saaslayer 0.0.1

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package/LICENSE ADDED
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+ Copyright (c) 2026 David Wells. All rights reserved.
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+
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+ This software and its source code are proprietary and confidential.
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+
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+ No license, right, or permission is granted to any person or entity to use,
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+ copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, or sell copies of this
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+ software, in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of the
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+ copyright holder.
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+
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+ Unauthorized use, reproduction, or distribution is strictly prohibited.
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+
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+ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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+ IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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+ FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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+ COPYRIGHT HOLDER BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES, OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER
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+ IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT, OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF, OR IN
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+ CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
package/README.md ADDED
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+ # saaslayer
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+
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+ SaaSLayer onboarding CLI. Bootstrap an AWS account for the SaaSLayer control plane and register a service's RBAC manifest.
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+
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+ ## Install
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ npm install -g saaslayer
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+ ```
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+
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+ Or run without installing:
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ npx saaslayer --help
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+ ```
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+
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+ Requires Node.js >= 18. The `init` command shells out to the [AWS CLI](https://aws.amazon.com/cli/), which must be installed and authenticated.
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+
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+ ## Commands
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+
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+ ### `saaslayer init`
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+
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+ Deploy the host-account bootstrap (3 IAM roles + permissions boundary + artifact bucket) into the caller's AWS account, trusting the SaaSLayer control plane. Uses the bundled `templates/host-account.yml`.
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ saaslayer init \
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+ --control-plane-account <12-digit-account-id> \
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+ --external-id <secret> \
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+ [--stack-name saaslayer-host-account] \
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+ [--region us-east-1] \
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+ [--stack-name-prefix sl-] \
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+ [--template PATH] \
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+ [--dry-run]
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+ ```
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+
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+ | Flag | Env | Description |
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+ | --- | --- | --- |
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+ | `--control-plane-account` | `SAASLAYER_CONTROL_PLANE_ACCOUNT` | 12-digit AWS account id allowed to assume the deploy role. Required. |
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+ | `--external-id` | `SAASLAYER_EXTERNAL_ID` | Trust secret shared during onboarding. Required. |
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+ | `--stack-name` | — | CloudFormation stack name. Defaults to `saaslayer-host-account`. |
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+ | `--region` | `AWS_REGION` | Deploy region. Defaults to `us-east-1`. |
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+ | `--stack-name-prefix` | — | Prefix for provisioned resources. Defaults to `sl-`. |
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+ | `--template` | — | Override the bundled template path. |
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+ | `--dry-run` | — | Validate the template only; deploy nothing. |
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+
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+ ### `saaslayer rbac register <manifest.json>`
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+
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+ Upsert a service's `rbac.manifest.json` into the RBAC catalog (`POST /catalog/register`). Run by a human or wired into CI.
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ saaslayer rbac register ./rbac.manifest.json \
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+ --api-base https://api.example.com \
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+ [--token $SAASLAYER_TOKEN]
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+ ```
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+
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+ | Flag | Env | Description |
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+ | --- | --- | --- |
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+ | `--api-base` | `SAASLAYER_API_BASE` | RBAC catalog API base URL. Required. |
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+ | `--token` | `SAASLAYER_TOKEN` | API key. Required. |
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+
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+ ## License
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+
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+ Proprietary. All rights reserved. See [LICENSE](./LICENSE).
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+ #!/usr/bin/env node
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+ // SaaSLayer CLI (M0.10, D18) — onboard an AWS account and register RBAC manifests.
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+ // `saaslayer init` deploys the bundled host-account.yml (the control plane's deploy role +
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+ // boundary + artifact bucket). `saaslayer rbac register` upserts a service's rbac.manifest.json
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+ // into the RBAC catalog (POST /catalog/register) — run by a human or wired into CI.
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+
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+ 'use strict'
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+ const fs = require('fs')
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+ const path = require('path')
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+ const { execFileSync } = require('child_process')
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+
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+ function parseArgs(argv) {
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+ const positional = []
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+ const flags = {}
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+ for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {
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+ const a = argv[i]
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+ if (a.startsWith('--')) {
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+ const key = a.slice(2)
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+ const next = argv[i + 1]
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+ if (next === undefined || next.startsWith('--')) { flags[key] = true } else { flags[key] = next; i++ }
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+ } else { positional.push(a) }
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+ }
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+ return { positional, flags }
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+ }
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+
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+ const HELP = `saaslayer — SaaSLayer onboarding CLI
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+
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+ Usage:
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+ saaslayer init --control-plane-account <12-digit> --external-id <secret> [--stack-name NAME]
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+ [--region REGION] [--stack-name-prefix sl-] [--template PATH] [--dry-run]
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+ Deploy the host-account bootstrap (3 IAM roles + permissions boundary + artifact
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+ bucket) into the caller's AWS account, trusting the SaaSLayer control plane.
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+ Uses the bundled templates/host-account.yml. --dry-run validates only.
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+
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+ saaslayer rbac register <manifest.json> --api-base URL [--token KEY]
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+ Upsert a service's rbac.manifest.json into the RBAC catalog.
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+ --token defaults to $SAASLAYER_TOKEN.
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+
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+ Global:
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+ --help Show this help.`
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+
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+ async function cmdRegister({ positional, flags }) {
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+ const manifestPath = positional[0]
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+ if (!manifestPath) throw new Error('rbac register: a manifest path is required')
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+ const apiBase = flags['api-base'] || process.env.SAASLAYER_API_BASE
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+ const token = flags.token || process.env.SAASLAYER_TOKEN
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+ if (!apiBase) throw new Error('rbac register: --api-base (or $SAASLAYER_API_BASE) is required')
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+ if (!token) throw new Error('rbac register: --token (or $SAASLAYER_TOKEN) is required')
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+ const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.resolve(manifestPath), 'utf8'))
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+ const res = await fetch(`${apiBase.replace(/\/$/, '')}/catalog/register`, {
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+ method: 'POST',
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+ headers: { 'x-api-key': token, authorization: `Bearer ${token}`, 'content-type': 'application/json' },
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+ body: JSON.stringify(manifest),
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+ })
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+ const body = await res.json().catch(() => ({}))
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+ if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`register failed (${res.status}): ${JSON.stringify(body.errors || body)}`)
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+ const a = body.data && body.data.attributes
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+ console.log(`registered "${(a && a.service) || manifest.service}" (${(a && a.resourceCount) || '?'} resource types)`)
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+ }
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+
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+ function cmdInit({ flags }) {
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+ const template = flags.template || path.join(__dirname, '..', 'templates', 'host-account.yml')
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+ if (!fs.existsSync(template)) throw new Error(`init: template not found at ${template}`)
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+ const region = flags.region || process.env.AWS_REGION || 'us-east-1'
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+ // Canonical name — matches the deployer's bootstrap so init updates the same stack
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+ // (the account-global named IAM resources allow only one host-account stack per account).
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+ const stackName = flags['stack-name'] || 'saaslayer-host-bootstrap'
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+ if (flags['dry-run']) {
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+ execFileSync('aws', ['cloudformation', 'validate-template', '--template-body', `file://${template}`, '--region', region], { stdio: 'inherit' })
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+ console.log(`\n[dry-run] template valid. Would deploy stack "${stackName}" to ${region}.`)
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+ return
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+ }
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+ // Required params: the SaaSLayer control-plane account that may assume the deploy role,
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+ // and the ExternalId trust secret shared during onboarding.
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+ const controlPlaneAccount = flags['control-plane-account'] || process.env.SAASLAYER_CONTROL_PLANE_ACCOUNT
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+ const externalId = flags['external-id'] || process.env.SAASLAYER_EXTERNAL_ID
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+ const stackPrefix = flags['stack-name-prefix'] || 'sl-'
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+ if (!controlPlaneAccount) throw new Error('init: --control-plane-account <12-digit id> (or $SAASLAYER_CONTROL_PLANE_ACCOUNT) is required')
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+ if (!/^[0-9]{12}$/.test(controlPlaneAccount)) throw new Error('init: --control-plane-account must be a 12-digit AWS account id')
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+ if (!externalId) throw new Error('init: --external-id <secret> (or $SAASLAYER_EXTERNAL_ID) is required — shared during onboarding')
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+ console.log(`Deploying host-account stack "${stackName}" to ${region} (control plane ${controlPlaneAccount})…`)
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+ execFileSync('aws', [
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+ 'cloudformation', 'deploy', '--template-file', template, '--stack-name', stackName, '--region', region,
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+ '--capabilities', 'CAPABILITY_NAMED_IAM',
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+ '--parameter-overrides',
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+ `ControlPlaneAccountId=${controlPlaneAccount}`, `ExternalId=${externalId}`, `StackNamePrefix=${stackPrefix}`,
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+ ], { stdio: 'inherit' })
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+ console.log('\nhost-account bootstrap deployed.')
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+ console.log(` • Control plane ${controlPlaneAccount} may now assume the deploy role (ExternalId gated).`)
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+ console.log(` • It can manage only CloudFormation stacks named "${stackPrefix}*" in this account.`)
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+ console.log(' • Share the ControlPlaneAccountId + ExternalId with SaaSLayer onboarding to finish setup.')
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+ }
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+
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+ async function main() {
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+ const argv = process.argv.slice(2)
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+ const { positional, flags } = parseArgs(argv)
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+ if (flags.help || positional.length === 0) { console.log(HELP); return }
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+ const [cmd, sub] = positional
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+ try {
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+ if (cmd === 'init') return cmdInit({ flags })
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+ if (cmd === 'rbac' && sub === 'register') return await cmdRegister({ positional: positional.slice(2), flags })
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+ console.error(`Unknown command: ${positional.join(' ')}\n`); console.log(HELP); process.exit(1)
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+ } catch (err) {
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+ console.error(`error: ${err.message}`); process.exit(1)
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+ }
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+ }
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+ main()
package/package.json ADDED
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+ {
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+ "name": "saaslayer",
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+ "version": "0.0.1",
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+ "description": "SaaSLayer CLI \u2014 onboard an account (init) and register a service's RBAC manifest.",
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+ "type": "commonjs",
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+ "bin": {
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+ "saaslayer": "bin/saaslayer.js"
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+ },
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+ "files": [
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+ "bin",
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+ "templates",
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+ "README.md",
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+ "LICENSE"
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+ ],
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+ "engines": {
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+ "node": ">=18"
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+ },
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+ "license": "UNLICENSED",
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+ "author": "David Wells",
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+ "homepage": "https://github.com/DavidWells/saaslayer/tree/master/packages/cli#readme",
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+ "repository": {
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+ "type": "git",
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+ "url": "git+https://github.com/DavidWells/saaslayer.git",
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+ "directory": "packages/cli"
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+ },
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+ "bugs": {
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+ "url": "https://github.com/DavidWells/saaslayer/issues"
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+ },
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+ "keywords": [
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+ "saaslayer",
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+ "cli",
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+ "rbac",
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+ "aws",
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+ "cloudformation",
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+ "onboarding"
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+ ],
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+ "publishConfig": {
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+ "access": "public"
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+ },
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+ "scripts": {
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+ "test": "node bin/saaslayer.js --help >/dev/null && echo ok",
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+ "sync-template": "node scripts/sync-template.js",
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+ "prepublishOnly": "node scripts/sync-template.js"
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+ }
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+ }
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+ # SaaSLayer host-account bootstrap. Installed once per host (customer) account; grants the
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+ # SaaSLayer control plane the minimum access needed to deploy and support SaaSLayer modules.
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+ #
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+ # SECURITY REVIEWER SUMMARY
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+ #
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+ # This template creates one S3 bucket, one permissions-boundary managed policy, and three IAM roles:
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+ #
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+ # 1. SaaSLayerDeploymentRole — the only cross-account WRITE entry point. Assumable solely by the
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+ # SaaSLayer control-plane account (ControlPlaneAccountId parameter) and only with the shared
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+ # ExternalId. It can drive the CloudFormation lifecycle of stacks whose names start with
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+ # StackNamePrefix (default "sl-"), read/write the deployment artifact buckets, and pass exactly
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+ # one role (SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole) to CloudFormation. It cannot create IAM
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+ # resources or touch anything outside the managed stack namespace directly.
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+ #
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+ # 2. SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole — assumable ONLY by the CloudFormation service, never
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+ # cross-account. CloudFormation uses it to create/update/delete the resources declared by
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+ # approved SaaSLayer module templates. Its permissions are the provisioning verbs derived from
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+ # the module resource inventory (see per-statement comments below). Because only
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+ # SaaSLayerDeploymentRole can pass this role, it is reachable exclusively through the audited
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+ # stack lifecycle above.
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+ #
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+ # 3. SaaSLayerSupportReadOnlyRole — a separate cross-account READ-ONLY role for SaaSLayer support
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+ # staff. Same account + ExternalId trust gate as the deployment role, plus an enforced
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+ # "saaslayer-support-*" session-name pattern so every assumption is attributable in CloudTrail.
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+ # It carries only Get/List/Describe verbs, is tag-scoped to resources carrying
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+ # managed-by=saaslayer-deployer where IAM supports resource-tag conditions, and deliberately
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+ # excludes all data-plane reads (no S3 object reads, no DynamoDB item reads, no SSM parameter
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+ # values, no Secrets Manager secret values).
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+ #
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+ # SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary is a permissions boundary attached to every IAM role that
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+ # SaaSLayer module templates create: whatever a module role's own policy says, its effective
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+ # runtime permissions can never exceed this boundary.
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+ #
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+ # Every deployed SaaSLayer stack tags its resources with managed-by=saaslayer-deployer,
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+ # deploymentId, customerId, and moduleName for inventory and audit.
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+ #
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+ # Contract tests for this template live at tests/bootstrap.test.js (read-only guarantee for the
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+ # support role, external-id enforcement, wildcard justification audit).
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+ AWSTemplateFormatVersion: '2010-09-09'
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+ Description: >-
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+ SaaSLayer host-account bootstrap: deployment artifact bucket, CloudFormation execution role for
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+ approved SaaSLayer module templates, permissions boundary for module-created IAM roles, a
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+ cross-account deployment role restricted to SaaSLayer-prefixed stacks, and a cross-account
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+ read-only support role. Both cross-account roles require an external ID and trust only the
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+ SaaSLayer control-plane account supplied as a parameter.
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+
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+ Parameters:
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+ ControlPlaneAccountId:
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+ Type: String
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+ AllowedPattern: '^[0-9]{12}$'
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+ Description: >-
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+ AWS account ID that runs the SaaSLayer deployer control plane. This is the only account the
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+ cross-account roles in this template trust.
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+ ExternalId:
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+ Type: String
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+ NoEcho: true
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+ Description: >-
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+ External ID required when assuming SaaSLayerDeploymentRole or SaaSLayerSupportReadOnlyRole.
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+ Shared out-of-band during onboarding; assume-role calls without it are denied.
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+ StackNamePrefix:
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+ Type: String
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+ Default: sl-
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+ Description: >-
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+ Prefix for SaaSLayer-managed CloudFormation stacks. The deployment role can only operate on
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+ stacks whose names start with this prefix.
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+ EnableEmailInbound:
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+ Type: String
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+ AllowedValues: ['true', 'false']
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+ Default: 'false'
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+ Description: >-
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+ When 'true', grant the SES receipt-rule provisioning + inbound-mail runtime permissions that
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+ email-inbound-service needs. Default 'false' so host accounts that do NOT run email-inbound are
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+ not over-permissioned for SES. The deployer sets this per host based on the services it hosts.
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+
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+ Conditions:
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+ # Gate email-inbound-service's SES permissions so they exist only on host accounts that run it.
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+ EmailInboundEnabled: !Equals [!Ref EnableEmailInbound, 'true']
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+
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+ Resources:
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+ # Private, encrypted bucket for packaged module templates and lambda artifacts uploaded by the
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+ # deployer. Only the deployment role reads/writes it (see saaslayer-stack-lifecycle below).
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+ DeploymentArtifactBucket:
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+ Type: AWS::S3::Bucket
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+ Properties:
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+ PublicAccessBlockConfiguration:
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+ BlockPublicAcls: true
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+ BlockPublicPolicy: true
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+ IgnorePublicAcls: true
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+ RestrictPublicBuckets: true
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+ BucketEncryption:
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+ ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration:
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+ - ServerSideEncryptionByDefault:
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+ SSEAlgorithm: AES256
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+
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+ # Service role CloudFormation assumes while creating/updating/deleting resources declared by
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+ # approved SaaSLayer module templates. Not assumable by any AWS account — only the CloudFormation
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+ # service — and only reachable via SaaSLayerDeploymentRole's scoped iam:PassRole. Actions below
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+ # are the provisioning verbs for the module resource inventory (API Gateway REST APIs, Cognito
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+ # user/identity pools, DynamoDB tables, EventBridge buses, Lambda functions, log groups,
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+ # schedules, secrets, buckets, SSM parameters, queues) plus the IAM verbs for the roles/policies
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+ # those templates declare.
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+ SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole:
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+ Type: AWS::IAM::Role
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+ Properties:
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+ RoleName: SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole
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+ AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
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+ Version: '2012-10-17'
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+ Statement:
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+ - Effect: Allow
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+ Principal:
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+ Service: cloudformation.amazonaws.com
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+ Action: sts:AssumeRole
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+ Policies:
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+ - PolicyName: saaslayer-approved-template-execution
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+ PolicyDocument:
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+ Version: '2012-10-17'
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+ Statement:
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+ # Provisioning verbs per service. Several AWS create/list APIs only accept
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+ # Resource '*'; resource-name namespacing work to tighten this is tracked in
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+ # docs/permissions-hardening.md.
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+ - Effect: Allow
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+ Action:
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+ # API Gateway IAM actions are bare HTTP verbs against untyped resource paths;
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+ # REST API provisioning (methods, resources, deployments, stages, authorizers)
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+ # exercises all of them. Justified service wildcard (tests/bootstrap.test.js).
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+ - apigateway:*
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+ # Stack introspection while executing changesets (read-only verbs).
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+ - cloudformation:Describe*
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+ - cloudformation:Get*
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+ - cloudformation:List*
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+ # CloudWatch alarm + dashboard lifecycle for module observability resources.
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+ - cloudwatch:DeleteAlarms
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+ - cloudwatch:DeleteDashboards
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+ - cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms
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+ - cloudwatch:DisableAlarmActions
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+ - cloudwatch:EnableAlarmActions
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+ - cloudwatch:GetDashboard
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+ - cloudwatch:ListDashboards
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+ - cloudwatch:PutDashboard
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+ - cloudwatch:PutMetricAlarm
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+ - cloudwatch:TagResource
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+ - cloudwatch:UntagResource
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+ # CloudFront distribution + origin-access-control lifecycle for static-site modules
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+ # (rbac-admin-ui: private S3 origin + OAC). CreateDistribution/OAC cannot be
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+ # resource-scoped, so these sit in the Resource:'*' statement. CreateInvalidation
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+ # busts the edge cache when a redeploy uploads a new SPA build.
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+ - cloudfront:CreateDistribution
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+ - cloudfront:CreateInvalidation
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+ - cloudfront:CreateOriginAccessControl
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+ - cloudfront:DeleteDistribution
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+ - cloudfront:DeleteOriginAccessControl
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+ - cloudfront:GetDistribution
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+ - cloudfront:GetDistributionConfig
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+ - cloudfront:GetOriginAccessControl
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+ - cloudfront:ListTagsForResource
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+ - cloudfront:TagResource
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+ - cloudfront:UntagResource
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+ - cloudfront:UpdateDistribution
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+ - cloudfront:UpdateOriginAccessControl
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+ # SNS topic lifecycle: module stacks create an ops-alarms topic that
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+ # alarms publish to (lean health checks). Full lifecycle so
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+ # CloudFormation can create/read/tag/delete the managed topics.
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+ - sns:CreateTopic
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+ - sns:DeleteTopic
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+ - sns:GetTopicAttributes
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+ - sns:SetTopicAttributes
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+ - sns:Subscribe
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+ - sns:Unsubscribe
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+ - sns:ListSubscriptionsByTopic
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+ - sns:TagResource
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+ - sns:UntagResource
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+ # Cognito identity pool + user pool lifecycle (user-service module). Their
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+ # CloudFormation handlers exercise a broad, shifting action set; kept as
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+ # justified service wildcards until enumerated (docs/permissions-hardening.md).
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+ - cognito-identity:*
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+ - cognito-idp:*
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+ # DynamoDB table lifecycle (provisioning verbs only — no item read/write).
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+ - dynamodb:CreateTable
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+ - dynamodb:DeleteTable
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+ - dynamodb:DescribeContinuousBackups
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+ - dynamodb:DescribeContributorInsights
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+ - dynamodb:DescribeTable
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+ - dynamodb:DescribeTimeToLive
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+ - dynamodb:ListTagsOfResource
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+ - dynamodb:TagResource
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+ - dynamodb:UntagResource
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+ - dynamodb:UpdateContinuousBackups
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+ - dynamodb:UpdateContributorInsights
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+ - dynamodb:UpdateTable
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+ - dynamodb:UpdateTimeToLive
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+ # EventBridge custom event bus lifecycle (module event buses) + rule lifecycle for
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+ # scheduled Lambdas (serverless `schedule` events generate AWS::Events::Rule — e.g.
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+ # rbac-service's event-delivery poller). DescribeRule/PutRule/*Targets are required
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+ # or the rule CREATE fails with AccessDenied.
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+ - events:CreateEventBus
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+ - events:DeleteEventBus
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+ - events:DeleteRule
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+ - events:DescribeEventBus
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+ - events:DescribeRule
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+ - events:DisableRule
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+ - events:EnableRule
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+ - events:ListTagsForResource
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+ - events:ListTargetsByRule
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+ - events:PutPermission
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+ - events:PutRule
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+ - events:PutTargets
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+ - events:RemovePermission
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+ - events:RemoveTargets
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+ - events:TagResource
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+ - events:UntagResource
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+ # IAM role/policy lifecycle for the roles module templates declare (lambda
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+ # execution roles, scheduler roles). Runtime permissions of created roles are
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+ # capped by SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary.
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+ - iam:CreatePolicy
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+ - iam:CreatePolicyVersion
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+ - iam:CreateRole
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+ - iam:DeletePolicy
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+ - iam:DeletePolicyVersion
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+ - iam:DeleteRole
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+ - iam:DeleteRolePolicy
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+ - iam:DetachRolePolicy
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+ - iam:AttachRolePolicy
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+ - iam:GetPolicy
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+ - iam:GetPolicyVersion
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+ - iam:GetRole
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+ - iam:GetRolePolicy
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+ - iam:ListAttachedRolePolicies
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+ - iam:ListEntitiesForPolicy
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+ - iam:ListPolicyVersions
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+ - iam:ListRolePolicies
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+ - iam:PassRole
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+ - iam:PutRolePolicy
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+ - iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion
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+ - iam:TagPolicy
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+ - iam:TagRole
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+ - iam:UntagPolicy
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+ - iam:UntagRole
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+ - iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
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+ - iam:UpdateRole
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+ - iam:UpdateRoleDescription
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+ # KMS customer-managed key + alias lifecycle. rbac-service provisions an
242
+ # EventDeliveryKey (AWS::KMS::Key, rotation on) + alias for webhook payload
243
+ # encryption; CreateKey mandates Resource '*', and TagResource on the new key
244
+ # is required or CloudFormation fails with UnauthorizedTaggingOperation.
245
+ - kms:CreateAlias
246
+ - kms:CreateKey
247
+ - kms:DeleteAlias
248
+ - kms:DescribeKey
249
+ - kms:DisableKeyRotation
250
+ - kms:EnableKeyRotation
251
+ - kms:GetKeyPolicy
252
+ - kms:GetKeyRotationStatus
253
+ - kms:ListResourceTags
254
+ - kms:PutKeyPolicy
255
+ - kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion
256
+ - kms:TagResource
257
+ - kms:UntagResource
258
+ - kms:UpdateAlias
259
+ # Lambda function/layer/alias/event-source lifecycle. lambda:InvokeFunction is
260
+ # required because module templates use CloudFormation custom resources
261
+ # (Custom::Delay in user-service) that CloudFormation invokes during deploys.
262
+ - lambda:AddPermission
263
+ - lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping
264
+ - lambda:CreateFunction
265
+ - lambda:DeleteEventSourceMapping
266
+ - lambda:DeleteFunction
267
+ - lambda:DeleteFunctionConcurrency
268
+ - lambda:DeleteFunctionEventInvokeConfig
269
+ - lambda:DeleteLayerVersion
270
+ - lambda:DeleteProvisionedConcurrencyConfig
271
+ - lambda:GetAccountSettings
272
+ - lambda:GetAlias
273
+ - lambda:GetEventSourceMapping
274
+ - lambda:GetFunction
275
+ - lambda:GetFunctionCodeSigningConfig
276
+ - lambda:GetFunctionConcurrency
277
+ - lambda:GetFunctionConfiguration
278
+ - lambda:GetFunctionEventInvokeConfig
279
+ - lambda:GetLayerVersion
280
+ - lambda:GetPolicy
281
+ - lambda:GetProvisionedConcurrencyConfig
282
+ - lambda:GetRuntimeManagementConfig
283
+ - lambda:InvokeFunction
284
+ - lambda:ListAliases
285
+ - lambda:ListEventSourceMappings
286
+ - lambda:ListFunctions
287
+ - lambda:ListLayerVersions
288
+ - lambda:ListTags
289
+ - lambda:ListVersionsByFunction
290
+ - lambda:PublishLayerVersion
291
+ - lambda:PublishVersion
292
+ - lambda:PutFunctionCodeSigningConfig
293
+ - lambda:PutFunctionConcurrency
294
+ - lambda:PutFunctionEventInvokeConfig
295
+ - lambda:PutProvisionedConcurrencyConfig
296
+ - lambda:RemovePermission
297
+ - lambda:TagResource
298
+ - lambda:UntagResource
299
+ - lambda:UpdateAlias
300
+ - lambda:UpdateEventSourceMapping
301
+ - lambda:UpdateFunctionCode
302
+ - lambda:UpdateFunctionConfiguration
303
+ # Log group lifecycle for module functions/services. The LogDelivery and
304
+ # resource-policy verbs support AWS::Cognito::LogDeliveryConfiguration
305
+ # (user-service auth event logging).
306
+ - logs:CreateLogDelivery
307
+ - logs:CreateLogGroup
308
+ - logs:CreateLogStream
309
+ - logs:DeleteLogDelivery
310
+ - logs:DeleteLogGroup
311
+ - logs:DeleteLogStream
312
+ - logs:DeleteRetentionPolicy
313
+ - logs:DescribeIndexPolicies
314
+ - logs:DescribeLogGroups
315
+ - logs:DescribeLogStreams
316
+ - logs:DescribeResourcePolicies
317
+ - logs:GetLogDelivery
318
+ - logs:ListLogDeliveries
319
+ - logs:ListTagsForResource
320
+ - logs:PutDestination
321
+ - logs:PutDestinationPolicy
322
+ - logs:PutLogEvents
323
+ - logs:PutResourcePolicy
324
+ - logs:PutRetentionPolicy
325
+ - logs:TagLogGroup
326
+ - logs:TagResource
327
+ - logs:UntagLogGroup
328
+ - logs:UntagResource
329
+ - logs:UpdateLogDelivery
330
+ # EventBridge Scheduler lifecycle for module-declared schedules (rbac-core
331
+ # delegation expiry uses schedules; runtime CRUD is granted via the boundary).
332
+ - scheduler:CreateSchedule
333
+ - scheduler:CreateScheduleGroup
334
+ - scheduler:DeleteSchedule
335
+ - scheduler:DeleteScheduleGroup
336
+ - scheduler:GetSchedule
337
+ - scheduler:GetScheduleGroup
338
+ - scheduler:ListTagsForResource
339
+ - scheduler:TagResource
340
+ - scheduler:UntagResource
341
+ - scheduler:UpdateSchedule
342
+ # Secrets Manager secret lifecycle (AWS::SecretsManager::Secret in modules).
343
+ # No GetSecretValue: this role provisions secrets, it cannot read their values.
344
+ - secretsmanager:CreateSecret
345
+ - secretsmanager:DeleteResourcePolicy
346
+ - secretsmanager:DeleteSecret
347
+ - secretsmanager:DescribeSecret
348
+ - secretsmanager:GetResourcePolicy
349
+ - secretsmanager:PutResourcePolicy
350
+ - secretsmanager:PutSecretValue
351
+ - secretsmanager:RemoveRegionsFromReplication
352
+ - secretsmanager:ReplicateSecretToRegions
353
+ - secretsmanager:RestoreSecret
354
+ - secretsmanager:StopReplicationToReplica
355
+ - secretsmanager:TagResource
356
+ - secretsmanager:UntagResource
357
+ - secretsmanager:UpdateSecret
358
+ - secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage
359
+ # S3 bucket lifecycle + bucket configuration for module buckets, plus object
360
+ # read/write used while CloudFormation stages template artifacts.
361
+ - s3:CreateBucket
362
+ - s3:DeleteBucket
363
+ - s3:DeleteBucketPolicy
364
+ - s3:DeleteBucketWebsite
365
+ - s3:DeleteObject
366
+ - s3:GetAccelerateConfiguration
367
+ - s3:GetBucketAcl
368
+ - s3:GetBucketCORS
369
+ - s3:GetBucketLocation
370
+ - s3:GetBucketLogging
371
+ - s3:GetBucketNotification
372
+ - s3:GetBucketObjectLockConfiguration
373
+ - s3:GetBucketOwnershipControls
374
+ - s3:GetBucketPolicy
375
+ - s3:GetBucketPublicAccessBlock
376
+ - s3:GetBucketTagging
377
+ - s3:GetBucketVersioning
378
+ - s3:GetBucketWebsite
379
+ - s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration
380
+ - s3:GetLifecycleConfiguration
381
+ - s3:GetObject
382
+ - s3:ListBucket
383
+ - s3:PutAccelerateConfiguration
384
+ - s3:PutBucketAcl
385
+ - s3:PutBucketCORS
386
+ - s3:PutBucketLogging
387
+ - s3:PutBucketNotification
388
+ - s3:PutBucketObjectLockConfiguration
389
+ - s3:PutBucketOwnershipControls
390
+ - s3:PutBucketPolicy
391
+ - s3:PutBucketPublicAccessBlock
392
+ - s3:PutBucketTagging
393
+ - s3:PutBucketVersioning
394
+ - s3:PutBucketWebsite
395
+ - s3:PutEncryptionConfiguration
396
+ - s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration
397
+ - s3:PutObject
398
+ - s3:PutObjectAcl
399
+ # SSM parameter lifecycle for module configuration exports (AWS::SSM::Parameter).
400
+ - ssm:AddTagsToResource
401
+ - ssm:DeleteParameter
402
+ - ssm:DeleteParameters
403
+ - ssm:DescribeParameters
404
+ - ssm:GetParameter
405
+ - ssm:GetParameters
406
+ - ssm:GetParametersByPath
407
+ - ssm:ListTagsForResource
408
+ - ssm:PutParameter
409
+ - ssm:RemoveTagsFromResource
410
+ # SQS queue lifecycle (provisioning verbs only — no message send/receive).
411
+ - sqs:CreateQueue
412
+ - sqs:DeleteQueue
413
+ - sqs:GetQueueAttributes
414
+ - sqs:ListQueueTags
415
+ - sqs:SetQueueAttributes
416
+ - sqs:TagQueue
417
+ - sqs:UntagQueue
418
+ Resource: '*'
419
+ # SES receipt rule set/rule provisioning — only on hosts that run email-inbound
420
+ # (EnableEmailInbound=true). Identity verification (VerifyDomainIdentity/DKIM) runs
421
+ # CP-side in the domain-service, never from the tenant account.
422
+ - Fn::If:
423
+ - EmailInboundEnabled
424
+ - Effect: Allow
425
+ Action:
426
+ - ses:CreateReceiptRuleSet
427
+ - ses:DeleteReceiptRuleSet
428
+ - ses:CreateReceiptRule
429
+ - ses:DeleteReceiptRule
430
+ - ses:UpdateReceiptRule
431
+ - ses:DescribeReceiptRuleSet
432
+ - ses:DescribeReceiptRule
433
+ Resource: '*'
434
+ - !Ref AWS::NoValue
435
+ # Module templates use the AWS::LanguageExtensions transform; CloudFormation
436
+ # requires CreateChangeSet on the transform pseudo-resource to expand it.
437
+ - Effect: Allow
438
+ Action:
439
+ - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
440
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudformation:${AWS::Region}:aws:transform/LanguageExtensions
441
+
442
+ # Permissions boundary attached to every IAM role created by SaaSLayer module templates (the
443
+ # deployer passes this policy's ARN into each module deploy). A module role's effective runtime
444
+ # permissions are the INTERSECTION of its own policy and this boundary, so even a template bug
445
+ # that attaches an over-broad policy cannot exceed the actions listed here. The actions are the
446
+ # runtime (data-plane) needs of the modules: Cognito admin user operations, DynamoDB item CRUD,
447
+ # event publishing, lambda-to-lambda invocation, log writing, Pinpoint/SNS messaging for auth
448
+ # flows, S3 object CRUD, schedule CRUD for delegation expiry, and SQS messaging.
449
+ SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary:
450
+ Type: AWS::IAM::ManagedPolicy
451
+ Properties:
452
+ ManagedPolicyName: SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary
453
+ Description: Maximum runtime permissions for IAM roles created by SaaSLayer managed stacks.
454
+ PolicyDocument:
455
+ Version: '2012-10-17'
456
+ Statement:
457
+ - Effect: Allow
458
+ Action:
459
+ - cognito-idp:AdminDeleteUserAttributes
460
+ - cognito-idp:AdminGetUser
461
+ - cognito-idp:AdminListGroupsForUser
462
+ - cognito-idp:AdminSetUserMFAPreference
463
+ - cognito-idp:AdminUpdateUserAttributes
464
+ - cognito-idp:GetUserPoolMfaConfig
465
+ - cognito-idp:ListUsers
466
+ - dynamodb:BatchGetItem
467
+ - dynamodb:BatchWriteItem
468
+ - dynamodb:DeleteItem
469
+ - dynamodb:DescribeStream
470
+ - dynamodb:DescribeTable
471
+ - dynamodb:GetItem
472
+ - dynamodb:GetRecords
473
+ - dynamodb:GetShardIterator
474
+ - dynamodb:ListStreams
475
+ - dynamodb:PutItem
476
+ - dynamodb:Query
477
+ - dynamodb:Scan
478
+ - dynamodb:UpdateItem
479
+ - events:PutEvents
480
+ - execute-api:Invoke
481
+ - iam:PassRole
482
+ - kms:Decrypt
483
+ - kms:DescribeKey
484
+ - kms:Encrypt
485
+ - kms:GenerateDataKey
486
+ - lambda:InvokeFunction
487
+ - logs:CreateLogGroup
488
+ - logs:CreateLogStream
489
+ - logs:PutLogEvents
490
+ - mobiletargeting:PutEvents
491
+ - s3:AbortMultipartUpload
492
+ - s3:DeleteObject
493
+ - s3:GetBucketLocation
494
+ - s3:GetObject
495
+ - s3:ListBucket
496
+ - s3:PutObject
497
+ - scheduler:CreateSchedule
498
+ - scheduler:DeleteSchedule
499
+ - scheduler:GetSchedule
500
+ - scheduler:UpdateSchedule
501
+ - sns:Publish
502
+ - sqs:DeleteMessage
503
+ - sqs:GetQueueAttributes
504
+ - sqs:GetQueueUrl
505
+ - sqs:ReceiveMessage
506
+ - sqs:SendMessage
507
+ - sqs:SendMessageBatch
508
+ Resource: '*'
509
+ # SES runtime (forward/notify sends + the active-rule-set custom resource) — only on hosts
510
+ # that run email-inbound. Receiving into S3 is granted to the ses.amazonaws.com service
511
+ # principal by the module's bucket policy, not here.
512
+ - Fn::If:
513
+ - EmailInboundEnabled
514
+ - Effect: Allow
515
+ Action:
516
+ - ses:DescribeActiveReceiptRuleSet
517
+ - ses:DescribeReceiptRuleSet
518
+ - ses:SendEmail
519
+ - ses:SendRawEmail
520
+ - ses:SetActiveReceiptRuleSet
521
+ Resource: '*'
522
+ - !Ref AWS::NoValue
523
+
524
+ # Cross-account WRITE entry point for the SaaSLayer control plane. Trust is double-gated: only
525
+ # the control-plane account, and only with the shared external ID. Every mutating grant is scoped
526
+ # to the SaaSLayer stack namespace (StackNamePrefix) or the deployment artifact buckets; resource
527
+ # creation itself always happens through CloudFormation with the execution role above.
528
+ SaaSLayerDeploymentRole:
529
+ Type: AWS::IAM::Role
530
+ Properties:
531
+ RoleName: SaaSLayerDeploymentRole
532
+ AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
533
+ Version: '2012-10-17'
534
+ Statement:
535
+ - Effect: Allow
536
+ Principal:
537
+ AWS: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${ControlPlaneAccountId}:root
538
+ Action: sts:AssumeRole
539
+ Condition:
540
+ StringEquals:
541
+ sts:ExternalId: !Ref ExternalId
542
+ Policies:
543
+ - PolicyName: saaslayer-stack-lifecycle
544
+ PolicyDocument:
545
+ Version: '2012-10-17'
546
+ Statement:
547
+ # Full stack lifecycle (create/update/delete via changesets), restricted to stacks
548
+ # in the SaaSLayer namespace. Stacks outside ${StackNamePrefix}* are untouchable.
549
+ - Effect: Allow
550
+ Action:
551
+ - cloudformation:CreateStack
552
+ - cloudformation:CreateChangeSet
553
+ - cloudformation:UpdateStack
554
+ - cloudformation:ExecuteChangeSet
555
+ - cloudformation:SetStackPolicy
556
+ - cloudformation:DeleteChangeSet
557
+ - cloudformation:DeleteStack
558
+ - cloudformation:Describe*
559
+ - cloudformation:Get*
560
+ # Drift gate (update runs refuse to apply over out-of-band edits):
561
+ # Detect* verbs sit outside Describe*/Get* and must be listed.
562
+ - cloudformation:DetectStackDrift
563
+ - cloudformation:DetectStackResourceDrift
564
+ Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cloudformation:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/${StackNamePrefix}*
565
+ # Actions the API cannot scope to a stack ARN: ValidateTemplate, and the
566
+ # drift-detection status poll which operates on a detection id, not a stack.
567
+ - Effect: Allow
568
+ Action:
569
+ - cloudformation:ValidateTemplate
570
+ - cloudformation:DescribeStackDriftDetectionStatus
571
+ Resource: '*'
572
+ # The single permitted pass-role path: this role may hand CloudFormation exactly one
573
+ # execution role. It cannot pass any other role in the account.
574
+ - Effect: Allow
575
+ Action:
576
+ - iam:PassRole
577
+ Resource: !GetAtt SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole.Arn
578
+ # Artifact staging: the bootstrap-created artifact bucket, the per-stack serverless
579
+ # deployment buckets (sl- prefixed), and the module data buckets named from the
580
+ # deployer slug (sldep*) — e.g. user-service's versioned cognito-user-backup bucket,
581
+ # which teardown must empty (ListBucketVersions/DeleteObjectVersion) before the stack
582
+ # can delete it, or destroy fails with AccessDenied on s3:ListBucketVersions.
583
+ - Effect: Allow
584
+ Action:
585
+ - s3:GetBucketLocation
586
+ - s3:GetObject
587
+ - s3:PutObject
588
+ - s3:PutObjectAcl
589
+ - s3:DeleteObject
590
+ - s3:DeleteObjectVersion
591
+ - s3:ListBucket
592
+ - s3:ListBucketVersions
593
+ Resource:
594
+ - !GetAtt DeploymentArtifactBucket.Arn
595
+ - !Sub ${DeploymentArtifactBucket.Arn}/*
596
+ - arn:aws:s3:::sl-*serverlessdeploymentbuck*
597
+ - arn:aws:s3:::sl-*serverlessdeploymentbuck*/*
598
+ - arn:aws:s3:::sldep*-cognito-user-backup-*
599
+ - arn:aws:s3:::sldep*-cognito-user-backup-*/*
600
+ # rbac-admin-ui static-site bucket: serverless-s3-sync uploads the SPA + config.json
601
+ # under this role at deploy, and teardown empties it before the stack deletes it.
602
+ - arn:aws:s3:::sl-*-adminui-*
603
+ - arn:aws:s3:::sl-*-adminui-*/*
604
+ # email-inbound-service raw-MIME + attachment buckets: SES writes inbound mail here
605
+ # and teardown must empty them (ListBucketVersions/DeleteObjectVersion) before the
606
+ # stack can delete them, or destroy fails with AccessDenied.
607
+ - arn:aws:s3:::sl-*-email-inbound-raw-*
608
+ - arn:aws:s3:::sl-*-email-inbound-raw-*/*
609
+ - arn:aws:s3:::sl-*-email-inbound-attachments-*
610
+ - arn:aws:s3:::sl-*-email-inbound-attachments-*/*
611
+ # Deploy tooling introspection after stack operations complete: stack enumeration
612
+ # (ListStacks has no resource scoping), API Gateway lifecycle calls the Serverless
613
+ # tooling makes outside CloudFormation, and lambda version/alias inspection.
614
+ - Effect: Allow
615
+ Action:
616
+ - cloudformation:ListStacks
617
+ - cloudformation:ListStackResources
618
+ - apigateway:DELETE
619
+ - apigateway:GET
620
+ - apigateway:PATCH
621
+ - apigateway:POST
622
+ - apigateway:PUT
623
+ - lambda:GetAlias
624
+ - lambda:GetFunction
625
+ - lambda:GetFunctionConfiguration
626
+ - lambda:ListAliases
627
+ - lambda:ListTags
628
+ - lambda:ListVersionsByFunction
629
+ Resource: '*'
630
+ # Post-deploy SEED data-plane: after a module deploys, the deployer runs its seed
631
+ # script under this role to make the deployment usable — create the initial admin
632
+ # user in the just-created Cognito pool (user-service seed) and bootstrap the tenant,
633
+ # admin role, and trust policy in the rbac tables (rbac-core seed). Cognito admin
634
+ # actions cannot be resource-scoped to a pool that does not exist at bootstrap time;
635
+ # DynamoDB is scoped to the rbac-* managed tables.
636
+ - Effect: Allow
637
+ Action:
638
+ - cognito-idp:AdminCreateUser
639
+ - cognito-idp:AdminGetUser
640
+ - cognito-idp:AdminSetUserPassword
641
+ - cognito-idp:ListUsers
642
+ Resource: !Sub arn:aws:cognito-idp:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:userpool/*
643
+ - Effect: Allow
644
+ Action:
645
+ - dynamodb:GetItem
646
+ - dynamodb:PutItem
647
+ - dynamodb:UpdateItem
648
+ - dynamodb:Query
649
+ - dynamodb:BatchWriteItem
650
+ Resource:
651
+ - !Sub arn:aws:dynamodb:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:table/rbac-*
652
+ - !Sub arn:aws:dynamodb:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:table/rbac-*/index/*
653
+
654
+ # Cross-account READ-ONLY role for SaaSLayer support staff to diagnose managed deployments
655
+ # without the deployment role's write power. Trust matches the deployment role (control-plane
656
+ # account + external ID) and additionally pins the session name to saaslayer-support-* so each
657
+ # assumption is attributable in CloudTrail. Grants carry only Get/List/Describe verbs — enforced
658
+ # by tests/bootstrap.test.js — and exclude all data-plane reads: no S3 object reads, no DynamoDB
659
+ # item reads, no SSM parameter values, no Secrets Manager secret values.
660
+ SaaSLayerSupportReadOnlyRole:
661
+ Type: AWS::IAM::Role
662
+ Properties:
663
+ RoleName: SaaSLayerSupportReadOnlyRole
664
+ AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
665
+ Version: '2012-10-17'
666
+ Statement:
667
+ - Effect: Allow
668
+ Principal:
669
+ AWS: !Sub arn:aws:iam::${ControlPlaneAccountId}:root
670
+ Action: sts:AssumeRole
671
+ Condition:
672
+ StringEquals:
673
+ sts:ExternalId: !Ref ExternalId
674
+ StringLike:
675
+ sts:RoleSessionName: saaslayer-support-*
676
+ Policies:
677
+ - PolicyName: saaslayer-support-read-only
678
+ PolicyDocument:
679
+ Version: '2012-10-17'
680
+ Statement:
681
+ # Stack state, events, resources, and outputs for SaaSLayer-managed stacks only.
682
+ - Effect: Allow
683
+ Action:
684
+ - cloudformation:Describe*
685
+ - cloudformation:Get*
686
+ - cloudformation:ListStackResources
687
+ Resource: !Sub arn:${AWS::Partition}:cloudformation:${AWS::Region}:${AWS::AccountId}:stack/${StackNamePrefix}*
688
+ # Stack enumeration; the ListStacks API does not support resource scoping.
689
+ - Effect: Allow
690
+ Action:
691
+ - cloudformation:ListStacks
692
+ Resource: '*'
693
+ # Configuration reads scoped by resource tag: these services support the
694
+ # aws:ResourceTag condition key, and every SaaSLayer-deployed resource carries
695
+ # managed-by=saaslayer-deployer via stack tags. Untagged (customer) resources
696
+ # fail the condition and are not readable.
697
+ - Effect: Allow
698
+ Action:
699
+ - apigateway:GET
700
+ - cognito-idp:DescribeUserPool
701
+ - cognito-idp:DescribeUserPoolClient
702
+ - cognito-idp:GetUserPoolMfaConfig
703
+ - dynamodb:DescribeContinuousBackups
704
+ - dynamodb:DescribeTable
705
+ - dynamodb:DescribeTimeToLive
706
+ - dynamodb:ListTagsOfResource
707
+ - events:DescribeEventBus
708
+ - events:ListTagsForResource
709
+ - lambda:GetAlias
710
+ - lambda:GetFunction
711
+ - lambda:GetFunctionConfiguration
712
+ - lambda:GetFunctionEventInvokeConfig
713
+ - lambda:GetPolicy
714
+ - lambda:ListAliases
715
+ - lambda:ListTags
716
+ - lambda:ListVersionsByFunction
717
+ - sqs:GetQueueAttributes
718
+ - sqs:ListQueueTags
719
+ Resource: '*'
720
+ Condition:
721
+ StringEquals:
722
+ aws:ResourceTag/managed-by: saaslayer-deployer
723
+ # Log reads for diagnosing module function failures. CloudWatch Logs does not
724
+ # support aws:ResourceTag conditions on these read actions, and module log group
725
+ # names follow function names rather than a common prefix, so these cannot be
726
+ # tag- or ARN-scoped yet. They expose log content and log-group metadata only —
727
+ # no service configuration or data-plane records.
728
+ - Effect: Allow
729
+ Action:
730
+ - logs:DescribeLogGroups
731
+ - logs:DescribeLogStreams
732
+ - logs:GetLogEvents
733
+ - logs:GetLogGroupFields
734
+ - logs:GetLogRecord
735
+ - logs:ListTagsForResource
736
+ Resource: '*'
737
+ # Alarm/dashboard state for module observability. CloudWatch alarms support
738
+ # aws:ResourceTag; DescribeAlarms is an enumeration API evaluated per-alarm.
739
+ - Effect: Allow
740
+ Action:
741
+ - cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms
742
+ - cloudwatch:GetDashboard
743
+ - cloudwatch:ListDashboards
744
+ Resource: '*'
745
+
746
+ Outputs:
747
+ DeploymentRoleArn:
748
+ Description: Cross-account deployment role the SaaSLayer control plane assumes (external ID required).
749
+ Value: !GetAtt SaaSLayerDeploymentRole.Arn
750
+ SupportReadOnlyRoleArn:
751
+ Description: Cross-account read-only role SaaSLayer support staff assume for diagnostics (external ID required).
752
+ Value: !GetAtt SaaSLayerSupportReadOnlyRole.Arn
753
+ CloudFormationExecutionRoleArn:
754
+ Description: Service role CloudFormation uses to provision approved SaaSLayer module stacks; not assumable cross-account.
755
+ Value: !GetAtt SaaSLayerCloudFormationExecutionRole.Arn
756
+ DeploymentArtifactBucketName:
757
+ Description: Private, encrypted bucket holding packaged SaaSLayer deployment artifacts.
758
+ Value: !Ref DeploymentArtifactBucket
759
+ ManagedResourceBoundaryArn:
760
+ Description: Permissions boundary capping the runtime permissions of every IAM role created by SaaSLayer module stacks.
761
+ Value: !Ref SaaSLayerManagedResourceBoundary