ruflo 3.10.46 → 3.11.0

package/src/ruvocal/.claude-flow/logs/headless/audit_1777950042278_jvj5xq_result.log

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+[2026-05-05T03:01:38.241Z] RESULT
+============================================================
+{
+  "success": true,
+  "output": "# Security Vulnerability Analysis Report\n\n```json\n{\n  \"vulnerabilities\": [\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"high\",\n      \"file\": \"adminToken.js\",\n      \"line\": 5,\n      \"description\": \"Admin token generated as UUID fallback and stored in plaintext. Tokens are auto-generated if not configured, reducing entropy. Token reset after validation creates timing window for race conditions.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"high\",\n      \"file\": \"adminToken.js\",\n      \"line\": 17,\n      \"description\": \"No rate limiting on token validation attempts. Attackers can brute-force the random UUID token without consequence.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"high\",\n      \"file\": \"apiToken.js\",\n      \"line\": 6,\n      \"description\": \"API keys (OPENAI_API_KEY, HF_TOKEN) exposed directly in plaintext. If this function's output is logged, cached, or exposed via error messages, credentials are compromised.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"high\",\n      \"file\": \"auth.js\",\n      \"line\": 88,\n      \"description\": \"OAuth tokens stored in plaintext in MongoDB. If database is compromised, all user tokens are exposed without encryption. No evidence of token encryption at rest.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"auth.js\",\n      \"line\": 43,\n      \"description\": \"OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET and OPENID_CLIENT_ID stored in plaintext configuration. Should use environment-specific secure vaults.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"auth.js\",\n      \"line\": 48,\n      \"description\": \"Insecure cookie configuration allowed via ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES flag. Permits SameSite=lax and Secure=false, vulnerable to CSRF and man-in-the-middle attacks.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"APIClient.js\",\n      \"line\": 25,\n      \"description\": \"Error responses returned directly to client without sanitization. Could expose sensitive backend information, database errors, or internal paths.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"APIClient.js\",\n      \"line\": 17,\n      \"description\": \"No request timeout configured. Allows slowloris and resource exhaustion attacks. Missing Content-Type validation for responses.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"medium\",\n      \"file\": \"adminToken.js\",\n      \"line\": 27,\n      \"description\": \"Admin token displayed in console logs (logger.info). Logs may be persisted, indexed, or exposed in error tracking systems.\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"severity\": \"low\",\n      \"file\": \"PublicConfig.svelte.js\",\n      \"line\": 22,\n      \"description\": \"Public configuration accessible via Proxy without input validation. Ensure no secrets are included in PUBLIC_* environment variables.\"\n    }\n  ],\n  \"riskScore\": 72,\n  \"recommendations\": [\n    \"CRITICAL: Implement token hashing using bcrypt/argon2. Never store plaintext API keys, OAuth tokens, or admin tokens. Hash admin tokens and store hash in database.\",\n    \"CRITICAL: Move OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET and API_KEY access to server-only code. Implement secure key management (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, or similar).\",\n    \"CRITICAL: Enable HTTPS-only cookies: set Secure=true and SameSite=strict always. Remove ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES flag or restrict to development only.\",\n    \"HIGH: Implement rate limiting on token validation endpoints (adminToken.checkToken). Use exponential backoff and temporary account lockouts after N failed attempts.\",\n    \"HIGH: Encrypt sensitive data at rest in MongoDB using field-level encryption. Use AES-256-GCM for tokens and credentials.\",\n    \"HIGH: Add CSRF token validation to all state-changing requests (POST, PATCH, DELETE). Validate Origin and Referer headers.\",\n    \"MEDIUM: Sanitize error responses before sending to client. Return generic messages (e.g., 'Authentication failed') instead of specific errors ('Invalid token' or 'User not found').\",\n    \"MEDIUM: Add request timeout to fetch calls: `signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000)` in APIClient.js. Prevent resource exhaustion.\",\n    \"MEDIUM: Implement Content Security Policy headers to restrict SVG execution and prevent XSS via embedded scripts in SVG icons.\",\n    \"MEDIUM: Add audit logging for sensitive operations (admin logins, token refreshes). Log to immutable append-only storage (syslog, CloudWatch, etc.).\",\n    \"MEDIUM: Implement automatic session timeout and invalidation for expired tokens. Don't allow indefinite token refresh cycles.\",\n    \"LOW: Use HTTP-only cookies for session IDs. Prevent JavaScript access via `httpOnly: true` (already implemented, but verify it's consistent).\",\n    \"LOW: Validate all OpenID configuration inputs (CLIENT_ID, PROVIDER_URL). Prevent SSRF and config injection attacks.\",\n    \"LOW: Add security headers: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY, Strict-Transport-Security, X-XSS-Protection.\"\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n## Summary\n\n**Risk Level**: HIGH (72/100)\n\nThe codebase has **critical authentication and token management vulnerabilities**:\n\n1. **Plaintext Token Storage** — Admin tokens, API keys, and OAuth tokens stored without encryption\n2. **No Rate Limiting** — Admin token validation can be brute-forced\n3. **Credentials in Config** — OpenID secrets and API keys in environment variables without secure vaults\n4. **Insecure Cookies** — Allow non-HTTPS, non-strict SameSite mode\n5. **Information Disclosure** — Error messages expose backend details\n\n**Immediate Actions Required**:\n- Hash all tokens (bcrypt/argon2)\n- Implement rate limiting on authentication endpoints\n- Use HTTPS-only, SameSite=strict cookies\n- Move secrets to secure vaults\n- Encrypt tokens in MongoDB\n",
+  "parsedOutput": {
+    "vulnerabilities": [
+      {
+        "severity": "high",
+        "file": "adminToken.js",
+        "line": 5,
+        "description": "Admin token generated as UUID fallback and stored in plaintext. Tokens are auto-generated if not configured, reducing entropy. Token reset after validation creates timing window for race conditions."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "high",
+        "file": "adminToken.js",
+        "line": 17,
+        "description": "No rate limiting on token validation attempts. Attackers can brute-force the random UUID token without consequence."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "high",
+        "file": "apiToken.js",
+        "line": 6,
+        "description": "API keys (OPENAI_API_KEY, HF_TOKEN) exposed directly in plaintext. If this function's output is logged, cached, or exposed via error messages, credentials are compromised."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "high",
+        "file": "auth.js",
+        "line": 88,
+        "description": "OAuth tokens stored in plaintext in MongoDB. If database is compromised, all user tokens are exposed without encryption. No evidence of token encryption at rest."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "file": "auth.js",
+        "line": 43,
+        "description": "OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET and OPENID_CLIENT_ID stored in plaintext configuration. Should use environment-specific secure vaults."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "file": "auth.js",
+        "line": 48,
+        "description": "Insecure cookie configuration allowed via ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES flag. Permits SameSite=lax and Secure=false, vulnerable to CSRF and man-in-the-middle attacks."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "file": "APIClient.js",
+        "line": 25,
+        "description": "Error responses returned directly to client without sanitization. Could expose sensitive backend information, database errors, or internal paths."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "file": "APIClient.js",
+        "line": 17,
+        "description": "No request timeout configured. Allows slowloris and resource exhaustion attacks. Missing Content-Type validation for responses."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "medium",
+        "file": "adminToken.js",
+        "line": 27,
+        "description": "Admin token displayed in console logs (logger.info). Logs may be persisted, indexed, or exposed in error tracking systems."
+      },
+      {
+        "severity": "low",
+        "file": "PublicConfig.svelte.js",
+        "line": 22,
+        "description": "Public configuration accessible via Proxy without input validation. Ensure no secrets are included in PUBLIC_* environment variables."
+      }
+    ],
+    "riskScore": 72,
+    "recommendations": [
+      "CRITICAL: Implement token hashing using bcrypt/argon2. Never store plaintext API keys, OAuth tokens, or admin tokens. Hash admin tokens and store hash in database.",
+      "CRITICAL: Move OPENID_CLIENT_SECRET and API_KEY access to server-only code. Implement secure key management (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, or similar).",
+      "CRITICAL: Enable HTTPS-only cookies: set Secure=true and SameSite=strict always. Remove ALLOW_INSECURE_COOKIES flag or restrict to development only.",
+      "HIGH: Implement rate limiting on token validation endpoints (adminToken.checkToken). Use exponential backoff and temporary account lockouts after N failed attempts.",
+      "HIGH: Encrypt sensitive data at rest in MongoDB using field-level encryption. Use AES-256-GCM for tokens and credentials.",
+      "HIGH: Add CSRF token validation to all state-changing requests (POST, PATCH, DELETE). Validate Origin and Referer headers.",
+      "MEDIUM: Sanitize error responses before sending to client. Return generic messages (e.g., 'Authentication failed') instead of specific errors ('Invalid token' or 'User not found').",
+      "MEDIUM: Add request timeout to fetch calls: `signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000)` in APIClient.js. Prevent resource exhaustion.",
+      "MEDIUM: Implement Content Security Policy headers to restrict SVG execution and prevent XSS via embedded scripts in SVG icons.",
+      "MEDIUM: Add audit logging for sensitive operations (admin logins, token refreshes). Log to immutable append-only storage (syslog, CloudWatch, etc.).",
+      "MEDIUM: Implement automatic session timeout and invalidation for expired tokens. Don't allow indefinite token refresh cycles.",
+      "LOW: Use HTTP-only cookies for session IDs. Prevent JavaScript access via `httpOnly: true` (already implemented, but verify it's consistent).",
+      "LOW: Validate all OpenID configuration inputs (CLIENT_ID, PROVIDER_URL). Prevent SSRF and config injection attacks.",
+      "LOW: Add security headers: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY, Strict-Transport-Security, X-XSS-Protection."
+    ]
+  },
+  "durationMs": 55963,
+  "model": "haiku",
+  "sandboxMode": "strict",
+  "workerType": "audit",
+  "timestamp": "2026-05-05T03:01:38.241Z",
+  "executionId": "audit_1777950042278_jvj5xq"
+}