rungate 0.2.1 → 0.4.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (129) hide show
  1. package/bin/rungate.ts +70 -0
  2. package/lib/aes-calculator.ts +66 -0
  3. package/lib/agent-audit.ts +139 -0
  4. package/lib/agent-brief-validation.ts +359 -0
  5. package/lib/agents-md-refs.ts +90 -0
  6. package/lib/bash-file-read.ts +197 -0
  7. package/lib/behavioral-cache.ts +78 -0
  8. package/lib/branch-cleanup.ts +234 -0
  9. package/lib/brief-context-parser.ts +35 -0
  10. package/lib/brief-precedence.ts +114 -0
  11. package/lib/canary.ts +117 -0
  12. package/lib/check-registry.ts +226 -0
  13. package/lib/ci-checkout.ts +426 -0
  14. package/lib/cli-commands.ts +137 -0
  15. package/lib/compliance-backfill.ts +232 -0
  16. package/lib/compliance-report.ts +605 -0
  17. package/lib/compliance.ts +361 -0
  18. package/lib/config-loader.ts +255 -0
  19. package/lib/config-readers.ts +86 -0
  20. package/lib/conformity.ts +2161 -137
  21. package/lib/container-provenance.ts +230 -0
  22. package/lib/create-brief.ts +150 -0
  23. package/lib/create-sc.ts +267 -0
  24. package/lib/decomposition-waves.ts +197 -0
  25. package/lib/deep-merge.ts +69 -0
  26. package/lib/dev-liveness.ts +214 -0
  27. package/lib/directive-extractor.ts +210 -0
  28. package/lib/distribution-standing.ts +113 -0
  29. package/lib/doc-hygiene.ts +238 -0
  30. package/lib/eval-criteria.ts +6 -0
  31. package/lib/evidence-portability.ts +123 -0
  32. package/lib/evidence-prevalidator.ts +390 -0
  33. package/lib/evidence-required.ts +150 -0
  34. package/lib/evidence-satisfiability.ts +288 -0
  35. package/lib/frontmatter.ts +163 -0
  36. package/lib/gap-scanner.ts +348 -0
  37. package/lib/gate-check-audit.ts +190 -0
  38. package/lib/gate-enforcement.ts +366 -0
  39. package/lib/generators/agent-briefs.ts +136 -0
  40. package/lib/generators/agents-md.ts +511 -0
  41. package/lib/generators/code-map.ts +60 -0
  42. package/lib/generators/types.ts +184 -0
  43. package/lib/git-ref-normalizer.ts +107 -0
  44. package/lib/github.ts +539 -0
  45. package/lib/harness-identity.ts +63 -0
  46. package/lib/hill-climb.ts +164 -0
  47. package/lib/instruction-effectiveness.ts +131 -0
  48. package/lib/issue-closure-audit.ts +225 -0
  49. package/lib/issue-create-override.ts +343 -0
  50. package/lib/issue-extraction.ts +368 -0
  51. package/lib/js-top-level-code.ts +250 -0
  52. package/lib/liveness-contradiction.ts +149 -0
  53. package/lib/organize.ts +505 -0
  54. package/lib/paths.ts +197 -6
  55. package/lib/phase2-decomposition.ts +270 -0
  56. package/lib/post-fix-verify.ts +157 -0
  57. package/lib/prior-branch.ts +512 -0
  58. package/lib/project-state-shape.ts +166 -0
  59. package/lib/promote-outputs.ts +156 -0
  60. package/lib/prove-label-gate.ts +128 -0
  61. package/lib/reachability.ts +302 -0
  62. package/lib/release-preflight.ts +288 -0
  63. package/lib/rule-health-pipeline.ts +264 -0
  64. package/lib/rule-health-trend.ts +161 -0
  65. package/lib/rule-provenance.ts +149 -0
  66. package/lib/rule-registry.ts +128 -0
  67. package/lib/rungate-schema.ts +127 -5
  68. package/lib/sc-claim-forms.ts +179 -0
  69. package/lib/sc-cover.ts +150 -0
  70. package/lib/sc-guard.ts +157 -0
  71. package/lib/sc-ids.ts +344 -0
  72. package/lib/scaffold/defaults.ts +165 -0
  73. package/lib/scaffold/managed-workflow.ts +370 -0
  74. package/lib/scaffold/owned-files.ts +265 -0
  75. package/lib/scaffold/pre-push-hook.ts +165 -0
  76. package/lib/scaffold/steps.ts +2621 -0
  77. package/lib/scanner.ts +701 -0
  78. package/lib/scope-denylist.ts +258 -0
  79. package/lib/screenshot-upload.ts +73 -0
  80. package/lib/secret-patterns.ts +112 -0
  81. package/lib/security-verdict.ts +616 -0
  82. package/lib/signal-phrases.ts +1 -0
  83. package/lib/spec-change-conformity.ts +80 -0
  84. package/lib/spec-files.ts +62 -0
  85. package/lib/spec-registry.ts +133 -0
  86. package/lib/spec-updater.ts +96 -0
  87. package/lib/stale-cleanup.ts +224 -0
  88. package/lib/stale-issue-scanner.ts +36 -0
  89. package/lib/strip-js-comments.ts +269 -0
  90. package/lib/suite-measurement.ts +228 -0
  91. package/lib/task-completion-checks.ts +224 -0
  92. package/lib/test-suite-lock.ts +1136 -0
  93. package/lib/transcript-checker.ts +1140 -0
  94. package/lib/typescript-project.ts +233 -0
  95. package/lib/validators/spec-validators.ts +171 -0
  96. package/lib/verdict-capture.ts +73 -0
  97. package/lib/verified-push.ts +535 -0
  98. package/lib/workflow-security.ts +174 -0
  99. package/lib/worktree-cleanup.ts +432 -0
  100. package/lib/worktree-collect.ts +283 -0
  101. package/lib/worktree-isolation.ts +82 -0
  102. package/lib/worktree-repo.ts +300 -0
  103. package/package.json +27 -3
  104. package/prompts/ac-adversary.md +14 -2
  105. package/prompts/aditi.md +5 -0
  106. package/prompts/blast-radius.md +5 -0
  107. package/prompts/container-verify.md +5 -0
  108. package/prompts/discovery.md +4 -0
  109. package/prompts/environment.md +5 -0
  110. package/prompts/evidence-hierarchy.md +5 -0
  111. package/prompts/evidence-validator.md +11 -0
  112. package/prompts/marcus.md +5 -0
  113. package/prompts/prevention.md +5 -0
  114. package/prompts/prove-reproducer.md +12 -0
  115. package/prompts/quinn-decision-tree.md +5 -0
  116. package/prompts/quinn-ui-brief.md +5 -0
  117. package/prompts/quinn.md +5 -0
  118. package/prompts/rca.md +5 -0
  119. package/prompts/read-before-write.md +4 -0
  120. package/prompts/regression.md +5 -0
  121. package/prompts/serena.md +5 -0
  122. package/scripts/audit-specs.ts +464 -0
  123. package/scripts/convert-spec.ts +293 -0
  124. package/scripts/create-sc.ts +92 -0
  125. package/scripts/create-spec.ts +166 -0
  126. package/scripts/extract-constraints.ts +4 -3
  127. package/scripts/generate-code-map.ts +1 -1
  128. package/scripts/scaffold-project.ts +138 -1426
  129. package/scripts/sync-spec-tests.ts +211 -126
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Files a goal put out of bounds, and the plans that claimed them anyway (#306).
3
+ *
4
+ * ## What happened
5
+ *
6
+ * #274 attempt 4 (`wf_b3714a40-bb7`). The goal said, under a heading in
7
+ * capitals, "ALSO DO NOT FIX, ALREADY FILED: #295 … leave it there". The
8
+ * `to-issues` decomposer then emitted a sub-issue whose `filesToModify` was
9
+ * `gates/schema.ts`, `lib/evidence-prevalidator.ts`,
10
+ * `gates/SCHEMA-GUIDE.md` — the three files you would touch to fix #295, and
11
+ * nothing to do with #274. The agent did what its file list permitted, and
12
+ * the run refused on its own contradiction: one sub-issue both documented the
13
+ * defect and removed it.
14
+ *
15
+ * The attribution is the decomposer's, not the agent's. The collection guard
16
+ * (#178, SC-413) refuses any file no sub-issue claimed, and it did not refuse
17
+ * these — so they were in the plan. An agent handed `gates/schema.ts` and a
18
+ * defect description has been told, by the strongest signal in the system,
19
+ * that the file is in scope.
20
+ *
21
+ * ## One thing #306 got wrong, corrected here
22
+ *
23
+ * The issue proposes "the goal already names them; the decomposer could be
24
+ * given an explicit deny-list". **The goal did not name them.** Re-read the
25
+ * quoted prohibition: it names an ISSUE (`#295`) and three code symbols
26
+ * (`prevalidationViolations`, `reading.broken`, `acs[].status`). Not one file
27
+ * path. The paths came from `discovery.filesToModify`, which
28
+ * `workflows/ship.js:1952` hands to the decomposer verbatim as "Files to
29
+ * modify".
30
+ *
31
+ * That changes the fix in a way worth stating, because a deny-list built on
32
+ * the issue's premise would have returned `[]` for the very run that
33
+ * motivated it and passed — the decorative check
34
+ * `.claude/rules/checks-must-be-able-to-fail.md` is about, shipped as its own
35
+ * remedy. So this module has two outputs, not one:
36
+ *
37
+ * - `deniedFiles` — paths the prohibition actually named, which can be
38
+ * enforced.
39
+ * - `unresolvedProhibitions` — prohibitions that named an issue and no file,
40
+ * which CANNOT be enforced and are reported rather than counted as clean.
41
+ * #274's own goal is this case. An empty deny-list and an unenforceable one
42
+ * look identical from the outside, and conflating them is the whole bug.
43
+ */
44
+
45
+ /** A marked region of goal text and what could be extracted from it. */
46
+ export interface Prohibition {
47
+ /** The text of the marked paragraph. */
48
+ text: string;
49
+ /** Repo-relative paths named inside it. */
50
+ files: string[];
51
+ /** Issue numbers named inside it, as `#295`. */
52
+ issues: string[];
53
+ }
54
+
55
+ /**
56
+ * Line markers that put the rest of a paragraph out of bounds.
57
+ *
58
+ * Deliberately short and literal. A wider list reads ordinary prose as a
59
+ * prohibition and starts denying files the run needs, which fails a correct
60
+ * plan — and a guard that fires on correct work is removed within a week.
61
+ */
62
+ const MARKERS = [
63
+ /\bdo\s+not\s+fix\b/i,
64
+ /\bdo\s+not\s+touch\b/i,
65
+ /\bdo\s+not\s+modify\b/i,
66
+ /\bout\s+of\s+scope\b/i,
67
+ /\bnot\s+in\s+scope\b/i,
68
+ /\balready\s+filed\b/i,
69
+ ];
70
+
71
+ /**
72
+ * A source path: an optional directory prefix and a KNOWN EXTENSION.
73
+ *
74
+ * The extension is what does the discriminating, and that is worth stating
75
+ * because the first draft of this file claimed the `/` did. It does not.
76
+ * `reading.broken` and `acs[].status` — both in #274's prohibition, both code
77
+ * expressions — are excluded because `.broken` and `.status` are not
78
+ * extensions, not because they lack a separator. Mutating the `/` from
79
+ * required to optional scored **zero red** against the cases written to
80
+ * defend it, which is how the claim was caught.
81
+ *
82
+ * The separator is optional on purpose, once it stopped being load-bearing:
83
+ * requiring it silently misses every root-level file a goal might name —
84
+ * `package.json`, `AGENTS.md`, `CODE-MAP.md` — which is a false negative in
85
+ * exactly the common case. How a bare name matches a plan entry is
86
+ * `matchesDenied` below, and it is not the same rule as for a full path.
87
+ */
88
+ const PATH = /\b([A-Za-z0-9_.-]+(?:\/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)*\.(?:ts|tsx|js|jsx|md|json|ya?ml|sh))\b/g;
89
+
90
+ const ISSUE_REF = /#(\d+)\b/g;
91
+
92
+ /** Paths named in a span of text, deduplicated, in first-seen order. */
93
+ export function pathsNamedIn(text: string): string[] {
94
+ return [...new Set([...text.matchAll(PATH)].map(m => m[1]))];
95
+ }
96
+
97
+ /**
98
+ * Split goal text into the paragraphs a marker puts out of bounds.
99
+ *
100
+ * A paragraph, not a line: #274's prohibition is one bolded lead-in followed
101
+ * by two sentences, and a line-scoped reader would see the marker and stop
102
+ * before the content. A paragraph, not the rest of the document: a marker
103
+ * near the top would otherwise deny the entire goal.
104
+ */
105
+ export function prohibitions(goalText: string): Prohibition[] {
106
+ const out: Prohibition[] = [];
107
+ for (const para of String(goalText ?? "").split(/\n\s*\n/)) {
108
+ if (!MARKERS.some(m => m.test(para))) continue;
109
+ out.push({
110
+ text: para.trim(),
111
+ files: pathsNamedIn(para),
112
+ issues: [...new Set([...para.matchAll(ISSUE_REF)].map(m => `#${m[1]}`))],
113
+ });
114
+ }
115
+ return out;
116
+ }
117
+
118
+ /**
119
+ * Every file the goal put out of bounds.
120
+ *
121
+ * `scopeOut` entries count in full — that field exists to say what is out of
122
+ * scope, so it needs no marker. Until now nothing read it at all: it was
123
+ * required by the discovery schema, appended to in one place, and consulted
124
+ * by nothing, which is its own small version of this bug.
125
+ */
126
+ export function deniedFiles(goalText: string, scopeOut: readonly string[] = []): string[] {
127
+ const fromGoal = prohibitions(goalText).flatMap(p => p.files);
128
+ const fromScopeOut = scopeOut.flatMap(s => pathsNamedIn(String(s ?? "")));
129
+ return [...new Set([...fromGoal, ...fromScopeOut])];
130
+ }
131
+
132
+ /**
133
+ * Prohibitions that name an issue and no file (#306).
134
+ *
135
+ * These are the ones the deny-list cannot act on, and reporting them is the
136
+ * point. "Nothing was denied because the goal named nothing" and "nothing was
137
+ * denied because the goal named no files" are the same empty list, and only
138
+ * the first is a clean run.
139
+ */
140
+ export function unresolvedProhibitions(goalText: string): Prohibition[] {
141
+ return prohibitions(goalText).filter(p => p.files.length === 0 && p.issues.length > 0);
142
+ }
143
+
144
+ /** A plan item that claims files. Shaped to match a sub-issue or discovery. */
145
+ export interface FileClaimant {
146
+ title?: string;
147
+ filesToModify?: readonly string[];
148
+ }
149
+
150
+ /**
151
+ * One spelling per path, so a guard cannot be stepped around by rewriting it.
152
+ *
153
+ * A string comparison is only as good as its normalisation, and `./a/b.ts`,
154
+ * `a//b.ts`, `a/./b.ts` and `a/c/../b.ts` are four spellings of one file that
155
+ * an `===` reads as four different ones. The whole value of this module is a
156
+ * comparison, so an un-normalised one is a guard with a documented bypass —
157
+ * "a detector narrower than what it detects", third shape in
158
+ * `.claude/rules/checks-must-be-able-to-fail.md`.
159
+ *
160
+ * A leading `..` is kept rather than resolved away: it escapes the repo root
161
+ * and there is nothing above it to collapse into, so dropping it would make
162
+ * `../secrets.ts` normalise to `secrets.ts` and match a deny entry that never
163
+ * meant it. Raised by the commit security review on this change.
164
+ */
165
+ export function normalisePath(p: string): string {
166
+ const raw = String(p ?? "").trim().replace(/\\/g, "/");
167
+ const out: string[] = [];
168
+ for (const seg of raw.split("/")) {
169
+ if (seg === "" || seg === ".") continue;
170
+ if (seg === ".." && out.length > 0 && out.at(-1) !== "..") out.pop();
171
+ else out.push(seg);
172
+ }
173
+ return out.join("/");
174
+ }
175
+
176
+ /**
177
+ * Does a plan's file entry fall under a denied entry?
178
+ *
179
+ * Two rules, because a goal names files two ways:
180
+ *
181
+ * - **A denied entry WITH a separator matches exactly**, after normalisation.
182
+ * A suffix match would read `test/gates/schema.ts` as `gates/schema.ts` and
183
+ * deny a file the prohibition never mentioned.
184
+ * - **A denied entry with NO separator matches by basename.** "Do not touch
185
+ * package.json" has to reach `package.json`, and "do not touch
186
+ * HARNESS-STANDARD.md" has to reach `specs/HARNESS-STANDARD.md` — a goal
187
+ * author naming a bare file means the file, wherever it lives. Requiring
188
+ * the path instead would make the common phrasing silently do nothing,
189
+ * which is this issue's own defect one level down.
190
+ *
191
+ * The basename arm compares the last segment rather than testing `endsWith`,
192
+ * because `endsWith("/package.json")` is satisfied by nothing a normalised
193
+ * path can spell differently but the segment comparison says what it means.
194
+ */
195
+ export function matchesDenied(planFile: string, deniedEntry: string): boolean {
196
+ const plan = normalisePath(planFile);
197
+ const denied = normalisePath(deniedEntry);
198
+ if (denied === "" || plan === "") return false;
199
+ if (denied.includes("/")) return plan === denied;
200
+ return plan === denied || plan.split("/").at(-1) === denied;
201
+ }
202
+
203
+ /** Violations, one line each. Empty allows. */
204
+ export function denylistViolations(
205
+ claimants: readonly FileClaimant[],
206
+ denied: readonly string[],
207
+ ): string[] {
208
+ const out: string[] = [];
209
+ for (const [i, c] of claimants.entries()) {
210
+ for (const f of c.filesToModify ?? []) {
211
+ if (!denied.some(d => matchesDenied(f, d))) continue;
212
+ out.push(
213
+ `${c.title ? `"${c.title}"` : `plan item ${i + 1}`} claims ${f}, which the goal ` +
214
+ `put out of scope. An agent handed a file is an agent told the file is in ` +
215
+ `scope (#306).`,
216
+ );
217
+ }
218
+ }
219
+ return out;
220
+ }
221
+
222
+ /**
223
+ * Did the deny-list eat the entire plan? (commit security review, #306)
224
+ *
225
+ * Two findings on this change were about the same hazard from opposite
226
+ * sides. The goal text is attacker-influenceable — issue bodies are — and
227
+ * nothing here validates it. What limits the damage is direction: a
228
+ * deny-list only ever NARROWS what an agent may write, so a hostile goal can
229
+ * deny progress but cannot grant access. That is the safe direction, and it
230
+ * is why this is a report rather than a refusal.
231
+ *
232
+ * The one outcome that is NOT safe is silence. If every file the run was
233
+ * going to touch is denied, stripping leaves an empty plan, and an empty
234
+ * plan is indistinguishable from a run with nothing to do — work refused,
235
+ * reported as work completed. That is the fail-open, and it is the shape the
236
+ * rest of this issue is about, so it gets a message rather than an empty
237
+ * array.
238
+ */
239
+ export function scopeContradiction(
240
+ files: readonly string[],
241
+ denied: readonly string[],
242
+ ): string | null {
243
+ if (files.length === 0 || denied.length === 0) return null;
244
+ if (withoutDenied(files, denied).length > 0) return null;
245
+ return (
246
+ `every file the run planned to touch is out of scope (${files.join(", ")} vs ` +
247
+ `denied ${denied.join(", ")}). An empty plan looks exactly like a run with ` +
248
+ `nothing to do, so this is reported rather than stripped in silence (#306).`
249
+ );
250
+ }
251
+
252
+ /** The denied files stripped out, order preserved. Same rule as above. */
253
+ export function withoutDenied(
254
+ files: readonly string[],
255
+ denied: readonly string[],
256
+ ): string[] {
257
+ return files.filter(f => !denied.some(d => matchesDenied(f, d)));
258
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
1
+ import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "fs";
2
+ import { basename } from "path";
3
+ import { $ } from "bun";
4
+
5
+ export interface UploadResult {
6
+ uploaded: string[];
7
+ failed: string[];
8
+ markdownLinks: string[];
9
+ }
10
+
11
+ /**
12
+ * Uploads screenshot files to GitHub via gists and returns markdown image links.
13
+ *
14
+ * Uses `gh gist create` to upload each screenshot file, then converts the gist URL
15
+ * to a raw content URL suitable for markdown embedding.
16
+ *
17
+ * @param issue - GitHub issue number (for future use in direct issue attachments)
18
+ * @param repo - Repository in owner/repo format
19
+ * @param screenshotPaths - Array of absolute paths to screenshot files
20
+ * @returns UploadResult with uploaded files, failed files, and markdown links
21
+ */
22
+ export async function uploadScreenshotsToIssue(
23
+ issue: number,
24
+ repo: string,
25
+ screenshotPaths: string[],
26
+ ): Promise<UploadResult> {
27
+ const result: UploadResult = {
28
+ uploaded: [],
29
+ failed: [],
30
+ markdownLinks: [],
31
+ };
32
+
33
+ if (screenshotPaths.length === 0) {
34
+ return result;
35
+ }
36
+
37
+ for (const filePath of screenshotPaths) {
38
+ // Check if file exists
39
+ if (!existsSync(filePath)) {
40
+ result.failed.push(filePath);
41
+ continue;
42
+ }
43
+
44
+ try {
45
+ // Upload to GitHub gist
46
+ // gh gist create returns the gist URL on stdout
47
+ const gistResult = await $`gh gist create --public ${filePath}`.text();
48
+ const gistUrl = gistResult.trim();
49
+
50
+ if (!gistUrl || !gistUrl.startsWith("https://gist.github.com/")) {
51
+ result.failed.push(filePath);
52
+ continue;
53
+ }
54
+
55
+ // Convert gist URL to raw content URL
56
+ // https://gist.github.com/user/abc123 → https://gist.githubusercontent.com/user/abc123/raw/filename.png
57
+ const gistId = gistUrl.split("/").pop();
58
+ const filename = basename(filePath);
59
+ const rawUrl = `https://gist.githubusercontent.com/${repo.split("/")[0]}/${gistId}/raw/${filename}`;
60
+
61
+ // Create markdown image link
62
+ const markdownLink = `![${filename}](${rawUrl})`;
63
+
64
+ result.uploaded.push(filePath);
65
+ result.markdownLinks.push(markdownLink);
66
+ } catch (error) {
67
+ result.failed.push(filePath);
68
+ console.error(`Failed to upload ${filePath}:`, error);
69
+ }
70
+ }
71
+
72
+ return result;
73
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * The single registry of secret patterns used by every scanner we generate.
3
+ *
4
+ * WHY THIS FILE EXISTS
5
+ *
6
+ * There were three copies and they disagreed:
7
+ *
8
+ * scripts/git-hooks/pre-commit:22 8 patterns
9
+ * lib/scaffold/steps.ts (gates.yml) 3 patterns
10
+ * lib/scaffold/steps.ts (pre-commit) 3 patterns
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+ *
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+ * So CI missed `gho_`, `ghs_`, `github_pat_`, `sk-ant-` and — worst — PEM
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+ * private key blocks entirely. A committed private key passed CI. And the
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+ * generated consumer pre-commit hook carried the weak 3-pattern set, so every
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+ * downstream project got the gap too, while this repo's own checked-in hook
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+ * had the full list.
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+ *
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+ * The generated `gates.yml` even asserted the opposite in a comment: "Two
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+ * tiers matching the pre-commit hook, so local and CI cannot disagree about
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+ * what counts as a secret." They disagreed. A comment is not a mechanism —
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+ * this file is the mechanism, and test/unit/secret-patterns.test.ts asserts
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+ * that every generated scanner carries exactly this registry.
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+ *
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+ * FORMAT
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+ *
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+ * POSIX ERE, consumed by `grep -E` and `git grep -E` in generated shell. Keep
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+ * it portable: no PCRE (`\d`, `\w`, lookarounds), no single quotes — the
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+ * string is embedded inside single-quoted shell arguments.
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+ */
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+
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+ export interface SecretPattern {
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+ /** Short identifier used in test failure messages. */
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+ id: string;
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+ /** POSIX ERE fragment, safe to join with `|`. */
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+ ere: string;
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+ /** What it catches, for the humans reading a blocked commit. */
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+ description: string;
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Tier 1 — anchored key formats.
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+ *
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+ * Unambiguous enough that a match is a secret, so there are no exceptions and
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+ * no allowlist. Anything needing an exception belongs in tier 2.
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+ */
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+ export const TIER1_SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[] = [
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+ { id: "github-pat-classic", ere: "ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}", description: "GitHub personal access token" },
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+ { id: "github-oauth", ere: "gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}", description: "GitHub OAuth token" },
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+ { id: "github-server", ere: "ghs_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}", description: "GitHub server-to-server token" },
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+ { id: "github-pat-fine", ere: "github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9]{22}_[A-Za-z0-9]{59}", description: "GitHub fine-grained PAT" },
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+ { id: "aws-access-key", ere: "AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}", description: "AWS access key ID" },
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+ // {20,} not {48}. The pre-commit hook used {48} and the CI scan used {20,};
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+ // taking the hook's value would have NARROWED CI, missing any sk- key
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+ // shorter than 48 chars — a coverage regression smuggled in by a
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+ // deduplication. When registries disagree, the union is the safe merge, not
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+ // whichever copy you happened to start from.
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+ { id: "openai", ere: "sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}", description: "OpenAI-style API key" },
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+ { id: "anthropic", ere: "sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9-]{90,}", description: "Anthropic API key" },
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+ {
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+ id: "private-key",
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+ ere: "-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----",
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+ description: "PEM private key block",
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+ },
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+ ];
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Tier 2 — credential assignments.
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+ *
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+ * Shape-based rather than format-based, so it needs the allowlist below.
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+ */
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+ export const TIER2_ASSIGNMENT_ERE =
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+ "(password|passwd|api[_-]?key|secret)[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*[A-Za-z0-9/+=_.-]{12,}";
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Values that look like credentials but are not.
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+ *
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+ * Applied to the extracted VALUE, never the whole line. Matching anywhere on
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+ * the line was an allowlist escape: appending `# placeholder` to a line
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+ * holding a real secret laundered it past the scan.
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+ */
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+ export const TIER2_ALLOWED_VALUE_ERE =
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+ "^$|[:=][[:space:]]*(process\\.env|os\\.environ|Deno\\.env|getenv|REDACTED|CHANGEME|placeholder)";
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+
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+ /** Tier 1 as one alternation, parenthesised and ready to embed in `grep -E '...'`. */
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+ export function tier1Ere(): string {
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+ return `(${TIER1_SECRET_PATTERNS.map(p => p.ere).join("|")})`;
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Guard against a pattern that cannot survive the trip into generated shell.
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+ *
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+ * Every pattern here is interpolated into a single-quoted shell string inside
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+ * a JS template literal. A single quote would terminate the shell quoting and
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+ * a backtick would end the template — in both cases producing a scanner that
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+ * either fails to parse or silently matches the wrong thing. Checked by a test
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+ * rather than trusted, because the failure is invisible in review.
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+ */
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+ export function unshellSafePatterns(): string[] {
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+ // Covers EVERY string that reaches generated shell, not just tier 1. The
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+ // tier-2 assignment and allowlist expressions are embedded the same way, so
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+ // checking only tier 1 would have been a validator with a narrower view
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+ // than the thing it validates.
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+ const embedded: Array<{ id: string; ere: string }> = [
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+ ...TIER1_SECRET_PATTERNS.map(p => ({ id: p.id, ere: p.ere })),
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+ { id: "tier2-assignment", ere: TIER2_ASSIGNMENT_ERE },
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+ { id: "tier2-allowlist", ere: TIER2_ALLOWED_VALUE_ERE },
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+ ];
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+ // A single quote ends the shell quoting; a backtick or ${ ends the JS
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+ // template the shell is built in. Backslashes are legitimate regex escapes,
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+ // so they are not disqualifying on their own.
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+ return embedded.filter(p => /['`]|\$\{/.test(p.ere)).map(p => p.id);
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+ }