clears the handoff params (they are written
|
|
893
|
+
# by PutParameter, NOT CloudFormation, so a stack delete leaves them behind) — M4b.
|
|
894
|
+
- ssm:DeleteParameter
|
|
895
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:aws:ssm:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:parameter/saaslayer/deployment/*
|
|
896
|
+
# Encrypt/decrypt the SecureString onboarding key through the SSM-managed default key
|
|
897
|
+
# (alias/aws/ssm). ViaService confines this grant to operations performed by SSM.
|
|
898
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
899
|
+
Action:
|
|
900
|
+
- kms:Encrypt
|
|
901
|
+
- kms:Decrypt
|
|
902
|
+
- kms:GenerateDataKey
|
|
903
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
904
|
+
Condition:
|
|
905
|
+
StringEquals:
|
|
906
|
+
kms:ViaService: !Sub ssm.${AWS::Region}.amazonaws.com
|
|
907
|
+
# Tenant-edge B (native single-tenant edge, epic f55t): the deploy role provisions a CloudFront
|
|
908
|
+
# distro + prefix-strip Function IN this account via DIRECT SDK calls (not CloudFormation), so
|
|
909
|
+
# these live on the DeploymentRole (the ExecutionRole copies are for CFN-driven Model-B). No IAM
|
|
910
|
+
# creation here — CloudFront distros/functions don't create roles — so the role stays narrow.
|
|
911
|
+
# Gated on the tenant-edge capability: a host on the shared edge never needs CloudFront write.
|
|
912
|
+
- Fn::If:
|
|
913
|
+
- TenantEdgeEnabled
|
|
914
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
915
|
+
Action:
|
|
916
|
+
- cloudfront:CreateDistribution
|
|
917
|
+
- cloudfront:GetDistribution
|
|
918
|
+
- cloudfront:GetDistributionConfig
|
|
919
|
+
- cloudfront:UpdateDistribution
|
|
920
|
+
- cloudfront:ListDistributions
|
|
921
|
+
- cloudfront:TagResource
|
|
922
|
+
- cloudfront:CreateFunction
|
|
923
|
+
- cloudfront:PublishFunction
|
|
924
|
+
- cloudfront:UpdateFunction
|
|
925
|
+
- cloudfront:DescribeFunction
|
|
926
|
+
- cloudfront:GetFunction
|
|
927
|
+
- cloudfront:ListFunctions
|
|
928
|
+
# Native/B teardown (teardownNativeEdge runs via THIS DeploymentRole, direct SDK): delete
|
|
929
|
+
# the per-tenant distro + strip Function on destroy. Without these the B teardown leaks.
|
|
930
|
+
- cloudfront:DeleteDistribution
|
|
931
|
+
- cloudfront:DeleteFunction
|
|
932
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
933
|
+
- !Ref AWS::NoValue
|
|
653
934
|
|
|
654
935
|
# Cross-account READ-ONLY role for SaaSLayer support staff to diagnose managed deployments
|
|
655
936
|
# without the deployment role's write power. Trust matches the deployment role (control-plane
|
|
@@ -660,7 +941,7 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
660
941
|
SaaSLayerSupportReadOnlyRole:
|
|
661
942
|
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
|
|
662
943
|
Properties:
|
|
663
|
-
RoleName:
|
|
944
|
+
RoleName: sl-foundation-support-ro-role
|
|
664
945
|
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
|
|
665
946
|
Version: '2012-10-17'
|
|
666
947
|
Statement:
|
|
@@ -684,7 +965,13 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
684
965
|
- cloudformation:Describe*
|
|
685
966
|
- cloudformation:Get*
|
|
686
967
|
- cloudformation:ListStackResources
|
|
687
|
-
Resource:
|
|
968
|
+
Resource:
|
|
969
|
+
# SaaSLayer-managed module stacks (sl-*) AND the foundation stack itself
|
|
970
|
+
# (saaslayer-foundation / -host-bootstrap): the deployer's foundation discovery assumes
|
|
971
|
+
# THIS support-ro role and reads the foundation stack Outputs, so it must be in scope.
|
|
972
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudformation:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/${StackNamePrefix}*
|
|
973
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudformation:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/saaslayer-foundation*
|
|
974
|
+
- !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudformation:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/saaslayer-host-bootstrap*
|
|
688
975
|
# Stack enumeration; the ListStacks API does not support resource scoping.
|
|
689
976
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
690
977
|
Action:
|
|
@@ -720,20 +1007,22 @@ Resources:
|
|
|
720
1007
|
Condition:
|
|
721
1008
|
StringEquals:
|
|
722
1009
|
aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
|
|
723
|
-
# Log
|
|
724
|
-
#
|
|
725
|
-
#
|
|
726
|
-
#
|
|
727
|
-
# no service configuration or data-plane records.
|
|
1010
|
+
# Log-group enumeration + tag reads stay account-wide (enumeration APIs return only
|
|
1011
|
+
# names/metadata). Log CONTENT reads are scoped to SaaSLayer module log groups
|
|
1012
|
+
# (/aws/lambda/<StackNamePrefix>*), so support can never read the customer's own
|
|
1013
|
+
# application logs — which routinely carry PII, bearer tokens, and secrets.
|
|
728
1014
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
729
1015
|
Action:
|
|
730
1016
|
- logs:DescribeLogGroups
|
|
1017
|
+
- logs:ListTagsForResource
|
|
1018
|
+
Resource: '*'
|
|
1019
|
+
- Effect: Allow
|
|
1020
|
+
Action:
|
|
731
1021
|
- logs:DescribeLogStreams
|
|
732
1022
|
- logs:GetLogEvents
|
|
733
1023
|
- logs:GetLogGroupFields
|
|
734
1024
|
- logs:GetLogRecord
|
|
735
|
-
|
|
736
|
-
Resource: '*'
|
|
1025
|
+
Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:logs:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:log-group:/aws/lambda/${StackNamePrefix}*:*
|
|
737
1026
|
# Alarm/dashboard state for module observability. CloudWatch alarms support
|
|
738
1027
|
# aws:ResourceTag; DescribeAlarms is an enumeration API evaluated per-alarm.
|
|
739
1028
|
- Effect: Allow
|
|
@@ -753,9 +1042,14 @@ Outputs:
|
|
|
753
1042
|
CloudFormationExecutionRoleArn:
|
|
754
1043
|
Description: Service role CloudFormation uses to provision approved SaaSLayer module stacks; not assumable cross-account.
|
|
755
1044
|
Value: !GetAtt SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole.Arn
|
|
756
|
-
DeploymentArtifactBucketName:
|
|
757
|
-
Description: Private, encrypted bucket holding packaged SaaSLayer deployment artifacts.
|
|
758
|
-
Value: !Ref DeploymentArtifactBucket
|
|
759
1045
|
ManagedResourceBoundaryArn:
|
|
760
1046
|
Description: Permissions boundary capping the runtime permissions of every IAM role created by SaaSLayer module stacks.
|
|
761
1047
|
Value: !Ref SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary
|
|
1048
|
+
FoundationVersion:
|
|
1049
|
+
Description: Version of this foundation template installed in the account.
|
|
1050
|
+
Value: !FindInMap [Meta, Foundation, Version]
|
|
1051
|
+
SaaSLayerAccountRef:
|
|
1052
|
+
Description: Share this with SaaSLayer support to identify your account and foundation version.
|
|
1053
|
+
Value: !Sub
|
|
1054
|
+
- 'org=${OrgId} account=${AWS::AccountId} region=${AWS::Region} prefix=${StackNamePrefix} v=${Ver}'
|
|
1055
|
+
- Ver: !FindInMap [Meta, Foundation, Version]
|