rulesync 43.1.2 → 43.2.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/cli/index.cjs +4 -4
- package/dist/cli/index.js +4 -4
- package/dist/cli/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/{import-BTqYh7nP.cjs → import-DAT3ge4z.cjs} +603 -75
- package/dist/{import-D2uYjAdc.js → import-DPXjeK8q.js} +604 -76
- package/dist/{import-D2uYjAdc.js.map → import-DPXjeK8q.js.map} +1 -1
- package/dist/index.cjs +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
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@@ -5544,24 +5544,27 @@ const AUGMENTCODE_HOOK_EVENTS = [
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* Hook events supported by Mistral Vibe (mistral-vibe).
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*
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* Vibe exposes three hook events in `.vibe/hooks.toml`: `pre_tool` ←
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* `preToolUse`, `post_tool` ← `postToolUse`, and `post_agent` ← `stop`
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* after every assistant turn that ends
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*
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*
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*
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*
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* `
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* `preToolUse`, `post_tool` ← `postToolUse`, and `post_agent` ← `stop` /
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* `subagentStop`. `post_agent` fires after every assistant turn that ends
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* without pending tool calls, for the main agent and (since v3.0.2) for every
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* subagent. v3.0.3 lets a `post_agent` hook take a `match` on the agent that
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* finished its turn: the reserved alias `main` selects the main agent, so
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* canonical `stop` becomes `post_agent` with `match = "main"`, and a canonical
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* `subagentStop` with a matcher becomes `post_agent` with that agent name as
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* `match`. Only the tool events (`pre_tool`/`post_tool`) carry the `strict`
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* flag. Only `type: "command"` hooks are relevant.
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*
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* v2.21.0 graduated hooks from experimental and renamed all three types
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* (`before_tool` → `pre_tool`, `after_tool` → `post_tool`, `post_agent_turn` →
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* `post_agent`). `HookType` is a strict enum, so an entry using an old name is
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* rejected outright and reported as a `HookConfigIssue`.
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* @see https://github.com/mistralai/mistral-vibe/blob/
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* @see https://github.com/mistralai/mistral-vibe/blob/v3.0.3/README.md
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*/
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const VIBE_HOOK_EVENTS = [
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"preToolUse",
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"postToolUse",
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"stop"
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"stop",
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"subagentStop"
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];
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/**
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* Hook events supported by Codewhale.
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@@ -7029,9 +7032,10 @@ const JUNIE_TO_CANONICAL_EVENT_NAMES = invertEventNames(CANONICAL_TO_JUNIE_EVENT
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/**
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* Map canonical camelCase event names to Mistral Vibe snake_case.
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*
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* Vibe documents three hook events. The canonical `stop`
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* `post_agent` (fires after every assistant turn
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* calls)
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* Vibe documents three hook events. The canonical `stop` and `subagentStop`
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* events both map to Vibe's `post_agent` (fires after every assistant turn
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* ending without pending tool calls); the adapter tells them apart with the
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* hook's `match` on the agent name (`main` for the main agent).
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*
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* These are the v2.21.0 names; the pre-2.21.0 spellings (`before_tool`,
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* `after_tool`, `post_agent_turn`) are rejected by Vibe's strict `HookType`
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@@ -7041,7 +7045,8 @@ const JUNIE_TO_CANONICAL_EVENT_NAMES = invertEventNames(CANONICAL_TO_JUNIE_EVENT
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const CANONICAL_TO_VIBE_EVENT_NAMES = {
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preToolUse: "pre_tool",
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postToolUse: "post_tool",
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stop: "post_agent"
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stop: "post_agent",
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subagentStop: "post_agent"
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};
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/**
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* Map Mistral Vibe snake_case event names to canonical camelCase.
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@@ -7054,6 +7059,7 @@ const CANONICAL_TO_VIBE_EVENT_NAMES = {
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*/
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const VIBE_TO_CANONICAL_EVENT_NAMES = {
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...invertEventNames(CANONICAL_TO_VIBE_EVENT_NAMES),
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post_agent: "stop",
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before_tool: "preToolUse",
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after_tool: "postToolUse",
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post_agent_turn: "stop"
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@@ -8404,6 +8410,32 @@ const CopilotPermissionsOverrideSchema = zod_mini.z.looseObject({
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sandbox: zod_mini.z.optional(CopilotSandboxSchema)
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});
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/**
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* The permission mode the GitHub Copilot CLI starts new interactive sessions
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* in (`defaultPermissionMode` of `~/.copilot/settings.json`): `manual` prompts
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* for every request not already allowed, `assisted` lets a model review
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* eligible requests (Assisted Permissions, non-experimental since v1.0.104),
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* and `allow-all` is equivalent to `--allow-all`. These are the CLI's own
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* values and differ from the VS Code `copilot` target's
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* {@link COPILOT_DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODES}.
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*
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* @see https://docs.github.com/en/copilot/reference/copilot-cli-reference/cli-config-dir-reference
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*/
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const COPILOTCLI_DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODES = [
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"manual",
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"assisted",
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"allow-all"
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];
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/**
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* Tool-scoped override block for the GitHub Copilot CLI.
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* `defaultPermissionMode` writes the user-scope `defaultPermissionMode` key of
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* `~/.copilot/settings.json`; it has no canonical category, and the repository
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* settings file does not accept it.
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*/
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const CopilotcliPermissionsOverrideSchema = zod_mini.z.looseObject({
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permission: zod_mini.z.optional(ToolScopedPermissionSchema),
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defaultPermissionMode: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.enum(COPILOTCLI_DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODES))
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});
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/**
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* oh-my-pi's `tools.approvalMode` values: the tool tiers it auto-approves
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* before prompting. `always-ask` auto-approves only read-only tools,
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* `always-ask-cached` (Ask and remember) also prompts before file reads and
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@@ -8420,11 +8452,14 @@ const OMP_APPROVAL_MODES = [
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];
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/**
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* Tool-scoped override block for oh-my-pi (`omp`). `approvalMode` writes the
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* `tools.approvalMode` key of `config.yml`,
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* `tools.approvalMode` key of `config.yml`, and `restrictedFolders` the
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* `tools.restrictedFolders` list (folders where every action prompts in every
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* approval mode, `yolo` included); neither has a canonical category.
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*/
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const OmpPermissionsOverrideSchema = zod_mini.z.looseObject({
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permission: zod_mini.z.optional(ToolScopedPermissionSchema),
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approvalMode: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.enum(OMP_APPROVAL_MODES))
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approvalMode: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.enum(OMP_APPROVAL_MODES)),
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restrictedFolders: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.array(zod_mini.z.string()))
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});
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const KimiCodePermissionsOverrideSchema = zod_mini.z.looseObject({
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permission: zod_mini.z.optional(ToolScopedPermissionSchema),
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@@ -8876,6 +8911,48 @@ const QoderPermissionsOverrideSchema = zod_mini.z.looseObject({
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agentsMdExcludes: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.array(zod_mini.z.string()))
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});
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/**
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* Tool-scoped override block for CodeBuddy Code. The shared `permission` block
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* continues to drive `permissions.allow`/`ask`/`deny` of
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* `.codebuddy/settings.json` (project) / `~/.codebuddy/settings.json` (global).
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*
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* The other documented settings with no canonical category are authored here
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* and merged into the same file, key by key, over what the file already
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* holds:
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*
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* - `autoReview` (`policy` replaces the built-in security policy of the `auto`
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* permission mode, `extraPolicy` is appended to it) and the legacy
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* `autoMode` rules (`environment` / `allow` / `soft_deny` / `hard_deny`).
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* CodeBuddy reads both from the user and project-local settings only, never
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* from the shared project file, so they are written by `--global` generate
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* alone.
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* - `memory.parentDiscovery`: whether project instruction files
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* (`CODEBUDDY.md` / `AGENTS.md`) are also discovered in parent directories.
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*
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* Only the keys listed here are written; any other key of these groups is
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* skipped with a warning. Removing a key from the override leaves the
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* previously written value in place.
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*
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* @see https://www.codebuddy.ai/docs/cli/settings
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* @see https://www.codebuddy.ai/docs/cli/memory
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* @example
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* { "autoReview": { "extraPolicy": "Allow dev namespace releases" },
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* "memory": { "parentDiscovery": false } }
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*/
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const CodebuddyPermissionsOverrideSchema = zod_mini.z.looseObject({
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permission: zod_mini.z.optional(ToolScopedPermissionSchema),
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autoReview: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.looseObject({
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policy: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.string()),
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extraPolicy: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.string())
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})),
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autoMode: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.looseObject({
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environment: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.array(zod_mini.z.string())),
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allow: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.array(zod_mini.z.string())),
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soft_deny: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.array(zod_mini.z.string())),
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hard_deny: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.array(zod_mini.z.string()))
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})),
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memory: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.looseObject({ parentDiscovery: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.boolean()) }))
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});
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/**
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* One native Factory Droid permission rule. `match.prefix` positions are either
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* a single token or a non-empty list of alternative tokens.
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*
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zed: zod_mini.z.optional(ZedPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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devin: zod_mini.z.optional(DevinPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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qoder: zod_mini.z.optional(QoderPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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copilotcli: zod_mini.z.optional(CopilotcliPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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"antigravity-ide": zod_mini.z.optional(CanonicalPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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continue: zod_mini.z.optional(CanonicalPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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copilot: zod_mini.z.optional(CopilotPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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codebuddy: zod_mini.z.optional(
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codebuddy: zod_mini.z.optional(CodebuddyPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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commandcode: zod_mini.z.optional(CanonicalPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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lettacode: zod_mini.z.optional(CanonicalPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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copilotcli: zod_mini.z.optional(CanonicalPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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crush: zod_mini.z.optional(CanonicalPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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goose: zod_mini.z.optional(CanonicalPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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omp: zod_mini.z.optional(OmpPermissionsOverrideSchema),
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enabled: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.boolean()),
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description: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.string())
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})),
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cline: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.looseObject({
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disabled: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.boolean()),
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enabled: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.boolean())
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})),
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continue: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.looseObject({
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alwaysApply: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.boolean()),
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description: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.string()),
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},
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permissions: {
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kind: "replace-owned-keys",
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ownedKeys: [
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ownedKeys: [
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"allowedUrls",
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"deniedUrls",
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]
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permissions: {
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ownedKeys: [
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ownedKeys: [
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"autoMode",
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"memory"
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"tools",
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"enabled_tools",
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"enable_subagents"
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"enable_subagents",
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"outside_workdir"
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}
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}
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}
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}
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static getSettablePaths({ global: _global = false } = {}) {
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return {
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return {
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relativeDirPath: QWENCODE_SKILLS_DIR_PATH,
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importOnlySkillRoots: [AGENTSMD_SKILLS_DIR_PATH]
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};
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}
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getFrontmatter() {
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return QwencodeSkillFrontmatterSchema.parse(this.requireMainFileFrontmatter());
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*/
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const VIBE_PROMPTS_DIR_PATH = (0, node_path.join)(".vibe", "prompts");
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/**
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* The agent name Vibe reserves for `post_agent` hook matching (v3.0.3+).
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* `AgentProfile.from_toml` refuses a file whose stem matches it case-insensitively, so an
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* agent written as `main.toml` would never load.
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+
* @see https://github.com/mistralai/mistral-vibe/blob/v3.0.3/vibe/core/agents/models.py
|
|
39694
|
+
*/
|
|
39695
|
+
const VIBE_RESERVED_AGENT_NAME = "main";
|
|
39696
|
+
function isReservedVibeAgentFileName(relativeFilePath) {
|
|
39697
|
+
return (0, node_path.basename)(relativeFilePath).replace(/\.(md|toml)$/, "").toLowerCase() === VIBE_RESERVED_AGENT_NAME;
|
|
39698
|
+
}
|
|
39699
|
+
/**
|
|
39596
39700
|
* Vibe resolves a `system_prompt_id` by file name, and
|
|
39597
39701
|
* `VibeConfigSchema._check_system_prompt` evaluates it during validation — an
|
|
39598
39702
|
* unresolvable id raises and the agent is dropped at discovery. The id must
|
|
@@ -39707,9 +39811,17 @@ var VibeSubagent = class VibeSubagent extends ToolSubagent {
|
|
|
39707
39811
|
* evaluates the property during validation, so an unresolvable
|
|
39708
39812
|
* `system_prompt_id` raises and `AgentRegistry._try_load` drops the agent
|
|
39709
39813
|
* with a warning.
|
|
39814
|
+
*
|
|
39815
|
+
* A subagent named `main` is skipped with a warning: Vibe reserves that name
|
|
39816
|
+
* for hook matching and does not load an agent file called `main.toml`.
|
|
39710
39817
|
*/
|
|
39711
|
-
static fromRulesyncSubagents({ rulesyncSubagents, outputRoot = process.cwd(), global = false }) {
|
|
39818
|
+
static fromRulesyncSubagents({ rulesyncSubagents, outputRoot = process.cwd(), global = false, logger }) {
|
|
39712
39819
|
return rulesyncSubagents.flatMap((rulesyncSubagent) => {
|
|
39820
|
+
const sourcePath = rulesyncSubagent.getRelativeFilePath();
|
|
39821
|
+
if (isReservedVibeAgentFileName(sourcePath)) {
|
|
39822
|
+
logger?.warn(`Skipping Vibe subagent ${sourcePath}: Vibe reserves the agent name '${VIBE_RESERVED_AGENT_NAME}' for hook matching and does not load an agent file named '${VIBE_RESERVED_AGENT_NAME}'. Rename the subagent file.`);
|
|
39823
|
+
return [];
|
|
39824
|
+
}
|
|
39713
39825
|
const agentFile = VibeSubagent.fromRulesyncSubagent({
|
|
39714
39826
|
outputRoot,
|
|
39715
39827
|
relativeDirPath: VibeSubagent.getSettablePaths({ global }).relativeDirPath,
|
|
@@ -44996,17 +45108,49 @@ var ClaudecodeRule = class ClaudecodeRule extends ToolRule {
|
|
|
44996
45108
|
* - `alwaysApply: true`: force the rule to always load (equivalent to a file
|
|
44997
45109
|
* with no frontmatter at all).
|
|
44998
45110
|
* - `description`: label surfaced in the rule toggle UI.
|
|
45111
|
+
* - `disabled: true` (or `enabled: false`): the rule is switched off. Since
|
|
45112
|
+
* Cline v4.1.26 (cline/cline#14605) the rule toggle writes this flag into the
|
|
45113
|
+
* rule file itself instead of keeping it only in extension state.
|
|
44999
45114
|
*
|
|
45000
45115
|
* Rules without frontmatter are always active. Uses `z.looseObject()` so
|
|
45001
|
-
* forward-compatible fields added upstream are preserved on round-trip
|
|
45116
|
+
* forward-compatible fields added upstream are preserved on round-trip: every
|
|
45117
|
+
* key other than `paths` / `alwaysApply` / `description` is carried in the
|
|
45118
|
+
* rulesync `cline:` section.
|
|
45002
45119
|
*
|
|
45003
45120
|
* @see https://docs.cline.bot/customization/cline-rules
|
|
45121
|
+
* @see https://github.com/cline/cline/blob/main/sdk/packages/core/src/extensions/config/user-instruction-config-loader.ts
|
|
45004
45122
|
*/
|
|
45005
45123
|
const ClineRuleFrontmatterSchema = zod_mini.z.looseObject({
|
|
45006
45124
|
paths: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.union([zod_mini.z.array(zod_mini.z.string()), zod_mini.z.string()])),
|
|
45007
45125
|
alwaysApply: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.boolean()),
|
|
45008
45126
|
description: zod_mini.z.optional(zod_mini.z.string())
|
|
45009
45127
|
});
|
|
45128
|
+
const CLINE_RULE_FIELD_TYPES = {
|
|
45129
|
+
disabled: "boolean",
|
|
45130
|
+
enabled: "boolean"
|
|
45131
|
+
};
|
|
45132
|
+
const CANONICAL_CLINE_RULE_KEYS = [
|
|
45133
|
+
"paths",
|
|
45134
|
+
"alwaysApply",
|
|
45135
|
+
"description"
|
|
45136
|
+
];
|
|
45137
|
+
/** Returns a copy of `record` without the canonical `paths` / `alwaysApply` / `description` keys. */
|
|
45138
|
+
function omitCanonicalClineRuleKeys(record) {
|
|
45139
|
+
return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(record ?? {}).filter(([key]) => !CANONICAL_CLINE_RULE_KEYS.includes(key)));
|
|
45140
|
+
}
|
|
45141
|
+
/**
|
|
45142
|
+
* Splits a Cline rule frontmatter into the keys that have canonical rulesync
|
|
45143
|
+
* homes (`paths` / `alwaysApply` / `description`) and the rest, which are
|
|
45144
|
+
* lifted into the rulesync `cline:` section.
|
|
45145
|
+
*/
|
|
45146
|
+
function extractClineSection({ frontmatter, relativeFilePath }) {
|
|
45147
|
+
return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(omitCanonicalClineRuleKeys(frontmatter)).filter(([key, value]) => {
|
|
45148
|
+
const expected = Object.hasOwn(CLINE_RULE_FIELD_TYPES, key) ? CLINE_RULE_FIELD_TYPES[key] : void 0;
|
|
45149
|
+
if (expected === void 0 || value === void 0 || typeof value === expected) return true;
|
|
45150
|
+
warnWithFallback(void 0, `Cline rules: dropping ${key} from ${relativeFilePath}: Cline rejects the whole rule unless it is a ${expected}.`);
|
|
45151
|
+
return false;
|
|
45152
|
+
}));
|
|
45153
|
+
}
|
|
45010
45154
|
function isNonRootParams$1(params) {
|
|
45011
45155
|
return "frontmatter" in params && "body" in params;
|
|
45012
45156
|
}
|
|
@@ -45081,6 +45225,10 @@ var ClineRule = class ClineRule extends ToolRule {
|
|
|
45081
45225
|
toRulesyncRule() {
|
|
45082
45226
|
if (this.isRoot()) return this.toRulesyncRuleDefault();
|
|
45083
45227
|
const globs = this.frontmatter?.alwaysApply === true ? ["**/*"] : normalizePaths$1(this.frontmatter?.paths);
|
|
45228
|
+
const cline = extractClineSection({
|
|
45229
|
+
frontmatter: this.frontmatter,
|
|
45230
|
+
relativeFilePath: this.getRelativeFilePath()
|
|
45231
|
+
});
|
|
45084
45232
|
return new RulesyncRule({
|
|
45085
45233
|
outputRoot: process.cwd(),
|
|
45086
45234
|
relativeDirPath: RULESYNC_RULES_RELATIVE_DIR_PATH,
|
|
@@ -45089,7 +45237,8 @@ var ClineRule = class ClineRule extends ToolRule {
|
|
|
45089
45237
|
root: false,
|
|
45090
45238
|
targets: ["*"],
|
|
45091
45239
|
description: this.frontmatter?.description,
|
|
45092
|
-
globs
|
|
45240
|
+
globs,
|
|
45241
|
+
...Object.keys(cline).length > 0 && { cline }
|
|
45093
45242
|
},
|
|
45094
45243
|
body: this.body ?? this.getFileContent()
|
|
45095
45244
|
});
|
|
@@ -45134,16 +45283,22 @@ var ClineRule = class ClineRule extends ToolRule {
|
|
|
45134
45283
|
* universal match-everything globs mean "always", so they map to
|
|
45135
45284
|
* `alwaysApply: true` instead of a `paths` list; specific globs become
|
|
45136
45285
|
* conditional `paths`; an empty globs list leaves the rule always-active with
|
|
45137
|
-
* no `paths`/`alwaysApply`.
|
|
45286
|
+
* no `paths`/`alwaysApply`. Every key of the rulesync `cline:` section
|
|
45287
|
+
* (e.g. `disabled: true`) is written into the frontmatter too; the canonical
|
|
45288
|
+
* `paths` / `alwaysApply` / `description` win over same-named keys there.
|
|
45138
45289
|
*/
|
|
45139
45290
|
static buildNonRootRule({ outputRoot, rulesyncRule, validate, relativeDirPath }) {
|
|
45140
45291
|
const rulesyncFrontmatter = rulesyncRule.getFrontmatter();
|
|
45141
45292
|
const globs = normalizePaths$1(rulesyncFrontmatter.globs);
|
|
45142
45293
|
const isUniversal = globs.length > 0 && globs.every((glob) => glob === "**/*" || glob === "*");
|
|
45294
|
+
const rawClineSection = rulesyncFrontmatter.cline ?? {};
|
|
45295
|
+
for (const key of CANONICAL_CLINE_RULE_KEYS) if (Object.hasOwn(rawClineSection, key)) warnWithFallback(void 0, `Cline rules: ignoring cline.${key} in ${rulesyncRule.getRelativeFilePath()}: set the canonical ${key === "description" ? "description" : "globs"} instead.`);
|
|
45296
|
+
const clineSection = omitCanonicalClineRuleKeys(rawClineSection);
|
|
45143
45297
|
const frontmatter = {
|
|
45144
45298
|
paths: globs.length > 0 && !isUniversal ? globs : void 0,
|
|
45145
45299
|
alwaysApply: isUniversal ? true : void 0,
|
|
45146
|
-
description: rulesyncFrontmatter.description || void 0
|
|
45300
|
+
description: rulesyncFrontmatter.description || void 0,
|
|
45301
|
+
...clineSection
|
|
45147
45302
|
};
|
|
45148
45303
|
return new ClineRule({
|
|
45149
45304
|
outputRoot,
|
|
@@ -55830,6 +55985,14 @@ function applyCommandPrefix({ def, converterConfig }) {
|
|
|
55830
55985
|
if (isExecForm) return `${bracePlaceholder(converterConfig.projectDirVar)}/${stripSurroundingQuotes(relativeCommand)}`;
|
|
55831
55986
|
return anchorInline(`"${converterConfig.projectDirVar}"/${relativeCommand}`);
|
|
55832
55987
|
}
|
|
55988
|
+
/** Whether a field restricted to some events applies on this one. */
|
|
55989
|
+
function isEventApplicable({ events, eventName }) {
|
|
55990
|
+
return events === void 0 || events.has(eventName);
|
|
55991
|
+
}
|
|
55992
|
+
/** Quote and comma-join a set of names (events, hook types) for a warning. */
|
|
55993
|
+
function describeEvents(names) {
|
|
55994
|
+
return [...names].map((name) => `"${name}"`).join(", ");
|
|
55995
|
+
}
|
|
55833
55996
|
/**
|
|
55834
55997
|
* Whether a field registered for `command` hooks only applies to this hook.
|
|
55835
55998
|
* Applied on both export and import: a value imported into a canonical field
|
|
@@ -55851,7 +56014,7 @@ function isFieldApplicable({ commandOnly, hookType }) {
|
|
|
55851
56014
|
* silence — the mirror of the import side.
|
|
55852
56015
|
*/
|
|
55853
56016
|
function emitPassthroughFields({ def, hookType, eventName, fields, isValid, warn }) {
|
|
55854
|
-
for (const { canonical, tool, commandOnly, maxLength, collapseWhitespaceForLength, onlyWithFlag } of fields) {
|
|
56017
|
+
for (const { canonical, tool, commandOnly, maxLength, collapseWhitespaceForLength, onlyWithFlag, events } of fields) {
|
|
55855
56018
|
const value = def[canonical];
|
|
55856
56019
|
if (value === void 0) continue;
|
|
55857
56020
|
if (!isFieldApplicable({
|
|
@@ -55861,6 +56024,13 @@ function emitPassthroughFields({ def, hookType, eventName, fields, isValid, warn
|
|
|
55861
56024
|
warn?.(`Dropping "${canonical}" from a "${hookType}" hook on "${eventName}": this tool documents "${tool}" on "command" hooks only, so it is not generated.`);
|
|
55862
56025
|
continue;
|
|
55863
56026
|
}
|
|
56027
|
+
if (events !== void 0 && !isEventApplicable({
|
|
56028
|
+
events,
|
|
56029
|
+
eventName
|
|
56030
|
+
})) {
|
|
56031
|
+
if (value !== false) warn?.(`Dropping "${canonical}" from a "${hookType}" hook on "${eventName}": this tool honours "${tool}" on ${describeEvents(events)} only, so it is not generated.`);
|
|
56032
|
+
continue;
|
|
56033
|
+
}
|
|
55864
56034
|
if (!isValid({
|
|
55865
56035
|
value,
|
|
55866
56036
|
canonical
|
|
@@ -55874,9 +56044,12 @@ function emitPassthroughFields({ def, hookType, eventName, fields, isValid, warn
|
|
|
55874
56044
|
if (length > maxLength) warn?.(`"${canonical}" on a "${hookType}" hook on "${eventName}" is ${length} characters long${collapseWhitespaceForLength ? " after collapsing whitespace" : ""}; this tool caps "${tool}" at ${maxLength} characters and will shorten it.`);
|
|
55875
56045
|
}
|
|
55876
56046
|
}
|
|
55877
|
-
return Object.fromEntries(fields.filter(({ canonical, commandOnly }) => isFieldApplicable({
|
|
56047
|
+
return Object.fromEntries(fields.filter(({ canonical, commandOnly, events }) => isFieldApplicable({
|
|
55878
56048
|
commandOnly,
|
|
55879
56049
|
hookType
|
|
56050
|
+
}) && isEventApplicable({
|
|
56051
|
+
events,
|
|
56052
|
+
eventName
|
|
55880
56053
|
}) && isValid({
|
|
55881
56054
|
value: def[canonical],
|
|
55882
56055
|
canonical
|
|
@@ -55889,16 +56062,24 @@ function emitPassthroughFields({ def, hookType, eventName, fields, isValid, warn
|
|
|
55889
56062
|
* kind has a rule an authored file can plausibly violate — turns a rejected
|
|
55890
56063
|
* value into a warning instead of a silent drop.
|
|
55891
56064
|
*/
|
|
55892
|
-
function importPassthroughFields({ h, hookType, fields, isValid, describeInvalid, warn }) {
|
|
55893
|
-
const
|
|
56065
|
+
function importPassthroughFields({ h, hookType, eventName, fields, isValid, describeInvalid, warn }) {
|
|
56066
|
+
const typeApplicable = fields.filter(({ commandOnly }) => isFieldApplicable({
|
|
55894
56067
|
commandOnly,
|
|
55895
56068
|
hookType
|
|
55896
56069
|
}));
|
|
56070
|
+
const applicable = typeApplicable.filter(({ events }) => isEventApplicable({
|
|
56071
|
+
events,
|
|
56072
|
+
eventName
|
|
56073
|
+
}));
|
|
55897
56074
|
const skipped = fields.filter(({ commandOnly }) => !isFieldApplicable({
|
|
55898
56075
|
commandOnly,
|
|
55899
56076
|
hookType
|
|
55900
56077
|
}));
|
|
55901
56078
|
for (const { tool } of skipped) if (h[tool] !== void 0) warn?.(`Dropping "${tool}" from an imported "${hookType}" hook: this tool documents it on "command" hooks only, so it is not imported.`);
|
|
56079
|
+
for (const { tool, events } of typeApplicable) if (events !== void 0 && !isEventApplicable({
|
|
56080
|
+
events,
|
|
56081
|
+
eventName
|
|
56082
|
+
}) && h[tool] !== void 0 && h[tool] !== false) warn?.(`Dropping "${tool}" from an imported "${hookType}" hook on "${eventName}": this tool honours it on ${describeEvents(events)} only, so it is not imported.`);
|
|
55902
56083
|
for (const { tool, canonical } of applicable) if (describeInvalid !== void 0 && h[tool] !== void 0 && !isValid({
|
|
55903
56084
|
value: h[tool],
|
|
55904
56085
|
canonical
|
|
@@ -56066,11 +56247,11 @@ function isKeywordFieldApplicable({ spec, hookType, eventName, flags, direction,
|
|
|
56066
56247
|
return false;
|
|
56067
56248
|
}
|
|
56068
56249
|
if (hookTypes !== void 0 && !hookTypes.has(hookType)) {
|
|
56069
|
-
warn?.(`Dropping "${field}" from a "${hookType}" hook on "${eventName}": this tool documents "${tool}" on ${
|
|
56250
|
+
warn?.(`Dropping "${field}" from a "${hookType}" hook on "${eventName}": this tool documents "${tool}" on ${describeEvents(hookTypes)} hooks only, so it is not ${direction}.`);
|
|
56070
56251
|
return false;
|
|
56071
56252
|
}
|
|
56072
56253
|
if (events !== void 0 && !events.has(eventName)) {
|
|
56073
|
-
warn?.(`Dropping "${field}" from a "${hookType}" hook on "${eventName}": this tool honours "${tool}" on ${
|
|
56254
|
+
warn?.(`Dropping "${field}" from a "${hookType}" hook on "${eventName}": this tool honours "${tool}" on ${describeEvents(events)} only, so it is not ${direction}.`);
|
|
56074
56255
|
return false;
|
|
56075
56256
|
}
|
|
56076
56257
|
if (ignoredEvents?.has(eventName)) {
|
|
@@ -56516,6 +56697,7 @@ function importAllPassthroughFields({ h, hookType, eventName, converterConfig, w
|
|
|
56516
56697
|
...importPassthroughFields({
|
|
56517
56698
|
h,
|
|
56518
56699
|
hookType,
|
|
56700
|
+
eventName,
|
|
56519
56701
|
fields: converterConfig.booleanPassthroughFields ?? [],
|
|
56520
56702
|
isValid: isBooleanValue,
|
|
56521
56703
|
warn
|
|
@@ -56530,6 +56712,7 @@ function importAllPassthroughFields({ h, hookType, eventName, converterConfig, w
|
|
|
56530
56712
|
...importPassthroughFields({
|
|
56531
56713
|
h,
|
|
56532
56714
|
hookType,
|
|
56715
|
+
eventName,
|
|
56533
56716
|
fields: converterConfig.numberPassthroughFields ?? [],
|
|
56534
56717
|
isValid: isImportableNumber,
|
|
56535
56718
|
describeInvalid: describeInvalidScalar,
|
|
@@ -56538,6 +56721,7 @@ function importAllPassthroughFields({ h, hookType, eventName, converterConfig, w
|
|
|
56538
56721
|
...importPassthroughFields({
|
|
56539
56722
|
h,
|
|
56540
56723
|
hookType,
|
|
56724
|
+
eventName,
|
|
56541
56725
|
fields: converterConfig.stringPassthroughFields ?? [],
|
|
56542
56726
|
isValid: isImportableString,
|
|
56543
56727
|
describeInvalid: describeInvalidScalar,
|
|
@@ -56546,6 +56730,7 @@ function importAllPassthroughFields({ h, hookType, eventName, converterConfig, w
|
|
|
56546
56730
|
...importPassthroughFields({
|
|
56547
56731
|
h,
|
|
56548
56732
|
hookType,
|
|
56733
|
+
eventName,
|
|
56549
56734
|
fields: converterConfig.arrayPassthroughFields ?? [],
|
|
56550
56735
|
isValid: isImportableArray,
|
|
56551
56736
|
describeInvalid: describeInvalidArray,
|
|
@@ -56554,6 +56739,7 @@ function importAllPassthroughFields({ h, hookType, eventName, converterConfig, w
|
|
|
56554
56739
|
...importPassthroughFields({
|
|
56555
56740
|
h,
|
|
56556
56741
|
hookType,
|
|
56742
|
+
eventName,
|
|
56557
56743
|
fields: converterConfig.recordPassthroughFields ?? [],
|
|
56558
56744
|
isValid: isEmittableRecord,
|
|
56559
56745
|
describeInvalid: describeInvalidRecord,
|
|
@@ -56562,6 +56748,7 @@ function importAllPassthroughFields({ h, hookType, eventName, converterConfig, w
|
|
|
56562
56748
|
...importPassthroughFields({
|
|
56563
56749
|
h,
|
|
56564
56750
|
hookType,
|
|
56751
|
+
eventName,
|
|
56565
56752
|
fields: converterConfig.objectPassthroughFields ?? [],
|
|
56566
56753
|
isValid: isImportableObject,
|
|
56567
56754
|
describeInvalid: describeInvalidObject,
|
|
@@ -61394,6 +61581,11 @@ const GROKCLI_CONVERTER_CONFIG = {
|
|
|
61394
61581
|
tool: "env",
|
|
61395
61582
|
commandOnly: true
|
|
61396
61583
|
}],
|
|
61584
|
+
booleanPassthroughFields: [{
|
|
61585
|
+
canonical: "failClosed",
|
|
61586
|
+
tool: "failClosed",
|
|
61587
|
+
events: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["preToolUse", "beforeSubmitPrompt"])
|
|
61588
|
+
}],
|
|
61397
61589
|
arrayPassthroughFields: [{
|
|
61398
61590
|
canonical: "args",
|
|
61399
61591
|
tool: "args",
|
|
@@ -63043,6 +63235,15 @@ const LETTACODE_CONVERTER_CONFIG = {
|
|
|
63043
63235
|
timeoutUnit: "milliseconds"
|
|
63044
63236
|
};
|
|
63045
63237
|
/**
|
|
63238
|
+
* Letta Code documents settings-file hooks as deprecated in favor of Mods
|
|
63239
|
+
* (https://docs.letta.com/reference/deprecated/hooks) but still ships the
|
|
63240
|
+
* loader, so rulesync keeps emitting them and tells the user once per run.
|
|
63241
|
+
* Mods are not modeled: they are JS/TS code modules loaded only from
|
|
63242
|
+
* `~/.letta/mods/` or an agent's memory directory, with no declarative or
|
|
63243
|
+
* project-local form a canonical hook could be translated into.
|
|
63244
|
+
*/
|
|
63245
|
+
const LETTACODE_HOOKS_DEPRECATION_WARNING = "Letta Code documents settings.json hooks as deprecated in favor of Mods and may remove them in a future release; rulesync still writes them while Letta Code loads them. See https://docs.letta.com/reference/deprecated/hooks";
|
|
63246
|
+
/**
|
|
63046
63247
|
* Letta Code keeps a boolean `disabled` switch beside the event arrays inside
|
|
63047
63248
|
* `hooks`. rulesync owns the whole `hooks` key, so the switch is read back from
|
|
63048
63249
|
* the existing file and carried into the generated one instead of being lost.
|
|
@@ -63101,6 +63302,11 @@ function parseLettacodeSettings$1(fileContent, filePath) {
|
|
|
63101
63302
|
* and UI preferences, ...), so generation merges the `hooks` key into the
|
|
63102
63303
|
* existing file (see `SHARED_CONFIG_OWNERSHIP`) instead of overwriting it.
|
|
63103
63304
|
*
|
|
63305
|
+
* Letta Code marks this surface deprecated in favor of Mods (see
|
|
63306
|
+
* `LETTACODE_HOOKS_DEPRECATION_WARNING`); generation warns once per run when it
|
|
63307
|
+
* writes any hook.
|
|
63308
|
+
*
|
|
63309
|
+
* @see https://docs.letta.com/reference/deprecated/hooks
|
|
63104
63310
|
* @see https://github.com/letta-ai/letta-code/blob/main/src/hooks/types.ts
|
|
63105
63311
|
* @see https://github.com/letta-ai/letta-code/blob/main/src/hooks/loader.ts
|
|
63106
63312
|
*/
|
|
@@ -63145,6 +63351,7 @@ var LettacodeHooks = class LettacodeHooks extends ToolHooks {
|
|
|
63145
63351
|
converterConfig: LETTACODE_CONVERTER_CONFIG,
|
|
63146
63352
|
logger
|
|
63147
63353
|
});
|
|
63354
|
+
if (Object.keys(hooks).length > 0) warnOnceWithFallback(logger, LETTACODE_HOOKS_DEPRECATION_WARNING);
|
|
63148
63355
|
const fileContent = applySharedConfigPatch({
|
|
63149
63356
|
fileKey: sharedConfigFileKey(paths),
|
|
63150
63357
|
feature: "hooks",
|
|
@@ -65142,11 +65349,38 @@ const VIBE_DIR = ".vibe";
|
|
|
65142
65349
|
const VIBE_HOOKS_FILE_NAME = "hooks.toml";
|
|
65143
65350
|
/**
|
|
65144
65351
|
* Vibe scopes the tool-name `match` glob and the `strict` flag to tool hooks
|
|
65145
|
-
* (`pre_tool` / `post_tool`)
|
|
65146
|
-
*
|
|
65147
|
-
* @
|
|
65352
|
+
* (`pre_tool` / `post_tool`). `post_agent` takes a `match` too since v3.0.3,
|
|
65353
|
+
* but on the name of the agent that finished its turn, not a tool name (see
|
|
65354
|
+
* {@link VIBE_MAIN_AGENT_MATCH}).
|
|
65355
|
+
* @see https://github.com/mistralai/mistral-vibe/blob/v3.0.3/README.md
|
|
65148
65356
|
*/
|
|
65149
65357
|
const VIBE_TOOL_EVENTS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["pre_tool", "post_tool"]);
|
|
65358
|
+
/** The Vibe event both canonical `stop` and `subagentStop` become. */
|
|
65359
|
+
const VIBE_POST_AGENT_EVENT = "post_agent";
|
|
65360
|
+
/**
|
|
65361
|
+
* The reserved agent alias a `post_agent` hook's `match` uses to run only
|
|
65362
|
+
* after the main agent. Without a `match`, `post_agent` runs after every
|
|
65363
|
+
* agent, subagents included (v3.0.2+), whereas canonical `stop` is
|
|
65364
|
+
* main-agent-only — so `stop` is written with this match.
|
|
65365
|
+
* @see https://github.com/mistralai/mistral-vibe/blob/v3.0.3/README.md
|
|
65366
|
+
*/
|
|
65367
|
+
const VIBE_MAIN_AGENT_MATCH = "main";
|
|
65368
|
+
/**
|
|
65369
|
+
* The `post_agent` `match` for a canonical `subagentStop` hook, or null to
|
|
65370
|
+
* skip it. Vibe has no selector for "every subagent but not the main agent",
|
|
65371
|
+
* so a matcher naming the subagent is required.
|
|
65372
|
+
*/
|
|
65373
|
+
function toVibeSubagentMatch({ matcher, logger }) {
|
|
65374
|
+
if (typeof matcher !== "string" || matcher === "" || matcher === "*") {
|
|
65375
|
+
logger?.warn("Vibe hooks: skipping a \"subagentStop\" hook without an agent-name matcher. Vibe's post_agent cannot select every subagent without also running after the main agent; set \"matcher\" to the subagent name.");
|
|
65376
|
+
return null;
|
|
65377
|
+
}
|
|
65378
|
+
if (matcher.toLowerCase() === VIBE_MAIN_AGENT_MATCH) {
|
|
65379
|
+
logger?.warn("Vibe hooks: skipping a \"subagentStop\" hook whose matcher is \"main\". Vibe reserves \"main\" for the main agent; use a \"stop\" hook instead.");
|
|
65380
|
+
return null;
|
|
65381
|
+
}
|
|
65382
|
+
return matcher;
|
|
65383
|
+
}
|
|
65150
65384
|
const SUPPORTED_VIBE_EVENTS = new Set(VIBE_HOOK_EVENTS);
|
|
65151
65385
|
/**
|
|
65152
65386
|
* The `match` a canonical `Bash` matcher becomes. Vibe tests `match` against a
|
|
@@ -65170,7 +65404,8 @@ function fromVibeHookMatch(match) {
|
|
|
65170
65404
|
/**
|
|
65171
65405
|
* Build the flat `[[hooks]]` array for `.vibe/hooks.toml` from a canonical
|
|
65172
65406
|
* hooks config. Vibe uses a flat array where each entry carries its own event
|
|
65173
|
-
* `type`,
|
|
65407
|
+
* `type`, `match` glob/regex (a tool name for tool hooks, an agent name
|
|
65408
|
+
* for `post_agent`), and `command`. Only `type: "command"`
|
|
65174
65409
|
* canonical hooks are emitted: a Vibe hook is a shell command line. (v2.25.1
|
|
65175
65410
|
* to v2.25.4 briefly exec'd it without a shell under the unified harness and
|
|
65176
65411
|
* skipped any command containing a backslash; v2.25.5 restored shell
|
|
@@ -65178,7 +65413,7 @@ function fromVibeHookMatch(match) {
|
|
|
65178
65413
|
* now run through the shell" — and dropped the backslash skip.)
|
|
65179
65414
|
* @see https://github.com/mistralai/mistral-vibe/blob/v3.0.2/README.md
|
|
65180
65415
|
*/
|
|
65181
|
-
function canonicalToVibeHooks({ config, toolOverride }) {
|
|
65416
|
+
function canonicalToVibeHooks({ config, toolOverride, logger }) {
|
|
65182
65417
|
const shared = {};
|
|
65183
65418
|
for (const [event, defs] of Object.entries(config.hooks)) if (SUPPORTED_VIBE_EVENTS.has(event)) shared[event] = defs;
|
|
65184
65419
|
const effective = {
|
|
@@ -65186,30 +65421,40 @@ function canonicalToVibeHooks({ config, toolOverride }) {
|
|
|
65186
65421
|
...toolOverride
|
|
65187
65422
|
};
|
|
65188
65423
|
const hooks = [];
|
|
65424
|
+
const nextIndexByVibeEvent = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
|
|
65189
65425
|
for (const [event, defs] of Object.entries(effective)) {
|
|
65190
65426
|
if (!SUPPORTED_VIBE_EVENTS.has(event)) continue;
|
|
65191
65427
|
const vibeEvent = lookupOwn({
|
|
65192
65428
|
record: CANONICAL_TO_VIBE_EVENT_NAMES,
|
|
65193
65429
|
key: event
|
|
65194
65430
|
}) ?? event;
|
|
65195
|
-
let index = 0;
|
|
65196
65431
|
for (const def of defs) {
|
|
65197
65432
|
if ((def.type ?? "command") !== "command") continue;
|
|
65198
65433
|
if (typeof def.command !== "string") continue;
|
|
65199
|
-
const name = typeof def.name === "string" ? def.name : `${vibeEvent}-${index}`;
|
|
65200
65434
|
const isToolEvent = VIBE_TOOL_EVENTS.has(vibeEvent);
|
|
65435
|
+
let match;
|
|
65436
|
+
if (isToolEvent) match = toVibeHookMatch(def.matcher);
|
|
65437
|
+
else if (event === "subagentStop") {
|
|
65438
|
+
const subagentMatch = toVibeSubagentMatch({
|
|
65439
|
+
matcher: def.matcher,
|
|
65440
|
+
logger
|
|
65441
|
+
});
|
|
65442
|
+
if (subagentMatch === null) continue;
|
|
65443
|
+
match = subagentMatch;
|
|
65444
|
+
} else match = VIBE_MAIN_AGENT_MATCH;
|
|
65445
|
+
const index = nextIndexByVibeEvent.get(vibeEvent) ?? 0;
|
|
65201
65446
|
const entry = {
|
|
65202
|
-
name
|
|
65447
|
+
name: typeof def.name === "string" ? def.name : `${vibeEvent}-${index}`,
|
|
65203
65448
|
type: vibeEvent,
|
|
65449
|
+
match,
|
|
65204
65450
|
command: def.command
|
|
65205
65451
|
};
|
|
65206
|
-
if (isToolEvent) entry.match = toVibeHookMatch(def.matcher);
|
|
65207
65452
|
if (typeof def.timeout === "number") entry.timeout = def.timeout;
|
|
65208
65453
|
const strict = def.strict;
|
|
65209
65454
|
if (isToolEvent && typeof strict === "boolean") entry.strict = strict;
|
|
65210
65455
|
if (typeof def.description === "string") entry.description = def.description;
|
|
65211
65456
|
hooks.push(entry);
|
|
65212
|
-
index
|
|
65457
|
+
nextIndexByVibeEvent.set(vibeEvent, index + 1);
|
|
65213
65458
|
}
|
|
65214
65459
|
}
|
|
65215
65460
|
return { hooks };
|
|
@@ -65221,14 +65466,22 @@ function vibeEntryToCanonicalDef(raw) {
|
|
|
65221
65466
|
const vibeEvent = typeof entry.type === "string" ? entry.type : void 0;
|
|
65222
65467
|
if (vibeEvent === void 0) return null;
|
|
65223
65468
|
if (isPrototypePollutionKey(vibeEvent)) return null;
|
|
65224
|
-
|
|
65469
|
+
let canonicalEvent = lookupOwn({
|
|
65225
65470
|
record: VIBE_TO_CANONICAL_EVENT_NAMES,
|
|
65226
65471
|
key: vibeEvent
|
|
65227
65472
|
}) ?? vibeEvent;
|
|
65228
65473
|
const def = { type: "command" };
|
|
65229
65474
|
if (typeof entry.command === "string") def.command = entry.command;
|
|
65230
|
-
|
|
65231
|
-
|
|
65475
|
+
if (vibeEvent === VIBE_POST_AGENT_EVENT) {
|
|
65476
|
+
const agentMatch = typeof entry.match === "string" ? entry.match : "";
|
|
65477
|
+
if (agentMatch !== "" && agentMatch !== "*" && agentMatch.toLowerCase() !== VIBE_MAIN_AGENT_MATCH) {
|
|
65478
|
+
canonicalEvent = "subagentStop";
|
|
65479
|
+
def.matcher = agentMatch;
|
|
65480
|
+
}
|
|
65481
|
+
} else {
|
|
65482
|
+
const matcher = fromVibeHookMatch(entry.match);
|
|
65483
|
+
if (matcher !== void 0) def.matcher = matcher;
|
|
65484
|
+
}
|
|
65232
65485
|
if (typeof entry.timeout === "number") def.timeout = entry.timeout;
|
|
65233
65486
|
if (typeof entry.name === "string") def.name = entry.name;
|
|
65234
65487
|
if (typeof entry.description === "string") def.description = entry.description;
|
|
@@ -65259,6 +65512,26 @@ function vibeHooksToCanonical(parsed) {
|
|
|
65259
65512
|
}
|
|
65260
65513
|
return canonical;
|
|
65261
65514
|
}
|
|
65515
|
+
/** Vibe reads a `match` with a `re:` prefix or glob metacharacters as a pattern. */
|
|
65516
|
+
const VIBE_PATTERN_MATCH = /^re:|[*?[]/;
|
|
65517
|
+
/**
|
|
65518
|
+
* Move the imported `subagentStop` hooks into the `vibe` override when any of
|
|
65519
|
+
* them matches agents by a regex or glob rather than by a literal name. Such a
|
|
65520
|
+
* pattern can also select the main agent (a main session answers to its mode
|
|
65521
|
+
* name, e.g. `accept-edits`), and other tools would read it as their own
|
|
65522
|
+
* matcher syntax, so it is kept Vibe-only. The override replaces the shared
|
|
65523
|
+
* list for its event, so the whole list moves to keep every entry on Vibe.
|
|
65524
|
+
*/
|
|
65525
|
+
function takeVibeOnlySubagentStop({ hooks, logger }) {
|
|
65526
|
+
const defs = lookupOwn({
|
|
65527
|
+
record: hooks,
|
|
65528
|
+
key: "subagentStop"
|
|
65529
|
+
});
|
|
65530
|
+
if (defs === void 0 || !defs.some((def) => typeof def.matcher === "string" && VIBE_PATTERN_MATCH.test(def.matcher))) return;
|
|
65531
|
+
delete hooks.subagentStop;
|
|
65532
|
+
logger?.warn("Vibe hooks: a post_agent hook matches agents by a pattern, so its subagentStop hooks are imported into the vibe override instead of the shared hooks.");
|
|
65533
|
+
return defs;
|
|
65534
|
+
}
|
|
65262
65535
|
function parseVibeToml(fileContent) {
|
|
65263
65536
|
const parsed = smol_toml.parse(fileContent || smol_toml.stringify({}));
|
|
65264
65537
|
if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) return {};
|
|
@@ -65298,12 +65571,13 @@ var VibeHooks = class extends ToolHooks {
|
|
|
65298
65571
|
validate
|
|
65299
65572
|
});
|
|
65300
65573
|
}
|
|
65301
|
-
static async fromRulesyncHooks({ outputRoot = process.cwd(), rulesyncHooks, validate = true, global = false }) {
|
|
65574
|
+
static async fromRulesyncHooks({ outputRoot = process.cwd(), rulesyncHooks, validate = true, global = false, logger }) {
|
|
65302
65575
|
const paths = this.getSettablePaths({ global });
|
|
65303
65576
|
const config = rulesyncHooks.getJson();
|
|
65304
65577
|
const vibeHooks = canonicalToVibeHooks({
|
|
65305
65578
|
config,
|
|
65306
|
-
toolOverride: config.vibe?.hooks
|
|
65579
|
+
toolOverride: config.vibe?.hooks,
|
|
65580
|
+
logger
|
|
65307
65581
|
});
|
|
65308
65582
|
const fileContent = smol_toml.stringify(vibeHooks);
|
|
65309
65583
|
return new this({
|
|
@@ -65314,15 +65588,30 @@ var VibeHooks = class extends ToolHooks {
|
|
|
65314
65588
|
validate
|
|
65315
65589
|
});
|
|
65316
65590
|
}
|
|
65317
|
-
toRulesyncHooks() {
|
|
65591
|
+
toRulesyncHooks(options = {}) {
|
|
65318
65592
|
const hooks = vibeHooksToCanonical(this.parseFileContentOrThrow({
|
|
65319
65593
|
displayName: "Vibe",
|
|
65320
65594
|
parse: (fileContent) => parseVibeToml(fileContent)
|
|
65321
65595
|
}));
|
|
65322
|
-
|
|
65596
|
+
const vibeOnlySubagentStop = takeVibeOnlySubagentStop({
|
|
65597
|
+
hooks,
|
|
65598
|
+
logger: options.logger
|
|
65599
|
+
});
|
|
65600
|
+
const config = buildImportedHooksConfig({
|
|
65323
65601
|
hooks,
|
|
65324
65602
|
overrideKey: "vibe"
|
|
65325
|
-
})
|
|
65603
|
+
});
|
|
65604
|
+
if (vibeOnlySubagentStop !== void 0) {
|
|
65605
|
+
const override = config.vibe ?? {};
|
|
65606
|
+
config.vibe = {
|
|
65607
|
+
...override,
|
|
65608
|
+
hooks: {
|
|
65609
|
+
...override.hooks,
|
|
65610
|
+
subagentStop: vibeOnlySubagentStop
|
|
65611
|
+
}
|
|
65612
|
+
};
|
|
65613
|
+
}
|
|
65614
|
+
return this.toRulesyncHooksDefault({ fileContent: JSON.stringify(config, null, 2) });
|
|
65326
65615
|
}
|
|
65327
65616
|
validate() {
|
|
65328
65617
|
try {
|
|
@@ -76939,6 +77228,12 @@ const REASONIX_PLUGIN_FIELDS = [
|
|
|
76939
77228
|
"load",
|
|
76940
77229
|
"oauth_allow_missing_pkce_metadata"
|
|
76941
77230
|
];
|
|
77231
|
+
/**
|
|
77232
|
+
* The `load` mode that puts a server's tools in the provider schema. Reasonix
|
|
77233
|
+
* compares it case-insensitively after trimming (`normalizeMCPLoad`).
|
|
77234
|
+
* @see https://github.com/esengine/DeepSeek-Reasonix/blob/studio-v2.53.0/internal/contract/config/mcp_load.go
|
|
77235
|
+
*/
|
|
77236
|
+
const REASONIX_MCP_LOAD_ALWAYS = "always";
|
|
76942
77237
|
/** The `[[plugins]]` key that canonical `disabledTools` is written to and read from. */
|
|
76943
77238
|
const REASONIX_DISABLED_TOOLS_KEY = "disabled_tools";
|
|
76944
77239
|
var ReasonixMcp = class ReasonixMcp extends ToolMcp {
|
|
@@ -77103,7 +77398,9 @@ function hasExpectedType(value, expected) {
|
|
|
77103
77398
|
* `concurrency` string decodes fine but is ignored in favor of the server-name
|
|
77104
77399
|
* default, so it is dropped too rather than written as a setting that does
|
|
77105
77400
|
* nothing. An unknown `load` string is read as `deferred`, the default, so it
|
|
77106
|
-
* passes through as authored.
|
|
77401
|
+
* passes through as authored. A project `load = "always"` also passes through,
|
|
77402
|
+
* but is warned about in `writePassthroughFields`: see the v2.53.0 note on
|
|
77403
|
+
* `REASONIX_PLUGIN_FIELDS`.
|
|
77107
77404
|
* @see https://github.com/esengine/DeepSeek-Reasonix/blob/v2.31.0/internal/contract/config/plugin_entry.go
|
|
77108
77405
|
*/
|
|
77109
77406
|
function invalidPassthroughFieldReason(field, value) {
|
|
@@ -77143,6 +77440,7 @@ function writePassthroughFields({ name, server, plugin, global, logger }) {
|
|
|
77143
77440
|
continue;
|
|
77144
77441
|
}
|
|
77145
77442
|
if (field === "oauth_allow_missing_pkce_metadata" && value === true) logger?.warn(`Reasonix MCP: "${name}" sets "oauth_allow_missing_pkce_metadata", which lets OAuth proceed with an authorization server that does not advertise PKCE support.` + (global ? "" : ` Reasonix honours it only from the user config, not a project reasonix.toml.`));
|
|
77443
|
+
if (field === "load" && !global && server.disabled !== true && typeof value === "string" && value.trim().toLowerCase() === REASONIX_MCP_LOAD_ALWAYS) logger?.warn(`Reasonix MCP: "${name}" sets "load" to "always" in the project reasonix.toml. Reasonix 2.53.0 and later ignore a project-declared load mode and defer the server; set it in the user config (the server's "load" or [tools.mcp_load]) instead.`);
|
|
77146
77444
|
plugin[field] = value;
|
|
77147
77445
|
}
|
|
77148
77446
|
}
|
|
@@ -86081,6 +86379,41 @@ var ClinePermissions = class ClinePermissions extends ToolPermissions {
|
|
|
86081
86379
|
// src/features/permissions/codebuddy-permissions.ts
|
|
86082
86380
|
/** Top-level key of `.codebuddy/settings.json` that rulesync owns. */
|
|
86083
86381
|
const CODEBUDDY_PERMISSIONS_KEY = "permissions";
|
|
86382
|
+
/**
|
|
86383
|
+
* The top-level settings groups the `codebuddy` override may author, each with
|
|
86384
|
+
* the only keys of that group rulesync writes and imports. A group's other
|
|
86385
|
+
* keys are kept as the file has them; an override key not listed here is
|
|
86386
|
+
* skipped with a warning.
|
|
86387
|
+
*
|
|
86388
|
+
* - `autoReview`: the `auto` permission mode's review policy (`policy`
|
|
86389
|
+
* replaces the built-in security policy, `extraPolicy` is appended to it).
|
|
86390
|
+
* - `autoMode`: the legacy natural-language `auto` rules, still read as
|
|
86391
|
+
* additional policy.
|
|
86392
|
+
* - `memory.parentDiscovery`: whether `CODEBUDDY.md` / `AGENTS.md` are also
|
|
86393
|
+
* discovered in parent directories of the launch directory.
|
|
86394
|
+
*
|
|
86395
|
+
* @see https://www.codebuddy.ai/docs/cli/settings
|
|
86396
|
+
* @see https://www.codebuddy.ai/docs/cli/memory
|
|
86397
|
+
*/
|
|
86398
|
+
const CODEBUDDY_OVERRIDE_GROUP_KEYS = {
|
|
86399
|
+
autoReview: ["policy", "extraPolicy"],
|
|
86400
|
+
autoMode: [
|
|
86401
|
+
"environment",
|
|
86402
|
+
"allow",
|
|
86403
|
+
"soft_deny",
|
|
86404
|
+
"hard_deny"
|
|
86405
|
+
],
|
|
86406
|
+
memory: ["parentDiscovery"]
|
|
86407
|
+
};
|
|
86408
|
+
const CODEBUDDY_OVERRIDE_GROUPS = Object.keys(CODEBUDDY_OVERRIDE_GROUP_KEYS);
|
|
86409
|
+
/**
|
|
86410
|
+
* Groups CodeBuddy reads from the user and project-local settings only: the
|
|
86411
|
+
* shared project `.codebuddy/settings.json` is not read for them, so a checked-in
|
|
86412
|
+
* repository cannot relax the review of its own actions. They are written and
|
|
86413
|
+
* imported in global mode alone.
|
|
86414
|
+
* @see https://www.codebuddy.ai/docs/cli/settings
|
|
86415
|
+
*/
|
|
86416
|
+
const CODEBUDDY_USER_ONLY_GROUPS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["autoReview", "autoMode"]);
|
|
86084
86417
|
/** The rule lists under `permissions`, one per canonical action. */
|
|
86085
86418
|
const CODEBUDDY_RULE_LISTS = [
|
|
86086
86419
|
"allow",
|
|
@@ -86234,6 +86567,87 @@ function buildCodebuddyRuleLists({ config, existingPermissions, logger }) {
|
|
|
86234
86567
|
return lists;
|
|
86235
86568
|
}
|
|
86236
86569
|
/**
|
|
86570
|
+
* Whether a settings value has the shape the `codebuddy` override schema
|
|
86571
|
+
* accepts for that key, so an off-spec value is left in the file instead of
|
|
86572
|
+
* being written or making the imported permissions file fail validation.
|
|
86573
|
+
*/
|
|
86574
|
+
function isLiftableCodebuddyValue(key, value) {
|
|
86575
|
+
switch (key) {
|
|
86576
|
+
case "policy":
|
|
86577
|
+
case "extraPolicy": return typeof value === "string";
|
|
86578
|
+
case "parentDiscovery": return typeof value === "boolean";
|
|
86579
|
+
default: return isStringArray(value);
|
|
86580
|
+
}
|
|
86581
|
+
}
|
|
86582
|
+
/** Name every written override setting that can make the `auto` review more lenient. */
|
|
86583
|
+
function announceCodebuddyReviewSettings({ picked, group, where, logger }) {
|
|
86584
|
+
if (group === "autoReview" && typeof picked.policy === "string") logger?.warn(`CodeBuddy permissions: codebuddy.autoReview.policy was written to ${where}, so it replaces CodeBuddy's built-in security policy for the 'auto' permission mode.`);
|
|
86585
|
+
if (group === "autoReview" && typeof picked.extraPolicy === "string") logger?.warn(`CodeBuddy permissions: codebuddy.autoReview.extraPolicy was written to ${where}, so it is appended to the security policy CodeBuddy's 'auto' permission mode reviews actions against.`);
|
|
86586
|
+
if (group === "autoMode" && toStringArray$1(picked.allow).length > 0) logger?.warn(`CodeBuddy permissions: codebuddy.autoMode.allow was written to ${where}, so CodeBuddy's 'auto' permission mode leans toward approving the actions it describes.`);
|
|
86587
|
+
}
|
|
86588
|
+
/**
|
|
86589
|
+
* The top-level keys the `codebuddy` override contributes to the settings
|
|
86590
|
+
* patch, besides `permissions`. Each group is the existing group with the
|
|
86591
|
+
* authored keys laid over it; a group is only in the patch when authored, so
|
|
86592
|
+
* a hand-set value survives an unrelated regeneration.
|
|
86593
|
+
*/
|
|
86594
|
+
function buildCodebuddyOverridePatch({ override, existing, global, where, logger }) {
|
|
86595
|
+
const patch = {};
|
|
86596
|
+
if (override === void 0) return patch;
|
|
86597
|
+
for (const group of CODEBUDDY_OVERRIDE_GROUPS) {
|
|
86598
|
+
const authored = override[group];
|
|
86599
|
+
if (!isRecord(authored)) continue;
|
|
86600
|
+
if (CODEBUDDY_USER_ONLY_GROUPS.has(group) && !global) {
|
|
86601
|
+
logger?.warn(`CodeBuddy permissions: skipping codebuddy.${group} in project mode — CodeBuddy does not read ${group} from the shared project .codebuddy/settings.json. Run 'rulesync generate --global' to write it to ~/.codebuddy/settings.json.`);
|
|
86602
|
+
continue;
|
|
86603
|
+
}
|
|
86604
|
+
const allowedKeys = CODEBUDDY_OVERRIDE_GROUP_KEYS[group];
|
|
86605
|
+
const picked = {};
|
|
86606
|
+
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(authored)) {
|
|
86607
|
+
if (isPrototypePollutionKey(key) || value === void 0) continue;
|
|
86608
|
+
if (!allowedKeys.includes(key)) {
|
|
86609
|
+
logger?.warn(`CodeBuddy permissions: skipping codebuddy.${group}.${key} — Rulesync writes only ${allowedKeys.map((k) => `${group}.${k}`).join(", ")} from the codebuddy override; set other keys in ${where} by hand.`);
|
|
86610
|
+
continue;
|
|
86611
|
+
}
|
|
86612
|
+
picked[key] = value;
|
|
86613
|
+
}
|
|
86614
|
+
if (Object.keys(picked).length === 0) continue;
|
|
86615
|
+
const existingValue = existing[group];
|
|
86616
|
+
if (existingValue !== void 0 && !isRecord(existingValue)) {
|
|
86617
|
+
logger?.warn(`CodeBuddy permissions: skipping codebuddy.${group} — ${group} in ${where} is not an object, so Rulesync leaves it as it is. Fix it by hand to let Rulesync write ${group}.`);
|
|
86618
|
+
continue;
|
|
86619
|
+
}
|
|
86620
|
+
patch[group] = {
|
|
86621
|
+
...existingValue,
|
|
86622
|
+
...picked
|
|
86623
|
+
};
|
|
86624
|
+
announceCodebuddyReviewSettings({
|
|
86625
|
+
picked,
|
|
86626
|
+
group,
|
|
86627
|
+
where,
|
|
86628
|
+
logger
|
|
86629
|
+
});
|
|
86630
|
+
}
|
|
86631
|
+
return patch;
|
|
86632
|
+
}
|
|
86633
|
+
/**
|
|
86634
|
+
* Lift the settings the `codebuddy` override authors back out of a settings
|
|
86635
|
+
* file. `autoReview` and `autoMode` are lifted only from the user file, the
|
|
86636
|
+
* one of the two rulesync manages that CodeBuddy reads them from.
|
|
86637
|
+
*/
|
|
86638
|
+
function liftCodebuddyOverride({ settings, global }) {
|
|
86639
|
+
const lifted = {};
|
|
86640
|
+
for (const group of CODEBUDDY_OVERRIDE_GROUPS) {
|
|
86641
|
+
if (CODEBUDDY_USER_ONLY_GROUPS.has(group) && !global) continue;
|
|
86642
|
+
const existingGroup = settings[group];
|
|
86643
|
+
if (!isRecord(existingGroup)) continue;
|
|
86644
|
+
const picked = {};
|
|
86645
|
+
for (const key of CODEBUDDY_OVERRIDE_GROUP_KEYS[group]) if (Object.hasOwn(existingGroup, key) && isLiftableCodebuddyValue(key, existingGroup[key])) picked[key] = existingGroup[key];
|
|
86646
|
+
if (Object.keys(picked).length > 0) lifted[group] = picked;
|
|
86647
|
+
}
|
|
86648
|
+
return lifted;
|
|
86649
|
+
}
|
|
86650
|
+
/**
|
|
86237
86651
|
* CodeBuddy Code permissions.
|
|
86238
86652
|
*
|
|
86239
86653
|
* Rules live under the `permissions` key of `.codebuddy/settings.json`
|
|
@@ -86244,7 +86658,10 @@ function buildCodebuddyRuleLists({ config, existingPermissions, logger }) {
|
|
|
86244
86658
|
* writes go through the shared-config gateway, the sibling keys of the rule
|
|
86245
86659
|
* lists (`defaultMode`, `additionalDirectories`, `trustedDirectories`, ...)
|
|
86246
86660
|
* are kept, and the file is never deleted. The gitignored
|
|
86247
|
-
* `.codebuddy/settings.local.json` layer is left to CodeBuddy.
|
|
86661
|
+
* `.codebuddy/settings.local.json` layer is left to CodeBuddy. The
|
|
86662
|
+
* `codebuddy` override's other settings (`autoReview`, `autoMode`,
|
|
86663
|
+
* `memory.parentDiscovery`) go through `buildCodebuddyOverridePatch` /
|
|
86664
|
+
* `liftCodebuddyOverride`.
|
|
86248
86665
|
*
|
|
86249
86666
|
* @see https://www.codebuddy.ai/docs/cli/permissions
|
|
86250
86667
|
* @see https://www.codebuddy.ai/docs/cli/settings
|
|
@@ -86283,8 +86700,9 @@ var CodebuddyPermissions = class CodebuddyPermissions extends ToolPermissions {
|
|
|
86283
86700
|
relativePath: (0, node_path.join)(paths.relativeDirPath, paths.relativeFilePath)
|
|
86284
86701
|
});
|
|
86285
86702
|
const existingPermissions = isRecord(existing[CODEBUDDY_PERMISSIONS_KEY]) ? existing[CODEBUDDY_PERMISSIONS_KEY] : {};
|
|
86703
|
+
const config = rulesyncPermissions.getJson();
|
|
86286
86704
|
const lists = buildCodebuddyRuleLists({
|
|
86287
|
-
config
|
|
86705
|
+
config,
|
|
86288
86706
|
existingPermissions,
|
|
86289
86707
|
logger
|
|
86290
86708
|
});
|
|
@@ -86299,7 +86717,16 @@ var CodebuddyPermissions = class CodebuddyPermissions extends ToolPermissions {
|
|
|
86299
86717
|
fileKey: sharedConfigFileKey(paths),
|
|
86300
86718
|
feature: "permissions",
|
|
86301
86719
|
existingContent,
|
|
86302
|
-
patch: {
|
|
86720
|
+
patch: {
|
|
86721
|
+
[CODEBUDDY_PERMISSIONS_KEY]: Object.keys(permissions).length > 0 ? permissions : void 0,
|
|
86722
|
+
...buildCodebuddyOverridePatch({
|
|
86723
|
+
override: config.codebuddy,
|
|
86724
|
+
existing,
|
|
86725
|
+
global,
|
|
86726
|
+
where: `${(0, node_path.join)(paths.relativeDirPath, paths.relativeFilePath)}${global ? " in the home directory" : ""}`,
|
|
86727
|
+
logger
|
|
86728
|
+
})
|
|
86729
|
+
},
|
|
86303
86730
|
filePath
|
|
86304
86731
|
}),
|
|
86305
86732
|
validate: true,
|
|
@@ -86320,7 +86747,14 @@ var CodebuddyPermissions = class CodebuddyPermissions extends ToolPermissions {
|
|
|
86320
86747
|
const existing = rules[parsed.pattern];
|
|
86321
86748
|
if (existing === void 0 || PERMISSION_ACTION_PRIORITY[action] > PERMISSION_ACTION_PRIORITY[existing]) rules[parsed.pattern] = action;
|
|
86322
86749
|
}
|
|
86323
|
-
|
|
86750
|
+
const codebuddy = liftCodebuddyOverride({
|
|
86751
|
+
settings,
|
|
86752
|
+
global: this.global
|
|
86753
|
+
});
|
|
86754
|
+
return this.toRulesyncPermissionsDefault({ fileContent: JSON.stringify({
|
|
86755
|
+
permission,
|
|
86756
|
+
...Object.keys(codebuddy).length > 0 && { codebuddy }
|
|
86757
|
+
}, null, 2) });
|
|
86324
86758
|
}
|
|
86325
86759
|
static forDeletion({ outputRoot = process.cwd(), relativeDirPath, relativeFilePath, global = false }) {
|
|
86326
86760
|
return new CodebuddyPermissions({
|
|
@@ -89286,7 +89720,7 @@ const AUTO_APPROVE_KEYS = {
|
|
|
89286
89720
|
*
|
|
89287
89721
|
* @see https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/agents/reference/ai-settings
|
|
89288
89722
|
*/
|
|
89289
|
-
const DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE_KEY = "chat.permissions.default";
|
|
89723
|
+
const DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE_KEY$1 = "chat.permissions.default";
|
|
89290
89724
|
/**
|
|
89291
89725
|
* The prefix every Agent Host sandbox setting shares. A `copilot.sandbox` leaf
|
|
89292
89726
|
* at path `a.b` is written to `chat.agent.sandbox.a.b`.
|
|
@@ -89574,7 +90008,7 @@ var CopilotPermissions = class CopilotPermissions extends ToolPermissions {
|
|
|
89574
90008
|
});
|
|
89575
90009
|
}
|
|
89576
90010
|
const defaultPermissionMode = config.copilot?.defaultPermissionMode;
|
|
89577
|
-
if (defaultPermissionMode !== void 0) patch[DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE_KEY] = defaultPermissionMode;
|
|
90011
|
+
if (defaultPermissionMode !== void 0) patch[DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE_KEY$1] = defaultPermissionMode;
|
|
89578
90012
|
const sandbox = config.copilot?.sandbox;
|
|
89579
90013
|
if (sandbox !== void 0) {
|
|
89580
90014
|
Object.assign(patch, buildSandboxPatch({
|
|
@@ -89630,7 +90064,7 @@ var CopilotPermissions = class CopilotPermissions extends ToolPermissions {
|
|
|
89630
90064
|
for (const [pattern, flag] of Object.entries(autoApprove)) rules[pattern] = flag ? "allow" : "deny";
|
|
89631
90065
|
if (Object.keys(rules).length > 0) permission[category] = rules;
|
|
89632
90066
|
}
|
|
89633
|
-
const defaultPermissionMode = settings[DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE_KEY];
|
|
90067
|
+
const defaultPermissionMode = settings[DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE_KEY$1];
|
|
89634
90068
|
const sandbox = readSandboxFromSettings(settings);
|
|
89635
90069
|
const copilot = {
|
|
89636
90070
|
...isCopilotDefaultPermissionMode(defaultPermissionMode) && { defaultPermissionMode },
|
|
@@ -89663,6 +90097,16 @@ const WEBFETCH_CATEGORY$1 = "webfetch";
|
|
|
89663
90097
|
/** `~/.copilot/settings.json` and `.github/copilot/settings.json` keys. */
|
|
89664
90098
|
const ALLOWED_URLS_KEY = "allowedUrls";
|
|
89665
90099
|
const DENIED_URLS_KEY = "deniedUrls";
|
|
90100
|
+
/**
|
|
90101
|
+
* `~/.copilot/settings.json` only: the startup permission mode for new
|
|
90102
|
+
* interactive sessions, authored through the `copilotcli.defaultPermissionMode`
|
|
90103
|
+
* override. It is a user setting — the repository settings file does not list
|
|
90104
|
+
* it among its repo-overridable keys.
|
|
90105
|
+
*/
|
|
90106
|
+
const DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE_KEY = "defaultPermissionMode";
|
|
90107
|
+
function isCopilotcliDefaultPermissionMode(value) {
|
|
90108
|
+
return COPILOTCLI_DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODES.some((mode) => mode === value);
|
|
90109
|
+
}
|
|
89666
90110
|
function toUrlList(value) {
|
|
89667
90111
|
if (!Array.isArray(value)) return [];
|
|
89668
90112
|
return value.filter((entry) => typeof entry === "string");
|
|
@@ -89704,6 +90148,13 @@ function splitUrlRules(rules) {
|
|
|
89704
90148
|
* top-level keys in the user `settings.json`, so only documented keys are ever
|
|
89705
90149
|
* emitted there either.)
|
|
89706
90150
|
*
|
|
90151
|
+
* The `copilotcli.defaultPermissionMode` override (`manual` | `assisted` |
|
|
90152
|
+
* `allow-all`) writes the user-scope `defaultPermissionMode` key in global mode
|
|
90153
|
+
* only; in project mode it is skipped with a warning, since the repository
|
|
90154
|
+
* settings file does not accept it. It is patched only when authored, so a mode
|
|
90155
|
+
* the user picked through `/settings` otherwise survives. Writing `allow-all`
|
|
90156
|
+
* warns, because it makes new sessions skip every approval prompt.
|
|
90157
|
+
*
|
|
89707
90158
|
* @see https://docs.github.com/en/copilot/reference/copilot-cli-reference/cli-config-dir-reference
|
|
89708
90159
|
* @see https://github.com/github/copilot-cli/blob/main/changelog.md
|
|
89709
90160
|
*/
|
|
@@ -89746,7 +90197,8 @@ var CopilotcliPermissions = class CopilotcliPermissions extends ToolPermissions
|
|
|
89746
90197
|
const paths = CopilotcliPermissions.getSettablePaths({ global });
|
|
89747
90198
|
const filePath = (0, node_path.join)(outputRoot, paths.relativeDirPath, paths.relativeFilePath);
|
|
89748
90199
|
const existingContent = await readFileContentOrNull(filePath) ?? "{}";
|
|
89749
|
-
const
|
|
90200
|
+
const config = rulesyncPermissions.getJson();
|
|
90201
|
+
const rules = config.permission[WEBFETCH_CATEGORY$1];
|
|
89750
90202
|
const patch = {};
|
|
89751
90203
|
if (rules !== void 0) {
|
|
89752
90204
|
const { allowedUrls, deniedUrls } = splitUrlRules(rules);
|
|
@@ -89754,6 +90206,13 @@ var CopilotcliPermissions = class CopilotcliPermissions extends ToolPermissions
|
|
|
89754
90206
|
if (global) patch[ALLOWED_URLS_KEY] = allowedUrls.length > 0 ? allowedUrls : void 0;
|
|
89755
90207
|
else if (allowedUrls.length > 0) logger?.warn(`Copilot CLI permissions: dropping ${allowedUrls.length} "webfetch" allow rule(s) at project scope — ${(0, node_path.join)(paths.relativeDirPath, paths.relativeFilePath)} does not accept "${ALLOWED_URLS_KEY}" (repository settings may only add denials). Author allow rules in global scope (\`--global\`) instead.`);
|
|
89756
90208
|
}
|
|
90209
|
+
const defaultPermissionMode = config.copilotcli?.defaultPermissionMode;
|
|
90210
|
+
if (defaultPermissionMode !== void 0) {
|
|
90211
|
+
if (global) {
|
|
90212
|
+
patch[DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE_KEY] = defaultPermissionMode;
|
|
90213
|
+
if (defaultPermissionMode === "allow-all") logger?.warn(`Copilot CLI permissions: writing "${DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE_KEY}": "allow-all" to ${(0, node_path.join)(paths.relativeDirPath, paths.relativeFilePath)} — new interactive sessions will start with every tool, path and URL approved without prompting (equivalent to \`--allow-all\`). Deny rules and enterprise policy still apply.`);
|
|
90214
|
+
} else logger?.warn(`Copilot CLI permissions: skipping "copilotcli.${DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE_KEY}" at project scope — ${(0, node_path.join)(paths.relativeDirPath, paths.relativeFilePath)} does not accept "${DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE_KEY}" (it is a user setting). Author it in global scope (\`--global\`) instead.`);
|
|
90215
|
+
}
|
|
89757
90216
|
return new CopilotcliPermissions({
|
|
89758
90217
|
outputRoot,
|
|
89759
90218
|
relativeDirPath: paths.relativeDirPath,
|
|
@@ -89775,7 +90234,11 @@ var CopilotcliPermissions = class CopilotcliPermissions extends ToolPermissions
|
|
|
89775
90234
|
for (const pattern of toUrlList(settings[DENIED_URLS_KEY])) rules[pattern] = "deny";
|
|
89776
90235
|
if (this.global) for (const pattern of toUrlList(settings[ALLOWED_URLS_KEY])) rules[pattern] ??= "allow";
|
|
89777
90236
|
const permission = Object.keys(rules).length > 0 ? { [WEBFETCH_CATEGORY$1]: rules } : {};
|
|
89778
|
-
|
|
90237
|
+
const defaultPermissionMode = this.global ? settings[DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE_KEY] : void 0;
|
|
90238
|
+
return this.toRulesyncPermissionsDefault({ fileContent: JSON.stringify({
|
|
90239
|
+
permission,
|
|
90240
|
+
...isCopilotcliDefaultPermissionMode(defaultPermissionMode) && { copilotcli: { defaultPermissionMode } }
|
|
90241
|
+
}, null, 2) });
|
|
89779
90242
|
}
|
|
89780
90243
|
parseSettings() {
|
|
89781
90244
|
const relativePath = (0, node_path.join)(this.getRelativeDirPath(), this.getRelativeFilePath());
|
|
@@ -95280,6 +95743,7 @@ var MimocodePermissions = class extends OpencodePermissions {
|
|
|
95280
95743
|
// src/features/permissions/omp-permissions.ts
|
|
95281
95744
|
const CATCH_ALL_PATTERN$5 = "*";
|
|
95282
95745
|
const APPROVAL_MODE_KEY = "approvalMode";
|
|
95746
|
+
const RESTRICTED_FOLDERS_KEY = "restrictedFolders";
|
|
95283
95747
|
const ACTION_TO_OMP_APPROVAL = {
|
|
95284
95748
|
allow: "allow",
|
|
95285
95749
|
ask: "prompt",
|
|
@@ -95318,9 +95782,9 @@ const MANAGED_OMP_TOOLS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
|
|
|
95318
95782
|
*
|
|
95319
95783
|
* - `tools.approval.<tool>: allow | prompt | deny` is a per-tool policy honored
|
|
95320
95784
|
* in every approval mode. A category's catch-all `*` rule maps here
|
|
95321
|
-
* (`ask` → `prompt`).
|
|
95322
|
-
* with pattern-specific rules collapses to one action (deny > ask >
|
|
95323
|
-
* an implicit `ask` when there is no catch-all) and a warning.
|
|
95785
|
+
* (`ask` → `prompt`). `tools.approval` has no per-path matcher, so a non-bash
|
|
95786
|
+
* category with pattern-specific rules collapses to one action (deny > ask >
|
|
95787
|
+
* allow, with an implicit `ask` when there is no catch-all) and a warning.
|
|
95324
95788
|
* - `bash.patterns: [{ match, approval }]` is an ordered, first-match-wins list
|
|
95325
95789
|
* of command globs (only `*` is a wildcard). Every `bash` rule except a
|
|
95326
95790
|
* catch-all `allow` is written there, ordered deny → prompt → allow so that
|
|
@@ -95337,12 +95801,15 @@ const MANAGED_OMP_TOOLS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
|
|
|
95337
95801
|
*
|
|
95338
95802
|
* The `omp.approvalMode` override writes `tools.approvalMode` (`always-ask`,
|
|
95339
95803
|
* `always-ask-cached`, `write` or `yolo`); without it the key is left as it is in the file, and on
|
|
95340
|
-
* import a recognized value is read back into the override.
|
|
95804
|
+
* import a recognized value is read back into the override. Likewise the
|
|
95805
|
+
* `omp.restrictedFolders` override writes `tools.restrictedFolders` (folders
|
|
95806
|
+
* where every action prompts in every approval mode, `yolo` included), is left
|
|
95807
|
+
* alone when absent, and is read back on import.
|
|
95341
95808
|
*
|
|
95342
95809
|
* `config.yml` carries every other oh-my-pi setting, so only `tools.approval`
|
|
95343
95810
|
* (the keys rulesync manages), `bash.patterns` and an authored
|
|
95344
|
-
* `tools.approvalMode` are rewritten; sibling
|
|
95345
|
-
* kept, and the file is never deleted.
|
|
95811
|
+
* `tools.approvalMode` or `tools.restrictedFolders` are rewritten; sibling
|
|
95812
|
+
* keys such as `bash.enabled` are kept, and the file is never deleted.
|
|
95346
95813
|
*
|
|
95347
95814
|
* @see https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi/blob/main/docs/settings.md
|
|
95348
95815
|
* @see https://github.com/can1357/oh-my-pi/blob/main/docs/approval-mode.md
|
|
@@ -95391,6 +95858,7 @@ var OmpPermissions = class OmpPermissions extends ToolPermissions {
|
|
|
95391
95858
|
logger
|
|
95392
95859
|
});
|
|
95393
95860
|
const approvalMode = config.omp?.approvalMode;
|
|
95861
|
+
const restrictedFolders = config.omp?.restrictedFolders;
|
|
95394
95862
|
const existingTools = isRecord(existing.tools) ? existing.tools : {};
|
|
95395
95863
|
const nextApproval = {
|
|
95396
95864
|
...isRecord(existingTools.approval) ? Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(existingTools.approval).filter(([tool]) => !MANAGED_OMP_TOOLS.has(tool) && !Object.hasOwn(approval, tool)).map(([tool, value]) => [tool, raisedApproval(value, floor)])) : {},
|
|
@@ -95398,6 +95866,7 @@ var OmpPermissions = class OmpPermissions extends ToolPermissions {
|
|
|
95398
95866
|
};
|
|
95399
95867
|
const toolsSiblings = withoutKey(existingTools, "approval");
|
|
95400
95868
|
if (approvalMode !== void 0) toolsSiblings[APPROVAL_MODE_KEY] = approvalMode;
|
|
95869
|
+
if (restrictedFolders !== void 0) toolsSiblings[RESTRICTED_FOLDERS_KEY] = restrictedFolders;
|
|
95401
95870
|
const nextTools = Object.keys(nextApproval).length > 0 ? {
|
|
95402
95871
|
...toolsSiblings,
|
|
95403
95872
|
approval: nextApproval
|
|
@@ -95648,11 +96117,26 @@ function convertOmpToRulesync(config) {
|
|
|
95648
96117
|
}
|
|
95649
96118
|
if (Object.keys(bashRules).length > 0) permission.bash = bashRules;
|
|
95650
96119
|
const approvalMode = tools[APPROVAL_MODE_KEY];
|
|
96120
|
+
const restrictedFolders = importRestrictedFolders(tools[RESTRICTED_FOLDERS_KEY]);
|
|
96121
|
+
const omp = {
|
|
96122
|
+
...isOmpApprovalMode(approvalMode) && { approvalMode },
|
|
96123
|
+
...restrictedFolders !== void 0 && { restrictedFolders }
|
|
96124
|
+
};
|
|
95651
96125
|
return {
|
|
95652
96126
|
permission,
|
|
95653
|
-
...
|
|
96127
|
+
...Object.keys(omp).length > 0 && { omp }
|
|
95654
96128
|
};
|
|
95655
96129
|
}
|
|
96130
|
+
/**
|
|
96131
|
+
* `tools.restrictedFolders` as the override list: its string entries, or
|
|
96132
|
+
* `undefined` when it is unset or no entry survives (so a list of non-strings
|
|
96133
|
+
* is not imported as `[]` and then rewritten as an empty list).
|
|
96134
|
+
*/
|
|
96135
|
+
function importRestrictedFolders(value) {
|
|
96136
|
+
if (!Array.isArray(value)) return;
|
|
96137
|
+
const folders = value.filter((entry) => typeof entry === "string");
|
|
96138
|
+
return folders.length === 0 && value.length > 0 ? void 0 : folders;
|
|
96139
|
+
}
|
|
95656
96140
|
function isOmpApprovalMode(value) {
|
|
95657
96141
|
return OMP_APPROVAL_MODES.some((mode) => mode === value);
|
|
95658
96142
|
}
|
|
@@ -100749,19 +101233,31 @@ const CANONICAL_TO_VIBE_TOOL_NAMES = {
|
|
|
100749
101233
|
};
|
|
100750
101234
|
/**
|
|
100751
101235
|
* The tables earlier rulesync versions wrote for canonical categories that
|
|
100752
|
-
* Vibe 3.x
|
|
100753
|
-
* effect")
|
|
100754
|
-
* `agents
|
|
101236
|
+
* Vibe 3.x does not read: `[tools.grep]` (Vibe warns that it "has no
|
|
101237
|
+
* effect"), `[tools.task]` for the subagent tool v3.0.0 renamed to
|
|
101238
|
+
* `agents.*`, and `[tools.external_directory]` — Vibe has no such tool, and
|
|
101239
|
+
* its unused-settings check skips unknown tool names as custom/MCP tools, so
|
|
101240
|
+
* that deny was silently inert. A regenerate that configures the category removes them — and
|
|
100755
101241
|
* the matching `disabled_tools` entry — instead of leaving an inert table.
|
|
100756
101242
|
* Import still reads them (see {@link VIBE_TO_CANONICAL_TOOL_NAMES}), so a
|
|
100757
101243
|
* Vibe 2.x config is lifted into the canonical categories rather than lost.
|
|
100758
101244
|
*/
|
|
100759
101245
|
const VIBE_RETIRED_TOOL_TABLES = {
|
|
100760
101246
|
grep: "grep",
|
|
100761
|
-
agent: "task"
|
|
101247
|
+
agent: "task",
|
|
101248
|
+
external_directory: "external_directory"
|
|
100762
101249
|
};
|
|
100763
101250
|
/** The canonical category Vibe's `enable_subagents` switch expresses. */
|
|
100764
101251
|
const VIBE_SUBAGENT_CATEGORY = "agent";
|
|
101252
|
+
/** The canonical category Vibe's top-level `outside_workdir` setting expresses. */
|
|
101253
|
+
const VIBE_OUTSIDE_WORKDIR_CATEGORY = "external_directory";
|
|
101254
|
+
/**
|
|
101255
|
+
* The values of Vibe's `outside_workdir` (v3.0.3+). There is no allow value:
|
|
101256
|
+
* access outside the working directory is granted per path through a tool's
|
|
101257
|
+
* `allowlist` (`vibe-path:...`) or `--add-dir`.
|
|
101258
|
+
* @see https://github.com/mistralai/mistral-vibe/blob/v3.0.3/README.md
|
|
101259
|
+
*/
|
|
101260
|
+
const VIBE_OUTSIDE_WORKDIR_VALUES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["ask", "deny"]);
|
|
100765
101261
|
const VIBE_TO_CANONICAL_TOOL_NAMES = {
|
|
100766
101262
|
bash: "bash",
|
|
100767
101263
|
read_file: "read",
|
|
@@ -100837,7 +101333,8 @@ const CANONICAL_PERMISSION_CATEGORIES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
|
|
|
100837
101333
|
"grep",
|
|
100838
101334
|
"glob",
|
|
100839
101335
|
"notebookedit",
|
|
100840
|
-
"agent"
|
|
101336
|
+
"agent",
|
|
101337
|
+
"external_directory"
|
|
100841
101338
|
]);
|
|
100842
101339
|
var VibePermissions = class VibePermissions extends ToolPermissions {
|
|
100843
101340
|
toml;
|
|
@@ -100918,7 +101415,11 @@ var VibePermissions = class VibePermissions extends ToolPermissions {
|
|
|
100918
101415
|
rules: permission[VIBE_SUBAGENT_CATEGORY],
|
|
100919
101416
|
logger
|
|
100920
101417
|
});
|
|
100921
|
-
const
|
|
101418
|
+
const outsideWorkdirPatch = resolveOutsideWorkdirPatch({
|
|
101419
|
+
rules: permission[VIBE_OUTSIDE_WORKDIR_CATEGORY],
|
|
101420
|
+
logger
|
|
101421
|
+
});
|
|
101422
|
+
const tableCategories = Object.entries(permission).filter(([category]) => category !== VIBE_SUBAGENT_CATEGORY && category !== VIBE_OUTSIDE_WORKDIR_CATEGORY);
|
|
100922
101423
|
for (const [category, rules] of tableCategories) {
|
|
100923
101424
|
const vibeToolNames = resolveNames(category);
|
|
100924
101425
|
if (vibeToolNames === void 0) {
|
|
@@ -100992,7 +101493,8 @@ var VibePermissions = class VibePermissions extends ToolPermissions {
|
|
|
100992
101493
|
enabledTools
|
|
100993
101494
|
}),
|
|
100994
101495
|
disabled_tools: disabledTools.size > 0 ? [...disabledTools].toSorted() : void 0,
|
|
100995
|
-
...enableSubagentsPatch
|
|
101496
|
+
...enableSubagentsPatch,
|
|
101497
|
+
...outsideWorkdirPatch
|
|
100996
101498
|
},
|
|
100997
101499
|
filePath
|
|
100998
101500
|
}),
|
|
@@ -101036,6 +101538,8 @@ var VibePermissions = class VibePermissions extends ToolPermissions {
|
|
|
101036
101538
|
}
|
|
101037
101539
|
for (const category of silencedCategories) ensurePermission(permission, category)["*"] = "deny";
|
|
101038
101540
|
if (this.toml.enable_subagents === false) ensurePermission(permission, VIBE_SUBAGENT_CATEGORY)["*"] = "deny";
|
|
101541
|
+
const outsideWorkdir = this.toml.outside_workdir;
|
|
101542
|
+
if (typeof outsideWorkdir === "string" && VIBE_OUTSIDE_WORKDIR_VALUES.has(outsideWorkdir)) ensurePermission(permission, VIBE_OUTSIDE_WORKDIR_CATEGORY)["*"] = outsideWorkdir === "deny" ? "deny" : "ask";
|
|
101039
101543
|
warnOnUnresolvableDisabledTools({
|
|
101040
101544
|
entries: disabledToolEntries,
|
|
101041
101545
|
tools: this.toml.tools
|
|
@@ -101112,7 +101616,7 @@ function retireLegacyToolTables({ permission, tools, disabledTools, logger }) {
|
|
|
101112
101616
|
}
|
|
101113
101617
|
if (disabledTools.delete(legacyToolName)) removed.push(`disabled_tools entry '${legacyToolName}'`);
|
|
101114
101618
|
}
|
|
101115
|
-
if (removed.length > 0) logger?.warn(`Removed ${removed.join(", ")} from the Vibe config: Vibe 3.x
|
|
101619
|
+
if (removed.length > 0) logger?.warn(`Removed ${removed.join(", ")} from the Vibe config: Vibe 3.x does not read [tools.grep], the former 'task' subagent tool or an 'external_directory' tool (the 'external_directory' category is written to outside_workdir instead), so those entries had no effect.`);
|
|
101116
101620
|
}
|
|
101117
101621
|
/**
|
|
101118
101622
|
* Report the rules of a category that has no Vibe tool table. `grep` gets its
|
|
@@ -101148,6 +101652,30 @@ function resolveEnableSubagentsPatch({ rules, logger }) {
|
|
|
101148
101652
|
return { enable_subagents: action === "deny" ? false : void 0 };
|
|
101149
101653
|
}
|
|
101150
101654
|
/**
|
|
101655
|
+
* Translate the canonical `external_directory` category into Vibe's top-level
|
|
101656
|
+
* `outside_workdir` setting (v3.0.3+), which decides whether a file or shell
|
|
101657
|
+
* tool call reaching outside the working directory prompts (`"ask"`, the
|
|
101658
|
+
* default) or is refused with a tool error (`"deny"`). A `*` deny or ask writes
|
|
101659
|
+
* that value; a `*` allow has no Vibe value, so it is warned about and the key
|
|
101660
|
+
* is removed, leaving Vibe's default prompt. Without a `*` rule the key is left
|
|
101661
|
+
* as the file has it. Pattern rules are skipped with a warning: path grants go
|
|
101662
|
+
* in a tool's `allowlist` (`vibe-path:...`) instead.
|
|
101663
|
+
* @see https://github.com/mistralai/mistral-vibe/blob/v3.0.3/README.md
|
|
101664
|
+
* @see https://github.com/mistralai/mistral-vibe/blob/v3.0.3/vibe/app_server/_unified_permissions.py
|
|
101665
|
+
*/
|
|
101666
|
+
function resolveOutsideWorkdirPatch({ rules, logger }) {
|
|
101667
|
+
if (rules === void 0) return {};
|
|
101668
|
+
const patternCount = Object.keys(rules).filter((pattern) => pattern !== "*").length;
|
|
101669
|
+
if (patternCount > 0) logger?.warn(`Vibe's outside_workdir applies to every path outside the working directory; skipping ${patternCount} pattern rule(s) of the '${VIBE_OUTSIDE_WORKDIR_CATEGORY}' category. Grant a path through a tool's allowlist ("vibe-path:...") in the Vibe config instead.`);
|
|
101670
|
+
const action = rules["*"];
|
|
101671
|
+
if (action === void 0) return {};
|
|
101672
|
+
if (action === "allow") {
|
|
101673
|
+
logger?.warn(`Vibe's outside_workdir only takes "ask" or "deny"; the '${VIBE_OUTSIDE_WORKDIR_CATEGORY}' category's "*": "allow" leaves Vibe's default, which prompts before reaching outside the working directory.`);
|
|
101674
|
+
return { outside_workdir: void 0 };
|
|
101675
|
+
}
|
|
101676
|
+
return { outside_workdir: action };
|
|
101677
|
+
}
|
|
101678
|
+
/**
|
|
101151
101679
|
* Apply the Vibe-scoped override's per-tool `sensitive_patterns` (patterns that
|
|
101152
101680
|
* escalate to ASK even when the base permission is ALWAYS). rulesync owns this
|
|
101153
101681
|
* list for any category the override names: a present list is set, an empty
|