residoo 0.3.1 → 0.3.2

package/package.json

@@ -1,19 +1,45 @@
 {
   "name": "residoo",
-  "version": "0.3.1",
+  "version": "0.3.2",
   "description": "Find secrets leaking through your AI coding agent's session history. Zero network calls in the scan path, zero dependencies.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "author": "CloudRoam (https://cloudroam.io)",
-  "repository": { "type": "git", "url": "git+https://github.com/dandovdub/residoo.git" },
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "git+https://github.com/dandovdub/residoo.git"
+  },
   "homepage": "https://github.com/dandovdub/residoo#readme",
-  "bugs": { "url": "https://github.com/dandovdub/residoo/issues" },
-  "bin": { "residoo": "bin/residoo.js" },
+  "bugs": {
+    "url": "https://github.com/dandovdub/residoo/issues"
+  },
+  "bin": {
+    "residoo": "bin/residoo.js"
+  },
   "main": "src/cli.js",
-  "engines": { "node": ">=18" },
-  "scripts": { "test": "node tests/smoke.js" },
-  "files": ["bin", "src", "README.md", "SECURITY.md", "LICENSE"],
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">=18"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "test": "node tests/smoke.js"
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "bin",
+    "src",
+    "README.md",
+    "SECURITY.md",
+    "LICENSE"
+  ],
   "keywords": [
-    "security", "secrets", "secret-scanning", "ai-agent", "claude-code",
-    "cursor", "copilot", "mcp", "privacy", "cli", "encryption"
+    "security",
+    "secrets",
+    "secret-scanning",
+    "ai-agent",
+    "claude-code",
+    "cursor",
+    "copilot",
+    "mcp",
+    "privacy",
+    "cli",
+    "encryption"
   ]
 }

package/src/decode.js

@@ -49,9 +49,14 @@
 //    is recovered by retrying the decode with ONE edge chunk dropped — but
 //    only one, and only at an edge: junk on both edges, or prose merged into
 //    the middle of a blob, still loses the whole candidate.
-//  - At most B64_MAX_CANDIDATES candidates are decoded per line; a line with
-//    more encoded runs than that is reported by the caller as only partially
-//    checked rather than silently truncated.
+//  - There is deliberately NO per-line candidate cap. Real transcript lines
+//    routinely hold hundreds of decode-sized alnum runs (uuids, hashes,
+//    request ids), so any cap either silently starves a genuine blob
+//    sitting past it or flags nearly every real file as partially checked.
+//    None is needed for cost: each character belongs to at most one
+//    candidate and decoding is a few linear passes, so total work per line
+//    is O(line length) with small constants, and line length is already
+//    bounded by the sources' own file-read caps.
 
 // A run is made of characters that can appear in base64 or base64url:
 // A-Z a-z 0-9 + / = _ - (see isB64Code). Wrap separators between chunks of
@@ -74,7 +79,6 @@ const B64_MIN_CHUNK = 4;
 
 const B64_MIN_CHARS = 24;          // fewer chars cannot hide a real credential
 const B64_MAX_ENCODED = 90000;     // ~64KB decoded ceiling; skip bigger runs
-const B64_MAX_CANDIDATES = 256;    // per line, so a pathological line stays bounded
 const PRINTABLE_MIN = 0.85;        // decoded bytes must be mostly text to rescan
 
 /** JSON whitespace escapes -> the real line breaks they stand for. */
@@ -91,9 +95,10 @@ function normalizeEscapes(line) {
  *
  * Each candidate is returned as its ARRAY of chunks, not pre-joined: the
  * decode step needs the chunk boundaries to retry with an edge chunk dropped
- * (see findDecodedMatches). `truncated` is true when the per-line candidate
- * cap cut the list short, so the caller can surface the partial coverage
- * instead of silently dropping the rest.
+ * (see findDecodedMatches). Candidates shorter than B64_MIN_CHARS joined are
+ * discarded here for free: they can never decode (decodeToText rejects them
+ * by length), and most base64-charset runs on a line are exactly such short
+ * prose words and ids.
  */
 function isB64Code(c) {
   return (c >= 48 && c <= 57) || (c >= 65 && c <= 90) || (c >= 97 && c <= 122) ||
@@ -123,14 +128,13 @@ function splitAtPadding(chunk) {
 
 function b64Candidates(norm) {
   const candidates = []; // array of chunk arrays
-  let truncated = false;
   let current = null;   // chunk array of the candidate in progress
   let runStart = -1;    // start of the b64 run in progress, -1 when not in one
   let gapClean = true;  // gap since the last chunk held only \r \n
   const push = (cand) => {
-    if (candidates.length >= B64_MAX_CANDIDATES) { truncated = true; return false; }
-    candidates.push(cand);
-    return true;
+    let len = 0;
+    for (const c of cand) len += c.length;
+    if (len >= B64_MIN_CHARS) candidates.push(cand);
   };
   const n = norm.length;
   for (let i = 0; i <= n; i++) {
@@ -147,13 +151,13 @@ function b64Candidates(norm) {
         for (let p = 0; p < parts.length; p++) {
           if (p === 0 && current !== null && gapClean) current.push(parts[p]);
           else {
-            if (current !== null && !push(current)) return { candidates, truncated };
+            if (current !== null) push(current);
             current = [parts[p]];
           }
           // A part ending in padding is a complete value: nothing after it —
           // not even across a clean wrap gap — can belong to the same blob.
           if (parts[p].charCodeAt(parts[p].length - 1) === 61) {
-            if (!push(current)) return { candidates, truncated };
+            push(current);
             current = null;
           }
         }
@@ -168,7 +172,7 @@ function b64Candidates(norm) {
     if (c !== -1 && c !== 10 && c !== 13) gapClean = false;
   }
   if (current !== null) push(current);
-  return { candidates, truncated };
+  return candidates;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -211,19 +215,15 @@ function decodeToText(cleaned) {
 /**
  * Find credentials that appear only base64-encoded on one line. `rules` MUST
  * be the high-confidence subset (see LIMITS above). Returns
- * { matches, truncated } where matches is
  * [{ ruleId, label, confidence, value, encoding }] with `value` the DECODED
  * secret (caller redacts), deduped by rule+value so a blob echoed twice on
- * one line (content plus tool-result mirror) is one entry, and `truncated`
- * is true when the per-line candidate cap left runs unchecked (the caller
- * surfaces that as partial coverage, never silently).
+ * one line (content plus tool-result mirror) is one entry.
  */
 function findDecodedMatches(line, rules) {
   const out = [];
   const seen = new Set();
   const norm = normalizeEscapes(line);
-  const { candidates, truncated } = b64Candidates(norm);
-  for (const chunks of candidates) {
+  for (const chunks of b64Candidates(norm)) {
     // A wrap-merged candidate can carry one glued-on neighbor token: a word
     // or filename sitting directly above or below the blob across the wrap
     // newline merges into the candidate and breaks the decode (alignment
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ function findDecodedMatches(line, rules) {
       }
     }
   }
-  return { matches: out, truncated };
+  return out;
 }
 
 // ── Feature 2: split-line boundary join ─────────────────────────────────────

package/src/scan.js

@@ -196,12 +196,9 @@ async function scan({ sources, includeNoisy = false, includeSuppressed = false,
   // was present only encoded on this line. It redacts from the DECODED value
   // (the encoded run is treated as secret material and never appears in the
   // preview), and carries an `encoding` marker the report renders as
-  // "base64-wrapped". Returns true when the per-line candidate cap left
-  // encoded runs on this line unchecked, so the caller can flag the file as
-  // only partially checked instead of staying silent about the gap.
+  // "base64-wrapped".
   const decodeLine = (line, file, relFile, lineNo, mtimeMs) => {
-    const { matches, truncated } = findDecodedMatches(line, highRules);
-    for (const d of matches) {
+    for (const d of findDecodedMatches(line, highRules)) {
       const suppressedReason = suppressionReason(d.value, null);
       if (suppressedReason && !includeSuppressed) {
         suppressedCount++;
@@ -210,7 +207,6 @@ async function scan({ sources, includeNoisy = false, includeSuppressed = false,
       record({ id: d.ruleId, label: d.label }, d.value, relFile, file, lineNo,
         mtimeMs, suppressedReason ? "low" : "high", suppressedReason, { encoding: d.encoding });
     }
-    return truncated;
   };
 
   // Feature 2: split-line boundary join. A finding here means one credential
@@ -291,10 +287,9 @@ async function scan({ sources, includeNoisy = false, includeSuppressed = false,
       // Content projection of the PREVIOUS line, kept so each line is
       // projected once and reused for both pairs it belongs to.
       let prevContent = null;
-      // Per-file degradation flags, each surfaced at most once so a
-      // pathological file produces one visible entry, not thousands.
+      // Per-file degradation flag, surfaced at most once so a pathological
+      // file produces one visible entry, not thousands.
       let lineMatchFailed = false;
-      let decodeTruncated = false;
       for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
         const line = lines[i];
         if (line) {
@@ -307,7 +302,7 @@ async function scan({ sources, includeNoisy = false, includeSuppressed = false,
           // (same contract as the readLines catch above).
           try {
             matchLine(line, file, relFile, i + 1, mtimeMs);
-            decodeTruncated = decodeLine(line, file, relFile, i + 1, mtimeMs) || decodeTruncated;
+            decodeLine(line, file, relFile, i + 1, mtimeMs);
             const content = contentProjection(line);
             // Boundary join with the previous line (2-way splits only; see
             // decode.js). Both lines must be non-empty so a blank separator
@@ -327,9 +322,6 @@ async function scan({ sources, includeNoisy = false, includeSuppressed = false,
           prevContent = null;
         }
       }
-      if (decodeTruncated) {
-        unreadableFiles.push({ file: safeName(file), reason: "some lines held more encoded runs than the per-line bound; checked partially" });
-      }
     }
 
     if (sourceScannedAnything) sourcesScanned.push(source.id());