residoo 0.8.4 → 0.8.5

package/README.md

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ while losing rows, then fixed in public against the classes it was losing
 
 ## What it does
 
-- Scans your local AI-agent session transcripts for 53 high-confidence
+- Scans your local AI-agent session transcripts for 56 high-confidence
   secret patterns: cloud provider keys, private key blocks, OAuth/API
   tokens, database connection strings, and more. See
   [`src/patterns.js`](src/patterns.js).

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "residoo",
-  "version": "0.8.4",
+  "version": "0.8.5",
   "description": "Find secrets leaking through your AI coding agent's session history. Zero network calls in the scan path, zero dependencies.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "author": "CloudRoam (https://cloudroam.io)",

package/src/patterns.js

@@ -58,6 +58,34 @@ const PATTERNS = [
   // unlike a short/generic prefix where that same generosity would matter.
   { id: "stripe_webhook_secret", label: "Stripe webhook signing secret", confidence: "high",
     re: /\bwhsec_[A-Za-z0-9]{24,64}\b/g },
+  // Azure AD (Entra ID) client secret. Found missing by cross-checking
+  // gitleaks' own open-issue tracker (gitleaks/gitleaks#1687), which
+  // asked for Azure coverage generally -- gitleaks itself already has a
+  // rule (id "azure-ad-client-secret" in its own gitleaks.toml), so this
+  // is adapted directly from that battle-tested pattern rather than
+  // designed from scratch: 2-4 chars, one digit, the literal "Q~"
+  // marker, then 28-36 more chars. No capture group (unlike gitleaks'
+  // Go regex), to match every other rule in this file using the whole
+  // match as the value; zero-width lookaround used instead of gitleaks'
+  // literal delimiter character classes for the same reason -- the
+  // charset includes non-word characters (~ .) that a plain \b boundary
+  // can't reliably bound. Azure Storage Account keys were investigated
+  // and NOT added: they're a bare, unprefixed base64 blob (~88 chars,
+  // confirmed via learn.microsoft.com), the same unsafe generic shape
+  // already excluded for Weights & Biases' classic key format.
+  { id: "azure_ad_client_secret", label: "Azure AD (Entra ID) client secret", confidence: "high",
+    re: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9_.~-])[A-Za-z0-9_.~]{2,4}\dQ~[A-Za-z0-9_.~-]{28,36}(?![A-Za-z0-9_.~-])/g },
+  // Tailscale auth key. Found missing via gitleaks/gitleaks#1778 (still
+  // open there too). No fully authoritative current spec found: Tailscale's
+  // own kb/1085/auth-keys page shows an older bare "tskey-<hex>" example,
+  // while more recent third-party usage consistently shows a newer
+  // "tskey-auth-<id>-<secret>" two-segment form -- genuine format
+  // evolution, not a single confirmed shape. Covers both on the strength
+  // of the "tskey-" prefix alone, which carries negligible false-positive
+  // risk regardless of which era's exact body shape is present, same
+  // reasoning as whsec_ above.
+  { id: "tailscale_auth_key", label: "Tailscale auth key", confidence: "high",
+    re: /\btskey-(?:auth-)?[A-Za-z0-9-]{15,80}\b/g },
   // The negative lookahead keeps this rule mutually exclusive with anthropic_key
   // and openrouter_key below — without it, "sk-ant-..." or "sk-or-v1-..." match
   // BOTH this pattern and the more specific one, and get reported twice under
@@ -284,6 +312,25 @@ const PATTERNS = [
   // than a doc-confirmed exact count.
   { id: "posthog_key", label: "PostHog personal API key", confidence: "high",
     re: /\bphx_[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}\b/g },
+  // Claude Code Remote Control session URL -- not a vendor API key, a URL
+  // that IS a bearer credential: opening it in a browser grants full
+  // read/write/execute access to a live local Claude Code session, no
+  // further auth. Anthropic's own docs (code.claude.com/docs/en/remote-control,
+  // fetched 2026-09-04) confirm this URL is printed directly into the
+  // conversation ("Claude Code also posts the session URL in the
+  // conversation") -- i.e. this genuinely lands in the exact transcripts
+  // this project scans, not a hypothetical risk. Found via a gitleaks
+  // open-issue request (gitleaks/gitleaks#2094) that proposed a
+  // `session_<id>` prefix as "illustrative," unconfirmed. That guess was
+  // checked against this project's own installed `claude` binary (macOS,
+  // `strings /usr/local/bin/claude`) rather than assumed correct: the
+  // literal web-URL template is `` `/code/${sessionId}` `` with NO prefix
+  // at all, and `sessionId:mqH.randomUUID()` confirms the ID is a
+  // standard UUID v4 -- both directly present in the shipped binary's own
+  // strings, not inferred. The gitleaks issue's proposed pattern would
+  // have MISSED every real instance of this URL.
+  { id: "claude_code_remote_control_url", label: "Claude Code Remote Control session URL", confidence: "high",
+    re: /\bclaude\.ai\/code\/[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}\b/g },
   // LangSmith personal access token (lsv2_pt_) / service key (lsv2_sk_).
   // Found missing by cross-checking agentsweep's own open-issue tracker.
   // The first segment (32 hex, UUID-shaped) is consistent across every

package/src/rotation.js

@@ -216,6 +216,32 @@ const ROTATION_GUIDANCE = {
     ],
     revokeNote: "A leaked webhook secret alone can't drain funds or read data -- it only lets an attacker forge fake Stripe-Signature headers to a webhook endpoint that trusts them, so this is a spoofing/logic-bypass risk, not an account-access one. Still worth rolling promptly: it's what stands between a webhook handler and forged events.",
   },
+  // Fetched learn.microsoft.com (2026-09-04), Azure App Registration
+  // secret management docs: steps below are the documented
+  // create-update-verify-delete rotation flow, not guessed.
+  azure_ad_client_secret: {
+    label: "Azure AD (Entra ID) client secret",
+    consolePath: "Microsoft Entra ID > App registrations > [app] > Certificates & secrets",
+    steps: [
+      "Create a new client secret on the same app registration first (New client secret)",
+      "Update whatever used the old one with the new value, and verify it works",
+      "Only then delete the leaked secret (trash icon next to it), to minimize downtime",
+    ],
+    revokeNote: "Deletion is immediate. Prefer create-then-delete over delete-then-create if the app can tolerate two live secrets briefly -- it avoids an outage window for whatever depends on this secret.",
+  },
+  // Fetched tailscale.com/kb/1085/auth-keys (2026-09-04): exact console
+  // path and the important revoke-vs-deauthorize distinction are quoted
+  // from that page, not inferred.
+  tailscale_auth_key: {
+    label: "Tailscale auth key",
+    consolePath: "console.tailscale.com/admin/settings/keys",
+    steps: [
+      "Open the Keys page of the admin console",
+      "Find the key in the table and select Revoke",
+      "If a node already used this key to join your tailnet, also delete that node from the Machines page -- revoking the key alone does not deauthorize nodes already using it",
+    ],
+    revokeNote: "Revoking is immediate for future use of the key, but any node it already authorized stays connected until separately removed from Machines -- the two are not the same action.",
+  },
   // help.openai.com articles 5112595 and 8304786 exist (surfaced by search)
   // but the help center serves HTTP 403 to this project's fetcher, so no URL
   // is shipped: unverifiable end to end fails the bar above.
@@ -785,6 +811,21 @@ const ROTATION_GUIDANCE = {
     ],
     revokeNote: "Deletion is immediate; the key stops authenticating on the next request.",
   },
+  // Not a vendor API key with a console to rotate it in -- a session URL
+  // that IS the credential. Steps below per code.claude.com/docs/en/
+  // remote-control (fetched 2026-09-04): disconnect terminates the URL's
+  // access immediately; there is no separate "revoke" step to perform
+  // afterward the way there is for a leaked API key.
+  claude_code_remote_control_url: {
+    label: "Claude Code Remote Control session URL",
+    consolePath: "the terminal running the session, or claude.ai/code's session list",
+    steps: [
+      "In the terminal running the session, run /remote-control again to disconnect (or use the status panel's disconnect option)",
+      "If you no longer have terminal access, end the local session entirely -- Remote Control access ends with it",
+      "Start a fresh Remote Control session if you still need one; it gets a new, unrelated URL",
+    ],
+    revokeNote: "Disconnecting invalidates the URL immediately -- your local session keeps running in the terminal either way, only the remote-access link is torn down. There is no separate token to also revoke at a vendor console.",
+  },
   // Fetched docs.langchain.com/langsmith/create-account-api-key
   // (2026-09-04): both personal access tokens and service keys are
   // created and managed from the workspace's own API Keys settings page.