rungate 0.2.1 → 0.4.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/bin/rungate.ts +70 -0
- package/lib/aes-calculator.ts +66 -0
- package/lib/agent-audit.ts +139 -0
- package/lib/agent-brief-validation.ts +359 -0
- package/lib/agents-md-refs.ts +90 -0
- package/lib/bash-file-read.ts +197 -0
- package/lib/behavioral-cache.ts +78 -0
- package/lib/branch-cleanup.ts +234 -0
- package/lib/brief-context-parser.ts +35 -0
- package/lib/brief-precedence.ts +114 -0
- package/lib/canary.ts +117 -0
- package/lib/check-registry.ts +226 -0
- package/lib/ci-checkout.ts +426 -0
- package/lib/cli-commands.ts +137 -0
- package/lib/compliance-backfill.ts +232 -0
- package/lib/compliance-report.ts +605 -0
- package/lib/compliance.ts +361 -0
- package/lib/config-loader.ts +255 -0
- package/lib/config-readers.ts +86 -0
- package/lib/conformity.ts +2161 -137
- package/lib/container-provenance.ts +230 -0
- package/lib/create-brief.ts +150 -0
- package/lib/create-sc.ts +267 -0
- package/lib/decomposition-waves.ts +197 -0
- package/lib/deep-merge.ts +69 -0
- package/lib/dev-liveness.ts +214 -0
- package/lib/directive-extractor.ts +210 -0
- package/lib/distribution-standing.ts +113 -0
- package/lib/doc-hygiene.ts +238 -0
- package/lib/eval-criteria.ts +6 -0
- package/lib/evidence-portability.ts +123 -0
- package/lib/evidence-prevalidator.ts +390 -0
- package/lib/evidence-required.ts +150 -0
- package/lib/evidence-satisfiability.ts +288 -0
- package/lib/frontmatter.ts +163 -0
- package/lib/gap-scanner.ts +348 -0
- package/lib/gate-check-audit.ts +190 -0
- package/lib/gate-enforcement.ts +366 -0
- package/lib/generators/agent-briefs.ts +136 -0
- package/lib/generators/agents-md.ts +511 -0
- package/lib/generators/code-map.ts +60 -0
- package/lib/generators/types.ts +184 -0
- package/lib/git-ref-normalizer.ts +107 -0
- package/lib/github.ts +539 -0
- package/lib/harness-identity.ts +63 -0
- package/lib/hill-climb.ts +164 -0
- package/lib/instruction-effectiveness.ts +131 -0
- package/lib/issue-closure-audit.ts +225 -0
- package/lib/issue-create-override.ts +343 -0
- package/lib/issue-extraction.ts +368 -0
- package/lib/js-top-level-code.ts +250 -0
- package/lib/liveness-contradiction.ts +149 -0
- package/lib/organize.ts +505 -0
- package/lib/paths.ts +197 -6
- package/lib/phase2-decomposition.ts +270 -0
- package/lib/post-fix-verify.ts +157 -0
- package/lib/prior-branch.ts +512 -0
- package/lib/project-state-shape.ts +166 -0
- package/lib/promote-outputs.ts +156 -0
- package/lib/prove-label-gate.ts +128 -0
- package/lib/reachability.ts +302 -0
- package/lib/release-preflight.ts +288 -0
- package/lib/rule-health-pipeline.ts +264 -0
- package/lib/rule-health-trend.ts +161 -0
- package/lib/rule-provenance.ts +149 -0
- package/lib/rule-registry.ts +128 -0
- package/lib/rungate-schema.ts +127 -5
- package/lib/sc-claim-forms.ts +179 -0
- package/lib/sc-cover.ts +150 -0
- package/lib/sc-guard.ts +157 -0
- package/lib/sc-ids.ts +344 -0
- package/lib/scaffold/defaults.ts +165 -0
- package/lib/scaffold/managed-workflow.ts +370 -0
- package/lib/scaffold/owned-files.ts +265 -0
- package/lib/scaffold/pre-push-hook.ts +165 -0
- package/lib/scaffold/steps.ts +2621 -0
- package/lib/scanner.ts +701 -0
- package/lib/scope-denylist.ts +258 -0
- package/lib/screenshot-upload.ts +73 -0
- package/lib/secret-patterns.ts +112 -0
- package/lib/security-verdict.ts +616 -0
- package/lib/signal-phrases.ts +1 -0
- package/lib/spec-change-conformity.ts +80 -0
- package/lib/spec-files.ts +62 -0
- package/lib/spec-registry.ts +133 -0
- package/lib/spec-updater.ts +96 -0
- package/lib/stale-cleanup.ts +224 -0
- package/lib/stale-issue-scanner.ts +36 -0
- package/lib/strip-js-comments.ts +269 -0
- package/lib/suite-measurement.ts +228 -0
- package/lib/task-completion-checks.ts +224 -0
- package/lib/test-suite-lock.ts +1136 -0
- package/lib/transcript-checker.ts +1140 -0
- package/lib/typescript-project.ts +233 -0
- package/lib/validators/spec-validators.ts +171 -0
- package/lib/verdict-capture.ts +73 -0
- package/lib/verified-push.ts +535 -0
- package/lib/workflow-security.ts +174 -0
- package/lib/worktree-cleanup.ts +432 -0
- package/lib/worktree-collect.ts +283 -0
- package/lib/worktree-isolation.ts +82 -0
- package/lib/worktree-repo.ts +300 -0
- package/package.json +27 -3
- package/prompts/ac-adversary.md +14 -2
- package/prompts/aditi.md +5 -0
- package/prompts/blast-radius.md +5 -0
- package/prompts/container-verify.md +5 -0
- package/prompts/discovery.md +4 -0
- package/prompts/environment.md +5 -0
- package/prompts/evidence-hierarchy.md +5 -0
- package/prompts/evidence-validator.md +11 -0
- package/prompts/marcus.md +5 -0
- package/prompts/prevention.md +5 -0
- package/prompts/prove-reproducer.md +12 -0
- package/prompts/quinn-decision-tree.md +5 -0
- package/prompts/quinn-ui-brief.md +5 -0
- package/prompts/quinn.md +5 -0
- package/prompts/rca.md +5 -0
- package/prompts/read-before-write.md +4 -0
- package/prompts/regression.md +5 -0
- package/prompts/serena.md +5 -0
- package/scripts/audit-specs.ts +464 -0
- package/scripts/convert-spec.ts +293 -0
- package/scripts/create-sc.ts +92 -0
- package/scripts/create-spec.ts +166 -0
- package/scripts/extract-constraints.ts +4 -3
- package/scripts/generate-code-map.ts +1 -1
- package/scripts/scaffold-project.ts +138 -1426
- package/scripts/sync-spec-tests.ts +211 -126
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/**
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* Files a goal put out of bounds, and the plans that claimed them anyway (#306).
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*
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* ## What happened
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*
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* #274 attempt 4 (`wf_b3714a40-bb7`). The goal said, under a heading in
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* capitals, "ALSO DO NOT FIX, ALREADY FILED: #295 … leave it there". The
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* `to-issues` decomposer then emitted a sub-issue whose `filesToModify` was
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* `gates/schema.ts`, `lib/evidence-prevalidator.ts`,
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* `gates/SCHEMA-GUIDE.md` — the three files you would touch to fix #295, and
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* nothing to do with #274. The agent did what its file list permitted, and
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* the run refused on its own contradiction: one sub-issue both documented the
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* defect and removed it.
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*
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* The attribution is the decomposer's, not the agent's. The collection guard
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* (#178, SC-413) refuses any file no sub-issue claimed, and it did not refuse
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* these — so they were in the plan. An agent handed `gates/schema.ts` and a
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* defect description has been told, by the strongest signal in the system,
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* that the file is in scope.
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*
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* ## One thing #306 got wrong, corrected here
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*
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* The issue proposes "the goal already names them; the decomposer could be
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* given an explicit deny-list". **The goal did not name them.** Re-read the
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* quoted prohibition: it names an ISSUE (`#295`) and three code symbols
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* (`prevalidationViolations`, `reading.broken`, `acs[].status`). Not one file
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* path. The paths came from `discovery.filesToModify`, which
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* `workflows/ship.js:1952` hands to the decomposer verbatim as "Files to
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* modify".
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*
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* That changes the fix in a way worth stating, because a deny-list built on
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* the issue's premise would have returned `[]` for the very run that
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* motivated it and passed — the decorative check
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* `.claude/rules/checks-must-be-able-to-fail.md` is about, shipped as its own
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* remedy. So this module has two outputs, not one:
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*
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* - `deniedFiles` — paths the prohibition actually named, which can be
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* enforced.
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* - `unresolvedProhibitions` — prohibitions that named an issue and no file,
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* which CANNOT be enforced and are reported rather than counted as clean.
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* #274's own goal is this case. An empty deny-list and an unenforceable one
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* look identical from the outside, and conflating them is the whole bug.
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*/
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/** A marked region of goal text and what could be extracted from it. */
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export interface Prohibition {
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/** The text of the marked paragraph. */
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text: string;
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/** Repo-relative paths named inside it. */
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files: string[];
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/** Issue numbers named inside it, as `#295`. */
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issues: string[];
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}
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/**
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* Line markers that put the rest of a paragraph out of bounds.
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*
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* Deliberately short and literal. A wider list reads ordinary prose as a
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* prohibition and starts denying files the run needs, which fails a correct
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* plan — and a guard that fires on correct work is removed within a week.
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*/
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const MARKERS = [
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/\bdo\s+not\s+fix\b/i,
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/\bdo\s+not\s+touch\b/i,
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/\bdo\s+not\s+modify\b/i,
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/\bout\s+of\s+scope\b/i,
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/\bnot\s+in\s+scope\b/i,
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/\balready\s+filed\b/i,
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];
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/**
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* A source path: an optional directory prefix and a KNOWN EXTENSION.
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*
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* The extension is what does the discriminating, and that is worth stating
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* because the first draft of this file claimed the `/` did. It does not.
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* `reading.broken` and `acs[].status` — both in #274's prohibition, both code
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* expressions — are excluded because `.broken` and `.status` are not
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* extensions, not because they lack a separator. Mutating the `/` from
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* required to optional scored **zero red** against the cases written to
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* defend it, which is how the claim was caught.
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*
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* The separator is optional on purpose, once it stopped being load-bearing:
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* requiring it silently misses every root-level file a goal might name —
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* `package.json`, `AGENTS.md`, `CODE-MAP.md` — which is a false negative in
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* exactly the common case. How a bare name matches a plan entry is
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* `matchesDenied` below, and it is not the same rule as for a full path.
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*/
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const PATH = /\b([A-Za-z0-9_.-]+(?:\/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)*\.(?:ts|tsx|js|jsx|md|json|ya?ml|sh))\b/g;
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const ISSUE_REF = /#(\d+)\b/g;
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/** Paths named in a span of text, deduplicated, in first-seen order. */
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export function pathsNamedIn(text: string): string[] {
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return [...new Set([...text.matchAll(PATH)].map(m => m[1]))];
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}
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/**
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* Split goal text into the paragraphs a marker puts out of bounds.
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*
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* A paragraph, not a line: #274's prohibition is one bolded lead-in followed
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* by two sentences, and a line-scoped reader would see the marker and stop
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* before the content. A paragraph, not the rest of the document: a marker
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* near the top would otherwise deny the entire goal.
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*/
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export function prohibitions(goalText: string): Prohibition[] {
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const out: Prohibition[] = [];
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for (const para of String(goalText ?? "").split(/\n\s*\n/)) {
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if (!MARKERS.some(m => m.test(para))) continue;
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out.push({
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text: para.trim(),
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files: pathsNamedIn(para),
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issues: [...new Set([...para.matchAll(ISSUE_REF)].map(m => `#${m[1]}`))],
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});
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}
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return out;
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}
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/**
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* Every file the goal put out of bounds.
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*
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* `scopeOut` entries count in full — that field exists to say what is out of
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* scope, so it needs no marker. Until now nothing read it at all: it was
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* required by the discovery schema, appended to in one place, and consulted
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* by nothing, which is its own small version of this bug.
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*/
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export function deniedFiles(goalText: string, scopeOut: readonly string[] = []): string[] {
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const fromGoal = prohibitions(goalText).flatMap(p => p.files);
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const fromScopeOut = scopeOut.flatMap(s => pathsNamedIn(String(s ?? "")));
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return [...new Set([...fromGoal, ...fromScopeOut])];
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}
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/**
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* Prohibitions that name an issue and no file (#306).
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*
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* These are the ones the deny-list cannot act on, and reporting them is the
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* point. "Nothing was denied because the goal named nothing" and "nothing was
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* denied because the goal named no files" are the same empty list, and only
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* the first is a clean run.
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*/
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export function unresolvedProhibitions(goalText: string): Prohibition[] {
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return prohibitions(goalText).filter(p => p.files.length === 0 && p.issues.length > 0);
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}
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/** A plan item that claims files. Shaped to match a sub-issue or discovery. */
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export interface FileClaimant {
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title?: string;
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filesToModify?: readonly string[];
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}
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/**
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* One spelling per path, so a guard cannot be stepped around by rewriting it.
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*
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* A string comparison is only as good as its normalisation, and `./a/b.ts`,
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* `a//b.ts`, `a/./b.ts` and `a/c/../b.ts` are four spellings of one file that
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* an `===` reads as four different ones. The whole value of this module is a
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* comparison, so an un-normalised one is a guard with a documented bypass —
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* "a detector narrower than what it detects", third shape in
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* `.claude/rules/checks-must-be-able-to-fail.md`.
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*
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* A leading `..` is kept rather than resolved away: it escapes the repo root
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* and there is nothing above it to collapse into, so dropping it would make
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* `../secrets.ts` normalise to `secrets.ts` and match a deny entry that never
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* meant it. Raised by the commit security review on this change.
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*/
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export function normalisePath(p: string): string {
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const raw = String(p ?? "").trim().replace(/\\/g, "/");
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const out: string[] = [];
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for (const seg of raw.split("/")) {
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if (seg === "" || seg === ".") continue;
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if (seg === ".." && out.length > 0 && out.at(-1) !== "..") out.pop();
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else out.push(seg);
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}
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return out.join("/");
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}
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/**
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* Does a plan's file entry fall under a denied entry?
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*
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* Two rules, because a goal names files two ways:
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*
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* - **A denied entry WITH a separator matches exactly**, after normalisation.
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* A suffix match would read `test/gates/schema.ts` as `gates/schema.ts` and
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* deny a file the prohibition never mentioned.
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* - **A denied entry with NO separator matches by basename.** "Do not touch
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* package.json" has to reach `package.json`, and "do not touch
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* HARNESS-STANDARD.md" has to reach `specs/HARNESS-STANDARD.md` — a goal
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* author naming a bare file means the file, wherever it lives. Requiring
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* the path instead would make the common phrasing silently do nothing,
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* which is this issue's own defect one level down.
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*
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* The basename arm compares the last segment rather than testing `endsWith`,
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* because `endsWith("/package.json")` is satisfied by nothing a normalised
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* path can spell differently but the segment comparison says what it means.
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*/
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export function matchesDenied(planFile: string, deniedEntry: string): boolean {
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const plan = normalisePath(planFile);
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const denied = normalisePath(deniedEntry);
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if (denied === "" || plan === "") return false;
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if (denied.includes("/")) return plan === denied;
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return plan === denied || plan.split("/").at(-1) === denied;
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}
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/** Violations, one line each. Empty allows. */
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export function denylistViolations(
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claimants: readonly FileClaimant[],
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denied: readonly string[],
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|
207
|
+
): string[] {
|
|
208
|
+
const out: string[] = [];
|
|
209
|
+
for (const [i, c] of claimants.entries()) {
|
|
210
|
+
for (const f of c.filesToModify ?? []) {
|
|
211
|
+
if (!denied.some(d => matchesDenied(f, d))) continue;
|
|
212
|
+
out.push(
|
|
213
|
+
`${c.title ? `"${c.title}"` : `plan item ${i + 1}`} claims ${f}, which the goal ` +
|
|
214
|
+
`put out of scope. An agent handed a file is an agent told the file is in ` +
|
|
215
|
+
`scope (#306).`,
|
|
216
|
+
);
|
|
217
|
+
}
|
|
218
|
+
}
|
|
219
|
+
return out;
|
|
220
|
+
}
|
|
221
|
+
|
|
222
|
+
/**
|
|
223
|
+
* Did the deny-list eat the entire plan? (commit security review, #306)
|
|
224
|
+
*
|
|
225
|
+
* Two findings on this change were about the same hazard from opposite
|
|
226
|
+
* sides. The goal text is attacker-influenceable — issue bodies are — and
|
|
227
|
+
* nothing here validates it. What limits the damage is direction: a
|
|
228
|
+
* deny-list only ever NARROWS what an agent may write, so a hostile goal can
|
|
229
|
+
* deny progress but cannot grant access. That is the safe direction, and it
|
|
230
|
+
* is why this is a report rather than a refusal.
|
|
231
|
+
*
|
|
232
|
+
* The one outcome that is NOT safe is silence. If every file the run was
|
|
233
|
+
* going to touch is denied, stripping leaves an empty plan, and an empty
|
|
234
|
+
* plan is indistinguishable from a run with nothing to do — work refused,
|
|
235
|
+
* reported as work completed. That is the fail-open, and it is the shape the
|
|
236
|
+
* rest of this issue is about, so it gets a message rather than an empty
|
|
237
|
+
* array.
|
|
238
|
+
*/
|
|
239
|
+
export function scopeContradiction(
|
|
240
|
+
files: readonly string[],
|
|
241
|
+
denied: readonly string[],
|
|
242
|
+
): string | null {
|
|
243
|
+
if (files.length === 0 || denied.length === 0) return null;
|
|
244
|
+
if (withoutDenied(files, denied).length > 0) return null;
|
|
245
|
+
return (
|
|
246
|
+
`every file the run planned to touch is out of scope (${files.join(", ")} vs ` +
|
|
247
|
+
`denied ${denied.join(", ")}). An empty plan looks exactly like a run with ` +
|
|
248
|
+
`nothing to do, so this is reported rather than stripped in silence (#306).`
|
|
249
|
+
);
|
|
250
|
+
}
|
|
251
|
+
|
|
252
|
+
/** The denied files stripped out, order preserved. Same rule as above. */
|
|
253
|
+
export function withoutDenied(
|
|
254
|
+
files: readonly string[],
|
|
255
|
+
denied: readonly string[],
|
|
256
|
+
): string[] {
|
|
257
|
+
return files.filter(f => !denied.some(d => matchesDenied(f, d)));
|
|
258
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "fs";
|
|
2
|
+
import { basename } from "path";
|
|
3
|
+
import { $ } from "bun";
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
export interface UploadResult {
|
|
6
|
+
uploaded: string[];
|
|
7
|
+
failed: string[];
|
|
8
|
+
markdownLinks: string[];
|
|
9
|
+
}
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
/**
|
|
12
|
+
* Uploads screenshot files to GitHub via gists and returns markdown image links.
|
|
13
|
+
*
|
|
14
|
+
* Uses `gh gist create` to upload each screenshot file, then converts the gist URL
|
|
15
|
+
* to a raw content URL suitable for markdown embedding.
|
|
16
|
+
*
|
|
17
|
+
* @param issue - GitHub issue number (for future use in direct issue attachments)
|
|
18
|
+
* @param repo - Repository in owner/repo format
|
|
19
|
+
* @param screenshotPaths - Array of absolute paths to screenshot files
|
|
20
|
+
* @returns UploadResult with uploaded files, failed files, and markdown links
|
|
21
|
+
*/
|
|
22
|
+
export async function uploadScreenshotsToIssue(
|
|
23
|
+
issue: number,
|
|
24
|
+
repo: string,
|
|
25
|
+
screenshotPaths: string[],
|
|
26
|
+
): Promise<UploadResult> {
|
|
27
|
+
const result: UploadResult = {
|
|
28
|
+
uploaded: [],
|
|
29
|
+
failed: [],
|
|
30
|
+
markdownLinks: [],
|
|
31
|
+
};
|
|
32
|
+
|
|
33
|
+
if (screenshotPaths.length === 0) {
|
|
34
|
+
return result;
|
|
35
|
+
}
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
for (const filePath of screenshotPaths) {
|
|
38
|
+
// Check if file exists
|
|
39
|
+
if (!existsSync(filePath)) {
|
|
40
|
+
result.failed.push(filePath);
|
|
41
|
+
continue;
|
|
42
|
+
}
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
44
|
+
try {
|
|
45
|
+
// Upload to GitHub gist
|
|
46
|
+
// gh gist create returns the gist URL on stdout
|
|
47
|
+
const gistResult = await $`gh gist create --public ${filePath}`.text();
|
|
48
|
+
const gistUrl = gistResult.trim();
|
|
49
|
+
|
|
50
|
+
if (!gistUrl || !gistUrl.startsWith("https://gist.github.com/")) {
|
|
51
|
+
result.failed.push(filePath);
|
|
52
|
+
continue;
|
|
53
|
+
}
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
55
|
+
// Convert gist URL to raw content URL
|
|
56
|
+
// https://gist.github.com/user/abc123 → https://gist.githubusercontent.com/user/abc123/raw/filename.png
|
|
57
|
+
const gistId = gistUrl.split("/").pop();
|
|
58
|
+
const filename = basename(filePath);
|
|
59
|
+
const rawUrl = `https://gist.githubusercontent.com/${repo.split("/")[0]}/${gistId}/raw/${filename}`;
|
|
60
|
+
|
|
61
|
+
// Create markdown image link
|
|
62
|
+
const markdownLink = ``;
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
64
|
+
result.uploaded.push(filePath);
|
|
65
|
+
result.markdownLinks.push(markdownLink);
|
|
66
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
67
|
+
result.failed.push(filePath);
|
|
68
|
+
console.error(`Failed to upload ${filePath}:`, error);
|
|
69
|
+
}
|
|
70
|
+
}
|
|
71
|
+
|
|
72
|
+
return result;
|
|
73
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* The single registry of secret patterns used by every scanner we generate.
|
|
3
|
+
*
|
|
4
|
+
* WHY THIS FILE EXISTS
|
|
5
|
+
*
|
|
6
|
+
* There were three copies and they disagreed:
|
|
7
|
+
*
|
|
8
|
+
* scripts/git-hooks/pre-commit:22 8 patterns
|
|
9
|
+
* lib/scaffold/steps.ts (gates.yml) 3 patterns
|
|
10
|
+
* lib/scaffold/steps.ts (pre-commit) 3 patterns
|
|
11
|
+
*
|
|
12
|
+
* So CI missed `gho_`, `ghs_`, `github_pat_`, `sk-ant-` and — worst — PEM
|
|
13
|
+
* private key blocks entirely. A committed private key passed CI. And the
|
|
14
|
+
* generated consumer pre-commit hook carried the weak 3-pattern set, so every
|
|
15
|
+
* downstream project got the gap too, while this repo's own checked-in hook
|
|
16
|
+
* had the full list.
|
|
17
|
+
*
|
|
18
|
+
* The generated `gates.yml` even asserted the opposite in a comment: "Two
|
|
19
|
+
* tiers matching the pre-commit hook, so local and CI cannot disagree about
|
|
20
|
+
* what counts as a secret." They disagreed. A comment is not a mechanism —
|
|
21
|
+
* this file is the mechanism, and test/unit/secret-patterns.test.ts asserts
|
|
22
|
+
* that every generated scanner carries exactly this registry.
|
|
23
|
+
*
|
|
24
|
+
* FORMAT
|
|
25
|
+
*
|
|
26
|
+
* POSIX ERE, consumed by `grep -E` and `git grep -E` in generated shell. Keep
|
|
27
|
+
* it portable: no PCRE (`\d`, `\w`, lookarounds), no single quotes — the
|
|
28
|
+
* string is embedded inside single-quoted shell arguments.
|
|
29
|
+
*/
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
export interface SecretPattern {
|
|
32
|
+
/** Short identifier used in test failure messages. */
|
|
33
|
+
id: string;
|
|
34
|
+
/** POSIX ERE fragment, safe to join with `|`. */
|
|
35
|
+
ere: string;
|
|
36
|
+
/** What it catches, for the humans reading a blocked commit. */
|
|
37
|
+
description: string;
|
|
38
|
+
}
|
|
39
|
+
|
|
40
|
+
/**
|
|
41
|
+
* Tier 1 — anchored key formats.
|
|
42
|
+
*
|
|
43
|
+
* Unambiguous enough that a match is a secret, so there are no exceptions and
|
|
44
|
+
* no allowlist. Anything needing an exception belongs in tier 2.
|
|
45
|
+
*/
|
|
46
|
+
export const TIER1_SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[] = [
|
|
47
|
+
{ id: "github-pat-classic", ere: "ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}", description: "GitHub personal access token" },
|
|
48
|
+
{ id: "github-oauth", ere: "gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}", description: "GitHub OAuth token" },
|
|
49
|
+
{ id: "github-server", ere: "ghs_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}", description: "GitHub server-to-server token" },
|
|
50
|
+
{ id: "github-pat-fine", ere: "github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9]{22}_[A-Za-z0-9]{59}", description: "GitHub fine-grained PAT" },
|
|
51
|
+
{ id: "aws-access-key", ere: "AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}", description: "AWS access key ID" },
|
|
52
|
+
// {20,} not {48}. The pre-commit hook used {48} and the CI scan used {20,};
|
|
53
|
+
// taking the hook's value would have NARROWED CI, missing any sk- key
|
|
54
|
+
// shorter than 48 chars — a coverage regression smuggled in by a
|
|
55
|
+
// deduplication. When registries disagree, the union is the safe merge, not
|
|
56
|
+
// whichever copy you happened to start from.
|
|
57
|
+
{ id: "openai", ere: "sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}", description: "OpenAI-style API key" },
|
|
58
|
+
{ id: "anthropic", ere: "sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9-]{90,}", description: "Anthropic API key" },
|
|
59
|
+
{
|
|
60
|
+
id: "private-key",
|
|
61
|
+
ere: "-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----",
|
|
62
|
+
description: "PEM private key block",
|
|
63
|
+
},
|
|
64
|
+
];
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
/**
|
|
67
|
+
* Tier 2 — credential assignments.
|
|
68
|
+
*
|
|
69
|
+
* Shape-based rather than format-based, so it needs the allowlist below.
|
|
70
|
+
*/
|
|
71
|
+
export const TIER2_ASSIGNMENT_ERE =
|
|
72
|
+
"(password|passwd|api[_-]?key|secret)[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*[A-Za-z0-9/+=_.-]{12,}";
|
|
73
|
+
|
|
74
|
+
/**
|
|
75
|
+
* Values that look like credentials but are not.
|
|
76
|
+
*
|
|
77
|
+
* Applied to the extracted VALUE, never the whole line. Matching anywhere on
|
|
78
|
+
* the line was an allowlist escape: appending `# placeholder` to a line
|
|
79
|
+
* holding a real secret laundered it past the scan.
|
|
80
|
+
*/
|
|
81
|
+
export const TIER2_ALLOWED_VALUE_ERE =
|
|
82
|
+
"^$|[:=][[:space:]]*(process\\.env|os\\.environ|Deno\\.env|getenv|REDACTED|CHANGEME|placeholder)";
|
|
83
|
+
|
|
84
|
+
/** Tier 1 as one alternation, parenthesised and ready to embed in `grep -E '...'`. */
|
|
85
|
+
export function tier1Ere(): string {
|
|
86
|
+
return `(${TIER1_SECRET_PATTERNS.map(p => p.ere).join("|")})`;
|
|
87
|
+
}
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
89
|
+
/**
|
|
90
|
+
* Guard against a pattern that cannot survive the trip into generated shell.
|
|
91
|
+
*
|
|
92
|
+
* Every pattern here is interpolated into a single-quoted shell string inside
|
|
93
|
+
* a JS template literal. A single quote would terminate the shell quoting and
|
|
94
|
+
* a backtick would end the template — in both cases producing a scanner that
|
|
95
|
+
* either fails to parse or silently matches the wrong thing. Checked by a test
|
|
96
|
+
* rather than trusted, because the failure is invisible in review.
|
|
97
|
+
*/
|
|
98
|
+
export function unshellSafePatterns(): string[] {
|
|
99
|
+
// Covers EVERY string that reaches generated shell, not just tier 1. The
|
|
100
|
+
// tier-2 assignment and allowlist expressions are embedded the same way, so
|
|
101
|
+
// checking only tier 1 would have been a validator with a narrower view
|
|
102
|
+
// than the thing it validates.
|
|
103
|
+
const embedded: Array<{ id: string; ere: string }> = [
|
|
104
|
+
...TIER1_SECRET_PATTERNS.map(p => ({ id: p.id, ere: p.ere })),
|
|
105
|
+
{ id: "tier2-assignment", ere: TIER2_ASSIGNMENT_ERE },
|
|
106
|
+
{ id: "tier2-allowlist", ere: TIER2_ALLOWED_VALUE_ERE },
|
|
107
|
+
];
|
|
108
|
+
// A single quote ends the shell quoting; a backtick or ${ ends the JS
|
|
109
|
+
// template the shell is built in. Backslashes are legitimate regex escapes,
|
|
110
|
+
// so they are not disqualifying on their own.
|
|
111
|
+
return embedded.filter(p => /['`]|\$\{/.test(p.ere)).map(p => p.id);
|
|
112
|
+
}
|