residoo 0.3.2 → 0.3.3

package/README.md

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ As a GitHub Action (this repository doubles as a composite action):
 ```yaml
 steps:
   - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-  - uses: dandovdub/residoo@v0.3.0
+  - uses: dandovdub/residoo@v0.3.3
 ```
 
 As a pre-commit hook:
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ As a pre-commit hook:
 ```yaml
 repos:
   - repo: https://github.com/dandovdub/residoo
-    rev: v0.3.0
+    rev: v0.3.3
     hooks:
       - id: residoo
 ```

package/SECURITY.md

@@ -45,8 +45,19 @@ just asserted. See the git history for the actual commands run:
 - **Not vulnerable to regex denial-of-service.** Every pattern checked
   against the nested-quantifier shape behind real, dated CVEs in adjacent
   tooling (e.g. CVE-2026-0621, a ReDoS in Anthropic's own MCP SDK from
-  catastrophic backtracking on an exploded template pattern). Also stress-
-  tested directly against multi-megabyte adversarial inputs.
+  catastrophic backtracking on an exploded template pattern). A second,
+  distinct failure mode was found and fixed during a pre-launch audit: an
+  open-ended quantifier (`{n,}`) matching a multi-megabyte same-charset run
+  can overflow V8's regex engine on stack depth alone, independent of
+  catastrophic backtracking. The raw-match, base64-decode, and split-line
+  passes shared one try/catch at the time, so a crash partway through the
+  rule list could silently skip every rule after it for that line. Every
+  rule's quantifier is now explicitly bounded to its format's real maximum
+  length (a credential shape has a knowable ceiling), each of the three
+  passes has its own try/catch as a second, independent layer, and a
+  regression test asserts a real secret placed immediately after a
+  multi-megabyte adversarial run is still found. Stress-tested directly
+  against multi-megabyte adversarial inputs, including that exact shape.
 - **No supply-chain surface.** Zero runtime dependencies, zero
   pre/post-install lifecycle scripts. Check `package.json` yourself;
   there's nothing to hide behind a `postinstall` hook.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "residoo",
-  "version": "0.3.2",
+  "version": "0.3.3",
   "description": "Find secrets leaking through your AI coding agent's session history. Zero network calls in the scan path, zero dependencies.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "author": "CloudRoam (https://cloudroam.io)",

package/src/patterns.js

@@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ const PATTERNS = [
   { id: "private_key_block", label: "Private key block", confidence: "high",
     re: /-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/g },
   { id: "github_pat", label: "GitHub personal access token", confidence: "high",
-    re: /\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\b/g },
+    re: /\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,255}\b/g },
   { id: "gitlab_pat", label: "GitLab personal access token", confidence: "high",
-    re: /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/g },
+    re: /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,100}\b/g },
   { id: "slack_token", label: "Slack token", confidence: "high",
-    re: /\bxox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]{10,}\b/g },
+    re: /\bxox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]{10,500}\b/g },
   { id: "stripe_key", label: "Stripe API key (live mode)", confidence: "high",
-    re: /\b(sk|rk)_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/g },
+    re: /\b(sk|rk)_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,250}\b/g },
   // The sandbox-mode twin of the rule above, same body charset and the same
   // 20-char floor. Format verified against two production detectors plus the
   // vendor (2026-09-02): gitleaks' stripe-access-token rule matches
@@ -45,34 +45,34 @@ const PATTERNS = [
   // transcript that pastes sk_test today is the same workflow that will
   // paste sk_live at go-live.
   { id: "stripe_test_key", label: "Stripe API key (test mode)", confidence: "high",
-    re: /\b(sk|rk)_test_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/g },
+    re: /\b(sk|rk)_test_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,250}\b/g },
   // The negative lookahead keeps this rule mutually exclusive with anthropic_key
   // and openrouter_key below — without it, "sk-ant-..." or "sk-or-v1-..." match
   // BOTH this pattern and the more specific one, and get reported twice under
   // two different (one wrong) provider labels. Verified: all three regexes
   // independently matched their overlapping synthetic keys before this fix.
   { id: "openai_key", label: "OpenAI API key", confidence: "high",
-    re: /\bsk-(?!ant-|or-)(proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/g },
+    re: /\bsk-(?!ant-|or-)(proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,300}\b/g },
   { id: "anthropic_key", label: "Anthropic API key", confidence: "high",
-    re: /\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/g },
+    re: /\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,300}\b/g },
   { id: "google_api_key", label: "Google / Firebase API key", confidence: "high",
     re: /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/g },
   { id: "npm_token", label: "npm access token", confidence: "high",
     re: /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/g },
   { id: "sendgrid_key", label: "SendGrid API key", confidence: "high",
-    re: /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b/g },
+    re: /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,100}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,100}\b/g },
   { id: "twilio_key", label: "Twilio API key", confidence: "high",
     re: /\bSK[a-f0-9]{32}\b/g },
   { id: "jwt", label: "JWT-shaped token", confidence: "medium",
-    re: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\b/g },
+    re: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,2000}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,20000}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,2000}\b/g },
   { id: "connection_string_with_password", label: "Database connection string with embedded password", confidence: "high",
-    re: /\b(postgres(?:ql)?|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?):\/\/[^\s:@\/]+:[^\s@\/]{3,}@[^\s\/]+/g },
+    re: /\b(postgres(?:ql)?|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?):\/\/[^\s:@\/]{1,255}:[^\s@\/]{3,255}@[^\s\/]{1,255}/g },
   { id: "bearer_header", label: "Authorization: Bearer header with a real-looking token", confidence: "medium",
-    re: /\bauthorization["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']?bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._-]{16,}/gi },
+    re: /\bauthorization["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']?bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._-]{16,1000}/gi },
   { id: "refresh_token_field", label: "refresh_token field", confidence: "medium",
-    re: /"refresh_token"\s*:\s*"[^"\s]{20,}"/gi },
+    re: /"refresh_token"\s*:\s*"[^"\s]{20,4000}"/gi },
   { id: "access_token_field", label: "access_token field", confidence: "medium",
-    re: /"access_token"\s*:\s*"[^"\s]{20,}"/gi },
+    re: /"access_token"\s*:\s*"[^"\s]{20,4000}"/gi },
 
   // ── AI / LLM providers (added: competitive gap-close, see project history) ─
   // Every regex body below was checked against a production, field-tested
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ const PATTERNS = [
   // "pplx-" + a >=40-char body — consistent across independent sources even
   // without one canonical spec page.
   { id: "perplexity_key", label: "Perplexity API key", confidence: "high",
-    re: /\bpplx-[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}\b/g },
+    re: /\bpplx-[A-Za-z0-9]{40,200}\b/g },
   { id: "replicate_token", label: "Replicate API token", confidence: "high",
     re: /\br8_[0-9A-Za-z_-]{37}\b/g },
 
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ const PATTERNS = [
     // Confirmed against 1Password's own developer docs (developer.1password.com
     // -> 1password.dev/service-accounts/security): the token is "ops_" plus a
     // base64-encoded JWT, so it always continues "eyJ" (base64 of `{"`).
-    re: /\bops_eyJ[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{40,}\b/g },
+    re: /\bops_eyJ[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{40,2000}\b/g },
 
   // ── Comms / SaaS ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   { id: "discord_webhook", label: "Discord webhook URL", confidence: "high",
@@ -138,13 +138,13 @@ const PATTERNS = [
   // but Notion has not published an exact body length for it, so its bound
   // below is a floor, not a verified exact count.
   { id: "notion_token", label: "Notion integration token", confidence: "high",
-    re: /\b(?:secret_[A-Za-z0-9]{43}|ntn_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,})\b/g },
+    re: /\b(?:secret_[A-Za-z0-9]{43}|ntn_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,200})\b/g },
   { id: "linear_key", label: "Linear API key", confidence: "high",
     re: /\blin_api_[0-9A-Za-z]{40}\b/g },
   { id: "sentry_token", label: "Sentry auth token", confidence: "high",
     // Covers both current Sentry token shapes: org-scoped (sntrys_, base64
     // JWT-like body) and user-scoped (sntryu_, hex body).
-    re: /\b(?:sntrys_eyJ[A-Za-z0-9+/=_]{100,}|sntryu_[a-f0-9]{64})\b/g },
+    re: /\b(?:sntrys_eyJ[A-Za-z0-9+/=_]{100,4000}|sntryu_[a-f0-9]{64})\b/g },
 ];
 
 /**
@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ const PATTERNS = [
  */
 const NOISY_PATTERNS = [
   { id: "generic_password_assignment", label: "password / pwd assignment", confidence: "low",
-    re: /\b(password|passwd|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*["']?[^\s"']{6,}["']?/gi },
+    re: /\b(password|passwd|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*["']?[^\s"']{6,500}["']?/gi },
   { id: "generic_secret_assignment", label: "generic secret / apikey assignment", confidence: "low",
-    re: /\b(api[_-]?key|secret)\s*[:=]\s*["']?[A-Za-z0-9_\-\/+=]{12,}["']?/gi },
+    re: /\b(api[_-]?key|secret)\s*[:=]\s*["']?[A-Za-z0-9_\-\/+=]{12,500}["']?/gi },
 ];
 
 /**

package/src/scan.js

@@ -290,19 +290,36 @@ async function scan({ sources, includeNoisy = false, includeSuppressed = false,
       // Per-file degradation flag, surfaced at most once so a pathological
       // file produces one visible entry, not thousands.
       let lineMatchFailed = false;
+      // Each pass gets its own try/catch: every rule quantifier is bounded
+      // (see patterns.js) so none of these should throw on adversarial input
+      // any more, but this is the second, independent layer against that
+      // failure mode — a throw in one pass must never suppress the other
+      // two for the same line. Without this, a bug reintroduced in any one
+      // pass silently blinds the other two for that line rather than
+      // degrading loudly on its own. One unmatched line must degrade to a
+      // visible per-file flag, never abort the scan and discard every
+      // finding already collected (same contract as the readLines catch
+      // above).
+      const flagFailed = () => {
+        if (!lineMatchFailed) {
+          lineMatchFailed = true;
+          unreadableFiles.push({ file: safeName(file), reason: "some lines could not be matched" });
+        }
+      };
       for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
         const line = lines[i];
         if (line) {
-          // A rule regex itself can throw on adversarial input: V8's
-          // backtrack stack overflows (RangeError) when an open-ended
-          // quantifier meets a prefix followed by a multi-megabyte
-          // same-charset run — real transcripts contain such lines. One
-          // unmatched line must degrade to a visible per-file flag, never
-          // abort the scan and discard every finding already collected
-          // (same contract as the readLines catch above).
           try {
             matchLine(line, file, relFile, i + 1, mtimeMs);
+          } catch (err) {
+            flagFailed();
+          }
+          try {
             decodeLine(line, file, relFile, i + 1, mtimeMs);
+          } catch (err) {
+            flagFailed();
+          }
+          try {
             const content = contentProjection(line);
             // Boundary join with the previous line (2-way splits only; see
             // decode.js). Both lines must be non-empty so a blank separator
@@ -312,10 +329,7 @@ async function scan({ sources, includeNoisy = false, includeSuppressed = false,
             }
             prevContent = content;
           } catch (err) {
-            if (!lineMatchFailed) {
-              lineMatchFailed = true;
-              unreadableFiles.push({ file: safeName(file), reason: "some lines could not be matched" });
-            }
+            flagFailed();
             prevContent = null;
           }
         } else {